Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir) v. Justice Institute of British Columbia (No. 3), 2026 BCHRT 92
Date Issued: April 9, 2026
File: CS-004302
Indexed as: Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir) v. Justice Institute of British Columbia (No. 3),
2026 BCHRT 92
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Husnaa Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir)
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Justice Institute of British Columbia
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Rule 19(4)
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Kathleen Smith
Counsel for the Complainant: Evan Harvey
Counsel for the Respondent: Mark E. Colavecchia
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In this decision, I provide my reasons for dismissing Husnaa Nawaz’s human rights complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Human Rights Code, based on a reasonable settlement offer.
[2] Ms. Nawaz alleges that her employer, Justice Institute of British Columbia [JIBC] treated her adversely due to her disabilities, in several ways, between 2018 and 2022. In addition to her allegations based on her disabilities, she alleges JIBC singled her out for poor treatment for reasons related to her race and religion.
[3] JIBC denies discriminating. In an earlier application, JIBC applied to dismiss the complaint. The Tribunal granted JIBC’s dismissal application in part: Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir) v. Justice Institute of British Columbia and another, 2025 BCHRT 238 [Nawaz No. 1]. Two allegations remained after Nawaz No. 1 and are set to proceed to a hearing. These allegations are set out in Nawaz No. 1 and defined as the Third Time Off and Absenteeism Allegations at paras. 19 and 53.
[4] On December 1, 2025, JIBC made a with prejudice offer to Ms. Nawaz to resolve the remaining allegations. JIBC advised Ms. Nawaz that if she did not accept the offer, it would seek permission from the Tribunal to bring a dismissal application under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code and Rule 19(4) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. Ms. Nawaz did not accept the offer, and the Tribunal permitted JIBC to apply to dismiss the remainder of the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii). In brief, JIBC argues that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing in circumstances where it made a comprehensive offer that includes reasonable monetary and non-monetary terms.
[5] Ms. Nawaz opposes the dismissal application. She argues that the offer is not reasonable and the purposes of the Code would be served by allowing her complaint to proceed to a hearing.
[6] In this decision, I must address the following issues:
a. Is JIBC’s settlement offer reasonable?
b. Would it further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed where Ms. Nawaz rejected the offer?
[7] For the following reasons, I am persuaded that the offer is reasonable, and it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to the scheduled hearing. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties, as well as documents in the Tribunal’s record of this complaint. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[8] In this section, I set out a high-level chronology to put this decision in context. A detailed background to the complaint is provided in Nawaz No. 1 at paragraphs 9 to 53.
[9] Ms. Nawaz filed her complaint on January 29, 2021, and amended it on September 30, 2021. In brief, Ms. Nawaz alleges that JIBC’s monitoring of her attendance and its response to her absences – including the decision to withhold her flex days – failed to consider that most of her absences were related to her disabilities. She further alleges that JIBC subjected her requests for accommodation and time off to greater scrutiny than those of her co-workers who do not share her race or religion. The complaint allegations are dated from November 20, 2018, to August 26, 2021.
[10] The following are the remedies Ms. Nawaz listed in her January 2021 complaint:
a. Order to stop the discrimination and declaration that the conduct is discrimination;
b. Steps or programs to address the discrimination;
c. Specific remedies:
i. Restoration of her flex days;
ii. A commitment that the outcome of this complaint will not negatively impact her employment;
iii. A commitment that harassment and bullying will not be tolerated; and
iv. A formal apology.
[11] Ms. Nawaz’s September 2021 amendment did not concern remedy.
[12] JIBC’s response to the amended complaint asserts it had a right and duty to monitor Ms. Nawaz’s attendance, the steps it took were not discriminatory, and it reasonably accommodated her disabilities. JIBC denies that Ms. Nawaz was treated differently than any other employee with the same attendance issues, and asserts there is no basis for her allegation that race and religion were factors in its conduct.
[13] In Nawaz No. 1, the Tribunal grouped Ms. Nawaz’s allegations into the following four categories: Cold Workplace Allegation, Family Accommodation Allegation, Absenteeism Allegations, and Time Off Allegations (First, Second, and Third). Ultimately, the Tribunal dismissed the following allegations under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, on the basis that they have no reasonable prospect of success at a hearing:
a. Cold Workplace Allegation;
b. Family Accommodation Allegation; and
c. The First and Second Time Off Allegations.
[14] But for the present application, Nawaz No. 1 means that the Third Time Off Allegation and the Absenteeism Allegations will proceed to a hearing. A five-day hearing is scheduled to begin on October 19, 2026, and the parties’ witness and remedy disclosure are due on June 8 (Complainant) and June 22 (Respondent).
[15] On December 1, 2025, JIBC wrote to Ms. Nawaz with an offer to settle the complaint. The offer was made on a “with prejudice” basis and on the understanding that JIBC would seek permission to apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) if Ms. Nawaz did not accept it.
[16] These are the terms of the offer:
a. An amount for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect: $7,500.
b. Waiver of JIBC’s right to recover $200 in costs ordered by the Tribunal on October 30, 2025: Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir) v. Justice Institute of British Columbia (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 278 [Nawaz No. 2].
c. A letter of regret acknowledging the distress that Ms. Nawaz experienced, and expressing JIBC’s remorse for the negative impacts the negative experiences had on Ms. Nawaz.
d. A commitment to review JIBC’s procedures for accommodations and adjustments to modified work schedules, like flex time, and make any updates it deems necessary.
e. The offer will remain open for acceptance for two weeks after the Tribunal issues a decision on the dismissal application, regardless of the outcome.
[17] As noted above, Ms. Nawaz did not accept the offer and JIBC requested permission from the Tribunal to file the present application to dismiss. The Tribunal granted JIBC’s request and JIBC filed this application on January 9, 2026. The Tribunal set a schedule for written submissions. As set out above, Ms. Nawaz opposes the application and asks the Tribunal to deny it and proceed to the scheduled hearing.
III Analysis and DECISION
[18] JIBC applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code based on the December 1, 2025, offer.
[19] Section 27(1)(d)(ii) allows the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint where proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code. The Tribunal has held that when a reasonable settlement offer has been made, it may not further the Code’s purpose to proceed with a complaint: Heitner v. BC Provincial Renal Agency and others (No. 3), 2020 BCHRT 134 [Heitner] at para. 46.
[20] There are two prerequisites for the Tribunal to consider dismissing a complaint based on a reasonable settlement offer. First, the settlement offer must be made “with prejudice” because the Tribunal cannot rely on information about settlement discussions that is inadmissible based on privilege: Dar Santos v. University of British Columbia, 2003 BCHRT 73 [Dar Santos] at para. 64; Carter v. Travelex Canada and Travelex UK (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 275 at para. 25. Second, the offer must remain open for the complainant’s acceptance regardless of the outcome of the dismissal application: Issa v. Loblaw, 2009 BCHRT 264 [Issa] at para. 35.
[21] If the prerequisites are met, the Tribunal takes a two-step approach to determining whether to dismiss a complaint based on a reasonable settlement offer. The first step is to assess whether the offer is reasonable: Dar Santos at para. 59. If it is, then the next step is to assess whether allowing the complaint to proceed would serve the purposes of the Code.
[22] Here, there is no dispute that the prerequisites are met. The offer is clearly identified as “with prejudice” and expressly states that it will remain open for Ms. Nawaz to accept for two weeks after the Tribunal issues its decision on the dismissal application regardless of outcome.
[23] I begin my analysis by determining whether the offer is reasonable.
A. Step 1 – is the settlement offer reasonable?
[24] In assessing whether an offer is reasonable, the Tribunal assumes that the complainant will prove their allegations. At the same time, the settlement offer does not have to mirror exactly what the Tribunal would order. To meet the first part of the test, a settlement offer must consist of reasonable monetary and non-monetary remedies the Tribunal would likely order if the complainant were successful at a hearing: Heitner at para. 48.
[25] Relevant considerations for determining the reasonableness of an offer include whether the offer:
a. fully addresses the allegations and available remedies, both monetary and non‐monetary;
b. demonstrates that the respondent’s remedial actions adequately remedied the alleged violation and are consistent with the types of orders the Tribunal might make if the complaint were successful; and
c. includes a monetary component within the reasonable range that the Tribunal might award if the complaint were found to be justified.
Issa at para. 35
1. Does the offer fully address the allegations and available remedies, both monetary and non-monetary?
[26] There is no dispute that the offer includes both monetary and non-monetary remedies; however, the parties disagree on whether they fully address the allegations and available remedies.
[27] To determine whether the offer fully addresses the allegations, it is helpful to return to Nawaz No. 1. In that decision,the Tribunal held that only the Third Time Off Allegation and the Absenteeism Allegations would proceed to a hearing. I set out those allegations in detail below.
[28] Third Time Off Allegation: Ms. Nawaz alleges that on September 10, 2021, she submitted a request for time off on September 14, 2021, due to a medical procedure, and JIBC declined her request because it was the first two weeks of the semester. She alleges that, in the same period, JIBC approved a white colleague for time off. In short, Ms. Nawaz alleges that she was treated differently than a white colleague and her race and religion factored into the differential treatment.
[29] Absenteeism Allegations: Ms. Nawaz alleges that JIBC did not accept that she had a disability and harassed her by repeatedly reminding her of her high absenteeism rate and asking her to reduce her absences. As a result, she alleges that she sometimes worked on days when she did not feel well, for fear of further consequences. She also alleges that she was adversely impacted by the removal of her flex time schedule, a decision she says was connected to her race and religion, in addition to her disabilities. Ms. Nawaz asserts that her colleagues did not have their flex days revoked even though they took the same or more sick days. Based on Ms. Nawaz’s September 30, 2021, amendment, these allegations appear to run from March 2019 to September 2021.
[30] For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the offer addresses the impacts of JIBC declining Ms. Young’s September 2021, time off request; the repeated reminders and requests to reduce her absenteeism rate; and the removal of her ability to work a flex time schedule. The offer includes an amount for injury to dignity, which I am persuaded falls within the reasonable range that the Tribunal might award. It also includes non-monetary terms that I am persuaded adequately remedy the allegations.
[31] In reaching this conclusion, I do not accept Ms. Nawaz’s argument that the offer is not reasonable because it does not include an amount for lost wages. Therefore, I begin by explaining why I conclude that the failure to include an amount for lost wages does not make the offer unreasonable.
a. Lost wages
[32] In her response to the dismissal application, Ms. Nawaz asserts, for the first time, that she is claiming approximately two and a half years of lost wages, amounting to around $135,000, as a result of JIBC’s “ongoing discrimination” based on disability, race, and religion. As I understand it, this claim is based on: (1) the fact that she has been off work and receiving disability benefits since March 2023, and; (2) an assumption that she will continue to be unable to work until the date of the hearing in October 2026. In her response to the application, Ms. Nawaz alleges that but for JIBC’s discriminatory conduct she would still be actively working for JIBC and not be on an extended leave.
[33] JIBC disputes that Ms. Nawaz has any claim for lost wages on two bases. It says that Ms. Nawaz did not identify wage loss as a remedy sought in either the original complaint or her amendment to the complaint, or at any time before it made the offer. It also highlights that Ms. Nawaz’s claim for $135,000 in lost wages does not account for the fact that she has been receiving disability benefits since she started her leave of absence in March 2023.
[34] It is well established that the Tribunal has discretion to compensate a person for all, or a part, of any wages lost because of discrimination. The purpose of this compensation is to restore a complainant, to the extent possible, to the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. To support a claim for wage loss, Ms. Nawaz would have to establish a causal connection between the discrimination and the lost wages: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 [Gichuru] at para. 298-303, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396. Once a causal connection is established, the amount of compensation is a matter of discretion, to be exercised on a principled basis, in light of the purposes of the remedial provisions of the Code.
[35] For the following reasons, I am not persuaded to consider Ms. Nawaz’s claim for lost wages in my assessment of the reasonableness of the offer.
[36] Ms. Nawaz has not provided a basis from which the Tribunal could conclude there is a causal connection between the Third Time Off and Absenteeism Allegations, and the wage loss claimed in her response to the dismissal application. The amended complaint, as currently framed, does not allege that the discriminatory acts set out in the remaining allegations caused her to become unable to work. As set out above, Ms. Nawaz alleges that she sometimes attended worked when she was not feeling well, fearing further consequences. There is also no direct wage loss associated with the denial of a day off or the loss of her flex day.
[37] Ms. Nawaz does not argue that wage loss flows from the remaining allegations set out in Nawaz No. 1. In fact, Ms. Nawaz’s response to the dismissal application does not address the narrowing of her complaint as a result of Nawaz No. 1. She simply argues that wage loss flows from “ongoing harassment and discrimination.”
[38] In her response to the dismissal application, Ms. Nawaz asserts that she suffered a complete physical and mental breakdown caused by JIBC in March 2023. However, she does not address the fact that her complaint allegations do not include events after September 2021, or allegations beyond those set out in Nawaz No. 1. Although she is now alleging that ongoing events led to her inability work and the current disability leave, Ms. Nawaz has not amended her complaint to add any further allegations. This means that the wage loss claim beginning in March 2023 arises roughly one and a half years after the last alleged discriminatory conduct in September 2021.
[39] I pause to note that in her response to the application, Ms. Nawaz asks the Tribunal to rely on materials that she provided in the course of submissions on other applications. These include an affidavit that she prepared in June 2024 in relation to Nawaz No. 1, and an earlier application she brought to defer the complaint. Though it is a party’s responsibility to put before the Tribunal the materials it wants considered on each application, I reviewed the materials Ms. Nawaz referred to, as found in the complaint file. The June 2024 affidavit is approximately 20-pages and begins with Ms. Nawaz stating that, “Since March 2023, I have been unable to work due to severe mental health issues as confirmed by my psychiatrist” and “I am currently on a long-term disability.” This same information appears in Ms. Nawaz’s June 2023 application to defer.
[40] The specific paragraphs that Ms. Nawaz refers to in her June 2024 affidavit also contain statements about how persistent pressure and unfair treatment in a toxic work environment left her feeling harassed, intimidated, and bullied, which significantly worsened her physical and mental health. Those paragraphs (2, 17, 62, 63, 74) are general in nature and do not pinpoint when she became unable to work and under what circumstances.
[41] It is apparent from her affidavit that Ms. Nawaz alleges ongoing discrimination and discriminatory impacts, and that JIBC’s conduct contributed to her inability to work in March 2023. However, where she has not amended, or applied to amend her complaint, it is not appropriate for me to consider any new allegations in the course of this application. It is well established that changing the goal posts in the middle of an application to dismiss process would be unfair to respondents. This is the reason the Tribunal requires an application to amend when there is an outstanding application to dismiss the complaint: Rule 24(4).
[42] Lastly, I also find it relevant that Ms. Nawaz does not dispute that she remains an employee of JIBC receiving disability benefits yet does not address this in her response or in her asserted wage loss claim. Ms. Nawaz’s approach appears to treat her circumstances as if she had been terminated from her employment with wage loss necessarily flowing.
[43] Lastly, even if the Tribunal did find there was a causal connection between the Third Time Off and Absenteeism Allegations and any wage loss she incurred – which I do not accept as explained above – a contingency would likely be deducted based on the disability benefits she has received: Tozer v. British Columbia (Motor Vehicle Branch), 2002 BCHRT 11 at paras. 13-17.
[44] I turn next to the adequacy of the terms.
2. Do the proposed remedial actions adequately remedy the alleged violations and are they consistent with the types of orders the Tribunal might make if the complaint were successful?
[45] I begin by assessing the adequacy of the non-monetary aspects of the offer. JIBC’s offer includes two non-monetary terms:
a. A letter of regret acknowledging the distress that Ms. Nawaz experienced. The letter of regret will also express JIBC’s remorse for the negative impacts of these experiences on her.
b. JIBC commits to reviewing its procedures for accommodations and adjustments to modified work schedules, like flex time, and making any updates it deems necessary.
[46] JIBC argues that the letter of regret shows that it has reflected on Ms. Nawaz’s allegations and experience, and the negative impacts the alleged discrimination had on her. Moreover, it argues that the offer of a letter of regret goes beyond the remedies that the Tribunal has authority to order.
[47] With respect to the other component, JIBC argues that it similarly reflects that it has taken Ms. Nawaz’s allegations seriously and demonstrates that it is taking concrete steps to ameliorate the potential for harassment and discrimination being experienced by others.
[48] Ms. Nawaz argues that the non-monetary terms of the offer are inadequate for two reasons. First, she says that the offer does not provide any guarantees to her, including flex days, a modified work schedule, accommodation, or a lack of discrimination. Second, she says that JIBC is not offering to make any concrete changes to its policies and may well conclude after its review that no updates or changes are necessary. Ms. Nawaz relies on Jansen v. Molly Maid 2019 BCHRT 7 [Jansen] where the Tribunal declined to dismiss a complaint based on a settlement offer in part because the non-monetary aspect did not reasonably address the allegations.
[49] For the following reasons, I am persuaded that the non-monetary aspects of the offer adequately address the alleged violations of the Code and are consistent with what the Tribunal might order.
[50] Ms. Nawaz did not address the letter of regret in her response. I observe that, while not an admission of discrimination, JIBC has expressed its regret and remorse for the distress and negative impacts that Ms. Nawaz experienced as a result of the alleged discrimination. This expression is now before the public as a result of this decision. I agree with JIBC that this shows they are taking her experiences seriously.
[51] I find JIBC’s argument compelling that it is not able, at this time, to commit to Ms. Nawaz’s requests for flex days, a modified work schedule, and accommodation. JIBC correctly asserts that whether Ms. Nawaz requires an accommodation at work in the future, including a modified work schedule, will depend on up-to-date medical information that outlines her fitness for work as well as any limitations or restrictions that she has at that time. I also accept JIBC’s assertion that whether Ms. Nawaz will have a schedule which includes flex days may depend on the schedule she is capable of working, if and when she returns to work. As JIBC points out, a flex time schedule requires the employee to work an extra 30 minutes per day, five days per week, in order to be provided with a day-off every third week. Depending on the limitations and restrictions a person may have because of their disability, working extra time may not be possible.
[52] Lastly, it is my view that Jansenis distinguishable. In that case, the complainant alleged that she had been terminated from her employment because she was pregnant and needed time off work for pregnancy-related medical appointments. In that offer, the respondent proposed to acknowledge its obligation to provide a workplace free from discrimination, harassment, and bullying, including employees who are pregnant. It also committed to updating its equity training program to ensure sex discrimination was comprehensively addressed. The Tribunal concluded that this term did not reasonably address the specific allegations because the complaint was about a failure to accommodate a pregnant employee, not bullying and harassment. In short, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the respondent understood the full extent of the duty to accommodate a pregnant employee.
[53] Here, I can appreciate that Ms. Nawaz is not satisfied with the ambiguity of what changes or improvements may result from the proposed procedure review. However, where JIBC agrees to conduct a review of its procedures for accommodations and adjustments to modified work schedules, like flex time, I am satisfied that it is sufficiently connected to the remaining allegations. I am also satisfied it is consistent with the types of orders the Tribunal makes when a complaint is successful at a hearing. The proposed review is a future-oriented action aimed at improving procedures for employees in similar circumstances. I also find it relevant that Ms. Nawaz has not provided any basis from which I could conclude that JIBC does not intend to conduct the review in good faith or is unwilling to take steps identified as necessary to ensure a workplace free from harassment and discrimination.
[54] In the next section, I assess the monetary aspect of the offer.
3. Is the monetary component within the reasonable range that the Tribunal might award if the complaint were found justified?
[55] The settlement offer includes an amount for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect ($7,500) and waiver of the costs award ($200). The parties disagree on whether the amount proposed for injury to dignity is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order if Ms. Nawaz succeeded at the hearing. Ms. Nawaz did not address the waiver of the costs award.
[56] This Tribunal has discretion to award a complainant an amount to compensate them for injury to their dignity, feelings, and self-respect: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii). The purpose of these awards is compensatory, and not punitive. In exercising this discretion, the Tribunal generally considers three broad factors: the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant: Torres v. Royalty Kitchenware Ltd. (1982), 1982 CanLII 4886 (ON HRT), 3 CHRR D/858 (Ont. Bd. Inq); Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 2), 2011 BCHRT 185 [Gichuru No. 2] at para. 260, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396. The quantum is “highly contextual and fact-specific,” and the Tribunal has considerable discretion to award an amount it deems necessary to compensate a person who has been discriminated against: Gichuru No. 2 at para. 256; University of British Columbia v. Kelly, 2016 BCCA 271 at paras. 59-64.
[57] JIBC argues that $7,500 is well within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order assuming Ms. Nawaz proves her case. Ms. Nawaz argues that the amount offered for injury to dignity is not reasonable, and if successful, she would be entitled to an amount in the range of $10,000 to $15,000.
[58] For the following reasons, I am persuaded that $7,500 falls within the reasonable range the Tribunal might award if Ms. Nawaz were successful at a hearing.
[59] I begin by acknowledging that none of the cases cited by the parties mirror the exact circumstances of this case. However, I have reviewed and considered all of them in reaching my conclusion under this factor.
[60] The cases relied on by Ms. Nawaz include injury to dignity awards in the range of $7,500 to $15,000 (Barton v. Garrison, 2011 BCHRT 39, Singh v. Dodd’s Furniture (No. 2), 2021 BCHRT 85, Gebresadik v. Black Top Cabs, 2017 BCHRT 278, Haftbaradaran v. Saturna Beach Estates, 2017 BCHRT 184, and Vernon v. Howatt Enterprises and others, 2010 BCHRT 313). She also relies on cases that stand for the propositions that there is an upward trend in awards for injury to dignity (Biggings obo Walsh v. Pink and others, 2018 BCHRT 174 at para. 163), the Tribunal ought to account for inflation when considering the amount for an injury to dignity award (Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 16 at para 213), and cases involving termination of employment often attract the top end of this Tribunal’s awards (Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd., 2021 BCHRT 137 at para 129 and Lipp v. 0965319 BC Ltd., 2014 BCHRT 199, para. 69).
[61] The primary difficulty I have with Ms. Nawaz’s argument is that JIBC has not terminated her employment. I also do not accept her argument, based on the materials before me, that her current disability leave is akin to terminating her employment, warranting compensation at the top end of the range. In her response to the dismissal application, Ms. Nawaz asserts that she has been on a medical leave and receiving disability benefits since March 2023, is unsure when she will be medically fit to resume work, and JIBC is responsible for her inability to work due to ongoing discrimination and failure to accommodate. However, as set out earlier in this decision, Ms. Nawaz has not amended her complaint since September 2021 to include any new allegations, including after the Tribunal narrowed her complaint in Nawaz No. 1. The complaint that would go to hearing, but for this decision, does not include an allegation that her employment has been terminated, and as above, the evidence before me is to the contrary, she remains an employee on leave receiving disability benefits.
[62] I also do not accept JIBC’s argument that because Ms. Nawaz did not specifically identify injury to dignity as a remedy in the complaint form, she is not entitled to it. The cases relied on by JIBC for this argument concern complaints where the complainant did not seek an amount for injury to dignity in the context of a hearing. In my view, the fact that Ms. Nawaz did not tick the injury to dignity box on the original complaint form is not equivalent to a complainant who had the opportunity to but did not advance a claim for injury to dignity at a hearing. Moreover, there appears to be no dispute that Ms. Nawaz did not have legal counsel until November 2025, and her current legal counsel expressed an intention in January 2026 to amend the remedy section of the complaint to add wage loss and injury to dignity.
[63] Next, I turn to the cases that JIBC relies on as comparable. The injury to dignity awards in those cases range from $4000 to $5000 (Alagaratnam v. Metropolitan Hotel Vancouver, 2013 BCHRT 251, McBride v. Orea Sand & Gravel, 2010 BCHRT 1, and Salanguit v. Parq Vancouver, 2024 BCHRT 119). None of these cases involve the termination of employment. Rather, they concern issues related to employment including discrete incidents of discriminatory mocking at work; the discriminatory cancellation of short-term disability benefits; and discriminatory reduction of hours during a medical leave.
[64] When I take into consideration the nature of the Third Time Off and Absenteeism Allegations, I am satisfied that $7,500 is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might award. This amount acknowledges that Ms. Nawaz suffered a negative impact as a result of the remaining allegations, some of which were ongoing between March 2019 and September 2021. It also recognizes that this is not a case where the discrimination culminated in job loss. Further, I am satisfied that it contemplates the upward trend in awards, and inflation, particularly when compared to the cases relied on by JIBC.
Summary
[65] Looking at the entirety of offer, I am satisfied that it fully addresses the allegations and available remedies, adequately addresses the alleged violations of the Code, and offers an amount of monetary compensation that is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order. In summary, I find the offer reasonable.
[66] Even if a settlement offer is reasonable, the Tribunal may consider whether there are factors that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint, based on the purposes set out in s. 3 of the Code. I turn to that question next.
B. Step 2 – would allowing the complaint to proceed further the purposes of the Code?
[67] The assessment of whether proceeding with a complaint will further the purposes of the Code involves more than an assessment of an individual complaint, but encompasses broader public policy issues, such as the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in processing a complaint to a hearing: Dar Santos at para 59.
[68] JIBC argues that proceeding to a hearing would not further the Code’s purposes when it has put forward a reasonable offer that acknowledges the negative impacts alleged by Ms. Nawaz; contains terms directed at ensuring the same situation does not occur again; includes a significant monetary component; and includes terms that cannot be ordered by the Tribunal (letter of regret and waiver of the costs award). JIBC further argues that there is nothing novel or unique about the remaining allegations that would justify proceeding further based on broader public policy issues. In addition, JIBC asserts that proceeding in the face of the offer may discourage respondents from making meaningful efforts to craft settlement offers intended to fully resolve a complaint.
[69] Ms. Nawaz disagrees and argues that, even if the Tribunal finds the offer reasonable, it would further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint for several reasons. First, she asserts that she will receive a much higher monetary award if the complaint proceeds to a hearing. Second, she argues that allowing the complaint to proceed would allow her to address the various wrongs and prevent further discrimination against her and any other JIBC employees. Lastly, she asserts that the purposes of the Code are served by examining how a large public institution like JIBC treats its employees and addressing the allegations of systemic discrimination based on race, religion, and physical disability.
[70] For the following reasons, I am not persuaded that it would further the Code’s purposes to proceed where I have found JIBC made a reasonable settlement offer.
[71] I am not persuaded that Ms. Nawaz’ allegations are sufficiently novel to outweigh the strong public interest in parties resolving their disputes and not using scarce Tribunal resources by proceeding with a hearing after a reasonable settlement offer has been rejected. Complaints in the area of employment on the grounds of disability are among the most frequent at this Tribunal, including against large institutions.
[72] There is also something to be gained by not having the complaint proceed to a hearing where there has been a means of redress: Code, s. 3(e). Considerable resources will be required for a five-day hearing, and the Tribunal encourages respondents to respond appropriately to human rights complaints – even if it is late in the day: Heitner at para. 35. I am persuaded that JIBC has done so here.
IV CONCLUSION
[73] JIBC’s settlement offer is reasonable. It would not further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed. I grant the application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[74] As set out in JIBC’s materials, Ms. Nawaz has two weeks following the date of this decision to accept the settlement offer.
Kathleen Smith
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal