Collingwood v. The Society of Housing Opportunities and Progressive Employment and another, 2026 BCHRT 90
Date Issued: April 9, 2026
File(s): CS-015283
Indexed as: Collingwood v. The Society of Housing Opportunities and Progressive Employment and another, 2026 BCHRT 90
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Gail Collingwood
COMPLAINANT[S]
AND:
The Society of Housing Opportunities and Progressive Employment and Julie Dorsey
RESPONDENT[S]
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Ijeamaka Anika
On their own behalf: Gail Collingwood
Agent for the Respondents: Warren Postnikoff
Date of Hearing: November 3, 2025
Location of Hearing: Via Videoconferencing
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This Complaint was accepted as a retaliation complaint under s. 43 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] Gail Collingwood is a senior person living in an apartment unit operated by the Society of Housing Opportunities and Progressive Employment [the Society]. Julie Dorsey is the property manager for Ms. Collingwood’s building. In this decision, I refer to the Society and Ms. Dorsey as the Respondents. Ms. Collingwood’s issues with the Society arose from her desire to have her ex-husband, Allan Materi, move into her unit so that she could care for him. Mr. Materi had lived in Ms. Collingwood’s unit on an intermittent basis.
[3] On November 24, 2022, Ms. Collingwood (on behalf of Mr. Materi) filed a complaint with the Tribunal alleging discrimination in tenancy on the grounds of disability [the Original Complaint]. The Original Complaint alleged that the Respondents failed to accommodate Mr. Materi by denying his request to move into Ms. Collingwood’s unit with his dog, which he relied on due to his disability. The Respondents denied discriminating. They say they denied Mr. Materi’s request because the Society did not allow pets. The parties ultimately settled the complaint in February 2023.
[4] Ms. Collingwood says that after she filed the Original Complaint, the Respondents began picking on her and threatening to evict her. In March 2025, when Ms. Collingwood requested that Mr. Materi be permitted to return to her unit, the Respondents denied the request. Ms. Collingwood says that at the time, Ms. Dorsey told her she “better not get human rights involved again” or words to that effect. She says that statement caused her to look back on the treatment she had received since filing the Original Complaint and to recognize it as a pattern of retaliation.
[5] In this retaliation complaint, Ms. Collingwood alleges that the Respondents violated s. 43 of the Human Rights Code by: (1) refusing to allow her to speak with someone with higher authority at the Society or with a member of its Board of Directors; (2) threatening to evict her if she filed another complaint with the Tribunal; (3) subjecting her to petty enforcement rules that other tenants were permitted to disregard; and (4) refusing to permit Mr. Materi to return as an occupant in her unit.
[6] The Respondents deny that they retaliated against Ms. Collingwood. They say that they were enforcing the Society’s standard policies and tenancy regulations in the ordinary course of managing their properties, and that their conduct had nothing to do with the Original Complaint. Ms. Dorsey does not recall telling Ms. Collingwood not to get the Tribunal involved again. The Respondents say they have not treated Ms. Collingwood differently from other tenants. They ask for the complaint to be dismissed.
[7] I heard this complaint on November 3, 2025. Ms. Collingwood provided a brief oral statement at the conclusion of the hearing. She informed me that she did not wish to provide written closing submissions. The Respondents provided their written closing submissions on November 6, 2025. Ms. Collingwood did not submit a reply, and I am satisfied that she did not wish to do so.
[8] While the timing of some events might suggest retaliation, I am satisfied on the evidence that the Respondents’ conduct is explained by legitimate property management reasons rather than by the filing of the Original Complaint or the prospect of another human rights complaint.
[9] The complaint is dismissed.
II Witnesses and Credibility
[10] My findings of fact are based on the evidence the five witnesses presented in this hearing. These findings are made on the balance of probabilities, meaning I have found these facts to be more likely than not: FH v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 at para. 49. Where there is doubt, that doubt is resolved based on which party bears the burden of proof: Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 20. For the material issues in this complaint, that party is Ms. Collingwood.
[11] Ms. Collingwood testified on her own behalf and did not call any witnesses. Warren Postnikoff (the General Manager of Operations at the Society), Julie Dorsey, Daniel Parry (the Society’s landscaping supervisor), and Aaron Breitkreutz (maintenance manager at the Society) testified on behalf of the Respondents. Each witness testified and relied on various documents entered as exhibits during the hearing. I do not refer to all the evidence of every witness, but I have carefully considered all of it in reaching my conclusions.
[12] Credibility and reliability require different considerations. Credibility involves the veracity or truthfulness of a witness. It is about whether a witness is telling the truth. Reliability involves the accuracy of a witness’ testimony: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398, affirmed in 2012 BCCA 296, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 392, at para. 186; Hardychuk v. Johnstone, 2012 BCSC 1359 at para. 10; R. v. S.A.S., 2021 BCPC 69 at paras. 21-27.
[13] For all witness testimony, I start from the presumption that the witness is telling the truth: Hardychuk at para. 10. I then consider whether the story is accurate and inherently believable: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398. To do so, I consider a range of factors such as:
…[the witness’] ability and opportunity to observe events, the firmness of [their] memory, the ability to resist the influence of interest to modify [their] recollection, whether the witness’ evidence harmonizes with independent evidence that has been accepted, whether the witness changes [their] testimony during direct and cross-examination, whether the witness’ testimony seems unreasonable, impossible, or unlikely, whether a witness has a motive to lie, and the demeanour of a witness generally.
Bradshaw at para. 186.
[14] There was one instance were Ms. Collingwood and Ms. Dorsey gave conflicting evidence: whether Ms. Dorsey told Ms. Collingwood not to get the Tribunal involved again. Here, I prefer Ms. Collingwood’s evidence. I apply the factors set out in Bradshaw at para. 186. Ms. Collingwood was consistent; she described the statement in her complaint form and repeated it without wavering in her oral testimony and on cross-examination. There is no apparent reason for her to have fabricated this particular detail, and she raised it in the context of how she came to recognize a pattern of retaliation, not to embellish a separate allegation. Ms. Collongwood’s account is also internally coherent. It describes how a property manager, frustrated by the prospect of a second human rights complaint after having dealt with the first, may plausibly respond in those terms.
[15] Ms. Dorsey, on the other hand, does not say the words were not said, just that she does not recall saying them. That leaves open the real possibility that the words were said but are not remembered, particularly in the context of what she describes as a routine conversation about tenancy consequences. Her contemporaneous notes do not record the statement in either direction. I also note that Ms. Dorsey had an obvious interest in not being seen to have discouraged a complainant from exercising her rights under the Code.
[16] On all other material points, the evidence was either undisputed or did not turn on the credibility of any particular witness. I found the witnesses gave their evidence in a forthright manner, consistent with the documentary record and on cross-examination. Ms. Collingwood did not challenge Mr. Perry’s or Mr. Breitkreutz’s evidence on cross examination, and I accept their testimony as offered.
[17] I am grateful to all the witnesses that gave evidence. I have done my best to reconcile their evidence.
III BACKGROUND
[18] The background to this retaliation complaint is the Original Complaint which Ms. Collingwood filed with the Tribunal on November 24, 2022, on behalf of Mr. Materi, in which she alleged discrimination in tenancy on the grounds of disability. The parties entered into a Settlement Agreement regarding that complaint in February 2023. There is no dispute that Ms. Collingwood filed the Original Complaint and that the events described below occurred after it was filed.
1. The Society and Ms. Collingwood’s Tenancy
[19] The Society is a non-profit organization that builds and provides affordable housing in the Okanagan Region of British Columbia. The Society receives funding from BC Housing which sets rules on the length and number of overnight visits an individual is permitted. Tenants residing in the Society’s buildings who are in receipt of a rent subsidy must apply and be approved for such a subsidy by BC Housing. Tenants’ eligibility for the subsidy is contingent on the composition of their household, and changes in occupancy affect the rent calculation.
[20] Ms. Collingwood has been a tenant of the Society since June 2003. She is the sole tenant named in her tenancy agreement. The tenancy agreement between Ms. Collingwood and the Society prohibits guests from staying with pets or for more than 14 days. According to the tenancy agreement, breach of this provision is grounds for eviction. Mr. Materi had previously been a tenant of the Society on two occasions. He had a negative internal reference for both tenancies. The Respondents say that during his tenancies, Mr. Materi behaved poorly leading to the negative references, and for that reason, the Society would not consider renting to him again.
[21] Julie Dorsey is the property manager responsible for the property where Ms. Collingwood lives. Ms. Dorsey manages approximately 520 units with two associates. Ms. Dorsey described her practice of recording her interactions with tenants and observations she made when she walked around the premises. She made contemporaneous notes in a logbook which she entered into her file for each tenant as it pertained to them. Much of the evidence in this hearing was drawn from those records, which I found to be reliable.
2. The Original Complaint and Settlement
[22] Mr. Materi is Ms. Collingwood’s ex-husband. He faces various health challenges and Ms. Collingwood described him as terminally ill. Ms. Collingwood also describes herself as his caregiver – managing his bills, preparing his meals, cleaning, and administering his medications.
[23] From about May 2021, Mr. Materi and his registered service dog would stay with Ms. Collingwood on occasion while attending medical appointments in Kelowna. When he resided with her for periods that exceeded the Society’s guest policy, the Respondents adjusted her rent accordingly. In November 2022, Ms. Collingwood filed the Original Complaint alleging discrimination in tenancy based on Mr. Materi’s disability. She alleged that the Respondents’ denial of Mr. Materi’s request to move into her unit with his service dog, which the Respondents say was based on the Society’s no-pets policy, constituted a failure to accommodate his disability.
[24] The parties settled the Original Complaint in February 2023. By consent, the parties introduced the terms of the settlement at the hearing. Under the settlement, Mr. Materi was permitted to move back into Ms. Collingwood’s unit as an occupant – but not a tenant – so that Ms. Collingwood could care for him. In that respect, the settlement modified the Society’s 14-day guest policy for Mr. Materi, on the basis that his stays were connected to his care needs. However, the settlement also provided that Mr. Materi would not seek permanent occupancy or tenancy with the Society, and that Ms. Collingwood and Mr. Materi would abide by all other laws, policies, and regulations applicable to tenants of the Society. Ms. Collingwood was required to submit paperwork with BC Housing to adjust her rental subsidy. The Respondents say the settlement preserved their right not to enter into a tenancy with Mr. Materi. Ms. Dorsey testified that the settlement arrangement came to and end when Ms. Collingwood had Mr. Materi removed from the unit in early 2015.
3. Events following the Settlement
[25] The following is a summary of the Respondents’ interactions with Ms. Collingwood following the settlement of the Original Complaint, drawn primarily from Ms. Dorsey’s contemporaneous notes and clarified during Ms. Collingwood’s and Ms. Dorsey’s oral testimonies at the hearing. The facts set out below are largely undisputed. Where Ms. Collingwood and the Respondents differ is not on what occurred, but on whether it was connected to the human rights complaint.
[26] On February 17, 2023, Ms. Dorsey sent Ms. Collingwood the BC Housing Subsidy Application and the Income Declaration for both her and Mr. Materi to complete, in anticipation of Mr. Materi moving into the unit. Ms. Collingwood responded by handwritten annotation confirming her income and noting she would advise Ms. Dorsey of Mr. Materi’s move-in date once she knew it. By April 2023, Ms. Collingwood and Mr. Materi had submitted their income documents.
[27] During the spring and summer of 2023, Ms. Dorsey dealt with a number of routine property management matters involving Ms. Collingwood’s unit. In April 2023, Ms. Collingwood requested permission to continue using a dirt spot outside her unit for gardening, which Ms. Dorsey approved. She also asked about the Society building a permanent external storage addition to her unit. Ms. Dorsey told her that management had decided it was not something the Society would be doing, but that they were exploring the possibility of providing Ms. Collingwood with a list of approved portable storage sheds she could purchase herself. In May 2023, Ms. Dorsey approved Ms. Collingwood’s request to hang hummingbird feeders.
[28] In June 2023, Ms. Collingwood followed up on the exterior storage issue and asked why the Society could not build the unit itself. Ms. Dorsey told her she was awaiting feedback from management and would follow up.
[29] That same month, Ms. Collingwood called the Society’s reception to provide the names and contact information for the Society’s Board of Directors. She was provided with information on how to contact the Executive Director. Ms. Dorsey noted that all communication with the Board was done through the Society’s Executive Director. When Ms. Collingwood called, her call was directed to Ms. Dorsey. Ms. Collingwood says that directing her to Ms. Dorsey rather than allowing her to speak with the Board or a more senior figure was one form of retaliatory treatment that occurred after filing the Original Complaint.
[30] In July 2023, Ms. Dorsey observed that Mr. Materi had two vehicles on site – a car and a truck. She noted this in Ms. Collingwood’s file. When Ms. Dorsey spoke with Mr. Materi, he said he was using the truck for storage. Ms. Dorsey also noted that one of his vehicles had been parked in the fire lane. On July 12, 2023, Ms. Dorsey wrote to Ms. Collingwood advising that all vehicles on the property must be insured and operable and must not be parked in fire lanes. Ms. Collingwood responded that Mr. Materi’s vehicles were insured and that he had parked in the no-parking lane only because he was cleaning the inside of his car as it was shady there. Ms. Dorsey acknowledged the response.
[31] On July 26, 2023, Ms. Dorsey wrote to Ms. Collingwood asking that Mr. Materi not mow the lawn by her unit because the space was communal and was maintained by the Society’s landscaping team. The letter stated that the landscapers had intentionally left the grass longer during the heat of summer to retain moisture and prevent damage, and that there was a risk of the mower damaging sprinkler heads and other equipment.
[32] Ms. Collingwood characterizes these communications regarding the vehicles and lawn mowing, along with the subsequent enforcement letters described below, as petty and selective enforcement of rules that other tenants were not held to, which she says began after she filed the Original Complaint.
[33] In October 2023, Ms. Collingwood requested permission to put up a fence to contain Mr. Materi’s dog during snowy months. Ms. Dorsey told her a fence could not be attached to the Society’s property but could be permitted temporarily. Around this time, Ms. Collingwood told Ms. Dorsey that Mr. Materi had become volatile and she wanted help to remove him from her unit. Ms. Dorsey advised her that Mr. Materi was an occupant and not a tenant and suggested that each of their social workers might be able to assist.
[34] In December 2023, the Society decided to build permanent storage units for two units in the building, including Ms. Collingwood’s. Construction began in January 2024. The Respondents posted a notice on Ms. Collingwood’s door advising of the construction schedule and asking that the carport be cleared during the construction period. Mr. Breitkreutz testified that when the work was completed, the Society’s maintenance team moved Ms. Collingwood’s belongings into the new storage unit, to assist her given her mobility limitations.
[35] In early 2024, Ms. Collingwood called Ms. Dorsey on multiple occasions about Mr. Materi’s increasingly volatile behaviour. In March 2024, Ms. Collingwood reported to Ms. Dorsey that she had called the police, but they had been unable to remove Mr. Materi. She asked Ms. Dorsey to change the locks on her unit. Ms. Dorsey responded that rekeying the unit could be done for a $30 callout fee once Mr. Materi was no longer in the unit. In April 2024, Ms. Collingwood began providing Ms. Dorsey with notes documenting the abuse she was experiencing from Mr. Materi. Ms. Dorsey testified she felt bad for Ms. Collingwood because Ms. Collingwood had done a kind thing by allowing Mr. Materi live with her.
[36] By May 2024, Mr. Materi had given Ms. Collingwood a written notice that he would vacate her unit by May 31, 2024. Ms. Dorsey recalculated Ms. Collingwood’s rent to reflect her single occupancy and sent the relevant subsidy paperwork. However, Mr. Materi’s health had declined significantly, and he did not move out. The Society recalculated the rent contribution to the two-person rate. Ms. Collingwood provided another notice that Mr. Materi was moving out effective June 30, 2024. The Society told Ms. Collingwood that it would not recalculate the rent until Mr. Materi was physically out of the unit. By July 2024, Mr. Materi was taken to hospital; his dog and his vehicle would stay with Ms. Collingwood temporarily. Ms. Collingwood called Ms. Dorsey to recalculate her rent. Ms. Dorsey noted that by July 17, Mr. Materi was still occupying the unit and withheld the recalculation pending his departure.
[37] In September 2024, Ms. Dorsey conducted an inspection of Ms. Collingwood’s unit and wrote to her noting that one bedroom and the mechanical room in her unit were not accessible for inspection. The letter also asked Ms. Collingwood to ensure Mr. Materi’s dog was kept on a leash outside and that faeces were cleaned up. Ms. Collingwood says she was ill during the inspection and could not move the items herself.
[38] Throughout 2024 and into 2025, Ms. Collingwood submitted a series of maintenance requests, including having her air conditioner reconnected, having bedroom and office doors adjusted, and having her toilet seat replaced. The Respondents’ maintenance team addressed these requests. Mr. Breitkreutz testified that he and his staff provide one level of service to all tenants. He stated that when the standard issue toilet seat Ms. Collingwood requested did not fit and Ms. Collingwood asked for a commode, his team had it installed. Mr. Breitkreutz says this was not part of his team’s standard job responsibilities, but they did it to help out Ms. Collingwood.
[39] In January 2025, Ms. Collingwood sent a letter to the Respondents detailing how Mr. Materi was making her life difficult. The Society provided her with a copy of the Residential Tenancy Branch Notice to End Tenancy for Cause for her to serve to Mr. Materi. The Respondents also told Ms. Collingwood that they could not make Mr. Materi vacate her unit because he was not a tenant.
[40] In February 2025, Ms. Collingwood had served the End of Tenancy Notice to Mr. Materi and was having RCMP remove him. She requested that the Respondent change the locks on her unit and recalculate her rent to the one-person rate.
[41] In March 2025, the Respondents recalculated Ms. Collingwood’s rent to reflect single occupancy and agreed to reimburse any prorated overpaid rent funds for March if there were any. On March 31, 2025, she called Ms. Dorsey to request that Mr. Materi be permitted to return to her unit. Ms. Dorsey declined stating that the Respondents were not prepared to reinstate the settlement agreement. She testified that the settlement agreement ended when Mr. Materi moved out. Ms. Collingwood stated that she would file another complaint with the Tribunal if Mr. Materi was not permitted to move back in. During this conversation, Ms. Collingwood says Ms. Dorsey told her not to get the Tribunal involved again. Ms. Dorsey testified that she could not recall saying those words; the conversation she recalls had to do with explaining the consequences of Mr. Materi’s continued occupation. I addressed this conflict in my credibility analysis above. Ms. Collingwood says this refusal was itself an act of retaliation for the Original Complaint.
[42] On April 1, 2025, the Respondents posted a letter on Ms. Collingwood’s door stating that if Mr. Materi remained in her unit longer than the 14 days stated in the tenancy agreement, she may no longer qualify for the subsidized rental unit, and the Society would issue her a notice to end the tenancy. Ms. Collingwood says this letter, which she received shortly after Ms. Dorsey told her not to get the Tribunal invoiced again, constituted a threat of eviction connected to the human rights complaint.
[43] On April 22, 2025, Ms. Collingwood filed the retaliation complaint. On May 22, 2025, the Respondents received notice of the retaliation complaint.
IV ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[44] I now explain my reasons for finding that the Respondents did not violate s. 43 of the Code.
A. Legal Principles
[45] Section 43 of the Code states, in part, that:
A person must not evict, discharge, suspend, expel, intimidate, coerce, impose any pecuniary or other penalty on, deny a right or benefit to or otherwise discriminate against a person because that person complains or is named in a complaint, might complain or be named in a complaint, gives evidence, might give evidence or otherwise assists or might assist in a complaint or other proceeding under this Code.
[46] Section 43 is an important part of the Code. It protects the integrity of the complaint process and is aimed at ensuring that people can exercise their rights under the Code without fear of prejudicial consequences: JW v. LS, 2023 BCHRT 30 at para. 55.
[47] To succeed in her retaliation complaint, the burden is on Ms. Collingwood to prove that: (1) the Respondents were aware that she made or might make a complaint under the Code; (2) the Respondents engaged in or threatened to engage in conduct described in s. 43 of the Code (e.g., threatened to evict, intimidated, etc.); and (3) there is a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the discrimination complaint: Gichuru v. Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78, at para. 58 [Pallai].
[48] Ms. Collingwood argues that the Respondents retaliated against her after she filed the Original Complaint and because she told them she intended to file another complaint by: (1) refusing to allow her to speak with someone with higher authority at the Society or with a member of its Board; (2) threatening to evict her if she the Tribunal involved again; (3) subjecting her to petty and selective enforcement of rules; (4) refusing to permit Mr. Materi to move back into her unit. I refer to all of these collectively as the impugned conduct.
[49] I turn now to the elements that Ms. Collingwood must prove to establish her claim of retaliation.
B. Were the Respondents aware of the Original Complaint or Ms. Collingwood’s intention to file another human rights complaint?
[50] It is not disputed that the Respondents were aware of the Original Complaint that Ms. Collingwood filed on November 22, 2022, and as set out above, the parties settled the complaint in February 2023. I also accept Ms. Collingwood’s evidence that Ms. Dorsey was aware that she considered filing another human rights complaint. Ms. Dorsey’s contemporaneous notes from her conversation with Ms. Collingwood recorded that Ms. Collingwood told her she might do so during their March 2025 conversation. The first element of the retaliation test is satisfied.
C. Did the Respondents engage in conduct described in s. 43 of the Code?
[51] For the purposes of this analysis, I will assume without deciding that each of the following could, if established, constitute conduct described in s. 43:
a. Directing Ms. Collingwood to Ms. Dorsey rather than permitting her to speak with someone at a higher level of authority or with a Board member (potential intimidation/denying a benefit).
b. Warning Ms. Collingwood that she would lose her tenancy if Mr. Materi remained in her unit, in circumstances where Ms. Collingwood had stated she intended to file a human rights complaint (potential intimidation/imposing a penalty).
c. Issuing enforcement letters regarding Mr. Materi’s vehicles, the common lawn, his dog, and the condition of the mechanical room (potential intimidation/denying a benefit); and
d. Refusing to permit Mr. Materi to return as an occupant in Ms. Collingwood’s unit (imposing a penalty/denying a benefit).
[52] The determinative issue is whether there is a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the human rights complaint.
D. Is there a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the Original Complaint?
[53] My analysis turns on whether Ms. Collingwood has established a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the original complaint.
[54] Unlike the discrimination analysis that applies to other sections of the Code, the legal test for retaliation is not whether a human rights complaint was “a factor” in the conduct: Brooks v. Skyacres Turkey Ranch Ltd. and others (No. 2), 2022 BCHRT 73, at para. 234; Gichuru v. Pallai, 2012 BCHRT 327 at paras. 76-90, upheld by the BCCA in Pallai. The connection must be sufficient to prove retaliation: Pallai at para. 54. The Court in Pallai explained that there are two ways to establish a “sufficient connection” between the conduct and the complaint: by proving the respondent intended to retaliate; or by inference, where the respondent can reasonably have been perceived to have engaged in the conduct as retaliation, with the element of reasonable perception being assessed from the point of view of a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, at the time of the impugned conduct: para. 58.
[55] Since retaliation will rarely be acknowledged as such by a respondent, it often must be inferred from a review of all the evidence: C.S.W.U. Local 1611 v. SELI Canada (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 423 at para. 17. A “reasonable perception” which can arise by inference, is assessed from the point of view of “a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, at the time of the impugned conduct,” and not exclusively from the point of view of the complainant who alleges retaliation: Pallai at paras. 58 and 66.
[56] While s. 43 does not contain a justification clause, meaning that the Code does not set out a statutory defense for retaliation, a respondent’s evidence is important for assessing the context of the alleged retaliation. In particular, the respondent’s explanation for their conduct must be considered with all of the evidence to determine if the requisite connection has been established: Pallai at para 59.
[57] In considering whether there is a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the human rights complaint, I have considered all the evidence including: the timing of the Original Complaint and subsequent impugned conduct, the Respondents explanations for their conduct, Ms. Collingwood’s evidence about how she was treated, whether the evidence supports Ms. Collingwood’s suggestion that she was held to rules other tenants were not, and the overall context of the parties’ interactions.
[58] I start by acknowledging that the timing of some events could support an inference of retaliation. The Respondents were aware of the Original Complaint by December 2022 following the Tribunal’s notification. A number of the incidents Ms. Collingwood identifies as retaliatory including the letters regarding Mr. Materi’s vehicles, the lawn mowing notice, the re-inspection letter, and the denial of Mr. Materi’s request to return, occurred between 2023 and 2025, after the Original Complaint was filed. The timing could give rise to a reasonable inference that these events were connected to the human rights complaint.
[59] However, I am not satisfied on the totality of the evidence that the Respondents’ conduct was connected to the human rights complaint. I address each element of the impugned conduct in turn.
[60] First, I consider Ms. Collingwood’s allegation that the Respondents prevented her from speaking with someone with higher authority at the Society or with a member of its Board. Both Ms. Dorsey and Mr. Postnikoff testified that Ms. Collingwood was directed to Ms. Dorsey because management had delegated full authority over her file to Ms. Dorsey as property manager. This is a credible explanation. Directing Ms. Collingwood to Ms. Dorsey reflected standard management practice, not an effort to isolate or pressure her. The evidence further shows that Ms. Collingwood had been provided with contact information for the Society’s Executive Director, who serves as the Society’s liaison to the Board, in June 2023. There is no evidence that she was restricted from contacting the Executive Director or a Board member after that time.
[61] Second, Ms. Collingwood alleges that the April 2025 letter was retaliatory because it constituted a threat to evict her if she pursued a human rights complaint. The letter stated that if Mr. Materi remained in her unit beyond April 14, 2025, she would not longer qualify for her subsidized unit, and the Society would issue a notice to end her tenancy. I accept that the letter carried a clear consequence: non-compliance would result in a notice to end her tenancy. That is properly characterized as a warning of eviction, and I have treated it as such.
[62] However, I am not satisfied that the letter was connected to the human rights complaint. Ms. Dorsey’s evidence, which I accept, is that such letters are issued consistently to tenants across the Society’s properties when they are at risk of jeopardizing their tenancy, and that the purpose is to preserve tenancies by ensuring tenants understand the consequences of non-compliance. Ms. Collingwood was not singled out to receive that letter.
[63] The more difficult question is whether the letter can be explained consistently with the settlement, which had expressly permitted Mr. Materi’s occupancy beyond 14 days. I find that it can. As I described above, the settlement arrangement was a tailored consent-based modification of the Society’s guest policy, conditional on Mr. Materi’s occupancy being connected to his care needs and on his not seeking permanent tenancy with the Society. Ms. Dorsey testified that the arrangement effectively ended when Ms. Collingwood had Mr. Materi removed from the unit in early 2025 – a decision that Ms. Collingwood herself initiated. When Ms. Collingwood sought to reinstate Mr. Materi’s occupancy in March 2025, the settlement arrangement was no longer operative, and the standard terms of the tenancy agreement applied. The letter followed from that position. I find that the Respondents’ reversion to the standard 14-day rule was a consequence of the settlement arrangement having run its course, not a response to the human rights complaint.
[64] I now turn to Ms. Dorsey’s statement that Ms. Collingwood should not get the Tribunal involved again. Having found that Ms. Dorsey likely said words to that effect, I must consider whether that statement, taken together with the April 2025 letter, gives rise to a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the human rights complaint.
[65] I accept that the combination of a verbal warning against filing a complaint and a letter warning of eviction, occurring in close proximity could on their face, support an inference of retaliation.
[66] However, I am not satisfied that the connection is sufficient. The verbal statement and the letter must be assessed in context. As I found above, the April 2025 letter was issued because the settlement arrangement had ended and the standard terms applied again. I note that the Respondents reached this position before Ms. Collingwood raised the prospect of a further complaint, as Ms. Dorsey’s contemporaneous notes confirm. Ms. Dorsey’s statement to Ms. Collingwood, while inappropriate and ill-advised, is best understood as a frustrated response to that prospect rather than a signal that the letter was being issued because of it. On balance, the evidence does not support the conclusion that Ms. Collingwood’s statement about filing a complaint caused the letter to be issued or changed the Respondents’ approach to the occupancy issue. The Respondents’ decision not to reinstate the settlement arrangement preceded Ms. Collingwood’s threat and I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that it was grounded in the history of Mr. Materi’s occupancy and departure.
[67] In these circumstances, a reasonable complainant apprised of all the facts would not reasonably perceive the letter as having been issued in retaliation for the human rights complaint. The Respondents’ explanation, that the letter followed from Mr. Materi’s departure and the end of the settlement arrangement, is supported by the evidence.
[68] Third, Ms. Collingwood says that after the Original Complaint was filed, the Respondents began “picking on her,” holding her to rules that other tenants were permitted to disregard. She points to the July 2023 letter regarding Mr. Materi’s vehicles (one of which had been parked in the fire lane and one of which was being used for storage), the July 2023 letter regarding Mr. Materi mowing the common lawn, the September 2024 re-inspection letter requesting that the mechanical room be made accessible and that Mr. Materi’s dog be leashed and cleaned up after, and the $30 fee charged on a subsequent callout to re-key her unit. Ms. Collingwood made general observations at the hearing that other tenants were permitted to park in restricted areas, keep dogs, and leave items on their patios without consequence. I do not accept that those observations establish differential treatment.
[69] Ms. Dorsey testified that she monitors and enforces tenancy obligations consistently across all of the Society’s properties, and that she does not disclose her healings with other tenants due to privacy considerations. The Respondents’ evidence also is that these communications reflect standard property management practice applied consistently across all of the Society’s properties. Ms. Dorsey testified that she sends similar letters to multiple tenants each month, monitors activities across all of the Society’s units, and does not disclose her dealings with other tenants due to privacy considerations – which she explains is the reason Ms. Collingwood was not told how issues with neighbouring units were being addressed. Further, Ms. Collingwood admitted at the hearing that the truck had in fact been parked in the fire lane, that Mr. Materi had been mowing the common lawn, and that the mechanical room was full of belongings that blocked access during the re-inspection. These admissions undermine her claim that the enforcement was unfounded or pretextual.
[70] Regarding the $30 fee for re-keying her unit, Ms. Dorsey testified that the Respondents’ practice was to charge a $30 fee for a callout to change locks. It was at her discretion to impose this charge, and she did so typically after the first callout because it was staff time being used for the callout. Ms. Dorsey stated that when the locks were changed, Ms. Collingwood was charged a fee because this was a request she had made a few times before. Ms. Collingwood did not dispute this. The fee was charged on a subsequent callout, consistent with the Respondents’ practice of charging for repeated callouts to manage staff time and resources. This evidence does not support a finding that the Respondents’ conduct was related to the Original Complaint.
[71] I also note that some of the incidents Ms. Collingwood characterizes as retaliatory –including the requirement to clear her patio – predated the Original Complaint, as Ms. Collingwood herself conceded during cross-examination. That the same types of management communications continued after the complaint was filed is consistent with the Respondents carrying on their standard practices, not with retaliating against Ms. Collingwood for exercising her rights.
[72] I further note that throughout the relevant period, the Respondents continued to fulfill Ms. Collingwood’s maintenance requests: building a permanent exterior storage unit at no cost to her, replacing her toilet seat, changing her lightbulbs, and installing a commode at her request given her mobility challenges. Mr. Breitkreutz testified that the maintenance team went beyond their normal responsibilities to assist Ms. Collingwood.
[73] Finally, Ms. Collingwood alleges that the Respondents’ refusal to permit Mr. Materi to return to her unit as an occupant in March 2025 was retaliatory. I am not persuaded.
[74] I acknowledge that the Respondents’ position has not been fixed. Before the Original Complaint, they declined Mr. Materi’s occupancy. Through the settlement, the agreed to his occupancy on specific terms, as an occupant but not a tenant. In March 2025, returned to their original position.
[75] I make not findings on whether the Respondents were correct in their understanding that the settlement arrangement ended when Mr. Materi left the unit. That is not the question before me.
[76] The question is whether the March 2025 refusal to permit Mr. Materi’s return was connected to the filing of the human rights complaint or the prospect of a further one. I find that it was not. While the Respondents’ position was modified by the settlement, the settlement arrangement came to an end when Ms. Collingwood herself had Mr. Materi removed from the unit. As Ms. Collingwood acknowledged during cross-examination, the Respondents did not allow Mr. Materi to reside in her unit before she filed the Original Complaint in November 2022 and again in March 2025 when she renewed her request. Retaliation requires a detrimental change (evict, discharge, suspend, expel, intimidate, coerce, impose any pecuniary or other penalty on, deny a right or benefit) in conduct in response to the filing of a complaint or potentially filing one. The March 2025 refusal was not a response to the human rights complaint. Rather, it was a refusal to reinstate an arrangement that had already ended for reasons unconnected to the complaint. Ms. Dorsey testified that the Respondents’ underlying position, based on Mr. Materi’s negative internal reference and their obligations under the BC Housing subsidy agreement, both predated the Original Complaint and was not impacted by it. There is insufficient evidence before me that the filing of the Original Complaint, or the prospect of a further one, caused or contributed to that position.
[77] In Gichuru v. Vancouver Swing Society (No. 3), 2020 BCHRT 1, the Tribunal accepted that the threat of a human rights complaint was connected to the decision to ban Mr. Gichuru, because it supported the Swing Society’s assessment that he was not responding appropriately to the issues it had raised. However, it found that the connection was not “sufficient” to prove retaliation because “it was not Mr. Gichuru’s stated intention to file a human rights complaint that was the problem for VSS; it was his response on matters that concerned them that led to the conclusion to extend the ban”: para. 184. The Tribunal reasoned that to find retaliation in those circumstances would:
… mean that any person who stated an intention to file a complaint would be insulated from any negative impact – no matter its cause – simply by virtue of making the statement and that statement being in the mind of the respondent. The temporal connection between adverse treatment and an intention to file a complaint may give rise to a reasonable inference that the conduct is retaliatory, but it does not necessarily prove a sufficient connection. [at para. 183]
[78] Similar reasoning supported the Tribunal’s decision in Pallai that Mr. Pallai had evicted Mr. Gichuru for non-retaliatory reasons, notwithstanding that Mr. Gichuru had filed a human rights complaint and several other legal actions against Mr. Pallai at the time.
[79] Here, I am similarly not satisfied that Ms. Collingwood has established a sufficient connection between the human rights complaint and the impugned conduct. The Respondents have provided a credible explanation for each element of their conduct that rebuts any inference arising from timing alone. The enforcement letters were standard management communications responding to actual rule infractions that Ms. Collingwood largely acknowledged. The refusal to permit Mr. Materi’s return was consistent with the position the Respondents had maintained since before the Original Complaint was filed. The April 2025 letter was also issued to other tenants when they were at risk of jeopardizing their tenancies for varied reasons. Further, the Respondents continued to respond to Ms. Collingwood’s maintenance and other requests throughout the relevant period, sometimes going beyond what was strictly required. To accept Ms. Collingwood’s argument would mean that the filing of a complaint entitled her to be exempted from standard tenancy obligations to which all other tenants were subject. That is not the purpose of s. 43.
[80] A reasonable complainant, apprised of all the facts, would not reasonably perceive that the Respondents were acting out of retaliation for the human rights complaint. Rather, in the full context of this relationship, the Respondents’ conduct is better explained by their consistent property management approach and the ongoing, largely unchanged dispute about whether Mr. Materi could reside with Ms. Collingwood.
[81] Based on the totality of the evidence, I find that Ms. Collingwood has not established a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and her filing of the human rights complaint. As a result, I am not satisfied that the Respondents retaliated against Ms. Collingwood, and I dismiss the complaint of retaliation under s. 43 of the Code.
V CONCLUSION
[82] Ms. Collingwood has not proven that the Respondents violated s. 43 of the Code. The complaint is dismissed.
Ijeamaka Anika
Tribunal Member