Khader v. Board of Education of School District No. 68 (Nanaimo-Ladysmith), 2026 BCHRT 70
Date Issued: March 24, 2026
File: CS-007190
Indexed as: Khader v. Board of Education of School District No. 68 (Nanaimo-Ladysmith), 2026 BCHRT 70
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Mohammed Khader
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Board of Education of School District No. 68 (Nanaimo-Ladysmith)
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Annie E. Olson
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mohammed Khader applied to work as an Education Assistant [EA] in the Nanaimo-Ladysmith School District. The District did not offer him an interview, and he did not get the position. In this human rights complaint, he alleges that the District did not hire him because he is visibly racialized and Muslim. He further alleges that the District Manager of Administrative Services [the Employee] told him to “fuck off you dirty sand n—”. He says this is discrimination in employment, based on his race, ancestry, colour, place of origin, and religion, in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] The District denies discriminating. It says that it did not interview Mr. Khader based on feedback from his supervisor that he was not ready for the position. The Employee denies using racial slurs towards Mr. Khader and says in fact he insulted her as a woman. The District says that Mr. Khader became escalated during an in-person meeting with the Executive Director of Human Resources, resulting in the police being called and Mr. Khader being barred from District property.
[3] In this application, the District asks the Tribunal to dismiss Mr. Khader’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). It also asks for dismissal based on Mr. Khader’s conduct during the course of this complaint process, which has included non-compliance with Tribunal Rules and orders regarding disclosure, as well as inappropriate communications with the Tribunal and counsel for the District: Code, ss. 27(1)(d)(ii) and 27.5.
[4] Mr. Khader has indicated through emails and voicemails to the Tribunal that he does not consent to the dismissal of his complaint. However, he did not file any submissions in response to the dismissal application despite being given the opportunity to do so. In this application, I have relied on his version of events, set out in his complaint form.
[5] I have found I can most efficiently deal with the application under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. For the following reasons, I am satisfied this complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. It is dismissed.
II DECISION
[6] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. The onus is on the District in this application to establish the basis for dismissal.
[7] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[8] In this application, I must base my decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77. That is important in this case, because Mr. Khader has elected not to file any materials in response to the District’s application.
[9] There is no dispute that, at a hearing, Mr. Khader would be able to prove the first two elements of his complaint. Mr. Khader explains that he has South Asian ancestry, his skin colour is brown, and he is Muslim. These characteristics engage protections from discrimination based on race, ancestry, colour, place of origin, and religion. There is also no dispute that the District elected not to interview or hire Mr. Khader for a position as an EA. At a hearing, this would be sufficient to prove the first two elements of Mr. Khader’s complaint: protected characteristics and adverse impact in employment: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[10] The District argues that Mr. Khader has no reasonable prospect of proving the following elements of his case:
a. His protected characteristics were a factor in the District’s decision not to interview or hire him, and/or
b. The Employee told him to “fuck off you dirty sand n—” during a phone call on or around July 6, 2022.
I agree.
[11] Mr. Khader applied for a permanent position as an EA at the District on February 15, 2022. At that time, he was about three weeks into a six-week practicum as an EA at a District school [the School]. On February 17, the District’s Recruitment Coordinator wrote to the School’s Vice Principal to inquire about Mr. Khader. Their emails are before me in this application.
[12] The Recruitment Coordinator asked:
Just a quick check in regarding Mohammed Khader, EA practicum student at [the School]. He applied to our posting yesterday and I hope you can share some details about his practicum. How is he doing and is it going well?
The Vice Principal responded:
He isn’t ready for a position yet. He is half way through his six week practicum and only recently felt comfortable moving out of the observation phase.
[13] The District says that this response is the reason that it elected not to offer Mr. Khader an interview at that time.
[14] In his complaint, Mr. Khader alleges that his protected characteristics were the real reason he wasn’t interviewed. He says, “the respondent refused to consider me as a candidate for the position I applied for, despite being fully qualified, simply on the grounds that I am a Muslim”. He gives no basis for this allegation, and I cannot discern any based on the materials before me. In the absence of any evidence supporting an inference of discrimination, and in the face of the District’s evidence of a non-discriminatory explanation, Mr. Khader’s allegation is purely speculative and has no reasonable prospect of success.
[15] I understand that Mr. Khader argues that the Tribunal could infer discrimination based on his allegation that the Employee used a racial slur towards him on the phone. In this application, the Employee has sworn an affidavit denying that she used any derogatory or discriminatory language toward Mr. Khader. She explains that it is part of her role to field phone calls and schedule appointment with the District Superintendent. In that capacity, she spoke to Mr. Khader briefly twice. The first time was on June 15, 2022, when Mr. Khader called to speak to the Superintendent about hiring practices. The Employee directed him to Human Resources. The second call was in the week of June 21, 2022, when Mr. Khader called again wanting to talk to the Superintendent about hiring practices. The Employee says she again referred him to Human Resources, at which point she says that Mr. Khader made an “explicit comment” to her, the first word of which she couldn’t understand: “_____ woman”. He hung up on her.
[16] I appreciate that this allegation turns on two conflicting version of events. However, in my view, a hearing is not necessary to resolve it. Mr. Khader has elected not to respond to the Employee’s affidavit with his own statement, setting out his version of events. On its face, his allegation is shocking. Based on all the evidence before me, it does not make sense and is not credible. In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that the Tribunal does not make factual findings in a dismissal application. However, it does “apply a content-based analysis not unlike that which would be applied by a fact-finder”: Ritchie v. Central Okanagan Search and Rescue Society and others, 2016 BCHRT 110at para. 120. Among other things, this includes: looking for internal and external consistency, placing the evidence in context, and considering the overall relationship of the parties and all the surrounding circumstances. Then:
On this basis, I gauge the relative strengths and weaknesses of the case and determine what aspects of the complaint do not rise above conjecture and, in light of all of the material before me, have no reasonable prospect of success.
Ritchie at para. 120
[17] Based on the Employee’s affidavit – which Mr. Khader has not disputed – the context of their two short conversations was that Mr. Khader was trying to reach the District Superintendent. The Employee’s role in this conversation was an administrative one. There is no evidence before me that she had a relationship with Mr. Khader, knew who he was in the phone call, or was involved in the decision not to hire him. There is no explanation before me to contextualize this brief conversation and explain why the Employee, tasked with an administrative function, would say to Mr. Khader: “fuck off you dirty sand n—”. There is no evidence that he reported the alleged incident to the District, in contrast to his complaints about discrimination in the hiring process. In context, the allegation simply doesn’t make sense. I am satisfied that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Ritchie v. Central Okanagan Search and Rescue Society and others, 2016 BCHRT 110 at para. 120.
III CONCLUSION
[18] Mr. Khader’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. I dismiss it under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
[19] I note that, if I had not dismissed the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, I would have dismissed it under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) on the basis that it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed. Throughout the Tribunal’s process, Mr. Khader has refused to comply with his disclosure obligations under the Rules and my order dated February 6, 2025. He declined to make submissions about the District’s disclosure application, and then complained that the resulting orders were “absurd” and “ridiculous”. His communications with the Tribunal and the District have been inappropriate. He has accused the District of having a “dirty attitude” and showing “extreme belligerence”, and asked the District’s counsel whether they had any “shame defending and representing a clearly bigoted and discriminatory party”. He accused the Tribunal’s case manager, without foundation, of being “corrupt” and “biased”, accused the Tribunal of being “useless and just a waste of tax dollars”, and demanded the Tribunal “satisfy him that the Tribunal is not merely a token institute”. The Tribunal put him on notice that his complaint may be dismissed if he did not diligently pursue it and warned him about communicating respectfully. These warnings had no apparent effect on his conduct. Based on Mr. Khader’s pattern of behaviour throughout the process (which I have only briefly summarized here), I agree with the District that it would not further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair