Complainant v. Sancta Maria House, 2026 BCHRT 69
Date Issued: March 19, 2026
File: CS-007462
Indexed as: Complainant v. Sancta Maria House, 2026 BCHRT 69
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Complainant
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Sancta Maria House
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Complainant
Counsel for the Respondent: Spencer Toffoli
I INTRODUCTION
[1] The Complainant was in a social service program operated by Sancta Maria House. She alleges the House discriminated against her in services based on sex and mental disability contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code. Specifically, she says an employee of the House asked her if she had engaged in sex work, staff treated her poorly while in the program, and she was ultimately kicked out of the House’s residential recovery program.
[2] The House denies discriminating and applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c). It says the Complainant has no reasonable prospect of proving a connection between her sex and mental disability and its impugned conduct because it had wholly non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
[3] For the following reasons, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint. I am persuaded on the materials before me that the House is reasonably certain to establish that the reason for its conduct was entirely non-discriminatory and there is no reasonable prospect the complaint will succeed.
[4] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The House is a non-profit organization that operates supportive housing for women seeking recovery from substance abuse and trauma. Clients of the supporting housing program must meet certain criteria including that they must not pose a risk of harm to themselves or others.
[6] The Complainant says she is a person with mental disabilities including PTSD, a history of traumatic brain injuries and cognitive issues.
[7] On March 28, 2022, the Complainant applied to enroll in the House’s supportive housing program. During the intake interview the Complainant was asked if she had prior experience with sex work. The Complainant was accepted into the House’s program and began residing in its facility. The Complainant signed a declaration form confirming she had read, understood, and would abide by the guidelines of the program.
[8] On April 14, 2022, the Complainant made a comment to a staff person of the House about experiencing thoughts of self harm. The staff person took the Complainant to a hospital emergency department for a psychiatric assessment.
[9] The Complainant left the hospital prior to being assessed. The Complainant subsequently refused to undergo medical assessment.
[10] The House informed the Complainant that she must get a physician’s assessment certifying it was safe for her to return to its residence before returning. The Complainant opted not to get a medical assessment and moved out of the residence, ending the program.
III DECISION
[11] The House applies to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the House to establish the basis for dismissal.
[12] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[13] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[14] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[15] To prove her complaint at a hearing, the Complainant will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in services, and her protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[16] The Complainant is self-represented in this complaint. Her complaint and submissions could be described as appearing at the Tribunal’s gate “in ragged form”: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 38; PL v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development and others, 2023 BCHRT 58 at paras. 30-31; Rush v. Fraser Health Authority (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 13 at para. 28. The Tribunal’s duty of fairness requires it to make efforts to understand the arguments that self-represented litigants are trying to advance: Hassan v. BFI Constructors and another, 2024 BCHRT 137 at para. 13.
[17] Taken at its best, I understand the Complainant to be arguing that she was adversely impacted by being kicked out of the House’s program and residence. I understand her to be asking the Tribunal to draw an inference of connection with her protected characteristics because she was asked about sex work, treated poorly during the program, and kicked out because she did not get an assessment.
[18] The House’s submissions on their dismissal application focuses on nexus, the third element of Moore. It argues that there is no reasonable prospect the Complainant will succeed in establishing that her sex or mental disability were a factor in the impugned conduct. It argues that it is reasonably certain to prove at a hearing that asking program applicants about prior sex work experience is a standard question asked to all applicants. It says the Complainant has provided no evidentiary basis to draw a connection between her protected characteristics and her treatment during the program. Finally, it says they are reasonably certain to prove at a hearing that the Complainant was removed from the program solely because she failed to get a medical assessment stating she was not at risk of self-harm.
[19] Based on the information and materials before me, I am persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect the Tribunal would find at a hearing that the Complainant’s sex or mental disability was a factor in her treatment by the House. I am satisfied the House is reasonably certain to establish that its reason for their actions was wholly non-discriminatory. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.
[20] First, much of the Complainant’s submissions in response to the dismissal application are about her subjective perception that she was discriminated against and treated poorly by the House’s staff and other clients. She asserts that she was forced out of bed, made to do chores, slapped by an employee, and was verbally abused. She criticizes the House’s program and says she experienced negative impacts on her life after she left the residence. Aside from her general allegations that she was treated poorly, however, the Complainant has not asserted facts or provided any evidence or explanation from which the Tribunal could reasonably infer that her sex or mental disability was a factor in that treatment.
[21] Rather, the materials before me support the House’s position that it had non-discriminatory reasons for its treatment of the Complainant. Specifically, the House points to its policies showing all potential program participants are asked about their medical and psychiatric history, history of substance use, and history of engaging in sex work, to assess their history of trauma. The House also provided its program policies, and contemporaneous notes and incident reports that support their position that the Complainant said she had thoughts of self-harm which triggered their response under their policy which states that “any clients verbally expressing self harm, suicidal ideation or actions must be referred to the Emergency to be assessed by the psychiatrist for suitability to remain”.
[22] Next, the Complainant asserts that the staff and clients of the House are untrustworthy, and their evidence should not be believed. She agrees that she made a comment about self-harm but says it was not an expression of her intentions. She also argues that she was physically slapped and verbally abused by staff. The House disputes that the Complainant was hit or verbally abused.
[23] Where the parties disagree on what occurred, I am able to resolve the conflicts on the basis of the materials before me. Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. It is only when there are foundational or key issues of credibility, that the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[24] In my view, the conflict in the evidence, is not foundational to the issues raised in the complaint and, in any event, can be resolved on the basis of the materials. The Complainant says she expressed frustration with the House’s program but denies that her statement was an expression of self harm. The contemporaneous incident notes and program policies provided by the House support its position that when any expression of potential self-harm requires that client be immediately assessed by a professional and cannot return to the program without an assessment confirming they are not at risk to themselves or others.
[25] Finally, I turn to the Complainant’s assertion that she was slapped by an employee and verbally abused. The Complainant has provided little details about these alleged incidents beyond asserting that it happened. She has provided no information from which the Tribunal could reasonably connect her sex and mental disability to this alleged incident. She has not taken her assertion that she was slapped because of her sex and mental disability out of the realm of conjecture.
[26] Assessing the whole of the evidence, I am persuaded there is no reasonable prospect the Complainant will succeed at proving discrimination. The Complainant has not asserted facts or provided a basis upon which the Tribunal could reasonably infer that her protected characteristics were a factor in the House’s treatment of her during intake, her participation in the program, or her discharge from the program. The House has satisfied me that it is reasonably certain to provide a solely non-discriminatory explanation for all of its conduct. In these circumstances, I am persuaded the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.
IV CONCLUSION
[27] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c).
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal