Tyler v. BC Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 99
Date Issued: April 14, 2026
File(s): CS-006719
Indexed as: Tyler v. BC Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 99
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Suzanne Tyler
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(f)
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
On her own behalf: Suzanne Tyler
Counsel for the Respondent: Alexandra MacCarthy
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Suzanne Tyler filed a human rights complaint on April 20, 2022. She alleges that the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy discriminated against her in the area of employment based on the grounds of race, ancestry, and place of origin, in contravention of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] Ms. Tyler is a Black Canadian with ties to the United States. She is employed as a security analyst in a work unit that is or was part of the Ministry. She says that, between June 2020 and December 2021, work colleagues subjected her to discriminatory harassment and bullying by sharing discriminatory images, making derogatory comments, and creating a hostile work environment for racialized employees. She says she complained about this to her supervisors, but they did not immediately stop the misconduct or discipline the perpetrators.
[3] Ms. Tyler is unionized – the terms and conditions of her employment are set out in a collective agreement. Under the provisions of the collective agreement, she filed two written complaints regarding her allegations of discrimination, which were ultimately referred to expedited arbitration for a final and binding determination by a panel chaired by a labour arbitrator [Arbitration Proceeding]. The arbitration took place in 2024. In advance of the hearing, the Tribunal deferred Ms. Tyler’s human rights complaint pending the resolution of her collective agreement complaints: Tyler v. BC Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy, 2024 BCHRT 1 [Deferral Decision].
[4] The arbitrator issued a decision on February 26, 2025 [Award], substantiating some of Ms. Tyler’s allegations of discrimination. Specifically, the arbitrator determined that her co-workers had discriminated by circulating numerous images depicting negative stereotypes of Black people to her and others, and by joking and speaking in stereotypical Black voices. He also noted that Ms. Tyler’s executive director had used a jail cell background during a “diversity and inclusion” presentation to staff, which was unprofessional and breached the standards of conduct for public service employees.
[5] The arbitrator found that the circumstances of Ms. Tyler’s complaints were “particularly egregious” because some of the misconduct happened after she had already raised issues of racial discrimination and made her collective agreement complaints. The arbitrator determined that Ms. Tyler “was not provided with a discrimination-free workplace, and as a result she suffered injury to dignity.” He stated that her colleagues’ “use of and turning a blind eye to … racist based depictions was a form of bullying and harassment and demonstrative of a lack of foundational understanding of racial discrimination” faced by Ms. Tyler and others. The arbitrator concluded that images circulated by staff “were racist, offensive and inappropriate, and management was aware and took no action to stop it, which in turn served to fuel such behaviour.”
[6] The Ministry says Ms. Tyler’s complaint to the Tribunal is duplicative of the collective agreement complaints that were heard and decided in the Arbitration Proceeding. It applies to dismiss the complaint under ss. 27(1)(f) and (d)(ii) of the Code, arguing that the complaint has already been appropriately dealt with and proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code. I find I can most efficiently decide the Ministry’s application under s. 27(1)(f).
[7] Ms. Tyler wants her complaint to continue forward in the Tribunal’s process. She says no one has apologized for what she went through, and the Ministry has not assured her that action has been taken to prevent it from happening again. She asserts that there is systemic racism in her workplace, which must be exposed, and for which her employer must be held accountable.
[8] I am sorry for what Ms. Tyler has experienced. However, while the allegations in her human rights complaint are very serious, I am satisfied that they were appropriately dealt with in the Arbitration Proceeding. As a result, for the reasons that follow, the complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code.
[9] To make my decision, I have considered all the arguments and evidence filed. In my reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact related to the merits of the complaint.
II DECISION
[10] Section 27(1)(f) gives the Tribunal discretion to dismiss a complaint … where “the substance of the complaint … has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding.” This provision of the Code is the “statutory reflection” of common law doctrines aimed at delivering “to the litigation process principles of finality, the avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, and protection for the integrity of the administration of justice, all in the name of fairness”: British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52 [Figliola] at para. 25; see Ashton v. Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure and another, 2021 BCHRT 27 at para. 6.
[11] At their heart, the common law doctrines reflected in s. 27(1)(f) “exist to prevent unfairness by preventing ‘abuse of the decision-making process’”: Figliola at para. 34. Their “common underlying principles” include that (1) it is in everyone’s interest that the finality of a decision can be relied on, and (2) relitigation of issues previously decided in an appropriate forum can undermine confidence in the fairness of the justice system by creating inconsistent results and unnecessarily duplicative proceedings: Figliola at para. 34.
[12] Section 27(1)(f) does not codify the common law doctrines reflected in it; rather, “it embraces their underlying principles in pursuit of finality, fairness, and the integrity of the justice system by preventing unnecessary inconsistency, multiplicity and delay”: Figliola at para. 36. The Tribunal relies on these underlying principles in its application of s. 27(1)(f):
Relying on these underlying principles leads to the Tribunal asking itself whether there was concurrent jurisdiction to decide human rights issues; whether the previously decided legal issue was essentially the same as what is being complained of to the Tribunal; and whether there was an opportunity for the complainants or their privies to know the case to be met and have the chance to meet it, regardless of how closely the previous process procedurally mirrored the one the Tribunal prefers or uses itself. All of these questions go to determining whether the substance of a complaint has been “appropriately dealt with.” At the end of the day, it is really a question of whether it makes sense to expend public and private resources on the relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute: Figliola at para. 37.
[13] It is settled law that labour arbitrators and the Tribunal have concurrent jurisdiction to decide human rights issues: Sebastian v. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 2019 BCCA 241 at para. 37. The issue in the present dismissal application, then, is whether “the substance” of the allegations in Ms. Tyler’s human rights complaint were “appropriately dealt with” in the Arbitration Proceeding. More specifically, the questions in this dismissal application relate to whether the matters dealt with in the Arbitration Proceeding were “essentially the same” as the allegations now before this Tribunal, and whether those matters were dealt with appropriately within the meaning of s. 27(1)(f).
[14] To answer these questions, I will first identify the allegations in Ms. Tyler’s human rights complaint. I will then consider those allegations in the context of the Arbitration Proceeding that the Ministry says dealt with them.
A. The Allegations
[15] The Tribunal received Ms. Tyler’s human rights complaint on April 20, 2022. The complaint alleges that, between June 2020 and December 2021, work colleagues subjected Ms. Tyler to discriminatory harassment and bullying and created a hostile work environment for racialized employees, which was not immediately addressed by management, in contravention of s. 13 of the Code. Specifically, the complaint alleges that:
a. Throughout the time period of the complaint, co-workers shared GIF images and internet memes in employee group chats and other digital forms of communication, which depicted people of colour in stereotypical, demeaning, and belittling ways [Images Allegation];
b. During a morning meeting on “Juneteenth” (June 19, 2020), which is an annual U.S. holiday celebrating the end of slavery in that country, a co-worker said that they wanted to discuss something controversial, to which another responded, “something like Black Lives Matter?” [Juneteenth Allegation];
c. Co-workers made derogatory comments about people from the United States – in particular, on November 3, 2020, Ms. Tyler’s acting supervisor said “Americans are so stupid” in reference to the upcoming U.S. election [Americans Allegation]; and
d. Ms. Tyler’s acting supervisor called racialized employees “monkeys” – in particular, on March 17, 2021, he referred to two employees of colour as a “bunch of monkeys,” and stated, regarding one of them, that “the monkey couldn’t remember what keys to punch” [Monkeys Allegation].
[16] I will refer to these allegations, collectively, as the Allegations.
[17] The complaint seeks various remedies, including declaratory and cease-and-refrain orders, programs to address the discrimination, compensation for injury to dignity, and compensation for lost wages.
B. Did the Arbitration Proceeding appropriately deal with the substance of the Allegations?
[18] To dismiss Ms. Tyler’s complaint, I must be satisfied that (1) the issues dealt with in the Arbitration Proceeding were essentially the same as the Allegations, and (2) they were dealt with appropriately within the meaning of s. 27(1)(f). I begin with the former.
1. The issues were essentially the same
[19] The Ministry argues that the issues decided in the Arbitration Proceeding were essentially the same as those now raised in the complaint before the Tribunal. It says the allegations before the adjudicators in the Arbitration Proceeding related to the same time period and set of facts as the Allegations, and overlapped in nature and subject matter. Ms. Tyler does not dispute this in her response submission. On the whole of evidence before me, including Ms. Tyler’s collective agreement complaints and supporting materials, her submissions in the Arbitration Proceeding, and the final and binding Award, I agree with the Ministry.
[20] The arbitrator and his arbitration panel adjudicated the collective agreement complaints. Those complaints were comprised of wide-ranging allegations of racial discrimination, bullying and harassment, and misuse of managerial authority, which expressly included each of the Allegations and covered a similar time period.
[21] In the Award, the arbitrator set out the context and particulars of the alleged “incidents of racism and discrimination” before him, including the Juneteenth Allegation (Award, p. 4), the Americans Allegation (p. 4-5), the Monkeys Allegation (p. 5), and the Images Allegation (p. 6). He then went on to make determinations regarding each of the Allegations, concluding that the Images Allegation was substantiated, but the others were not (Award, pp. 21-22).
[22] With respect to the Images Allegation, the arbitrator found that many of the GIFs and memes in question were derogatory, racist, offensive, and inappropriate, and that management knew about them but did not take action, which made things worse. Based on his factual findings, he concluded that discrimination had occurred, and that Ms. Tyler was entitled to a remedial award (Award, p. 24). He went on to order general damages in the amount of $15,000 for injury to dignity, as well as reimbursement for certain losses, and career development and conflict management supports. In addition, he noted, “from a remedial standpoint,” that subsequent to Ms. Tyler’s complaints, the Ministry provided employees with a letter of expectation with directions regarding respectful communications, which was also included in the orientation package for new staff.
[23] Based on the materials before me, I am satisfied that the issues in the Arbitration Proceeding were essentially the same as those now before this Tribunal. I note that my conclusion in this regard is consistent with the Tribunal’s determination in the Deferral Decision, that “the nature and subject matter of the Collective Agreement Complaints overlaps almost entirely with this human rights complaint,” in that both “arise out of the same employment relationship, cover the same facts and time period, and make some of the same allegations of discrimination.”
2. The issues were dealt with appropriately
[24] The Tribunal’s assessment under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code is not just an exercise in comparing issues before the Tribunal with those in a previous proceeding. It is also about whether the other proceeding “appropriately dealt with” the issues. Section 27(1)(f) does not represent an invitation to “judicially review” the determinations of other decision-makers. However, it does require the Tribunal to look at whether the complainant now before it had an opportunity to know the case to be met and a chance to meet it in the previous proceeding, either directly or through a “privy”: Figliola at paras. 37-38.
[25] Neither party made substantive arguments regarding this part of the analysis – beyond the Ministry’s reference to Ms. Tyler receiving union representation in the Arbitration Proceeding.
[26] On the information and evidence filed, I am satisfied that Ms. Tyler participated fully in the Arbitration Proceeding. The collective agreement complaints that she put forward were detailed and thorough. Her submissions in the Arbitration Proceeding were equally comprehensive, and were supported by ample documentary evidence, including relevant correspondence and images. I acknowledge that Ms. Tyler now calls for a review of the Ministry’s existing complaint process and further investigation of alleged racism and discrimination in her workplace. However, everything before me indicates that she had a fair opportunity to make her case in the Arbitration Proceeding.
[27] Ms. Tyler’s submissions in this application are less about the Arbitration Proceeding, itself, and more about what happened (or did not happen) after. She says the Award shows that there is systemic discrimination in her workplace, and the remedies ordered by the arbitrator “do not set right what is wrong.” As a result, she argues, “the racism and discrimination I have experienced is destined to continue.” She says the Award validated her concerns “and signals that further investigation is warranted.” She calls on the Tribunal to conduct this investigation, hold the Ministry accountable, and ensure that necessary changes are made by her employer, “as that is what is in the best interest of all people of colour and the general public.”
[28] I appreciate Ms. Tyler raising these issues in response to the Ministry’s application. However, they are not an answer to its arguments about why her complaint should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code. The human rights issues in the collective agreement complaints were essentially the same as those now raised in Ms. Tyler’s complaint before the Tribunal. Adjudicators heard her submissions on those issues, reviewed her evidence, made findings of fact, reached conclusions regarding the merits of her allegations of discrimination, and ordered responsive remedies. In these circumstances, I find that it does not make sense to use additional public and private resources to relitigate this matter.
[29] For all of these reasons, the Ministry’s dismissal application is granted.
III CONCLUSION
[30] The complaint is dismissed: Code, s. 27(1)(f).
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member