Woo v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and another (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 76
Date Issued: March 26, 2026
File: CS-006870
Indexed as: Woo v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and another (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 76
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Linda Woo
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and FirstService Residential
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Linda Woo
Counsel for the Respondents: Anil Aggarwal
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Linda Woo filed a complaint alleging that The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and its property management company, FirstService Residential, discriminated against her in services based on physical and mental disability contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code. She says the Respondents have relied upon the terms of a settlement agreement and have not adequately addressed her complaints of noise from her neighbors.
[2] The Respondents applied to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. They said the complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding at a hearing because there is no connection between her protected characteristics and the Respondents’ reliance on the terms of the settlement agreement to address her noise complaints. In Woo v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and another, 2026 BCHRT 59 [ the Original Decision], I allowed the application and dismissed the complaint.
[3] Ms. Woo has now filed an application under Rule 36 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure for reconsideration of the Original Decision.
[4] I have not found it necessary to seek submissions from the Respondents.
[5] For the following reasons, I deny the reconsideration application.
II BACKGROUND
[6] The background to Ms. Woo’s complaint is set out in the Original Decision and I will not repeat it here: Woo at paras. 4-9. In brief, Ms. Woo resolved a previous human rights complaint with the Respondents by way of a settlement agreement on August 25, 2021. The agreement provides how the parties would address noise complaints made by Ms. Woo. Ms. Woo alleges the Respondents relied on the terms of the settlement agreement to not adequately resolve her complaints about noise in her unit.
[7] The issue before me in the Original Decision was whether there was no reasonable prospect that Ms. Woo could establish that her mental and physical disability was a factor in the Respondents’ handling of her noise complaints. I was satisfied, based on the whole of the evidence that there was not. Further I was satisfied that the Respondents were reasonably certain to prove a wholly non-discriminatory explanation for their conduct, and I dismissed the complaint.
III Analysis and DECISION
[8] The Tribunal has a limited jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions: Rule 36 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. Specifically, the Tribunal may reconsider a decision if it is in the interests of justice and fairness to do so: Routkovskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2012 BCCA 141 at para. 23. The Tribunal exercises this power sparingly, giving due consideration to the principle of finality in administrative proceedings: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 [Grant] at para 10.
[9] The burden is on the person seeking to have a matter re-opened to show that the interests of fairness and justice demand such an order: Grant at para. 10.
[10] In addition to seeking reconsideration, Ms. Woo asks that a different member of the Tribunal adjudicate this reconsideration as she has concerns about my impartiality and ability to decide this matter reasonably. I begin with this request.
[11] Whenever possible, the Tribunal will assign reconsideration applications to the same Member who made the original decision. That Member is most familiar with the evidence and issues in the complaint, and best placed to efficiently determine whether there is a basis to reconsider the original decision: Morgan-Hung v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2011 BCCA 122 at para. 70. There is an exception to this principle where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias of the Member who decided the original decision: The Sales Associate v. Aurora Biomed Inc and others (No. 4), 2021 BCHRT 21 at para. 5
[12] Tribunal Members are presumed to be impartial, and that presumption is not easily displaced: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 at para. 25. A party alleging bias bears a high burden, and the evidence of bias “must be substantial”: CS v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2017 BCSC 1268 at para. 155, upheld in 2018 BCCA 264.
[13] The test for reasonable apprehension of bias is whether an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, would conclude that it is more likely than not that the member would not decide the matter fairly: Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at para. 60.
[14] Ms. Woo says I should not be the one to reconsider the Original Decision because I ignored her evidence and should have found in her favour. From her submission, I infer that Ms. Woo is arguing that because she does not agree with the outcome or the reasons in the Original Decision, I must be biased and unreasonable and therefore unable to decide the reconsideration application fairly. Ms. Woo has not pointed to any evidence, other than the result in Woo, as a basis for why an informed person would conclude I am more likely than not to decide this application unfairly. In my view, Ms. Woo has not met the high evidentiary bar required to displace the presumption of impartiality. I deny the request that another member decide this application.
[15] Turning to the reconsideration application, Ms. Woo says the original decision was unfair because it did not consider her evidence, mischaracterized her arguments, and incorrectly analyzed her evidence and arguments. She says the Tribunal ought to have found in her favour because she continues to experience noise disturbance which the Respondents have not adequately addressed.
[16] The Tribunal does not have authority to reconsider a decision based on an argument that the decision was wrong or unreasonable or because there has been a change of circumstances: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 [Fraser Health] at paras. 135 and 160. The Tribunal will not reconsider a decision to address arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to hear a party reargue its case: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13. When a party simply disagrees with a Tribunal decision, the appropriate recourse is judicial review by the BC Supreme Court.
[17] Ms. Woo’s arguments do not present circumstances where fairness and justice require intervention in the Original Decision. Ms. Woo argues that her evidence shows the Respondents breached the terms of their settlement agreement and she continues to be disturbed by noise in her unit. I understand the ultimate point of Ms. Woo’s submission on the reconsideration application to be that the Tribunal ought to have found in her favour based on the evidence she provided. It appears that Ms. Woo is disagreeing with the Original Decision and arguing that the evidence submitted supports her position that the Respondents have not adequately addressed her noise complaints. Effectively, she argues that I should reweigh the evidence she submitted and reach a different outcome.
[18] Reconsideration is not an opportunity to reargue issues that have already been determined in the Original Decision. The Tribunal’s power to reconsider its decisions is limited. Ms. Woo’s argument is that she disagrees with how I weighed the evidence in the Original Decision, which is not a basis for reconsideration.
[19] Further, much of Ms. Woo’s submissions on the reconsideration application deals with her belief that the Respondents have breached the terms of the settlement agreement, her continued discomfort from noise, and belief that the Tribunal ought to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. These arguments do not provide a basis for reconsideration.
[20] For these reasons, I am not satisfied Ms. Woo has met her burden of showing that it would be in the interests of fairness and justice to reconsider the Original Decision.
IV Conclusion
[21] I deny the application for reconsideration.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member