J v. The Governing Council of The Salvation Army in Canada, 2026 BCHRT 79
Date Issued: March 27, 2026
File: CS-008421
Indexed as: J v. The Governing Council of The Salvation Army in Canada, 2026 BCHRT 79
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
J
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The Governing Council of The Salvation Army in Canada
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Amber Prince
Agent for the Complainant: K
Counsel for the Respondent: Rachel Au and Eleni Kassaris
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a decision about whether to dismiss J’s complaint without a hearing.
[2] J lived in a transitional housing building [Building A] operated by the Governing Council of the Salvation Army in Canada [Salvation Army]. The Salvation Army is a charitable, non-profit organization providing transitional housing and services in BC. J lived in a unit, on the women’s floor of Building A, and accessed other Salvation Army services, including services for women.
[3] J alleges that that Salvation Army’s inclusion of trans women in its services and housing for women discriminated against her, contrary to sections 8 and 10 of the Human Rights Code. She alleges that because she is a cis woman with post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD], and lived experience with gender based violence, the Salvation Army was obliged to provide her housing and services for cis women only.
[4] The Salvation Army says that J’s complaint is based only on her transphobic views, which cannot ground a complaint of discrimination under the Code. The Salvation Army applies to dismiss J’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c).
[5] For the reasons set out below, I allow the Salvation Army’s application and dismiss the complaint. I am persuaded that J has no reasonable prospect of proving that the Salvation Army’s inclusion of trans women in its transitional housing and services for women had an adverse impact on her.
[6] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties, but I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact. I apologize to the parties for the delay in issuing this decision.
II Preliminary issue: anonymizing j’s agent
[7] In an earlier decision, the Tribunal limited publication of J’s name: April 19, 2023 letter decision. After that, J consented to an agent representing her.
[8] On my own motion, I am also limiting publication of her agent’s name because identifying J’s agent may risk identifying J: Mr. C. v. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and another, 2021 BCHRT 22, paras. 38 and 43. In this decision, I refer to the agent by the randomized alias “K”.
III Terminology
[9] While J does not describe herself as a cis woman, the term is relevant and helpful in this context because J distinguishes herself from trans women. Cis or cisgender is a widely-recognized prefix or adjective to describe a person whose gender identity aligns with their sex assigned at birth. Trans or transgender is a prefix or adjective to describe a person whose gender identity does not align with their sex assigned at birth: Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (E.B.) c. 9302-6573 Québec inc. (Bar Lucky 7), 2024 QCTDP 9, para. 68.
[10] J describes the violence she has experienced as “male violence” including “male sexual violence”: Response to Dismissal Application, para. 50. The violence she describes is widely recognized as gender based violence, and I adopt the BC Office of Human Rights Commissioner’s definition of the term in its 2023 publication, “From hate to hope: Report of the Inquiry into hate in the COVID-19 pandemic”:
Gender-based violence is violence that is committed against someone based on their gender identity, sex or gender expression or perceived sex or gender. It takes many forms, including physical, economic, sexual or emotional (psychological) abuse and includes intimate partner violence […]
Gender-based violence is rooted in gender inequality, abuse of power, patriarchal systems and harmful gender norms. Ultimately, gender-based violence is about power and control. Gender based violence causes physical, emotional and social harm to those who experience and witness it and can be deadly.
Some people are at higher risk of being targeted for gender-based violence because of the ways that sexism, racism, colonialism, homophobia, transphobia and ableism impact them. Indigenous women and girls, transgender people, women living with disabilities, Black women and newcomer women to Canada all experience high levels of gender-based violence: p. 68.
IV Background
[11] The Salvation Army provides transitional housing for up to 24 months.
[12] On or about August 16, 2020, J and the Salvation Army entered into an occupancy agreement for a unit at Building A from September 1, 2020 to August 31, 2022. Transitional housing is, by its nature, temporary housing and not a tenancy under the Residential Tenancy Act: sections 1 and 4(f). As part of the occupancy agreement, J agreed to work with the Salvation Army to find housing after the term of her occupancy at Building A: Affidavit of David Burrows, paras. 16 and 17, and Exhibit D.
[13] When entering into the occupancy agreement, J told the Salvation Army that she had challenges dealing with men due to past trauma and had undiagnosed PTSD. She accepted a unit in Building A on the basis that the unit was on the women’s floor. The Salvation Army reserves the women’s floor at Building A for individuals who meet the basic intake criteria and “generally present physically and socially as female”: Burrows Affidavit, para. 10 and Exhibit A. In other words, cis and trans women are eligible for a unit on the women’s floor.
[14] On the women’s floor, J lived in a self-contained, unfurnished, bachelor-style unit with a bedroom, and bathroom. Occupants can only access the shared common areas and the floor they reside on.
[15] Salvation Army staff met with J regularly during her occupancy to support her with finding more permanent housing once her occupancy ended: Burrows Affidavit, paras. 9, 29-31 and Exhibits L and M.
[16] On or about March 3, 2022, Salvation Army staff reminded J that her occupancy agreement would end on August 31, 2022, and emphasised that she needed to work with the Salvation Army to find housing before her occupancy at Building A ended: Burrows Affidavit, para. 30 and Exhibit L.
[17] There is no question that by October 2022 J – and K on her behalf – began to assert to the Salvation Army that J required housing and services for cis women only: J’s Response to the Dismissal Application, Documents 11, 12, 17, 22, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 36, 46, 48, 49, 51, 94, 95, and 96. J asserted to the Salvation Army that its recognition of trans women is a denial of “sexed bodies” and results in unsafe “unisex spaces” rather than “women only” spaces: for example, Document 49.
[18] Since J did not secure other housing, and out of concern for her wellbeing, the Salvation Army granted her request for an extension of her occupancy at Building A until the end of November 2022 on the condition that she make her housing search her priority: Burrows Affidavit, para. 31 and Exhibit O.
[19] On October 3, 2022 the Salvation Army offered J a unit at another transitional housing building [Building B], which was similar to the building she was in except units in Building B were furnished: Burrows Affidavit, para. 32. J rejected the offer because housing and services for women at Building B is inclusive of trans women: J’s Response to the Dismissal Application, Document 95, para. 66.
[20] In October, 2021, the Salvation Army began providing weekly women’s and co-ed yoga classes at Building A, where practicable. Women’s yoga was offered on the women’s floor, accessible only to occupants on the women’s floor.
[21] On October 17, 2022, on J’s request, the Salvation Army agreed to further extend her occupancy at the building until December 31, 2022 conditional on J prioritizing her housing search. She agreed to meet with David Burrows, a Director of Housing and Shelter Programs at the Salvation Army, on a regular basis to work on securing new housing.
[22] Mr. Burrows met with J to address her housing needs, but J was not willing to consider housing options that required her to be around trans women or cis men.
[23] On October 24, 2022, J attended a women’s yoga class which was attended by one other Building A occupant, a trans woman. J left the class stating it had been changed to co-ed.
[24] J continued to seek extensions of her occupancy at Building A which the Salvation Army denied because Building A is transitional housing, not meant to exceed two years, and other applicants were on a year-long waitlist for the building: Burrows Affidavit, para. 45 and Exhibit BB.
[25] On or about December 14, 2022, the Salvation Army agreed to store J’s furniture to alleviate any concerns she would lose her furniture if she decided to move to a furnished unit at Building B: Burrows Affidavit, para. 57.
[26] On December 30, 2022, J left Building A and checked herself into a hospital. On December 31, 2022, her extended occupancy at Building A expired but after speaking with a social worker at the hospital, Mr. Burrows agreed to keep J’s items in her unit until January 31, 2023.
[27] By the end of January 2023, J moved out of Building A, taking some of her personal belongings and returning her keys and fob to the Salvation Army. She left some personal belongings behind in her unit. The Salvation Army stored those items in case J returned for them and eventually disposed of the items on March 31, 2023: Burrows Affidavit, para. 64.
[28] In her complaint, J asserts that because she is a cis woman with PTSD, who experienced gender based violence in the past, she needs housing and services for cis women only. She alleges that the Salvation Army ignored these needs and contributed to her inability to secure safe housing and services.
V ANALYSIS
[29] I return to the question of whether J’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success, under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. I begin with the relevant legal principles, then I apply them.
A. Section 27(1)(c) principles
[30] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. As part of this gate-keeping function, the Tribunal has discretion to dismiss a complaint, under s. 27(1)(c) if the complaint has no reasonable chance of succeeding at a hearing: Lord v Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176, para. 19.
[31] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c), as it would at a hearing. Instead, the Tribunal considers the whole of the evidence to decide whether there is no reasonable prospect that a complaint could be proven, after a full hearing of the evidence: Byelkova v Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 1312, para. 24; Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242, para. 52. The Tribunal bases its decision on the materials filed by the parties; not on what evidence might be given at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan, 2013 BCSC 942, para. 77; Conklin v University of British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 1569, para. 32.
[32] If there is no reasonable prospect of a complaint succeeding after a full hearing of the evidence, then it serves no purpose to proceed with the time and expense of a hearing: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49, para. 27.
[33] The onus is on the applicant to show there is no reasonable prospect a complaint will succeed: Byelkova, para. 27. At this stage, the complainant must show that their allegations are based on more than speculation: Lord, para. 19.
[34] To prove discrimination at a hearing, J would have to prove that she was adversely impacted by the Salvation Army, in the areas of services or tenancy; and that her disability or sex was a factor in the adverse impact(s): Code, ss. 8 and 10; Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61, para. 33. If, based on the dismissal application materials, J has no reasonable chance of proving discrimination, I may dismiss her complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
[35] In its dismissal application, the Salvation Army says that J has no reasonable prospect of proving that it adversely impacted her. I find that I can decide this application by addressing this argument. For that reason, I will assume without deciding that: J has a disability protected by the Code; and that her complaint falls within the areas of services and tenancy.
B. Applying the s. 27(1)(c) principles to this complaint
[36] On the evidence before me, I am persuaded that J has no reasonable prospect of proving that she was adversely impacted in the areas of housing or services by the Salvation Army.
[37] J says in response to the dismissal application that she “will establish” an adverse impact in receiving housing and services from the Salvation Army which were inclusive of trans women: para. 47. I cannot accept this submission as a basis to proceed to a hearing. As I said above, on an application to dismiss, the Tribunal bases its decision on the materials filed by the parties; not on what evidence might be given at the hearing.
[38] J has not pointed to any actual adverse impact she experienced while she lived at Building A or during her attendance at the optional yoga class. She supplied a letter from a case manager at a mental health team which only states that J would benefit from supportive housing: Document 54. She also supplied a letter from a counsellor indicating that J had experienced gender based violence prior to accessing the Salvation Army: Document 97. The counsellor’s letter does not address J’s experiences with the Salvation Army.
[39] The bulk of the rest of J’s materials are reiterations of her belief that trans women are not women. Other than repeating this belief, she has not supplied any evidence of an adverse impact she experienced at the Salvation Army. She alleges that the Salvation Army’s inclusion of trans women in its housing and services is “unsafe”, but this allegation is based only on her belief and speculation.
[40] J also alleges that she was adversely impacted because the Salvation Army ignored her and her housing was unstable. J has no reasonable prospect of showing the Salvation Army ignored her because the evidence shows that its staff was responsive to her inquiries and requests and met with her regularly to assist her with securing more permanent housing: Affidavit of Arumugam Prabath Pullay, para. 2 and Exhibit A; Burrows Affidavit, paras. 31 to 65 and Exhibits O to CC.
[41] J also has no reasonable prospect of proving that the end of her occupancy at Building A was an adverse impact because she understood and agreed to the term of that occupancy. This is not the same as a landlord or service provider unilaterally ending a tenancy or service.
[42] Here, the evidence indicates that:
a. J and the Salvation Army entered into an occupancy agreement for housing, which is, by its nature, temporary.
b. The Salvation Army extended J’s occupancy beyond the original terms of the agreement, several times and on J’s request to facilitate her search for more permanent housing.
c. It offered J another housing option and supported her housing search.
d. The Salvation Army did not agree to extend J’s occupancy further in the context of its provision of transitional housing, J refusal to accept a similar housing option, and its long waitlist for Building A.
[43] Ultimately, J’s complaint is about her beliefs and speculation about trans women, and not actual adverse impacts she experienced while accessing Salvation Army housing and services. Her speculative beliefs, without more, are not enough to show an adverse impact: Lord, para. 19; Chow v. Northern BC Graduate Students’ Society (NBCGSS) and another, 2026 BCHRT 48, paras. 120-121.
VI ORDER
[44] On my own motion I have limited publication of the name of J’s agent in this decision. I refer to the agent by the randomized alias, “K”.
[45] Because J has no reasonable prospect of proving she was adversely impacted by the Salvation Army, she has no reasonable prospect of proving discrimination. I dismiss her complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Amber Prince
Tribunal Member