Swanson v. BC Ministry of Attorney General (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 71
Date Issued: March 24, 2026
File: CS-001843
Indexed as: Swanson v. BC Ministry of Attorney General (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 71
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Lianna Swanson
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Attorney General
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
Counsel for the Complainant: Glen A. Purdy, KC
Counsel for the Respondent: Rochelle Pauls
Date of Hearing: November 10, 12, 13, 2025
Location of Hearing: Via Videoconference
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Lianna Swanson worked as Crown counsel with the BC Prosecution Service [BCPS] for over 24 years, in its Cranbrook office. In the course of that work, she was criminally harassed by a person she had prosecuted and developed post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]. In 2016, she took a medical leave of absence. She returned to work briefly in 2017 but was unable to continue. In 2019, WorkSafeBC reached out to the BCPS on Ms. Swanson’s behalf, proposing an accommodated return to work. At this point, Ms. Swanson was permanently restricted from attending court and doing work in the public eye. BCPS determined it could not accommodate Ms. Swanson’s medical limitations in its Cranbrook office. It did not allow her to return.
[2] There is no dispute that Ms. Swanson had disabilities which interfered with her ability to do all aspects of her job as Crown counsel. In this human rights complaint, Ms. Swanson argues that BCPS failed to take all reasonable and practical steps to accommodate her return to work and, as such, discriminated against her in employment in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. She asks for remedies.
[3] The BCPS argues that the requirement that Crown counsel attend court is a bona fide occupational requirement: Code, s. 13(4). It says that Ms. Swanson was no longer able to perform the core duties of Crown counsel and that there were no other reasonable options to accommodate her in the Cranbrook office, which is a small office serving several circuit courts. It asks that the complaint be dismissed.
[4] I heard this complaint over three days. I am grateful to the parties, their lawyers, and the witnesses for their professional participation.
[5] I start by acknowledging what is undisputed. What happened to Ms. Swanson – because of her work as a prosecutor – was terrible. It altered the course of her life. It triggered the end of her long career as Crown counsel, against her wishes and in a manner that denied her the respect and recognition she had earned after a long successful career in public service.
[6] However, for the following reasons, I am persuaded that, during the period relevant to this complaint, BCPS could not have accommodated Ms. Swanson without fundamentally altering the nature of the job of a Crown counsel in the Cranbrook office. This would have amounted to undue hardship. In this circumstance, I find that the BCPS did not discriminate against Ms. Swanson and I dismiss the complaint.
II OVERVIEW
[7] The material facts in this complaint are largely undisputed. They were supported by documentary evidence, as well as the evidence given by Ms. Swanson and the following witnesses:
a. Kristian DeJong. Mr. DeJong is Crown counsel at the Cranbrook office. Since 2024, he has worked exclusively doing virtual bail hearings. He testified about the evolution of virtual bail at the BC Provincial Court, and his duties.
b. Andrew Mayes. At the time of the events in this complaint, Mr. Mayes was the Deputy Regional Crown overseeing the Cranbrook office. Mr. Mayes testified about the work of Crown counsel in the office, Ms. Swanson’s attempt to return to work in 2017, and why it was not possible to permanently accommodate her no-court restriction.
c. Jessica Patterson. Ms. Patterson is currently Regional Crown Counsel in the Interior Region of BCPS, which includes the Cranbrook office. She testified about the role of Crown counsel, and why it is not possible to permanently accommodate a no-court restriction in the Cranbrook office.
I am satisfied that all the witnesses testified credibly and I have accepted all their evidence.
[8] Crown counsel are responsible for the prosecution of offences under the Criminal Code, provincial statutes and regulations, and federal statutes: Crown Counsel Act, s. 4. They decide whether to lay charges, which charges to lay, and have conduct of the proceedings in court through to their conclusion. This includes conducting bail hearings, pre-trial motions, trials, sentencing proceedings, and, in some cases, appeals.
[9] Ms. Swanson started working for the BCPS in 1992. She worked in the Cranbrook Crown counsel office. By 2016, she was “Crown Counsel Level 3”, meaning the most senior level of Crown. As such, she was responsible for more complex files, including murders, significantly violent offences, gun offenses, sexual assaults, and child pornography.
[10] Though it can vary, BCPS’s Cranbrook office is generally staffed by five to seven Crown counsel. They work in the Cranbrook courthouse, as well as several circuit court locations over a large geographic area. When Crown counsel attend a circuit court location, they are responsible for all courtroom duties in a given day.
[11] In 2011, a person whom Ms. Swanson had previously prosecuted began to harass and threaten her. He was charged and convicted of criminal harassment in 2014, following a trial in which he directly and abusively cross-examined Ms. Swanson for several days. The harassment continued after the conviction. In 2016, Ms. Swanson was diagnosed with PTSD arising in large part from this criminal harassment. In August 2016, she began a medical leave.
[12] In January 2017, Ms. Swanson’s psychologist opined that she was ready to return to full time duties. In a letter to the BCPS, the psychologist wrote: “Given [Ms. Swanson’s] history of psychological trauma I would request no court appearances for the foreseeable future. I will evaluate this restriction on a monthly basis”: Ex 1, tab 3. The BCPS advised Ms. Swanson that it could temporarily accommodate her for up to two months, in a role that would not require any court appearances. This was later extended until June 30.
[13] During Ms. Swanson’s return, she did charge assessments, responded to public inquiries, reviewed applications to vary bail by consent, reviewed supplemental disclosure, and other in-office duties as necessary. She met weekly with Mr. Mayes to monitor her progress. During this period, the office was required to cover Ms. Swanson’s court duties by hiring ad hoc legal counsel (17 days) and bringing in legal counsel from another office (6 days), at an additional cost of approximately $11,050 plus expenses: Ex 1, tab 7.
[14] By May, Ms. Swanson was not doing well. She was struggling with decision making and finding it increasingly difficult to do the work. One day, she was triggered when driving by the courthouse and broke into a cold sweat. On June 22, 2017, Ms. Swanson’s treating physician opined that she was “not capable of returning to work for full or modified duties due to conditions and impairment to concentration, problem solving, critical thinking skills. Unable to return to work x 6 months”: Ex 1, tab 6. Ms. Swanson began another medical leave.
[15] In July 2018, WorkSafeBC accepted that Ms. Swanson had a permanent disability, resulting in the following permanent restrictions and limitations:
– Restrictions:
o Restricted from performing job duties that involve court appearances and working in the public eye
– Limitations:
o Able to complete tasks involving focus and attention when able to self-pace and integrate micro-breaks.
Ex 2, tab 115
[16] Throughout 2018 and 2019, there were discussions within BCPS about whether Ms. Swanson would be returning, and in what capacity. In August 2019, Ms. Swanson put forward a proposal for how she could return to work within her limitations. She proposed to do the following:
– Charge approvals, within my predetermined limitations,
– Ensuring the proper implementation of ministry and Branch policies, procedures and programs,
– Responsible for: scheduling the rota, and Crown counsel to cases, case management, and retaining ad hoc counsel where required,
– The integration of the Crown counsel office into the local criminal justice system and community,
– Assisting Trial Crown, as required, with trial preparation, and legal research.
I would eventually like to work up to doing remand court (no trials). This would assist my Crown co-workers by allowing them more preparation time for trials, and other associated responsibilities.
[17] BCPS reviewed the proposal and determined that it could not accommodate Ms. Swanson in the Cranbrook office. Much of Ms. Swanson’s proposal reflected the duties of the Administrative Crown counsel – a position that was occupied. For the remainder of the proposed duties, Mr. Mayes’ assessment was that Ms. Swanson could provide some benefit to the office but only if she were supernumerary, meaning not counted as part of the normal staffing levels of the office. From his perspective, it was not feasible to permanently accommodate her as part of the regular complement, because of the extra burden that would impose on other Crown counsel to cover the court work, including on the complex files that senior counsel are responsible for. While BCPS considered that it may be possible to accommodate Ms. Swanson in a larger office, this option was never seriously explored because Ms. Swanson did not want to relocate.
[18] In September 2019, Ms. Swanson was approved for long-term disability benefits on the basis that she was totally disabled from any occupation with a similar wage rate to what she had been earning as Crown. In early 2020, BCPS moved forward to replace her. In doing so, it understood that, if Ms. Swanson was subsequently medically cleared to return to her duties, she would be entitled to return into a vacant position. However, Ms. Swanson’s restrictions and limitations have not changed, and she has not returned to work with the BCPS.
III DECISION
[19] There is no dispute that Ms. Swanson had a disability that interfered with her ability to perform all the functions of her job. This is sufficient to satisfy the elements of Ms. Swanson’s case and shift the burden to BCPS to justify its determination that she could not return to work: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[20] BCPS argues that, for Crown counsel in the Cranbrook office, the requirement that they attend court is a bona fide occupational requirement: Code, s. 13(4). This defence has three components:
a. Valid purpose. The employer must prove it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the employee’s job or function.
b. Good faith. The employer must prove it adopted the standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to fulfil its valid purpose.
c. Reasonable necessity and accommodation. The employer must prove that the standard was reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose and that it discharged its duty to accommodate.
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [Meiorin] at para. 54; Ciliberto v. Tree Island Industries Ltd., 2024 BCHRT 87 at para. 27
[21] In this case, there is no dispute about the first two elements of the defence. The role of Crown counsel is to prosecute offences through the court process. This is set out in s. 4 of the Crown Counsel Act, which provides:
Responsibilities of Crown counsel
4 (1) The [Assistant Deputy Attorney General, or ADAG] may designate as “Crown counsel” any individual or class of individual who is lawfully entitled to practise law in British Columbia.
(2) Each Crown counsel is authorized to represent the Crown before all courts in relation to the prosecution of offences.
(3) Subject to the directions of the ADAG or another Crown counsel designated by the ADAG, each Crown counsel is authorized to
(a) examine all relevant information and documents and, following the examination, to approve for prosecution any offence or offences that Crown counsel considers appropriate,
(b) conduct the prosecutions approved, and
(c) supervise prosecutions of offences that are being initiated or conducted by individuals who are not Crown counsel and, if the interests of justice require, to intervene and to conduct those prosecutions. …
To fulfill these duties, Ms. Patterson testified that all Crown counsel are expected to go to court. To the extent there may be exceptions, they are temporary. I am satisfied that the requirement that Crown counsel attend court is rationally connected to the performance of the job and was adopted in good faith.
[22] The case turns on the third element of the defence: specifically, whether the requirement to attend court is reasonably necessary, and BCPS fulfilled its duty to accommodate Ms. Swanson’s disabilities. I begin with general principles, none of which are in dispute.
[23] The purpose of an employer’s duty to accommodate is “to ensure that an employee who is able to work can do so” and that “persons who are otherwise fit to work are not unfairly excluded where working conditions can be adjusted without undue hardship”: Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employées de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), 2008 SCC 43at para. 14. This purpose informs the scope and content of the duty, expressed through the interrelated concepts of reasonableness and undue hardship: Québec (Comm. des norms, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail) v. Caron, 2018 SCC [Caron] para. 25.
[24] The concept of “reasonable accommodation” requires employers to take reasonable and practical steps to assess whether working conditions can be changed to allow the employee to do their work and, if not, whether there is other work that they could do: Hydro-Québec at para. 17. The standard is not perfection: Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at para. 425. Accommodation is an exercise in common sense and flexibility, in which both the process and substance of the accommodation are relevant: Meiorin at para. 66. Accommodation may include modifying working hours, changing or lightening duties, or authorizing staff transfers: Hydro-Québec at para. 17. However, as the term “reasonable” implies, this duty is not unlimited.
[25] The concept of “undue hardship” sets the limit for the lengths that employers are required to go to, and the point at which further efforts become unreasonable. Inherent in the concept is the recognition that there may be some hardship in accommodating a person’s disability. Accommodation is not always easy, convenient, or cost-effective. Employers are required to consider options that may result in some hardship, especially when an employee’s livelihood is at stake: Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp, 2017 SCC 30 at para. 128 (per Gascon J, dissenting but not on this point); Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15 [VIA Rail] at para. 122; Buchner v. Emergency and Health Services Commission, 2008 BCHRT 317 at para. 437. It is only when the hardship becomes “undue” that the duty ends.
[26] What is reasonable, and what hardship is undue, will vary “according to the characteristics of each enterprise, the specific needs of each employee, and the specific circumstances in which the decision is to be made”: McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, 2007 SCC 4 at para. 22. The point of undue hardship is reached “when reasonable means of accommodation are exhausted and only unreasonable or impractical options for accommodation remain”: VIA Rail at para. 130.
[27] Where an employee cannot work because of a disability, the employer’s duty to accommodate them ends “where the employee is no longer able to fulfill the basic obligations associated with the employment relationship for the foreseeable future”: Hydro-Québec at para. 19. The duty to accommodate does not oblige employers to create or assign work that is not productive for their enterprise. This principle flows logically from the purpose of accommodation, which is not to fundamentally change the employment contract, but to ensure that employers create conditions that allow employees who are able to work to do so.
[28] In this case, I accept BCPS’s evidence that attending court is a core duty for Crown counsel in the Cranbrook office. The office operates with a small complement of counsel serving a large geographic area. Ms. Swanson was one of the most senior counsel in the office and, in that capacity, was required to do her share of court work, including on the most complex files. As of late 2019 and 2020, she was no longer able to fulfill this basic obligation of her employment for the foreseeable future.
[29] I agree with BCPS that accommodating Ms. Swanson’s no-court restriction in the Cranbook office would give rise to undue hardship. It would take one of the most senior counsel in the office out of the rota and increase the burden on the other lawyers. This burden includes workload, travel, and exposure to the complex and difficult files typically assigned to senior counsel. It would create an imbalance in the work of the other Crown counsel, which the Business Manager of BCPS’s Regional Operations explained this way:
Each duty provides a break from the other and strengthens the quality of work overall. Having charge assessments with each Crown not only supports the Branch’s Crown File Ownership initiative (reduction in the number of different Crown and staff who end up having to read, work on or touch every file, as well as file quality, consistency and giving Crown greater control over their own workflow), but it also provides opportunities for the Crown to strengthen their relationships with their stakeholders (i.e. the Fernie assigned Crown would work with the Fernie detachment). The change in duties also offers a reprieve from the day-to-day stresses of dealing with difficult content, potentially fatiguing Crown in the long run. [Ex 1, tab 7]
[30] I accept Mr. Mayes’ evidence that, during Ms. Swanson’s temporary accommodation in 2017, the office attempted to cover Ms. Swanson’s court duties by hiring ad hoc counsel from the community or calling in counsel from other Crown offices. I further accept that this is not a viable option for the long term, given the challenges of hiring qualified ad hoc counsel in a small community, the cost, and the impact on other Crown offices. In that regard, Mr. Mayes testified that it is very difficult to find ad hoc legal counsel in the region. They are drawing from a small bar, not all of whom are capable or available to do the work. When they are required to pull Crown counsel in from other offices, that creates a gap in the other office, which then has to cover the work.
[31] In her August 2019 proposal, Ms. Swanson identified several duties that she says she could have performed, without attending court. There is no dispute that many of these duties comprised the job of the Administrative Crown Counsel. This role is typically assigned on a temporary basis, as a stepping stone to a management position. The Administrative Crown Counsel is responsible to oversee the operations of the Crown office, including through scheduling, work assignments, and supervising other counsel. When Ms. Swanson made her proposal, the role had just been awarded to another person. Reassigning those duties to Ms. Swanson would effectively take the job away from them. I agree with BCPS that an employer is not required to create a new position or displace another worker in order to accommodate an employee’s disability: Barker v. Vitalus Nutrition, 2016 BCHRT 88 at para. 44. I accept that doing so in this case would have given rise to undue hardship. In this process, Ms. Swanson has not argued otherwise.
[32] This is not to say that Ms. Swanson could not have made a contribution to the work of the office, which was understaffed. Mr. Mayes acknowledged as much at the time, noting that there could be some benefit if Ms. Swanson returned in a supernumerary basis and were not counted as part of the regular complement. However, this option would require the employer to create a position that did not exist, for which there was no real operational need. This is beyond what the duty to accommodate requires.
[33] I agree with BCPS that this case is similar to Thanh v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2020 BCHRT 15. In Thanh, the complainant was a community coroner who was restricted from being exposed to dead bodies. The Tribunal accepted that, in the BC Coroners Service, “Death is what [they] do”: para. 111. It concluded that “modifying the role of a coroner to exempt them from attending scenes of death would alter the very function and purpose of a coroner and impose undue hardship”: para. 111. Likewise here, attending court is what Crown counsel do, especially in the Cranbrook office. Modifying the role to exempt Ms. Swanson from attending court would alter the very function and purpose of her job, and amount to undue hardship.
[34] Ms. Swanson argues that BCPS could have accommodated her in a full-time position conducting telephone or virtual bail hearings. While this was not something that she proposed in August 2019, I agree with her that it was not her obligation to identify all possible accommodation options. That duty properly lay with BCPS, as the employer: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC) [Renaud] at para. 44; Buchner at para. 406; Flynn v. DF Architecture Inc. (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 81 at paras. 42-45. Ms. Swanson’s job as the employee was to bring forward the relevant information about her disability-related needs.
[35] By 2019, the information that Ms. Swanson had presented to BCPS was:
a. She was permanently restricted from attending court. This restriction did not specify that the restriction was limited to in-person appearances.
b. She was permanently restricted from working in the public eye.
c. She could complete tasks involving focus and attention when she was able to self-pace and integrate micro-breaks.
Ms. Swanson had set out a proposal about the work that she felt she could do, which did not include virtual bail hearings or any other remote court work. This was specifically noted by Mr. Mayes at the time: Ex 1 tab 13.
[36] In my view, based on the information it had at the time and the availability of remote bail work, it was reasonable that BCPS did not consider whether it could accommodate Ms. Swanson permanently into a position doing telephone or virtual bail hearings.
[37] To begin, I am not satisfied that there was full-time remote bail work available in Cranbrook when Ms. Swanson was seeking to return to work in August 2019, or in early 2020, when BCPS determined it could not accommodate her. At that time, most bail hearings in Cranbrook were conducted in person in court. While it was becoming more common to conduct bail hearings by phone in the circuit courts, this was not full-time work.
[38] Ms. Swanson points to a Letter of Understanding between the Province and the Crown Counsel Association dated August 23, 2018 [LOU] about a Weekend Bail Crown Counsel Assignment. It appears that the bail work in this assignment was mostly or entirely remote (presumably by phone). The witnesses knew relatively little about this, including the number of positions available, whether there were any vacancies, where the work was based, and whether the work was entirely remote. However, according to the LOU, the position was staffed “in each of the five regional hub locations as follows: Victoria; 222 Main Street; Surrey; Kelowna; and Prince George”: Ex 1, tab 10. The LOU does not contemplate that Crown could take on this assignment from outside those hubs. I understand, then, that this work was not available in Cranbrook. Given that Ms. Swanson had indicated she was not prepared to relocate, I cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for BCPS not to consider this option at the time.
[39] Next, Ms. Swanson argues that she should have been considered for full time work conducting virtual bail hearings when these became more common following the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Again, I am not satisfied that this presented a viable option around the time that accommodation was being considered, or that it was unreasonable not to consider it later.
[40] Mr. DeJong testified that, throughout the pandemic in 2020 and 2021, the BC Provincial Court was conducting virtual bail hearings, but it was unclear whether the practice would continue. As I understand it, it was not until 2022 or 2023 that the Court committed to a more structured, permanent, system of virtual bail hearings in the Interior Region. In its current form, there are two virtual bail hubs in the Interior Region. It is now possible to work as Crown counsel full time, from home, doing virtual bail hearings (though not necessarily as a permanent position).
[41] Based on this evidence, I find that the earliest that BCPS could have considered accommodating Ms. Swanson in a full-time position doing virtual bail hearings would have been 2022 or 2023 – years after her last proposal to return to work. By this time, Ms. Swanson no longer had practicing status with the Law Society and was recognized by her long-term disability provider to be permanently disabled from her own or any similar occupation. She had not worked for five years. Most importantly, her limitations and restrictions remained the same: she could not attend court or work in the public eye, and she needed to be able to self-pace and integrate micro-breaks. On their face, these limitations appear inconsistent with full time virtual bail work.
[42] Here I rely on the evidence of Mr. DeJong, who has worked full time from home in the daytime bail hub since 2024. He testified that the work is fast paced, high volume, with a lot of quick decision making. While there are court breaks, counsel does not have control over the pace of the work. Mr. DeJong described constantly working “against the clock”, making difficult decisions under public scrutiny with competing pressures and high stakes. Bail hearings are open to the public, and there are often media or other members of the public watching. Both Mr. DeJong and Ms. Patterson testified about current public scrutiny on the bail process, grounded in public perception of a “catch and release” criminal justice system. Mr. DeJong described being uncomfortable sometimes with his full name being visible to the accused person and observers. In short: the work requires daily attendance in virtual court, in the public eye, and a high volume of decision making without control over the pace.
[43] To support Ms. Swanson’s view that she could have done this work, she has submitted an expert report from Dr. Kari Nishi, her family physician, dated September 22, 2025: Ex 1, tab 41. Dr. Nishi opines that Ms. Swanson’s symptoms have been stable between 2019 and 2025. She says that, if Ms. Swanson were able to work from the safe environment of her home, her PTSD symptoms would be minimized and her cognitive functioning would be optimal. She says that Ms. Swanson could do concentrated work for 2-3 hours, with breaks in between. Finally, Dr. Nishi opines that returning to work may have benefited Ms. Swanson’s mental health and wellbeing.
[44] I accept Dr. Nishi’s evidence, and the BCPS has not challenged it. However, I agree with BCPS that it does not accurately reflect the full demands of the job, as described by Mr. DeJong. Dr. Nishi’s opinion does not address the public scrutiny and contact with the accused person and other justice actors, or the amount of decision making and pace of the work. And, while I appreciate that Ms. Swanson was able to successfully participate in this human rights hearing, this experience is not equivalent to the role of Crown counsel conducting multiple bail hearings in a day. I cannot conclude that Dr. Nishi’s 2025 opinion renders BCPS’s failure to consider this option for Ms. Swanson unreasonable.
[45] At most, I accept that it may have been possible that Ms. Swanson could have returned to work in 2022 or 2023 doing virtual bail. However, “just because an option is ‘possible’ does not mean it must be done”: Dunkley v. UBC and another, 2015 BCHRT 100 at para. 432, upheld in 2016 BCSC 1383. Here again I invoke the Tribunal’s observation in Thanh:
There may be a point at which it would be unreasonable to pursue an accommodation option. This may arise in circumstances where measures have little or no likelihood of success. That an accommodation option is “possible” does not mean that it must be done: Dunkley at para. 423. In cases where good faith and reasonable inquiries have been made, that lead to a conclusion of undue hardship, then the fact that there might be further inquiries which could be made is not relevant: Dunkley at para. 423. Ultimately, this analysis must be anchored in “common sense” and “flexibility”: Hydro-Québec at para 12. [at para. 100]
[46] In this case, I am satisfied that, between 2017 and 2020, BCPS made good faith and reasonable inquiries which led it to conclude that it was not possible to permanently accommodate Ms. Swanson’s no-court restriction. The decision was made based on Ms. Swanson’s stated permanent restrictions and limitations, the experience of her temporary accommodation in 2017, and the operational requirements of the Cranbrook office. It was made in consultation with Mr. Mayes (then Deputy Regional Crown counsel), the Regional Crown counsel, the Public Service Agency, and the Deputy Director of Regional Operations for the Ministry of the Attorney General: see e.g. Ex 2, tabs 155, 156; Ex 1, tab 13. The conclusion that a permanent accommodation would have given rise to undue hardship was, in my view, justified. This is sufficient to find that BCPS fulfilled its human rights obligations towards Ms. Swanson.
[47] I find that BCPS has proven that the requirement to attend court was a bona fide occupational requirement of the role of Crown counsel in the Cranbrook office. It could not reasonably accommodate Ms. Swanson. As such, it did not discriminate against her.
IV CONCLUSION
[48] Ms. Swanson deserves recognition and gratitude for her work as Crown counsel for over 20 years. Her career was abruptly and unjustly ended because of the criminal behaviour of a person that she encountered in the course of her work on behalf of British Columbians. The impacts of this behaviour permanently restricted her from conducting a vital and core part of her job: attending court.
[49] Unfortunately, during the period of this complaint, attending court was a bona fide occupational requirement for Crown counsel in the Cranbrook office. I am satisfied that BCPS did what it could reasonably do to consider whether it was possible to accommodate her, and that it could not. The complaint is dismissed.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair