Bruckman v. BC Ferry & Marine Workers’ Union, 2026 BCHRT 9
Date Issued: January 7, 2026
Files: CS-005758
Indexed as: Bruckman v. BC Ferry & Marine Workers’ Union, 2026 BCHRT 9
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jack Bruckman
COMPLAINANT
AND:
BC Ferry & Marine Workers’ Union
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On their own behalf: Jack Bruckman
Agent for the Respondent: Eric McNeely
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Jack Bruckman was the Executive Director for the BC Ferry & Marine Workers’ Union. They identify as non-binary, and present as a trans masculine butch woman. In this human rights complaint, they allege that, during their employment, they were misgendered and discriminated against by a Union local president. They allege this is discrimination based on their sex and gender identity or expression, in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] This hearing is scheduled to begin on August 3, 2026. In this application, the Union argues that it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the hearing in circumstances where it has remedied any possible discrimination and made Mx. Bruckman a reasonable settlement offer to address any injury to their dignity. They ask the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I agree that the purposes of the Code have been fulfilled by the Union’s remedial actions and its monetary offer to Mx. Bruckman. There would be no further purpose served by proceeding to a hearing. The complaint is dismissed.
II ISSUE
[4] As a preliminary issue, I acknowledge that the Union has also argued that the Tribunal should dismiss the complaint because it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). However, I do not consider these arguments in my decision because the Tribunal did not give the Union permission to apply for dismissal on this ground. Rather, I focus on the Union’s arguments, which were permitted, under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[5] Section 27(1)(d)(ii) grants the Tribunal discretion to dismiss a complaint where it would not further the Code’s purposes to proceed. Those purposes are set out in s. 3 as follows:
(a) to foster a society in British Columbia in which there are no impediments to full and free participation in the economic, social, political and cultural life of British Columbia;
(b) to promote a climate of understanding and mutual respect where all are equal in dignity and rights;
(c) to prevent discrimination prohibited by this Code;
(d) to identify and eliminate persistent patterns of inequality associated with discrimination prohibited by this Code;
(e) to provide a means of redress for those persons who are discriminated against contrary to this Code,
[6] These purposes encompass both private and public interests. In Dar Santos v. University of British Columbia, 2003 BCHRT 73, the Tribunal explained:
… I accept that, the “purposes of the Code” go beyond the individual rights of a complainant and respondent. The purposes of the Code, as outlined in s. 3, include several public policy purposes. Thus, the assessment of whether proceeding with a complaint will further the purposes of the Code, involves more than an assessment of an individual complaint, but encompasses broader public policy issues, such as the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in processing a complaint to a hearing. [para. 59]
[7] In light of those dual interests, there are circumstances where the Code’s purposes can be best met through a settlement negotiated between the parties. Those negotiated outcomes can save considerable public and private resources and may offer a more expeditious resolution for the dispute. They may also encompass remedies outside the Tribunal’s power, which more closely match the parties’ interests, and which may better serve the relationship in the long run. For those reasons, the Tribunal recognizes the role of settlement agreements in furthering the remedial purposes of the Code, and encourages and invests its own resources to help parties resolve complaints through mediation: Nguyen v. Prince Rupert School District No. 52, 2004 BCHRT 20 at para. 15.
[8] This complaint does not involve a negotiated outcome, because the remedial steps and proposed settlement have been crafted only by the Union. However, it is equally true in these circumstances that a settlement offer may contain terms which, if accepted, could fulfill the Code’spurposes while saving the significant public and private resources it takes to resolve a complaint after a hearing.
[9] The Tribunal considers two issues to determine whether a complaint should be dismissed based on a reasonable settlement offer. First, it determines whether the settlement offer is reasonable. Second, it assesses whether it would serve the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed. This analysis proceeds on the premise that the complainant’s allegations would be proven and the Tribunal would award a remedy: Carter v. Travelex Canada Ltd., 2009 BCCA 180 at para. 45. It requires that the settlement offer be made with prejudice, so that the Tribunal can examine its terms: Issa v. Loblaw Co., 2009 BCHRT 264 at para. 35. It also requires that the offer remain open for the complainant’s acceptance even if it is rejected and even if the Tribunal were to allow the application to dismiss.
[10] In this case, there is no dispute that the Union’s settlement offer is with prejudice, and that it is open for Mx. Bruckman to accept regardless of the outcome of this application (though this is not express in the offer, it is made clear in the Union’s submissions). I turn then to whether the offer is reasonable. The following factors may be relevant:
a. Whether the respondents’ remedial actions have adequately remedied the alleged violation and are consistent with the types of orders the Tribunal might make if the complaint were successful.
b. Whether the monetary settlement offer is within the reasonable range that the Tribunal might award if the complaint were found to be justified. It does not need to reflect exactly what the Tribunal would order, or what the complainant is seeking.
c. Whether the settlement offer fully addresses the allegations and available remedies, both monetary and non-monetary. It is not always necessary for a respondent to admit liability.
d. Whether any release sought by the respondent reflects orders that the Tribunal could make. A complainant cannot be asked to waive their rights in another forum.
See: Issa at para. 35; Sloane-Seale v. Swick’s Organic Landscaping Ltd., 2012 BCHRT 22; Frick v. University of British Columbia, 2009 BCHRT 85 at para. 54; Lowther v. Vancouver Island Health Authority, 2013 BCHRT 20.
[11] I begin by considering the allegations raised in Mx. Bruckman’s complaint, as it proceeded past the Tribunal’s screening stage. For the purpose of this analysis, I accept that Mx. Bruckman will be able to prove these allegations. In any event, many of them are undisputed.
III THE COMPLAINT
[12] Mx. Bruckman worked as the Executive Director for the Union between January 11, 2021, until their employment was terminated on November 12, 2021. They filed this human rights complaint shortly after their termination, on December 14, 2021.
[13] At the outset, it is important to define the scope of Mx. Bruckman’s complaint. This is because the parties have focused much of their evidence and submissions on the termination of Mx. Bruckman’s employment, which is not within the scope of their complaint. Rather, Mx. Bruckman’s complaint is limited to allegations arising out of the conduct of a Union Local President [the Local President], which they say discriminated against them based on their sex and gender identity.
[14] In their original complaint, Mx. Bruckman alleged that the Union had discriminated against them based on their sex, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, age, and political belief. Their allegations focused on two issues:
a. The termination of their employment: Mx. Bruckman alleged that the Union terminated their employment while they were investigating harassment claims by Union members and dealing with Union members upset about vaccine mandates. They allege that their pro-vaccine position made them a political target for Union members who were anti-vaccine at the time. Mx. Bruckman alleged that the termination was retaliation for how they handled a settlement with an ex-employee and because “they didn’t like having a queer non binary person who wasn’t a cis gendered male giving them operational and strategic advice”.
b. The conduct of the Local President: Mx. Bruckman alleged that the Local President yelled at them on two phone calls. During those calls, he said, “get off your old ass and do your job” and described a conflict between Union members as “just two strong females going at each other”. Mx. Bruckman also alleged that he repeatedly misgendered them by referring to them using she/her pronouns.
[15] The Tribunal screened Mx. Bruckman’s complaint to assess whether it alleged facts that, if proven, could constitute a contravention of the Code. On November 1, 2022, it wrote to Mx. Bruckman to confirm that part of their complaint could proceed but that some allegations could not proceed without further information. The Tribunal wrote:
Part of complaint can proceed
Since you noted that the [Local President] repeatedly misgendered you, the complaint can proceed on the ground of sex and gender identity.
The Tribunal explained that the rest of Mx. Bruckman’s allegations could not proceed without more information. It gave Mx. Bruckman an opportunity to provide more information about how their protected characteristics were a factor in their treatment, including the termination of their employment.
[16] Mx. Bruckman provided additional information in an amendment filed November 16, 2022. They said that the decision to terminate their employment had been made by the Union President, Eric McNeely, in direct connection with how they handled a settlement with a former employee. They also alleged that the work environment was toxic, citing complaints by women and LGBTQ Union members. They explained the significant impact that their termination had on them and their family.
[17] The Tribunal issued its final screening letter on November 25, 2022. It concluded that Mx. Bruckman still had not set out facts that, if proven, could establish that the Union discriminated against them based on their sexual orientation, age, or political belief. It confirmed that the complaint would proceed in the area of employment on the grounds of sex and gender identity.
[18] In light of the Tribunal’s screening decisions, the only allegations proceeding to a hearing concern Mx. Bruckman’s allegations that they were misgendered and/or harassed based on their sex and gender identity in their employment. Critically, the termination of their employment is not part of the complaint. This scope was confirmed in letters from the Tribunal dated June 17, 2024, July 5, 2024, and May 5, 2025.
[19] On May 5, 2025, the Tribunal ordered Mx. Bruckman to provide further particulars about their allegations that they had been misgendered and otherwise harassed or discriminated against in their employment based on their sex and gender identity. In response, Mx. Bruckman clarified:
a. The Local President “regularly misgendered” them, including over the phone and in person at two specific union events.
b. They told Mr. McNeely about this behaviour “on several occasions including face to face in his office at the Union Hall after I had had a phone call with a very hostile Local President”.
c. The Local President “minimized his hostile behaviour” and did not correct it, although he was aware of Mx. Bruckman’s pronouns.
d. In one phone call, Mx. Bruckman and the Local President were discussing a conflict between two female Union members, and the Local President said “you know how two women get”. Mx. Bruckman shared this with Mr. McNeely.
[20] These are the allegations that form the basis of Mx. Bruckman’s human rights complaint. Accepting that Mx. Bruckman will prove these allegations, and that they amounted to discrimination in their employment, the Tribunal will award remedies that flow from this conduct. Mx. Bruckman’s termination is not within the scope of their complaint and so the remedy would not address the impacts flowing from the loss of their employment. This is important, because most of what Mx. Bruckman has submitted throughout this process continues to focus on the impacts of the termination of their employment – which will not be adjudicated as part of this complaint.
[21] I turn next to the reasonableness of the Union’s settlement offer, and whether the Code’s purposes have been fulfilled in this complaint.
IV THE PURPOSES OF THE CODE HAVE BEEN FULFILLED
[22] In this case, I will assess the reasonableness of the Union’s settlement offer as well as the steps it took independently to address the issues raised by Mx. Bruckman’s complaint. Together, these efforts persuade me that it is not necessary for this complaint to proceed to a hearing in order to fulfill the Code’s purposes. I begin with the Union’s efforts to address the discrimination.
A. The Union’s remedial actions
[23] In considering whether the Union’s remedial actions have adequately remedied the alleged violation, I find the following factors relevant:
a. whether the Union took Mx. Bruckman’s discrimination claim seriously;
b. whether the Union appropriately addressed the impact on Mx. Bruckman; and
c. whether the Union took appropriate steps to ensure the discrimination would not happen again.
Tambour v. Teamsters Union Local 155, 2024 BCHRT 20 at para. 23
[24] Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the Union took Mx. Bruckman’s complaint about the Local President seriously. Mx. Bruckman does not dispute this in their submissions, instead focusing on other issues regarding their performance and employment, and the impacts of the termination. As a result, the evidence about the Union’s response to the Local President’s conduct is essentially undisputed.
[25] In his affidavit, Mr. McNeely says that Mx. Bruckman complained to him once about the Local President misgendering them, in July or August 2021. He says that he met with the Local President shortly after this to address the issue. He told the Local President that he must use they/them pronouns for Mx. Bruckman. When the Local President said it was hard for him to remember the correct pronouns, Mr. McNeely suggested that he use Mx. Bruckman’s name instead. The Local President agreed to try that.
[26] After this, Mr. McNeely understood that the issue had been addressed. I note that, although Mx. Bruckman says that they raised the issue with Mr. McNeely several times, they have not particularized this allegation, even after having been ordered to do so. Aside from one specific face to face conversation, which I take to be the same conversation Mr. McNeely is describing, Mx. Bruckman does not identify whether these conversations happened before or after Mr. McNeely spoke to the Local President. In this situation, I accept Mr. McNeely’s evidence that, after he spoke to the Local President, Mx. Bruckman did not raise the issue again in their employment. Mr. McNeely says, and I accept, that if Mx. Bruckman had raised the issue again he would have escalated his response and offered Mx. Bruckman additional supports.
[27] Instead, the first time that Mr. McNeely learned that Mx. Bruckman was not satisfied with how he had handled the issue was when he received this human rights complaint. Following this, in September 2023, he arranged for the Provincial Executive to receive expert training on trans inclusion.
[28] In his offers to settle this complaint, Mr. McNeely acknowledged the conduct of the Local President and apologized to Mx. Bruckman, writing:
With respect to [the Local President], I offer you my apology that he misgendered you. When I became aware that this had occurred, I spoke with him directly and told him to stop and it was my understanding that he had. The [Provincial Executive] has now received training from trans-rights educator Adrienne Smith.
And:
[The Local President] should not have misgendered you. I am sorry he did. He is no longer a Local President.
[29] In light of these steps, I am satisfied that the Union took Mx. Bruckman’s concern seriously and addressed it promptly and directly with the Local President. At this point, Mr. McNeely reasonably understood that the issue had been resolved and Mx. Bruckman had been restored to a safe workplace. After receiving the complaint, Mr. McNeely went further and arranged for training for all of the Provincial Executive to support a trans inclusive workplace. He apologized to Mx. Bruckman. In my view, this response is proportionate and responsive to the issue raised by Mx. Bruckman’s complaint. It is consistent with the types of remedies the Tribunal would order. Indeed, by apologizing, Mr. McNeely arguably went further than what the Tribunal would order. The response addresses the Code’s purposes of identifying and eliminating patterns of inequality, promoting a climate of understanding and mutual respect, and preventing further discrimination: Code, s. 3(b), (c), (d).
B. Monetary settlement offer
[30] In addition to the steps I’ve outlined above, the Union has offered Mx. Bruckman a monetary settlement of $8,000. It argues that this offer is reasonable and fulfills the Code’s purpose of providing a means of redress for people who experience discrimination: s. 3(e). I agree.
[31] At a hearing, Mx. Bruckman would be entitled to compensation for the injury they experienced to their dignity, feelings, and self-respect as a result of the Local President’s conduct. Any award would consider the nature of the discrimination, Mx. Bruckman’s social context or vulnerability, and the effect on Mx. Bruckman: Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd dba Buono Osteria and others, 2021 BCHRT 137 at para. 128.
[32] Here, the nature of the discrimination is that the Local President used the wrong pronouns for Mx. Bruckman at work and made a sexist comment about two female Union members. It is unclear how often the misgendering happened; Mx. Bruckman says this happened regularly and has pointed to three specific examples. There is no dispute that the Local President was struggling to use the correct pronouns. At the same time, the two did not work together daily. The Local President worked full time for BC Ferries, and Mr. McNeely says he would generally be in the office once per month, with some other communication by email or phone. Mx. Bruckman does not dispute this. Based on this, I assume that the Tribunal would find that, when they interacted once or twice a month, the Local President would often misgender Mx. Bruckman. I assume that this happened over the course of Mx. Bruckman’s 11-month employment.
[33] There is no dispute about the harm that can flow from being misgendered at work. Both parties cite the Tribunal’s decision in Nelson, in which the Tribunal acknowledged:
Like a name, pronouns are a fundamental part of a person’s identity. They are a primary way that people identify each other. Using correct pronouns communicates that we see and respect a person for who they are. Especially for trans, non-binary, or other non-cisgender people, using the correct pronouns validates and affirms they are a person equally deserving of respect and dignity. As Jessie Nelson explained in this hearing, their pronouns are “fundamental to me feeling like I exist”. When people use the right pronouns, they can feel safe and enjoy the moment. When people do not use the right pronouns, that safety is undermined and they are forced to repeat to the world: I exist. [para. 82]
[34] Intent isn’t determinative of discrimination, but a person’s good or bad intentions can mitigate or exacerbate the harms that flow from it: Nelson at para. 84. Though Mx. Bruckman characterises the Local President’s conduct as wilful, given how clear they were about their pronouns, there is no suggestion that it was intentional or malicious. It seems most accurate to describe the Local President as careless. At the same time, Mr. McNeely, as Union President, was receptive and responsive to Mx. Bruckman’s concerns and there is no suggestion that the misgendering was widespread or happening with other people they worked with.
[35] Turning to social context and vulnerability, I accept that, as a non-binary queer person, Mx. Bruckman faces barriers to full inclusion and that misgendering them is a significant one. Aside from that, there is no evidence that, as Executive Director, they were in a particularly vulnerable position vis a vis the Local President.
[36] Finally, there is very little information before me about the specific impact that the Local President’s conduct had on Mx. Bruckman. This is because Mx. Bruckman has predominantly focused on the impact of the termination – which was profound. However, the termination is outside the scope of the complaint. For the sake of this application, I will accept that the misgendering was hurtful and demeaning to Mx. Bruckman and did impact them negatively.
[37] Considering all of these factors, $8,000 is within the range of what Mx. Bruckman might receive at a hearing. The Union has cited cases involving discriminatory slurs or harassment in which the Tribunal has ordered compensation in the range of $1,000 – $6,000. I agree that, although they are not all analogous, some of the more recent cases are helpful for establishing a range of awards. These cases involved one or two incidents, which – while not as frequent as the discrimination here – were similarly or more virulent: e.g. Ben Maaouia and others v. Toscani Coffee Bar and another, 2021 BCHRT 23 ($1,000 – “I don’t want you Arabs here”); Martinez Johnson v. Whitewater Concrete Ltd., 2022 BCHRT 129($2,500 – two “egregious and virulent slurs” by a co-worker); Li v. Brown, 2018 BCHRT 228 ($5,000 – attempting to interfere with employment based on stereotypes about gender expression); and Bhangu v. Inderjit Dhillon and others, 2023 BCHRT 24 ($6,000 – a series of discriminatory slurs in a physical altercation).
[38] Mx. Bruckman appears to take the position that, at a hearing, they would be entitled to an award in the range of $30,000. This is the amount awarded to the complainant in Nelson. Respectfully, given the scope of their complaint, the circumstances are not analogous. In Nelson, the complainant was repeatedly and deliberately misgendered and mistreated at work over a four-week period and was then fired because of how they responded to that discrimination. They submitted substantial evidence about the impact this had on them. The fact that they had lost their employment because of discrimination was a significant factor in that award. Here, it does appear that the termination of Mx. Bruckman’s employment had a significant impact on them, but that impact would not be considered in an award by the Tribunal. There is not the type of similar evidence about the impact of the Local President’s conduct on Mx. Bruckman that might support a very high award.
[39] It is not necessary for a settlement offer to mirror precisely what the Tribunal might order at a hearing. Here, I am satisfied that the Union’s offer is within the reasonable range and satisfies the Code’s purposes of providing a remedy to people who have experienced discrimination: Code, s. 3(e). It is not necessary to have a hearing to fulfill this purpose.
C. The release
[40] All that the Union asks for in exchange for the monetary settlement is that Mx. Bruckman withdraw their human rights complaint. This is appropriate, and consistent with the outcome of a hearing.
D. Allegations are fully addressed
[41] Considering the Union’s efforts to address the discrimination, and the monetary settlement it has presented, I consider that Mx. Bruckman’s allegations have been fully addressed. There would be no further purpose served by proceeding to a hearing in this case.
V CONCLUSION
[42] The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(d)(ii). I remind Mx. Bruckman that the Union’s settlement offer remains open for acceptance.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair