Cruz v. Paladin Security Group Ltd. and others, 2026 BCHRT 91
Date Issued: April 9, 2026
File: CS-007314
Indexed as: Cruz v. Paladin Security Group Ltd. and others, 2026 BCHRT 91
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Remando Cruz
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Jarod Harvey and Lindsay Chomechko and Ashley Ram and Yehoshua Saadon and Ilderpreet Singh and Paladin Security Group Ltd.
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Andrew Robb
On his own behalf: Remando Cruz
Agent for the Respondents: Angad Singh Gill
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mr. Cruz was employed as a security officer by Paladin Security Group Ltd. [Paladin]. Paladin terminated his employment after an incident in which a member of the public accused Mr. Cruz of assaulting him. Jarod Harvey, Lindsay Chomechko, Ashley Ram, Yehoshua Saadon, and Ilderpreet Singh were employed by Paladin at the time of the incident, and were involved with Paladin’s response to the incident. In this decision I refer to them and Paladin, together, as the Respondents.
[2] Mr. Cruz filed a human rights complaint alleging the Respondents’ response to the incident, including the termination of his employment, was discrimination on the grounds of disability and criminal conviction. He says he has a disability affecting his vision, and his actions during the alleged assault were connected to his farsightedness, or hyperopia, as he was unable to see clearly at the time. Regarding the ground of criminal conviction, he says his employment was terminated because the Respondents believed he was guilty of the criminal offence of assault.
[3] The Respondents deny discriminating, and apply to dismiss the complaint. They say Mr. Cruz’s employment was terminated for non-discriminatory reasons related to violations of Paladin’s policies, and the termination was not connected to his disability or any criminal conviction. They say Mr. Cruz has no reasonable prospect of proving they discriminated against him based on his farsightedness, as he did not tell them he was farsighted, or that the alleged assault was connected to his farsightedness, before he filed this complaint.
[4] For the reasons set out below, I allow the Respondents’ application, and I dismiss the complaint. I find the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove their conduct was justified, under the Human Rights Code, as they could not have known of any connection between Mr. Cruz’s farsightedness and the incident when he was accused of assault. Additionally, I find Mr. Cruz has no reasonable prospect of proving he was charged with or convicted of a criminal offence, or that the Respondents believed he was.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] On July 14, 2022, Mr. Cruz was working as a bicycle patrol security officer, at a site in Vancouver. He observed a group of individuals using a tripod for photography. He says they were also smoking. He says these activities—smoking and taking photographs using a tripod—were prohibited at the site, so he approached them and asked them to stop.
[7] Mr. Cruz’s interaction with the individuals became heated. He says one of them used a device to shine a bright light in his face, while he was on his bicycle. He says he could not see well with the light in his face, due to his farsightedness, and he became concerned for his safety, so he “wiped off or tapped away” the individual’s device. The individual then alleged that Mr. Cruz had assaulted him and called the police. Mr. Cruz denies that he assaulted the individual. He says he acted reasonably during the incident and did not deliberately make contact with the individual.
[8] Police officers attended the scene, spoke to the witnesses, and viewed a cell phone video taken by the individual who alleged he was assaulted. The Respondents say the police told them Mr. Cruz was fortunate that the individual did not want to press charges, because Mr. Cruz’s conduct met the threshold for a charge of assault.
[9] Paladin investigated the incident. As part of the investigation, on July 19, 2022, Mr. Cruz met with Paladin staff. He says it was apparent to him, during the meeting, that they had already decided he was guilty.
[10] The Respondents say that after the initial meeting on July 19, 2022, they invited Mr. Cruz to attend an additional meeting, to review and respond to video footage obtained in Paladin’s investigation. Mr. Cruz did not attend any additional meeting. He does not deny that he was invited to review and respond to the video footage, but he says he lost trust in the investigative process after the initial meeting.
[11] Paladin terminated Mr. Cruz’s employment by letter dated July 28, 2022. The letter said he was terminated for cause because he escalated the situation, in the incident on July 14, and he could have been charged with assault. The letter included a brief account of the incident, a summary of Paladin’s investigation and its findings, and a list of the Paladin policies that Mr. Cruz violated.
III DECISION
[12] The Respondents apply to dismiss Mr. Cruz’s complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to dismiss complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[13] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[14] The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint beyond conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[15] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Cruz would have to prove he has one or more characteristics protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in his employment, and his protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would shift to the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[16] The Respondents argue the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success for a number of reasons. I find I can most efficiently decide the application based on their argument that Mr. Cruz was terminated solely for non-discriminatory reasons, and the decision to terminate him was justified, under the Code, because he violated Paladin policies, and he never told the Respondents he had a disability that was connected to his conduct on July 14, 2022. If the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove a justification defence at the hearing, then the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117 at para. 50.
[17] I will first address Mr. Cruz’s complaint on the ground of his disability, and then on the ground of criminal conviction.
A. Disability
[18] Mr. Cruz says the Respondents’ response to the alleged assault, especially the termination of his employment, was discrimination on the basis of his disability. He says his contact with the individual who shone a light in his eyes was not an intentional assault, but was due to his farsightedness.
[19] To justify their conduct at a hearing, including the termination of Mr. Cruz’s employment, the Respondents would have to prove it was based on a standard or practice adopted in good faith, for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of his job, and the standard or practice is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose. This includes Paladin’s duty to accommodate Mr. Cruz to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 54. The Respondents may also justify the termination by showing that they did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that he had a disability: Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at para. 373.
[20] The Respondents say Paladin decided to terminate Mr. Cruz because he violated several Paladin policies, in the incident on July 14, 2022. The termination letter dated July 28, 2022, included relevant parts of the policies, related to public relations and employees’ attitude and conduct. In the absence of any arguments to the contrary, I am satisfied the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove these policies were adopted reasonably and in good faith, for purposes connected to Paladin’s business operations as a provider of security services.
[21] Regarding the Respondents’ duty to accommodate Mr. Cruz’s disability, I considered whether they ought to have known he required accommodation. If they had reason to believe his conduct on July 14, 2022, was connected to a disability, then they may have had a duty to inquire about the connection, before terminating him for the conduct. But the Respondents say Mr. Cruz never informed them that he had a disability. In the materials before me, Mr. Cruz does not suggest that he ever told the Respondents he was farsighted.
[22] In Mr. Cruz’s response to the application to dismiss, he says he chose not to wear eyeglasses while he was on duty, despite his farsightedness, because his job demanded physical activities while patrolling outdoors at night, and wearing eyeglasses was not advisable. He does not say whether the Respondents knew of this choice, or whether they knew he sometimes wore eyeglasses.
[23] Mr. Cruz does not explain how any of the evidence before me could support a finding that the Respondents ought to have known there was a connection between his farsightedness and his conduct during the incident on July 14, 2022. He does not suggest that he told them there was any connection when he met with Paladin staff to discuss the incident, on July 19, 2022, and he does not explain why he did not tell them.
[24] Employees have a responsibility to bring forward facts that could facilitate accommodation, if they believe they require accommodation: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 p. 994. On the evidence before me, Mr. Cruz has no reasonable prospect of proving he did so. I find the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove they could not have known of any connection between Mr. Cruz’s farsightedness and the incident on July 14, 2022. This means that even if there was such a connection, the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove their conduct was justified, under the Code. On this basis, I find Mr. Cruz has no reasonable prospect of success in his human rights complaint on the ground of his disability.
B. Criminal conviction
[25] Section 13 of the Code prohibits discrimination in employment on the ground that a person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to their employment. The Tribunal has found this prohibition also applies to discrimination against people who were merely charged with an offence or perceived to have a conviction: Steinman v. Wholesale Blind Factory and others, 2013 BCHRT 261 at para. 19.
[26] The Respondents’ argument in the application to dismiss does not explicitly refer to the ground of criminal conviction. However, I understand the Respondents to argue that Mr. Cruz has no reasonable prospect of proving his complaint on this ground because they are reasonably certain to prove he was terminated for solely non-discriminatory reasons, namely that Mr. Cruz violated Paladin policies in the incident on July 14, 2022. I am satisfied that Mr. Cruz had notice that the Respondents sought to dismiss his complaint on this ground, as his response sets out his argument about the ground of criminal conviction: he says Paladin terminated his employment because the Respondents believed he committed the criminal offence of assault.
[27] I am satisfied that Mr. Cruz has no reasonable prospect of proving this part of his complaint. The Respondents do not deny that they believed Mr. Cruz assaulted the individual, or that this was part of the reason for his termination, but there is no evidence before me that he was charged or convicted of an offense, or that the Respondents believed he was. The Code prohibits discrimination based on a criminal charge or conviction, if the charge or conviction is unrelated to a person’s employment, but the parties have not referred me to any authorities suggesting the prohibition extends to discrimination based on conduct that could potentially lead to a charge or conviction.
[28] Based on the undisputed fact that Mr. Cruz was not charged or convicted of an offense, and in the absence of any evidence suggesting the Respondents believed he was, I find he has no reasonable prospect of proving the Respondents’ conduct was connected to the ground of criminal conviction, under the Code.
IV CONCLUSION
[29] Mr. Cruz’s human rights complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. The complaint is dismissed.
Andrew Robb
Tribunal Member