BC Human Rights Tribunal

Aolick v. A1 Convenience Store and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 62

Date Issued: March 13, 2026
File: CS-002186

Indexed as: Aolick v. A1 Convenience Store and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 62

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Kayla Aolick

COMPLAINANT

AND:

A1 Convenience Store and Harjodhan “Jodi” Rai and Surinder Rai

RESPONDENTS

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member: Jessica Derynck

Counsel for the Complainant: Laura Track

Agent for the Respondents: Major Rai

Date of Hearing: February 3 to 6, March 18, 2025

Location of Hearing: Videoconference

I          INTRODUCTION

[1]               Kayla Aolick is a woman with disabilities. She survived a rare brain cancer as a child, and surgery and other treatments left her with a seizure disorder and other lasting impacts. As a result of her disabilities, entering the workforce required a great deal of time and effort. In 2018, when Kayla was in her late 20s, she received services from employment agencies that help people with disabilities to find work. Kayla’s first job was at A1 Convenience Store [Store]. Harjodhan (Jodi) Rai and Surinder Rai own the Store. They are Kayla’s relatives. Their son, Major Rai, worked at the Store and coordinated with Kayla and the employment agencies to provide her with unpaid work experience for about eight months, then a paid position for six hours a week with an employment agency subsidizing her wage for 18 weeks. The Store paid Kayla’s full wages after the wage subsidy ended.   

[2]               Kayla’s employment at the Store ended in January 2020, about four months after her wage subsidy ended. Kayla filed a human rights complaint against the Store, Jodi, and Surinder [Respondents] in July 2020. She says the Respondents terminated her employment and this was discrimination. She also says the Respondents discriminated against her during her time working at the Store by not letting her bring her service dog to work, failing to provide her with a chair to use when she needed it, cancelling some of her shifts at the last minute, and making hurtful comments related to her disabilities.

[3]               The Respondents say they did not discriminate against Kayla. They say they gave her an opportunity to gain work experience that she would not have had otherwise, which helped her get into the workforce, and that they only ever intended to employ her for a short time for this purpose. They say they could not accommodate her to have her service dog in the store, and there was always a chair available for her to sit on. They deny making hurtful comments. They say changes to her shifts and the eventual end of her employment made sense in the context, and these actions were not discriminatory.

[4]               I heard the parties’ evidence on this complaint over four days, then heard their final arguments over half a day. Kayla and her mother, Sheila Aolick, testified. Major represented the Respondents as their agent and testified. He also called two Store employees as witnesses. Jodi and Surinder did not testify.

[5]               The hearing was challenging for Kayla and Major. Kayla testified about a difficult time in her life and was understandably emotional at times. Major represented his parents and their business to respond to a complaint about allegations that arose out of his efforts to help a family member. The Respondents decided to retain counsel just before the hearing, but their counsel withdrew when I denied the Respondents’ application for an adjournment for reasons that I explain below. I appreciate the participants’ efforts in these circumstances. I have carefully considered all the parties’ evidence.

[6]               For the reasons that follow, I find that the Respondents discriminated when they did not let Kayla bring her service dog to work, when they made hurtful comments related to her disabilities, and when they terminated her employment. Kayla did not establish that the allegations related to her request for a chair or cancelled shifts were additional instances of discrimination.

[7]               The Tribunal does not need to find an intention to discriminate to find that discrimination happened: Human Rights Code, s. 2. I cannot make findings about Jodi and Surinder’s intentions because they did not testify, but I find that Major’s intentions were good. He wanted to help Kayla get into the workforce. Unfortunately, the Respondents did not understand their human rights obligations to Kayla as an employee. I acknowledge the complexity of the situation underlying this complaint for the parties and for Major. Ultimately, however, discrimination is about the impact on a complainant. I order remedies for the discrimination based on the impact on Kayla.  

[8]               In this decision I refer to the parties, Major, and Kayla’s mother Sheila by their first names because they used first names at the hearing and because several participants share last names.   

[9]               I begin by explaining my decision on the preliminary issue of the Respondents’ adjournment application. Then I give a brief background to the case, summarize the issues and my findings, and address each of Kayla’s allegations. I set out the remedies I order at the end of the decision.

II       Respondents’ adjournment application

A.    Background to the application

[10]           The Tribunal sent the Respondents notice of the complaint proceeding on November 26, 2020. The Respondents did not retain counsel. Major assisted the Respondents with responding to the complaint and filing an application to dismiss, which the Tribunal allowed in part and denied in part on October 11, 2023. On October 8, 2024, Major attended a conference call with the case manager to set the hearing dates of February 3-6, 2025, and deadlines for filing forms before the hearing.

[11]           On November 21, 2024, I held a pre-hearing conference [PHC] to address an application Kayla made for disclosure of documents and assess the parties’ readiness for the hearing. Major attended on the Respondents’ behalf.

[12]           Major filed an application for document disclosure on November 28, 2024. The case manager advised him that he needed to find out from Kayla’s counsel whether Kayla consented to disclose the requested documents. On January 18, 2025, Major told the Tribunal that Kayla did not consent to all of his disclosure requests. He also told the Tribunal that he had retained counsel and provided his counsel’s contact information, but he said his counsel was on leave until January 30, 2025.

[13]           On January 20, 2025, the case manager told the parties that the Respondents’ counsel needed to file a Form 11 – Notice of Change or Withdrawal of Representative to confirm that she represented the Respondents. The case manager also told the parties that a request Major made for more time to submit that Respondents’ documents was denied. On the same date I wrote to the parties and told them that:

a.    Until counsel for the Respondents filed a Form 11 the Tribunal would continue to send correspondence to Major;

b.    If Major wanted counsel to represent the Respondents on their disclosure application but counsel was not available until January 30, I would not be able to address the application before the hearing dates, and this would not impact the Respondents’ deadline to submit their book of documents for use in the hearing; and

c.     Major could tell the case manager if he wanted to represent the Respondents himself on the disclosure application, or if their counsel were available before January 30, she may file a Form 11 and provide the Tribunal with her availability.

[14]           On January 27, 2025, Major told the Tribunal that he would represent the Respondents on the disclosure application and asked the Tribunal to address it before the hearing. The Tribunal scheduled a PHC for January 30 to address the application. On January 29, 2025, Major told the Tribunal and Kayla’s counsel that he had requested more time to submit the Respondents’ documents to allow his lawyer to catch up and understand the case, although no counsel had filed a Form 11 to date.

[15]           Major represented the Respondents at the PHC on January 30, 2025. At the PHC Major said the Respondents’ counsel had returned to work but was in court that day and would be filing a Form 11 and applying for an adjournment of the hearing dates. In a letter to the parties on January 30, I explained that I denied the Respondents’ application for disclosure because I found that the documents they requested were not relevant to the issues I needed to decide. At the PHC and in my letter I also explained the following to the parties about adjournment applications:

a.    The Tribunal’s website sets out the Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules] related to adjournment applications, and the legal test for an adjournment. If the Respondents were to apply for an adjournment, they would have to persuade me that their request was reasonable and would not be overly unfair to the complainant.

b.    If the Respondents were to apply for an adjournment, Major (or counsel, if the Respondents had counsel representing them) must first talk to Kayla’s counsel to find out Kayla’s position. Even if Kayla agreed to an adjournment or did not oppose an adjournment application, that did not guarantee the Tribunal would grant an adjournment.

c.     If the Respondents filed an adjournment application, I would not be able to schedule a PHC on Friday, January 31, so would need to address any adjournment application first thing on Monday, February 3, at the hearing. If the Respondent filed an application on January 31, I would review it before the start of the hearing to familiarize myself with the issues on the application so I could address it efficiently, because if the application were to be denied, I would want to use most of the day to proceed with the hearing and hear evidence.

[16]           On the afternoon of January 30, 2025, Major filed a Form 11 naming Jasmin Dhillon as the Respondents’ representative and providing her contact information. The case manager emailed Ms. Dhillon to ask her to confirm that she was representing the Respondents since she had not filed the Form 11 herself. The case manager received an automatic “out of office” response.

[17]           Ms. Dhillon responded to the case manager on the afternoon of January 31 to confirm that she represented the Respondents. She also advised that she would be seeking an adjournment and would be filing the required forms. She filed an application for adjournment after 4:00 p.m. on January 31.

[18]           I dealt with the adjournment application at the start of the hearing on February 3, 2025. Kayla opposed the application.

[19]           I explained that under Rule 30(2) of the Tribunal’s Rules, an application for an adjournment must be filed at least two full business days before the date set for hearing, unless the information or circumstances that form the basis of the application have not come to the party’s attention by that time. I asked Ms. Dhillon to explain the timing of the application, noting that Major had told the Tribunal he had counsel in December, the adjournment application said that Ms. Dhillon had been on a personal leave, and Major had told the Tribunal on January 30 that Ms. Dhillon was busy in court that day.

[20]           Ms. Dhillon explained that she spoke to Major before December 20, 2024, but he did not retain her at that time. Ms. Dhillon was not available until after January 30, 2025. She was in court on January 31, but not on January 30. She explained that Major retained her on January 31 and she was not available to speak to him properly until then. Ms. Dhillon submitted that she had not had time to review the file or prepare for the hearing, so she would need to withdraw as the Respondents’ representative without an adjournment.    

B.     Decision denying the adjournment application

[21]           I denied the Respondents’ adjournment application. I gave brief reasons at the hearing. This is a more thorough explanation of my reasons.

[22]           The first step of the legal test on an adjournment application is to decide whether the request for an adjournment is reasonable. I found that the Respondents’ request was not reasonable considering the timing. There was no reasonable explanation for why the Respondents did not retain counsel earlier in the process, then decided in December to retain someone who was not available for the six weeks before the hearing.

[23]           Ms. Dhillon submitted that Major did not realize that he was out of his depth, or realize the seriousness of the matter, until recently. She submitted that the length of the process to date was not the Respondents’ fault, and they had never requested an adjournment before, so it was not unreasonable to request one to have the chance to retain counsel.

[24]           Major also spoke to the application. He said he thought he was following the Tribunal’s process, he tried his best, and he did not know that Kayla could take the position that she did not have to disclose requested documents and that the Tribunal could decide that she did not have to disclose them. He did not want to pay for a lawyer when he thought he could represent the Respondents himself but realized late in the process that he should have a lawyer.

[25]           Ms. Dhillon added that the cost of counsel was a factor and that the Store was not eligible for any legal aid.

[26]           Major did not explain how he or the Respondents did not understand the adversarial nature of the complaint process before they requested documents from Kayla. There is information about the Tribunal’s process on its website and case managers provide parties with information about the process at each step. Until he retained counsel, Major was responsible for reviewing information from the Tribunal and Kayla’s counsel and informing himself of the process, including for issues like disclosure and adjournment applications.  

[27]           Kayla’s counsel submitted that the Respondents could have sought free representation from the Law Centre; there was no suggestion that they did this and found that assistance was not available to them.

[28]           The Tribunal denied the Respondents’ application to dismiss the complaint of discrimination based on disability, allowing the application in part to dismiss Kayla’s complaint of discrimination based on family status, on October 11, 2023. At that point it was clear that the complaint would proceed to a hearing. The Respondents did not explain why they did not realize the seriousness of the matter or understand the adversarial nature of the process at that time, or any time before they agreed to the hearing dates and confirmed that they were ready to proceed to hearing at the PHC on November 22, 2024. They did not explain why they did not then retain counsel who was available to prepare for the case in the weeks before the hearing but chose to wait to retain a lawyer who was not available until January 31. They also did not explain why Major told the Tribunal that the Respondents had retained counsel in December, or why he sent in a Form 11 identifying Ms. Dhillon as his representative on January 30, when Ms. Dhillon advised that he did not retain her until January 31.        

[29]           On reply, Ms. Dhillon submitted that Major did not really understand what the complaint was about and reiterated that he was out of his depth. She submitted that the complaint process had been four years to that point, and waiting another month would not cause any harm.

[30]           I considered Kayla’s counsel’s submissions that allowing the adjournment would be prejudicial to her. Kayla had a full-time job by the time of the hearing and had scheduled the week off. She had also waited four years for the hearing and had been preparing for many months up to the hearing date.

[31]           I found that there would be some unfairness to Kayla to adjourn the hearing. This would not be the sort of prejudice that might prevent her from eventually putting in her case. An adjournment would have resulted in Kayla needing to re-prepare for the hearing and take another week off so it could proceed months later after a last-minute adjournment, when the Respondents had plenty of time to retain counsel who was available to prepare. This would not have been fair to her, but this was not the deciding factor for denying the adjournment application. I note the issue of unfairness to Kayla because the Respondents submitted that there would be substantial prejudice to them if they had to proceed without counsel, and no prejudice to Kayla.

[32]           I found that allowing the adjournment would in fact result in some unfairness to Kayla, and that denying it would not prejudice the Respondents in a manner that would prevent them from putting in their case. I denied the application because I found that it was not reasonable to request an adjournment at the end of the business day before the hearing to retain counsel at the last moment.

[33]           Unavailability of counsel may be one factor in considering whether a request for an adjournment is reasonable, but this factor, in an of itself, is not always a sufficient basis on which to grant an adjournment: Miu v. Vancity Aluminum, 2005 BCHRT 319 at para. 9. Whether the party seeking the adjournment delayed in seeking counsel is a relevant factor. In Schulz v. Villa Fronterra and others, 2004 BCHRT 236, the Tribunal allowed a complainant’s adjournment application to give her time to retain counsel when she had “acted without delay” to seek counsel when issues arose at a pre-hearing conference about the correct respondents to the complaint. One the complainant learned that counsel would need more time to prepare she promptly filed her application: para. 21. 

[34]           In Schulz the Tribunal considered that there was an ongoing issue of the proper respondents to the complaint and it was not clear whether all of the respondents the complainant named had formal notice of the amendment naming them. The Tribunal noted that proceeding with a hearing where it did not appear that all the possible named respondents had notice of it would be a substantial prejudice to them: paras. 18-19. The Tribunal also noted that the complainant did not view the complaint as a simple matter: para. 22.

[35]           In contrast, in this case, the Respondents did not make efforts to seek counsel until about six weeks before the hearing and did not explain why they chose to retain someone who was not available during those six weeks. There were also no complex issues similar to the issue in Schulz of the uncertainty of the proper respondents and whether they all had notice of the complaint. The Respondents were aware of the allegations and that they were named respondents since November 2020, more than four years before the hearing dates. They filed an application to dismiss the complaint without counsel, which resulted in part of the complaint being dismissed.

[36]           Major was available to represent the Respondents at the hearing and was familiar with the allegations, which were relatively straightforward. It is common for self-represented people to appear before the Tribunal, and it is a Tribunal Member’s job to make sure a self-represented party understands the process during a hearing.

[37]           There was also no basis for the Respondents or Ms. Dhillon to believe that an adjournment would be a simple matter of putting the case over for a short time to give counsel time to prepare. I explained at the hearing that adjourning a complaint at the Tribunal is not a matter of putting the hearing dates over for a few weeks or a month, but that the Tribunal has a process for scheduling hearings months ahead.

[38]           I found that the Respondents’ late request to adjourn the hearing was not reasonable in all of these circumstances. 

C.     Hearing process with self-represented agent for the Respondents

[39]           Throughout the hearing I was cognizant of the fact that Major had hoped to receive an adjournment and ultimately have counsel represent the Respondents at the hearing but ended up representing the Respondents on his own. At all stages of the hearing, I made efforts to ensure that Major understood the process and had an opportunity to put in the Respondents’ case.

[40]           After Kayla gave her direct evidence on the first day of the hearing, Major asked for a summary of the allegations in the complaint, essentially asking Kayla’s counsel to repeat her opening statement. Kayla’s counsel provided a summary. The allegations and facts of the complaint were not overly complex, and Major was familiar with all of them. He cross examined Kayla and her mother, gave his own evidence, and introduced evidence from two Store employees who worked with Kayla. He had an opportunity to fully respond to the complaint and did so.

[41]           Kayla’s counsel advised during the hearing that Kayla would not be calling a witness from her witness list. I told Major that it was open to him to call that individual as a witness for the Respondents’ case, and to ask for an order for disclosure of the individual’s contact information if he did not have it. Major chose not to do this.

[42]           Major was three hours late for the hearing on the second day when he was scheduled to cross examine Kayla. I explain below where I address Kayla’s application for costs that he did not have a good explanation for this. However, I stood down the hearing in his absence and allowed him to cross examine Kayla that afternoon because it was important to allow him to fully respond to the complaint on the Respondents’ behalf.

[43]           The parties did their final arguments orally about six weeks after I heard the evidence. This was Major’s preference; he did not think that an opportunity to provide a written argument would help him. I directed Kayla’s counsel to provide Major with a written outline of her argument so Major would have an opportunity to respond to her submissions without needing to write them down during her oral submissions or recall them. I also ordered a break of one hour and 45 minutes after Kayla’s counsel gave her oral submissions so Major would have an opportunity to finalize his preparations before responding with the Respondents’ submissions.

[44]           I am satisfied that Major had a fair opportunity to respond to the complaint on the Respondents’ behalf.

[45]           I turn now to set out a brief background to the complaint before I address each of Kayla’s allegations. 

III     Background

[46]           Kayla lives with her mother. Kayla’s father is Jodi’s cousin. Kayla is Sikh, and in her culture Jodi and Surinder are like an aunt and uncle to her and Major is like her cousin. Jodi and Surinder have owned and run the Store, which is a convenience store at a gas station, since Kayla was a child. They also have other businesses associated with the Store, including a motel, laundry service, and car wash.

[47]           Kayla was diagnosed with a rare brain cancer when she was 11 years old. She had surgery to remove a tumour and had radiation treatment. Her treatments left her with ongoing conditions, including epilepsy. She had full-body seizures starting at age 12. Her doctors got those seizures under control, but by the time she worked at the Store she continued to have seizures where it looks to others like she is staring straight ahead. Kayla entered a neuropsychological report into evidence that explains these seizures are characterized by “absence like spells”. I refer to them as absence seizures in this decision. Kayla’s absence seizures last only seconds. She is not aware of what is happening during absence seizures and comes out of them tired and confused.

[48]           In 2012 Kayla got a service dog named Shadow to assist her with her seizures. Shadow was trained to alert Kayla if she was about to have a seizure so she could take medication, or to alert someone else if Kayla had a seizure and was not aware of it. I explain more about Shadow below in my analysis of the allegation that the Respondents discriminated by not allowing Kayla to bring Shadow to work.

[49]           In 2018 Kayla went to an organization called INEO Employment Services for help looking for a job. She wanted to work so she could earn more money than she received from disability payments and have more independence.

[50]           With help from INEO, Kayla started her unpaid work experience placement at the Store in August 2018. An agreement between Kayla, the Store, and INEO set out that Kayla would receive supervision and training in being a retail clerk in a convenience store.

[51]           Kayla’s unpaid work experience went until April 2019. During this time, she worked four hours per week, generally as two shifts of two hours each at first. At some point during this time, she started working one four-hour shift per week on Sundays. Most of the time she worked with an employee named Pradeep Katta, who trained and supervised her.

[52]           When Kayla was looking for employment, she planned to get a job with an employer that would allow her to bring Shadow to work. Kayla thought that she would be bringing Shadow to work with her at the Store and she brought him with her on the first day of her unpaid work experience. When she arrived, Major told her that she could not have Shadow at the store with her, so her mother took Shadow home. Kayla worked without Shadow throughout her employment at the Store. She says the Respondents discriminated by refusing to allow her to bring him to work. I refer to this as the Service Dog Allegation.  

[53]           At the end of her unpaid work experience Kayla had assistance from another organization called ETHOS, specifically through a program called Island Ops that subsidized wages for employees with disabilities to assist them with getting paid employment. Kayla began working at the Store for pay in May 2019, with Island Ops subsidizing her wages for 18 weeks. Initially she was going to work four hours per week on Sundays, but Island Ops required that she work on a weekday when the program would be able to send someone to the Store to periodically check on her. She ended up working four hours on Sundays and two hours on Wednesdays.

[54]           After the 18-week wage subsidy ended, the Store continued Kayla’s employment, paying her full wages for her six hours per week.

[55]           Kayla continued to work with Mr. Katta when she started the wage subsidy program. During that 18-week period Mr. Katta started working more at another of the Respondents’ businesses and Kayla started working more with Surinder. She also sometimes worked with a new employee named Jagpreet Chawla, and with Jodi. By the time the wage subsidy period ended, she mostly worked with Surinder, sometimes with Jodi, and sometimes overlapped with Mr. Chawla.

[56]           Kayla alleges that throughout her time at the Store she needed to sit down at times because of her disabilities, and the Respondents discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her with a chair she could use. This is the Chair Allegation.

[57]           Kayla says that after the wage subsidy program ended, Surinder and Jodi made hurtful comments to her related to her disabilities, including suggesting that she was not capable of working. Kayla says the comments were discrimination. I refer to this as the Hurtful Comments Allegation.

[58]           Kayla alleges that the Respondents fired her on January 8, 2020. She says that her disabilities were a factor and that this was discriminatory. This is the Termination Allegation. 

[59]           Kayla alleges that after the wage subsidy program ended the Respondents treated her poorly by sometimes cancelling her shifts at the last minute and sending her home when she arrived for work. She says her disabilities were a factor in this negative treatment and it was discriminatory. This is the Cancelled Shifts Allegation.

IV    Issues and summary of findings

A.    Credibility

[60]           This case involves different perspectives more than disputed facts, but the witnesses’ credibility is still important. For example, Kayla’s case, and my assessment of the appropriate remedies for discrimination, depend on whether I accept her evidence about what happened and the impact of the events on her. I must also decide whether to accept Major’s evidence about his recollection of events, and why he says the Respondents made decisions that they did.

[61]           Credibility involves an assessment of the extent to which a decision maker can rely on a witness’s testimony, considering both the sincerity of the witness and the accuracy of their evidence: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398, aff’d 2012 BCCA 296, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 392 (QL) at para. 186. This involves consideration of factors including a witness’s ability and opportunity to observe events, firmness of memory, ability to resist the influence of interest to modify recollection, consistency within the witness’s own testimony, harmony with independent evidence that has been accepted, whether the witness’s evidence seems unreasonable or unlikely, whether there is a motive to lie, and the witness’s general demeanour: Bradshaw at para. 186.

[62]           In some cases, a witness’ evidence may not be reliable because they have “made a conscious decision not to tell the truth”: Youyi Group Holdings (Canada) Ltd. v. Brentwood Lanes Canada Ltd., 2019 BCSC 739 at para. 89. In other cases, a witness may make an honest effort to give truthful evidence, but their testimony may not be reliable because of their inability to accurately observe, recall, or recount the event: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56 at para. 42; Youyi at paras. 89-90. In that case, if their testimony conflicts with the testimony of other witnesses who are better positioned to testify accurately, their evidence is not reliable: Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at para. 15.  

[63]           For the most part, the witnesses in this proceeding tried to give truthful evidence to the best of their ability. Kayla recalled some specific events and their timing when she had notes or text messages about those events from around the time they happened. In other areas of evidence, she did not recall details or recall when certain events occurred. This is understandable after the passage of time and does not call the sincerity of her evidence into question, but in some areas, it impacts the reliability of her evidence. I also find that Kayla’s perspective of the Respondents and their actions by the time her employment ended has influenced her recollection of earlier events to some extent, particularly regarding the Chair Allegation.

[64]           I find that Major recalled his own perspective of events related to Kayla’s employment at the Store, but he did not have a good recollection of communications with others about the various stages of Kayla’s employment. His perspective of the events also influenced his recollection to some extent. Major’s evidence about Jodi and Surinder’s conduct, particularly related to the Hurtful Comments Allegation and Termination Allegation, is not reliable because he was not present to observe the conversations and events underlying those allegations. 

[65]           I explain which evidence I rely on, and which evidence I do not accept, in the analysis of each allegation below.

[66]           First, I explain how Kayla may establish her case for each allegation, and how the Respondent may defend against the allegations.

B.     Kayla’s case

[67]           Section 13(1) of the Human Rights Code prohibits discrimination regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of personal characteristics including disability.

[68]           The Respondents do not dispute that Kayla has physical and mental disabilities. To establish her case for discrimination based on disability, she must show that she experienced an adverse impact in employment and that a disability was a factor: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. Her disability does not need to be the only factor, an overriding factor, or a significant factor: Quebec (Commission des Droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc., 2015 SCC 39 at paras. 45-52; Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30 at para. 46.

[69]           The Respondents do not need to have intended to discriminate for Kayla to make out her case: Code, s. 2.

[70]           I find that Kayla has established her case for the Service Dog Allegation, Hurtful Comments Allegation, and Termination Allegation. I find that she has not established an adverse impact in employment in which her disability was a factor to substantiate the Chair Allegation or Cancelled Shifts Allegation. I explain my decision on each allegation in the analysis below.

C.     The Respondents’ case

[71]           For the allegations where Kayla has made out her case, the Respondents may establish a defence to the complaint by proving that the adverse impact was justified based on a bona fide occupational requirement: Code, s. 13(4). To do this, the Respondents must establish that the standard or conduct creating the adverse impact was for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of Kayla’s job, was adopted in good faith, and was reasonably necessary, meaning that they could not have accommodated Kayla without experiencing undue hardship: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 SCR 3. 

[72]           I find that the Respondents have not established a defence to the Service Dog Allegation, Hurtful Comments Allegation, or Termination Allegation. The Respondents have not established that they could not have allowed Kayla to have Shadow at work without incurring undue hardship, or that they could not have continued to employ her after her termination date without incurring undue hardship. There is also no justification for hurtful comments and conduct related to a person’s disabilities.  

[73]           This means that the Respondents discriminated against Kayla in employment based on physical and mental disability contrary to s. 13(1) of the Code.

D.    Remedies

[74]           I explain the remedies I order for the Respondents’ breach of the Code in the analysis below.  

[75]           Under s. 44(2) of the Code an act of an employee, officer, director, official, or agent of an employer within the scope of the person’s authority is deemed to be an act of the employer. I find that Jodi and Surinder discriminated against Kayla, and their conduct is deemed to be an act of the Store. The Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the remedies I order.   

E.     Costs

[76]           Kayla applied for an order for cost against the Respondents. Under s. 37(4) of the Code the Tribunal may order a party to pay costs if the party has engaged in improper conduct or failed to follow the Tribunal’s rules.

[77]           I find that the Respondents engaged in improper conduct warranting costs.  

V       ANALYSIS AND DECISION

A.    Kayla’s disabilities

[78]           Kayla initially filed her complaint based on mental disability and later amended it to add the ground of physical disability. The Respondents do not dispute that Kayla has disabilities that impacted her during the time she worked at the Store. Kayla and her mother both testified about Kayla’s disabilities, and I accept their evidence. Her neuropsychological report dated December 20, 2017, also provides information about her medical history and impacts of her disabilities. Here I briefly explain some ways that Kayla’s disabilities impacted her during the time she worked at the Store.

[79]           Kayla got Shadow in 2012 because she had frequent absence seizures at that time. Sometimes Kayla’s mother could not wake her after an absence seizure and had to call an ambulance. Shadow could anticipate seizures and nudge Kayla to alert her. He carried medication in his vest that Kayla could take to prevent seizures if Shadow alerted her in time. If Kayla did have a seizure, Shadow could alert someone else, usually Kayla’s mother.

[80]           By the time she started her unpaid work experience at the Store, Kayla did not have as many absence seizures. Her neuropsychological report says she reported having them daily in December 2017, but she testified that by August 2018 she had about one or two seizures per week that lasted between ten and 30 seconds. After a seizure she felt tired, was sometimes confused, and often needed to take a nap.

[81]           Kayla and her mother explained that her seizures are the most serious lasting impact of her cancer and treatment, but there are also other impacts. Kayla’s neuropsychological report says she described sleep difficulties, daytime fatigue, and cognitive difficulties at the time of her evaluation in December 2017. The psychologist who did her evaluation and report said that Kayla’s medical history was complex and that her cognitive and functional difficulties were likely multifactorial in nature, including her history of seizures, sleep disturbances, medication effects, and metabolic factors. Kayla testified that her cognitive issues were problems with her memory that were a side effect of earlier radiation therapy and became worse in 2017. She also testified that she had fatigue and weakness in her arms and legs, which impacted her while she worked at the Store. She could not walk long distances and sometimes needed to sit down when she was tired.

[82]           Kayla’s disabilities and their impacts were complex and impacted her in various ways during the relevant time period. I further describe how her disabilities impacted her relevant to each allegation below.   

B.     Findings about the nature of Kayla’s employment

[83]           The Service Dog Allegation and Chair Allegation are about barriers that Kayla says existed for her in her employment because of the nature of the work and her disabilities. These allegations span the time of her employment from the start of her unpaid experience to the end of her work at the Store.

[84]           The Hurtful Comments Allegation, Cancelled Shifts Allegation, and Termination Allegation relate to changes in how Kayla says the Respondents treated her after her wage subsidy period ended, and are about the Respondents’ conduct and whether their actions created adverse impacts in which Kayla’s disabilities were a factor. The parties have different perspectives about the intentions for Kayla’s wage subsidy period and her employment following the wage subsidy, and the Respondents’ perspective is relevant to their explanations for some of their alleged conduct. Here I explain my findings related to those intentions.

[85]           Kayla testified that she understood the Respondents to be hiring her under the wage subsidy program with the intention of continuing her employment after the wage subsidy period ended. As the end of the wage subsidy period approached, Kayla hoped that the Respondents would hire her to continue on and found out on the last day that they would. Kayla says an Island Ops case manager told her that she would continue working at the Store on the same shifts and hours after the wage subsidy period ended.

[86]           Major testified that the Respondents hired Kayla because she was not able to find a job to get work experience anywhere else, and they thought they could help her get some experience on her resume and give her a reference. Major says that before the wage subsidy program started, he told a program coordinator from ETHOS that the Store would not be suitable for regular employment for Kayla, but Kayla was insistent on doing the wage subsidy program there. Major says the ETHOS program coordinator told him that if the Store just gave Kayla minimal hours it would help her get employment elsewhere.

[87]           During the wage subsidy period an employment counsellor from Work BC visited Kayla twice at the Store and completed reports of her site visits for the Island Ops program. Major testified that at the end of the wage subsidy period, and again at the end of November 2019, he spoke to the Work BC employment counsellor on the phone, told her that Kayla’s hours would be reduced, and asked whether they had found additional employment for Kayla. Major says he expected the employment counsellor to tell Kayla that the Store would reduce her hours, but he did not know whether that happened.

[88]           Kayla’s understanding that the Respondents intended to continue her employment for an indefinite period of time after the wage subsidy period is consistent with the evidence. If the Respondents only intended to continue Kayla’s employment for a fixed period of time, they did not communicate this to Kayla.

[89]           On May 3, 2019, Major signed a contract with ETHOS for the Store to hire Kayla under the wage subsidy program. Kayla signed the contract on May 7, 2019. The contract says the intended results are, “For the participant to increase her skills and become a regular part time staff member at this business, reaching her goal and the program goal of sustainable employment for Persons with Disabilities.”

[90]           Major emailed back and forth with the ETHOS program coordinator in the time leading up to the wage subsidy contract. On April 23, 2019, the program coordinator sent Major an Island Ops wage subsidy request form, which he completed and returned the same day. The form says that subsidized work experiences average 12 weeks but may be longer or shorter depending on the situation. Major wrote on the form that a 24-week subsidy would probably be best because Kayla, “would not get hours otherwise through the summer because it gets very busy. After summer in the fall if she wishes to continue it would be more suitable pace.” In a section of the form with the heading, “Potential for long term employment for the participant post work experience”, Major wrote, “Applicant may be able to continue at the requested number of hours.” He requested a subsidy for four hours per week on the form.

[91]           The ETHOS program coordinator replied to Major and asked him to clarify the section about the length of subsidy:

If she is approved for subsidy, will she be given her hours through the summer, even though it’s extra busy? When the subsidy ends, you stated you would keep her on staff for the limited shifts she can do. What would happen in future busy seasons when there is no longer wage subsidy?

[92]           Major responded to say:

with the wage subsidy she can continue her shift through the summer along with other employees working with her during busy times. If we were paying her full wage it would not make sense for us to staff her over a more experienced employee. Hopefully she will gain enough experience and capabilities over the year to be able to perform and handle the busy season the following year.

[93]           On April 29, 2019, the ETHOS case manager wrote to Major and told him that the wage subsidy request was approved. The length of the subsidy was 18 weeks. Major says no one explained to him why it was approved for 18 weeks and not 24, and he did not ask.

[94]           In cross examination Major testified that he told the ETHOS program coordinator that Kayla could work at the Store for 24 weeks. He says he had phone conversations with the program coordinator where he said they were not looking at long-term placement for Kayla, and the program coordinator said six months would be a good amount of experience and would give her a good reference for future employment.

[95]           Major’s evidence in cross examination is not consistent with his email exchange with the program coordinator. I find unlikely that he communicated information to ETHOS on the phone that directly contradicted what he wrote in the email exchange, which was that he wanted Kayla’s wages to be subsidized through the summer when it was busy, the fall would be a more suitable pace for her, and she may be able to continue working the requested number of hours per week (which was four at the time). Kayla’s understanding and expectation that her employment would continue after the wage subsidy period makes sense in this context, and there is no evidence that anyone told her otherwise.

[96]           When Major learned that Kayla needed to work some hours on a weekday so that someone from the wage subsidy program could visit her at work, he scheduled her to work two hours on Wednesdays. He allowed her to continue working four hours on Sundays because he thought she would benefit from that experience. The wage subsidy program subsidized her increased hours for a total of six hours per week.

[97]           On September 4, 2019, a client services representative from Island Ops emailed Major and said, “This is the last week of the Work Experience with Kayla. The intent was to hire her after it finishes as a permanent employee. Can you please let us know if this is the case?”

[98]           The Island Ops representative also emailed Kayla on the same day to say she hoped Kayla had enjoyed her experience and was hired on with the Store as a permanent employee. She asked Kayla to let her know how her experience went and to let them know if she required any support because they would be available for assistance for a year.

[99]           Major responded to the Island Ops representative on September 5, 2019. He said they were happy to help Kayla in the work employment program and believed it helped her gain some good experience and skills to add to her resume, but she still had difficulties with basic tasks in a fast-paced environment and needed constant supervision and assistance to prevent mistakes. He also said customers were often rude and overwhelming, not understanding Kayla’s circumstances. Major said the experience at the Store should help Kayla gain a different job in a slower-paced retail environment, and she would have a good reference. He said, “We can continue to provide Kayla similar hours at regular wage after the program finishes through the fall and hopefully she is able to find work in a more suitable working environment.”

[100]       This is the earliest evidence of Major, or anyone on behalf of the Respondents, telling an employment agency in writing that the Respondents only wanted to continue Kayla’s employment through fall 2019 and that they hoped she would then find work elsewhere. There is no reply from Island Ops in evidence. Major says he expected that someone would pass the message in his email on to Kayla, but there is no evidence that anyone did. Kayla’s evidence is that someone from Island Ops told her that she would continue working at the Store for the same shifts and hours, and this is what she did.

[101]       I find that the Respondents’ intentions for Kayla’s employment after the wage subsidy period changed between April and September 2019. Major initially hoped that Kayla would be able to handle the busy season the following year after gaining more experience and capabilities, but by the end of the wage subsidy period the Respondents did not feel that the Store was a suitable ongoing job for Kayla. They did not communicate this to Kayla at this time, and she understood that she had obtained a permanent job at the Store.

[102]       In summary, the Respondents created a work experience position for Kayla to work four unpaid hours per week, then increased her hours to six per week under the wage subsidy program. They continued her employment and paid her full wages for six hours per week after the wage subsidy ended. Major told Island Ops that the Respondents would do this “through the fall” and they hoped Kayla would then find different employment, but no one communicated this to Kayla at the time.

[103]       The Respondents’ perspective is that they hired Kayla as a favour to her to help her break into the job market when no one else would do this. They believe that they helped Kayla, and that they helped the employment organizations that assisted her to meet their objectives. Major’s evidence and the Respondents’ submissions indicate that they do not understand how the Respondents could have discriminated against Kayla in these circumstances.  

[104]       The Respondents did create a position for Kayla for her benefit when nothing required them to do this. They may have done this with the intention of helping her, although I do not have evidence from Jodi or Surinder about their personal intentions. In any case, the Respondents’ intentions do not affect their obligation not to discriminate against Kayla contrary to the Code. The purposes of the Code include fostering a society in which there are no impediments to full and free participation in economic life in BC and promoting a climate of understanding and mutual respect where all are equal in dignity and rights: s. 3. Consistent with these purposes, the Code protects employees from negative treatment in employment in which a disability is a factor: s. 13, Moore at para. 33. 

[105]       The Respondents take credit for Kayla’s eventual success of working full-time. I explain in the remedies section of this decision that this credit goes to Kayla, not to the Respondents. In any case, once the Respondents created a position for Kayla and hired her, they were obligated to avoid adverse impacts in her employment unless accommodating her would pose undue hardship. 

C.     Adverse impacts in the context of Kayla’s employment

[106]       The Respondents’ obligation not to discriminate against Kayla does not mean that they were required to treat Kayla exactly the same as they treated other employees. The Store’s other employees who worked with Kayla, Mr. Katta and Mr. Chawla, were full-time employees who had job duties that Kayla did not, such as physical work for the car wash and laundry. They were more experienced employees who did not need extensive training when they started working at the Store. Mr. Katta trained and supervised Kayla. It is possible for employers to treat employees differently from each other for reasons inherent to the differences in their positions and experience, so different treatment is not necessarily an adverse impact.

[107]       To decide whether the Respondents’ conduct was an adverse impact in Kayla’s employment, I consider that an employee’s subjective perspective of adverse treatment or impact is not enough to establish discrimination. Employers are allowed to manage their workplace, and the Tribunal must consider the entire context of a situation to determine whether any impacts on the employee rise to the level of discrimination contrary to the Code: Singh v. A & M Enterprise, 2023 BCHRT 148 at para. 57.

[108]       The context in this case includes the fact that working at the Store was Kayla’s first employment experience. I would expect some aspects of this to be inherently difficult for her.  

[109]       The Respondents’ obligations under the Code also did not necessarily require that they employ Kayla indefinitely. It is possible for an employer to end an employee’s employment for reasons unrelated to a protected characteristic like disability. In this case, it is also open to the Respondents to explain that they could not continue to reasonably accommodate Kayla in the position they created for her without undue hardship.

[110]       I now turn to address Kayla’s allegations.

D.    Service Dog Allegation

[111]       This is the first of two allegations that Kayla says date back to the start of her unpaid work experience at the Store and continued through her employment. These two allegations are about barriers that Kayla says impacted her ability to work and were related to her disabilities.

[112]       Kayla says she needed her service dog with her at all times, and not being allowed to have him at the Store with her impacted her health and sense of safety at work.  

[113]       There is no dispute that the Respondents did not allow Kayla to bring Shadow to work when she started her unpaid work experience. Major says he told someone from INEO before Kayla’s first day that it would not work for her to bring Shadow to the store. Kayla says she understood that she was allowed to bring Shadow and she arrived with him on her first day. Major told Kayla that she could not have Shadow at the store, so Sheila took Shadow home and Kayla stayed for her first shift, then went to work without Shadow from that point forward.

[114]       The Respondents’ decision that Kayla could not bring Shadow to the store was an adverse impact in her employment in which her disabilities were a factor.

[115]       Shadow supported Kayla by notifying her to prevent seizures or alerting someone else if she did have a seizure. An INEO case worker completed a disability related employability needs assessment on February 15, 2018, which says that Shadow had to be with Kayla at all times. Kayla and Sheila’s evidence about how Shadow supported Kayla, which I accept, is consistent with this. They say that from the time Kayla got Shadow in 2012 he was always with her, with very few exceptions, like when she had dental surgery and when she went to a wedding with her mother. The Respondents’ decision that she could not bring Shadow to the Store left Kayla without her usual support for her seizure disorder while she was at work.  

[116]       The Respondents have not established a defence to this allegation. They have not demonstrated that they could not have accommodated Kayla by allowing her to bring Shadow to work without experiencing undue hardship.

[117]       The purpose of an employer’s duty to accommodate is to ensure that an employee who is able to work has an opportunity to do so and is not unfairly excluded if working conditions can be adjusted to allow them to work without undue hardship: Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employées de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), 2008 SCC 43 at para. 14. Employers must take reasonable and practical steps to assess whether and how they can adjust the employee’s working conditions: Hydro-Quebec at para. 17. This is an exercise in common sense and flexibility: Hydro-Quebec at para. 12.

[118]       What is a reasonable accommodation, and what creates undue hardship for an employer, will vary according to characteristics of each employer, each employee’s specific needs, and the specific circumstances: McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, 2007 SCC 4 at para. 22.

[119]       Accommodation is a collaborative process that requires the employee’s participation as well as the employer’s. In this case, Kayla’s obligation was to make the Respondents aware of how her disabilities impacted her in her employment, and work with them by facilitating and accepting reasonable accommodation: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970.

[120]       To decide whether the Respondents met their obligation to accommodate Kayla in the circumstances, I considered whether they provided a reasonable alternative accommodation of ensuring she did not work alone, whether Kayla did not meet her own obligation to participate in her own accommodation by failing to give the Respondents enough information about her needs, and whether the Respondents’ evidence establishes that they could not have had Shadow in the Store without experiencing undue hardship.

[121]       I find that the Respondents did not reasonably accommodate Kayla by ensuring that she did not work alone.  

[122]       The Respondents say that Kayla was always safe and supported even though they did not allow her to bring Shadow to work because they made sure someone was always with her at the Store. However, Kayla’s evidence is that during the latter part of her employment, starting partway through the wage subsidy period, she did not always have someone with her. She testified that Surinder sometimes left her alone for short periods of time.

[123]       I accept Kayla’s evidence that someone was not always with her at the Store. Major testified that he always had eyes on Kayla when he worked with her, but he did not work with her much once her wage subsidy period started.

[124]       In any case, working with another person was not a reasonable substitute for having Shadow with her at the Store, and was not necessarily helpful in the context of her seizure disorder.  

[125]       Kayla testified that she was anxious not having Shadow with her because she worried about having a seizure when he was not there. She was concerned that she could have an absence seizure and fall because she would have no warning to sit down. She testified that she was without her “safety net” at work and the possibility of having a seizure was always on her mind.

[126]       I accept Kayla’s evidence about how Shadow assisted her and the concerns she had when she was not with him. Other people working at the Store may be able to check on her if they noticed her staring or they noticed if anything was wrong, but this was not a substitute for the support Shadow gave her.  

[127]       Although the Respondents now rely on their evidence that they never left Kayla alone in defence of the complaint, I find that, to the extent that they did ensure that Kayla was not alone at the Store, this was because they viewed Kayla as needing help with her work as much as it was to support her for reasons related to her disabilities. The Respondents’ witnesses all testified that Kayla could not work by herself because she may need help with transactions. Mr. Katta, who worked with Kayla throughout her unpaid work experience, testified that no one told him that Kayla could not be left alone for reasons related to her disabilities. He knew Kayla had disabilities and a service dog but did not know that she had seizures. He could not have kept an eye on her for the purpose of helping her if she had a seizure because he did not know what to look for.  

[128]       In any case, no person was a substitute for Shadow because no person could predict a seizure and warn Kayla so she could take medication and try to prevent it. Even if Kayla felt more secure working with others than working alone, this would not give her the same sense of security that she had when Shadow was with her.

[129]       During Kayla’s wage subsidy period, on May 29, 2019, the Work BC employment counsellor visited the Store and wrote a report for Island Ops about the visit. In response to a question about how Kayla was feeling about her placement, the case manager wrote, “She is working without Shadow, but its ok, because she is working with family” (as written). The case manager did not testify at the hearing. Kayla’s evidence is that she did not say this to the case manager. Her evidence is that she did not receive a copy of the report at the time but only got it a few years ago when she asked for a copy.

[130]       I accept Kayla’s evidence that she did not tell the employment counsellor that it was okay to work without Shadow because she was with family. The employment counsellor did not testify to explain why she wrote this, and Kayla’s evidence is not contradicted. Kayla also testified extensively about the negative impact of working without Shadow, and I accept that it was not “okay” for her. She worked without Shadow not because working with others was enough of a substitute, but because the Respondents did not let him stay with her on her first day.

[131]       I also find that Kayla did not impede the accommodation process by failing to give the Respondents information that they would need to accommodate her.

[132]       A respondent is not responsible for accommodating a disability that it was not aware of or could not reasonably been aware of: Klewchuk at para. 367. A complainant’s obligation to facilitate a reasonable accommodation includes bringing the facts related to discrimination to their employer’s attention, facilitating the implementation of reasonable proposals, and accepting reasonable accommodation: Renaud, Klewchuk at para. 372. When an employer has no way of knowing that a complainant needs accommodation, there are no reasonable or practical steps they can take to avoid the impact, so their duty to accommodate is discharged and there is no discrimination: Klewchuk at para. 372.

[133]       Major testified that he did not know the extent to which Kayla relied on Shadow. He knew that Shadow was Kayla’s service dog but did not know that she needed him close by all the time. He says he did not know what Shadow did other than notifying someone nearby if Kayla had a situation.

[134]       Major testified that when he first met with Kayla and a caseworker from INEO he told them that he would look into the possibility of Shadow coming to the Store, but before Kayla’s first shift he told the caseworker that it would not be possible. He says he thought the caseworker would have told Kayla this, but he had to tell Kayla when she arrived for her first shift that Shadow could not come in.

[135]       The Respondents submit in their closing argument that Kayla and INEO agreed that it would be beneficial for Kayla to work without Shadow. The Respondents also say no one told them that Kayla wanted or needed Shadow to be with her during the time she worked under the wage subsidy program or after that.

[136]       Major testified that Kayla understands that he and his parents live above the Store, and he believed that Kayla was comfortable there. The Respondents submit that no one said that Kayla wanted or required Shadow to be with her, and that Kayla never requested that Shadow be at the Store with her during her wage subsidy period or after that. They submit that Kayla wanted to work at the Store and took the productive step of increasing to six hours per week during the wage subsidy period without her support dog.

[137]       Kayla’s evidence is that when she went to INEO for help seeking employment, she made it clear that she needed to have Shadow with her. She testified that INEO approached potential workplaces where she would be able to have Shadow with her because helping her find a workplace where she could have him with her was their goal. She says that when she spoke with Major and an INEO worker together she told them that she needed Shadow with her and Major agreed that he could come to the Store. Kayla says she understood that she was allowed to bring Shadow until she showed up on her first day and Major told her that Shadow could not come to the Store with her.

[138]       Major says he did not definitively tell Kayla that Shadow could come to the Store. He says that when he spoke to Kayla with the INEO worker that he already knew it would not work to have Shadow at the Store, but he did not want to say no to her at that point. As stated above, he says he told the INEO worker after their meeting that Shadow could not come to the Store, and he expected the worker to pass the message to Kayla.

[139]       In cross examination Major suggested to Kayla that she was told before her first day that Shadow could not come to the Store. Kayla maintained that no one told her this, and that she brought Shadow on her first day because she thought he was allowed to be there. She testified in cross examination that Major told the INEO worker that Shadow could come, and if there was some reason it didn’t work, the Store would pay someone to stay with her. Major put to her that during this conversation he told Kayla that Shadow could come or that they could find a solution, which would be someone else working with her. Kayla maintained that Major had said that Shadow could come to the Store. She testified that Major mentioned being concerned about wires behind the till, but said Shadow could come to see whether it worked, and if it did not work, then they would pay someone to stay with her. Major put to Kayla that INEO and Kayla agreed to do the volunteer hours even without Shadow; again, Kayla testified that she did not know until her first day she showed up that Shadow could not stay with her.  

[140]       I accept Kayla’s evidence that, based on what Major told her and no one telling her otherwise, she believed that she was allowed to bring Shadow to work with her until she arrived on the first day of her unpaid work experience. Even if Major told someone from INEO that Shadow could not come to the Store, there is no evidence that anyone passed this message on to Kayla.

[141]       There is also no evidence to support the Respondents’ submission that Kayla and INEO agreed that it would benefit her to work without Shadow. Major did not put this proposition to Kayla in cross examination, and he did not testify that Kayla said this at any point.

[142]       I find that Kayla did not agree to work without Shadow. Rather, the Respondents decided that it would not work for her to bring Shadow to the Store. They decided this knowing that he was her support dog for a disability and without asking her for further information about why she asked to bring Shadow or how he would support her. They simply decided, based on the information they had, that she could not bring him.

[143]       Kayla did not ask to bring Shadow to the Store again after the first day of her unpaid work experience. I considered whether the Respondents have demonstrated that they met their duty to accommodate Kayla in the circumstances because she did not tell the Respondents that working without Shadow continued to adversely impact her. I find this is not the case.

[144]       The Respondents made their decision that Shadow could not be at the Store without speaking to Kayla about the impact on her in the first place. This was not a matter of Kayla failing to bring information to the Respondents’ attention. Rather, the Respondents surprised Kayla with their decision on the first day of her unpaid work experience even though Major had decided before that day that having Shadow at the Store would not work. The Respondents made their decision based on limited information without discussing the issue with Kayla, leaving her in the position of deciding whether to work without Shadow so she could have a job.   

[145]       Finally, the Respondents have not established that they would have incurred undue hardship by allowing Kayla to have Shadow at the Store.   

[146]       Major testified that the space behind the cash register in the Store is only about four feet by six feet and there was no space for a dog there. He did not allow Kayla to bring Shadow into the Store when she brought him on the first day of her unpaid work experience because he did not see a point to this. The Respondents did not consider whether Shadow could be in an office off of the Store because it led to the residence upstairs, and it is a small space with a desk and shelves where people need room to walk through. Major had not directly interacted with Shadow before but assumed that the Store would not be a suitable place for him.    

[147]       Kayla testified that there was more than enough room behind the counter for Shadow to lay down. Mr. Chawla, who worked with Kayla during her wage subsidy period and after, testified that the space behind the counter was about three feet by five feet, but described it as a big space where he needed to go back and forth to get various things. Mr. Katta described the space as “not big”, but comfortable for two people.

[148]       The Respondents have not established that the Store was too small for Shadow to be there during Kayla’s shifts. There are no photos of the space or measurements in evidence. The Respondents did not take the practical step of seeing if it could work having Shadow in the space or elsewhere. Kayla is in the best position to give evidence about whether there was space for Shadow to be in the Store with her without being disruptive or taking up too much space because she was very familiar with him and how he behaved when he was supporting her in public spaces. Her evidence was that Shadow could have been behind the counter with her and this would not have been disruptive. The Respondents’ evidence does not dispute this. 

[149]       The Respondents decided not to allow Shadow in the Store without exploring whether they could have him there for Kayla’s shifts as a reasonable accommodation. They have not established otherwise that it would have been undue hardship for Shadow to be at work with Kayla. I find that the Respondents discriminated against Kayla by prohibiting her from bringing her service dog to work at the Store.

E.     Chair Allegation

[150]       Kayla says another barrier existed that impacted her ability to work at the Store because of her disabilities. She says she needed to be able to sit down when she was tired and had to rest, and there was no chair available to her.

[151]       Kayla alleges that the Respondents discriminated against her throughout her employment by failing to provide a chair that she could use when she needed one. She submits that the Respondents cannot reasonably justify their failure to provide an accessible chair.

[152]       I find that Kayla has not established an adverse impact in which a disability was a factor related to this allegation.

[153]       Kayla’s evidence is that she needed to sit down to rest at times, and the chairs in the Store did not work for her. A disability-related employability needs assessment form that an INEO case worker completed for Kayla on February 15, 2018, says that in relation to standing (static or dynamic), she needs to be able to move, or sit down to rest. In relation to sitting, the form says Kayla needs to get up and move, and that her back can get sore if her chair doesn’t have good support. Kayla testified that the information on the form was consistent with her needs while she worked at the Store.

[154]       Kayla testified that there were two chairs at the store. One was counter-height; Kayla testified that this chair wobbled and that she almost fell trying to get into it once. The other chair was regular height; Kayla testified that she could not use it because it always had things on it like laundry and boxes.

[155]       The report that the Work BC employment counsellor wrote for Island Ops on May 29, 2019, says Kayla, “gets tired being on her feet for 4 hours so she has asked to have a chair nearby, though her Supervisor wants her moving about the store so she can engage with customers or do stock, she reported the chair is not very good/supportive”. The report says the employment counsellor suggested to Kayla that she wear comfortable shoes and speak to her supervisor with regards to asking for a better chair.

[156]       In another Island Ops report from the employment counsellor’s visit on September 4, 2019, in response to a question about whether Kayla required any adaptive equipment in order to perform her job, the employment counsellor wrote, “No, just access to a seat, though the supervisor wants her to move about the store as much as possible when volume is low.”

[157]       Kayla says she talked to Jodi about needing a chair and he said, “there is one right there”, and pointed to the regular height chair, which had boxes and laundry on it at the time.

[158]       Kayla testified that when she worked with Mr. Katta, he knew that she had disabilities and needed a chair. She says that on one occasion when she was working with Jodi, she sat on the edge of one of the chairs because she was exhausted and had no other choice, but Jodi told her to get up and move around. Kayla testified that this was the only occasion she recalls when she tried to sit and was told to get up, but there were other times that she wanted to sit and could not. I do not find this one instance to be an adverse impact in employment. Kayla did not testify that she told Jodi that she was sitting because she was exhausted and needed to sit. She testified that the INEO disability-related employability needs assessment form was consistent with her needs during the time she worked at the Store. This form says she needs to move around as well as sit down and rest. There is no evidence of any particular balance between Kayla’s need to move around versus sit and rest during her shifts. Kayla does not say that Jodi prohibited her from sitting on this occasion, and as far as the Respondents or colleagues asked her to move around the Store at times, this was generally consistent with her needs and her job.

[159]       Kayla testified that she once had a seizure during a shift and was not able to sit down after. She says this was not a good feeling because she was very tired after the seizure and felt like she was going to pass out. She says she told someone, likely Surinder, that she had to sit down, and they told her to walk around the Store and stock and stuff instead, but then Jodi came to talk to her, said she looked tired, and let her go home early. Kayla’s evidence about this instance is not relevant to the question of whether there was a chair available for her to sit in but is more relevant to an issue of whether the Respondents understood her disabilities and the impacts of her seizures. Kayla says Jodi came to tell her that she looked tired and could go home. She does not allege that this response to her having a seizure at work was discrimination or was not appropriate in the circumstances.

[160]       Major testified that the lower chair in the Store was for sitting on, not storing things on. He says there was a towel draped over the back of the chair that people often dried their hands on. Major says both chairs were available to Kayla, and he sometimes saw her sitting in the higher chair. He testified that sometimes people brought stock out from the storage room and put it down on the lower chair to attend to a customer, then put out the stock after attending to the customer.

[161]       Mr. Katta testified that Kayla sat on the chairs once in a while, and that Kayla never asked him to sit down or asked him anything about the chairs while they worked together. He also testified that there was a towel on the back of the chair for drying hands, and that stock would be placed on a chair from time to time while someone was putting it out. 

[162]       Mr. Chawla started working in the Store in May 2019. He testified that there would be something on the chairs from time to time, but if he put something on a chair, he would pick it up. He says that if there was laundry to fold that it needed to be folded quickly and then would go in the back. He says he sat on a chair to have his lunch every day, and that Kayla was often sitting on a chair if there were no customers in the Store.

[163]       In cross examination Major suggested to Kayla that unless the stuff on the lower chair was the same all through her employment, any stuff on it must have been temporary. Kayla responded that would be the case at any normal place, but at the Store no one picked things up from the chair, and stuff just sat there.

[164]       I find it is more likely than not that there were items like boxes and laundry on the shorter chair from time to time. The Respondents’ witnesses’ evidence about this is internally consistent, and it makes sense in the context of the Respondents’ business that any laundry or stock would only be on the chair temporarily. The Respondents’ witnesses also all testified that they saw Kayla using the chairs, and Kayla’s evidence does not directly contradict this, as she did not specifically testify that she never sat on the lower chair. Kayla also testified that Mr. Katta knew she needed to sit down sometimes, and she did not testify about any problems sitting when she needed to during her unpaid work experience. I find it more likely that there were times that the lower chair had boxes and laundry on it, particularly after Kayla’s wage subsidy period started and she no longer worked with Mr. Katta, and Kayla felt she could not use the chair during those times even if that was not the case. Kayla did not testify that the lower chair was not supportive enough or suitable for her to sit on when she needed to sit from time to time – she only testified about the issue of it having things on it.

[165]       The first written evidence related to Kayla asking the Respondents about a chair is the Island Ops report dated May 29, 2019. The employment counsellor suggested that Kayla ask about getting a better chair because the available chair was “not very good/supportive”. This is not consistent with Kayla’s claim that she could not use the shorter chair because it always had stuff on it. There is also no evidence that Kayla ever asked anyone to move things off of the lower chair at a time when she needed to sit down.

[166]       Kayla has not established an adverse impact related to not being able to sit as she needed to from time to time at work. The lower chair was available in the Store to sit on, even if there were items on it at times that could have been moved.

[167]       The Respondents’ duty to accommodate Kayla arises when there is an adverse impact on her in her employment in which a disability is a factor. Without Kayla first making out her case there is no duty to accommodate: D.L. v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development and others (No. 5), 2022 BCHRT 66 at para. 46. I do not need to consider whether the Respondents are able to justify failing to provide Kayla with a chair without a finding that there was an adverse impact in which a disability was a factor related to a need to sit and a request for a chair.

F.      Hurtful Comments Allegation

[168]       Kayla alleges that Jodi and Surinder treated her badly once her wage subsidy period ended and she began working more with Surinder. Kayla says there was a pattern of rude comments towards her that was related to her disabilities, which hurt her emotionally.

[169]       The Respondents submit that Jodi and Surinder did not make any hurtful comments to Kayla or treat her badly. Major testified that his parents tend to joke around, but they would not treat anyone as Kayla alleges. The Respondents submit that Kayla’s evidence about hurtful comments was limited to evidence of comments that third parties repeated to her, not comments that Jodi and Surinder made to her directly. 

[170]       There were no witnesses to contradict Kayla’s evidence about how Jodi and Surinder treated her because they did not testify at the hearing. My task related to this allegation is to assess Kayla’s evidence and decide whether Surinder and Jodi treated her as alleged, and if so, whether that treatment constitutes an adverse impact in which her disabilities were a factor.

[171]       The Respondents’ submission that Kayla’s evidence about this allegation is only about comments that third parties repeated to her is not correct. Kayla testified that Jodi and Surinder made comments about her to other parties in some instances, but she also testified that Jodi and Surinder made hurtful comments directly to her. In any case, while the question of whether Jodi and Surinder made comments directly to Kayla or made comments about her to others may be a relevant consideration, the allegation about Jodi and Surinder’s conduct and how they treated Kayla.

[172]       I accept Kayla’s evidence about how Jodi and Surinder treated her. Her evidence was sincere. She does not recall exact dates and context for all of the comments or treatment, but she recalls some instances in detail when she made notes about them in her phone close to the time they occurred. I would not expect a witness to recall every detail of comments and conduct that occurred years earlier. I accept that, overall, Surinder and Jodi treated Kayla as she described at the hearing. I find that the comments and conduct I outline below constitute a pattern of negative treatment that had an adverse impact in Kayla’s employment and in which her disabilities were a factor. This treatment was not inherent to the need to manage the Store and was not reflective of difficulties inherent to Kayla training and learning in her first job.

[173]       Kayla testified that Major and Mr. Katta treated her well during the periods of her unpaid work and wage subsidy. Mr. Katta’s and Major’s evidence is consistent with this, as are forms they completed for INEO. Major and Mr. Katta described Kayla in these forms, dated January 29, 2019, as reliable, consistent, co-operative, punctual, honest, and a team player. They both answered “yes” to the question of whether they would consider hiring Kayla if a position were available. In response to a question about where the employee would benefit from further skill development, Mr. Katta wrote on his form that Kayla needed more practice. Major noted on his form that Kayla struggled when under pressure or when recovering from a mistake with a transaction. Major’s evidence is that he was supportive of Kayla at times when she struggled. For example, Kayla recalls one instance when a customer was angry with her, and she became upset and cried – she and Major both testified that he was supportive of her in that case.

[174]       Kayla testified that there was a significant shift in how she was treated after the wage subsidy period ended, once she worked more with Surinder and sometimes with Jodi. She described the following incidents in her evidence.

a.    Jodi told Kayla at least twice that she was “too slow”. In one of these instances, Surinder had let a line of customers build up and Kayla was using a second till to help ring them through, and Jodi said she was “slow”.

b.    On two occasions Jodi told Kayla that she scared customers away.

c.     Jodi told Kayla that Shadow’s hair and smell were on her clothes, and that customers complained about this. Jodi pointed at Kayla’s pants when he said this, but there was no dog hair on her pants.

d.    Jodi commented that Kayla could not see.  

e.    Surinder told Kayla that she should look for other places to work like a drugstore or grocery store, that she did not have to go into the Store twice a week, and she was not capable of working a four-hour day.

f.      Once when Kayla was trying to help a customer, Surinder pushed Kayla out of the way and told Mr. Chawla to do it instead. Kayla talked to Jodi, who told her that Mr. Chawla was the boss of her and allowed to run her till.

g.    On or around December 26, 2019, Surinder got mad at Kayla and asked her to move from the till she was supposed to be working on until her shift ended. Mr. Chawla started to change the till before his shift, and Surinder was friendly with Mr. Chawla. Kayla became upset and frustrated, left early, and called her mother to pick her up.

[175]       Kayla testified that she and her mother went to talk to Major at another business where he was working on December 17, 2019. Kayla wanted to tell Major that things were different working with Surinder, and she wanted to work with Major or Mr. Katta again instead.

[176]       Major does not dispute that this conversation with Kayla occurred. Kayla made notes about this conversation, which say that Major told her Surinder could cut her hours if she wanted to because she was Kayla’s boss, winter was slow so she did not need to work six hours per week, and she could find a part-time job somewhere else if she wanted to. Major’s evidence is consistent with Kayla’s notes. He says the Respondents were reducing Kayla’s hours because the winter was slow. 

[177]       Kayla testified that Surinder treated her worse after her conversation with Major. She testified that Surinder ignored her if she asked for help, got mad at her if she did not do things exactly the same was as the Respondents, or was friendly with Mr. Chawla while ignoring that Kayla was even there. Kayla says this amounted to treating her like she was worthless. She says this is why she left work early on December 26, 2019.

[178]       I find that the Respondents started treating Kayla negatively in late fall or early winter 2019, once they did not want to pay her to work six hours per week anymore. This treatment included the incidents that Kayla described in her evidence.

[179]       Kayla’s evidence about how the Respondents treated her was sincere and consistent between direct and cross examination. Notes that she made in her phone around the time of the events are consistent with her evidence. For example, in a note dated December 12, 2019, Kayla wrote that Surinder said she did not have to work twice a week and was not capable of working for four hours. On January 10, 2020, after her employment ended, she noted that Jodi had made rude comments about her clothes and said that if she had to wear glasses to see, she should not be working there. In cross examination she confirmed that she clearly understood Jodi and Surinder’s comments even though English is not their first language.

[180]       Mr. Chawla testified that he did not observe anyone make rude comments to Kayla, and that any comments about her “scaring customers” were silly jokes. He was not always at the Store when Kayla worked with Surinder and Jodi, so his evidence cannot contradict Kayla’s, but in any case, I find his evidence to be unreliable.

[181]       I find that Mr. Chawla exaggerated when he testified about concerns that he says he had with Kayla’s work performance. For example, he testified that Kayla always “screwed up the till”, that she had difficulties with lotto transactions and customers “always got mad at her and left”, it took Kayla three to five minutes to do something that he could do in 30 seconds, Kayla caused lineups that were 25 minutes long and most customers would get mad and leave the Store, Kayla got mad and called her mother to pick her up “lots of times”, and that “it was always a problem with her”. He also testified that he is allergic to dogs and that Kayla’s clothes were “full of dog hair”.

[182]       I would not expect Kayla to work as quickly as more experienced employees. The Store was her first job, and she only worked six hours per week while the other employees worked full-time. However, I do not accept Mr. Chawla’s evidence that Kayla created lineups 25 minutes long. Kayla and other witnesses testified that someone could open a second till if it became busy and lineups formed. Mr. Katta testified that when he worked with Kayla, he tried to get customers to wait so Kayla could get more confident and get faster, but if there were five to six customers waiting, he would open a second till. It does not make sense that Kayla or those working with her would leave customers waiting for 25 minutes at the Store.

[183]       Mr. Chawla acknowledged in cross examination that if there were errors in the till that anyone working could have caused them. His evidence that customers “always” got mad at Kayla and left the Store is also not consistent with evidence from other witnesses. Major testified about one incident where a customer became mad at Kayla and left the Store; this was before Mr. Chawla worked there, and the incident stood out to Kayla as an isolated one. I do not accept that this happened repeatedly. Kayla and her mother also testified about the one incident on December 26, 2019, when Kayla became upset and called her mother to pick her up; this was also an isolated incident, not something that happened “lots of times”. 

[184]       Mr. Chawla’s treatment of Kayla in his evidence is consistent with how Kayla says the Respondents treated her after her wage subsidy ended. Kayla did not allege that Mr. Chawla made negative comments to her, but his evidence reflected a demeaning attitude toward Kayla that is consistent with the shift she describes in how the Respondents treated her in fall 2019. Kayla testified that the Respondents treated her as if she were worthless, and Mr. Chawla’s attitude towards her in his evidence suggested that he viewed her as worthless or a burden. Kayla testified that Jodi pointed to her and said her clothes had dog hair and smell on them when this was not the case, and Mr. Chawla testified that Kayla’s clothes were full of dog hair.

[185]       I am not able to make findings about Jodi and Surinder’s conduct based on Mr. Chawla’s evidence and attitude towards Kayla. It does not follow from his evidence that the Respondents held similar views of Kayla or treated her negatively towards the end of her employment. However, Mr. Chawla’s evidence does not contradict Kayla’s. He testified that any comments Jodi made about Kayla scaring customers were funny, which suggests that he did witness those comments. He does not dispute that Surinder was friendly to him while disregarding Kayla. His own views of Kayla that he expressed in his evidence are consistent with a discriminatory work environment based on Kayla’s disabilities.

[186]       I find that how the Respondents treated Kayla after the wage subsidy period ended was an adverse impact in her employment. Their conduct was not necessary or reasonable for managing the workplace. It is likely that they treated Kayla negatively because of the level of work she was able to do because of her disabilities, and because they no longer wanted to support her to learn and grow as an employee. Regardless of the reasons, however, this was negative treatment beyond aspects of the work experience that I would expect to be inherently and subjectively difficult for Kayla.

[187]       It may have been reasonable for the Respondents to help Kayla with complex transactions or ask Mr. Chawla to take over for her if the Store was busy and customers became impatient. It would have been reasonable for the Respondents to support Kayla to build her skills and abilities. If the Respondents determined that they could not afford to continue Kayla’s accommodated position, it would have been reasonable to talk to her about her future at the Store and how long she could continue gaining experience and skills there.

[188]       Instead, the Respondents dealt with issues like Kayla’s speed at transactions and their concerns about paying her as a second employee during her shifts by treating her badly. They turned what could have been respectful discussions about genuine workplace management issues into negative treatment. It was reasonable for Kayla to understand the words they used and their conduct towards her as suggesting negative views about her worth, capabilities, and potential, for example, when they pushed her out of the way to have another employee take over for her, and when they told her that she was not capable of working four hours per day. They made hurtful comments about dog hair and smell on her clothes when her dog was an essential support to her because of her seizure disorder. It was reasonable for Kayla to understand from this treatment that Jodi and Surinder did not want her working at the Store anymore because they did not value her for reasons related to her disabilities.

[189]       Major and Mr. Katta gave Kayla feedback during her unpaid work experience that was generally positive. On a form dated January 29, 2019, Mr. Katta marked Kayla as “outstanding”, the highest option over “good”, “acceptable”, and “unacceptable”, for “personal and social qualities” such as cooperative, respectful, reliable, showing interest and enthusiasm, and being “appropriately groomed”. He marked her as “good” for categories including “accepting of constructive criticism”, “adaptable to new tasks and situations”, and “asks for assistance when required”. He testified that by this point Kayla sometimes made mistakes in her work, but she was much better than when she started.

[190]       Based on Major’s email to Island Ops on September 5, 2019, in which he said Kayla still had difficulties with basic tasks in a fast-paced environment and needed constant supervision and assistance, and Kayla’s evidence of how Surinder and Jodi treated her at the Store, I find that the Respondents were not satisfied with how much Kayla had progressed by this point. It was open to them to respectfully give Kayla performance feedback and work with her to continue improving, or, if the Respondents had decided that they could not continue to put resources into more training and experience for Kayla on an ongoing basis, it was open to them to explain this to her.

[191]    The Respondents may not have intended to be cruel to Kayla but shifting how they treated her from Major and Mr. Katta’s supportive approach to Surinder, Jodi, and Mr. Chawla’s approach, which suggested to Kayla that they did not value her, had a significant negative impact. This conduct was discrimination.    

G.    Termination Allegation

[192]       Kayla alleges that the Respondents terminated her employment on January 8, 2020, when the Work BC employment counsellor visited the Store and Jodi told the case manager that the Respondents did not need Kayla to come to work anymore. Kayla says her disabilities were a factor in the decision to end her employment.

[193]       The Respondents deny that they terminated Kayla’s employment, or that the end of the working relationship was an adverse impact. They submit that business slowed down and they did not earn as much money, so they told Kayla they would be reducing her shifts, but they do not know what the employment counsellor told Kayla after speaking to Jodi. They also say that Kayla worked at the Store for an amount of time that makes sense in the context of her needing to get some work experience and a reference.

[194]       I find that the Respondents terminated Kayla’s employment, and this was an adverse impact in which her disabilities were a factor. I also find that the Respondents have not established a justification for the termination. I first describe the evidence.

[195]       Kayla testified that after the wage subsidy period the Respondents became less clear about when they wanted her to work. By the time Kayla and her mother went to talk to Major on December 17, 2019, Kayla felt that something was wrong.

[196]       Major testified in direct examination that in October or November of 2019 “we” told Kayla that if she wanted a good reference or to work for other work placements it would be a good time to do that so she could transition, and she did not need to come into the Store on Wednesdays anymore. In cross examination, he testified that he told Kayla that she did not need to work Wednesdays anymore, four hours per week were sufficient, and her hours would also reduce on Sundays.

[197]       I find that no one told Kayla in October or November 2019 that it was a good time to look for other work, or that she did not need to come into the Store on Wednesdays. Kayla testified that she started making notes in her phone about things that happened at work when things were starting to change and she became concerned. She started doing this on December 12, 2019, and went to talk to Major about her concerns on December 17. Kayla understood her employment to be long-term, at the same number of hours per week. Her pay stubs are consistent, showing that the Respondents paid her $168.67 for 12 hours of work, until the end of November 2019. Her pay for December 1-15 was $207.75 for 15 hours, and for December 16-31 she was paid $55.40 for four hours. It is more likely that the Respondents started telling her that her hours would change closer to the time when she started keeping notes, which was closer to when they actually reduced her hours.  

[198]       Kayla kept in touch with the Work BC employment counsellor after her wage subsidy period ended. She visited the employment counsellor at her office to talk about how things were going. Kayla testified that on January 5, 2020, she had a feeling that something was going to happen and she went to talk to the employment counsellor about her concerns. She made notes in her phone that say, “Uncle Jody says Major will talk to [employment counsellor] to see what she has to say. Otherwise, a reference letter will be written to go elsewhere, somewhere with more people. Cost them $30 to have an extra person on shift. Cause for HR report due to disability.”

[199]       Kayla testified that the reference to an “HR report due to disability” refers to something the employment counsellor said when they spoke. Kayla says she told the employment counsellor that it looked like the Respondents wanted to get rid of her, and the employment counsellor said that would be cause for a human rights complaint. Kayla says the employment counsellor said she would try to do another site visit and see what came of it.

[200]       The employment counsellor went to talk to Major on January 8, 2020, but Major was not there, so she spoke to Jodi instead. Kayla says she was working at the Store, and the employment counsellor told her to go to her office after her shift so they could talk.

[201]       Kayla testified that she and her mother went to talk to the employment counsellor after her shift, and the employment counsellor told her that Jodi fired her. Kayla says she broke down, and the employment counsellor was also upset. Kayla says it seemed to her that the employment counsellor did not want to have to tell Kayla that she was fired. Kayla says she asked the employment counsellor if she did something wrong, and the employment counsellor told her it was not her fault. Kayla took notes about this conversation, which say:

Uncle Jodi fires/lets me go for no cause or reason

Uses lame excuse that customers were complaining about me and it wouldn’t work out with me being there anymore.

Says it cost them $30 to pay an extra person to work with me

They’re not willing to come to a solution to work with me

[202]        Kayla testified that the employment counsellor said she asked Jodi who complained about Kayla, and Jodi would not say.

[203]       Major testified that Jodi did not intend to terminate Kayla’s employment, but to reduce her hours, and he does not know what the employment counsellor in turn said to Kayla.

1.      The Respondents terminated Kayla’s employment

[204]       I find that the Respondents terminated Kayla’s employment.

[205]       Without evidence from Jodi or the employment counsellor I cannot make any findings about the conversation between them. I can only make findings about what the employment counsellor told Kayla from Kayla’s and Sheila’s evidence about that conversation. Sheila’s evidence is consistent with Kayla’s. I accept their evidence that the employment counsellor told Kayla that the Respondents were firing her, and that the employment counsellor appeared upset to have to tell Kayla this.

[206]       Kayla asks me to draw an adverse inference to conclude that the Respondents terminated her employment. When a party does not introduce evidence from a witness at a hearing, the Tribunal may draw an adverse inference that the evidence would not have helped that party’s case. Whether to draw an adverse inference is discretionary, but the Tribunal will only do so if the party has not provided another explanation for why the witness did not testify: Loiselle v. Windward Software Inc., 2021 BCHRT 7 at paras. 69-70.

[207]       I find this is an appropriate case to draw an adverse inference. The Respondents did not explain why Jodi and Surinder did not testify. Major referred to their age but did not say that their age or any issues related to their age prevented either of them from attending the video hearing and giving evidence.

[208]       Without evidence from Jodi or Surinder there is no alternative explanation for what the employment counsellor told Kayla, other than that the Respondents decided to terminate her employment and Jodi communicated this to the employment counsellor. I infer that if Jodi and Surinder had given evidence it would not have supported an alternative explanation.

[209]       Kayla’s and Sheila’s evidence that the Respondents fired Kayla through the employment counsellor is also consistent with Major’s evidence that the Respondents only intended to continue Kayla’s employment through the fall, and with my findings that the Respondents treated her as if she were a burden by December. The record of employment [ROE] the Respondents issued for Kayla is also consistent with this; it says Kayla was paid for the period ending January 15, 2020, and the reason for issuing the ROE was “Shortage of work / End of contract or season”.

[210]       There is also no evidence that anyone expected or asked Kayla to return to work at the Store any time after Jodi’s conversation with the employment counsellor. Major testified that if hours were available, they could have told Kayla that she could come back to work in the spring or summer, but no one told Kayla this. If Kayla had stopped going to the Store under a misunderstanding that the Respondents had fired her when they had only intended to reduce her hours, it is not likely that they would have issued the ROE rather than ask her why she was not going to work at all or telling her which shifts they did want her to work.  

[211]       The termination was an adverse impact in employment. It is possible that an employee’s employment ending at the conclusion of a fixed period would not be an adverse impact, but the Respondents hired Kayla for an indefinite period. It may be the case that they only intended to keep Kayla through the fall, but they did not communicate this to her and did not hire her only for a fixed term.

2.      Kayla’s disabilities were a factor in the termination

[212]       I find that Kayla’s disabilities were a factor in the termination of her employment.

[213]       The Respondents created a part-time position for Kayla as an accommodation. They did not accommodate her need to have her service dog with her at the Store, but they accommodated her by allowing her to work limited hours to train and gain experience. This worked well while Kayla worked with Major and Mr. Katta during her unpaid and wage subsidy periods. By September 2019, Major wrote to ETHOS that Kayla still had difficulties with basic tasks, customers did not understand her “circumstances”, and she should work in a slower-paced environment. This suggests that the Respondents did not want Kayla working at the Store in a part-time accommodated position anymore and no longer wanted Kayla gaining experience and skills at their expense. 

[214]       The Respondents point to Kayla’s ROE to say that the reason for issuing it was “shortage of work/end of contract or season”. Major’s evidence is that he created Kayla’s position for the wage subsidy period so Kayla could get experience, but the Respondents informed the Work BC employment counsellor and Kayla around the time of the employment counsellor’s visit to the Store on September 4, 2019, that Kayla’s hours would be reduced.

[215]       I explained above that I find the Respondents did not tell Kayla that her hours would be reduced until closer to the time this happened in December 2019, and that the first written communication to anyone suggesting that the Store was not a suitable ongoing work environment for Kayla was Major’s email to the Island Ops client service representative on September 5, 2019.

[216]       In his September 2019 email Major said that the Store was fully staffed and hours are reduced considerably in the winter. It may be the case that the slower pace of the Store in the winter was a factor in the termination, but Kayla does not need to show that her disabilities were the only factor to make out her case. She only needs to establish that they were a factor. On all of the evidence, I find that the termination of Kayla’s employment was not simply due to a shortage of work at a less busy time of year, but another factor was that the Respondents decided by September 2019 that they did not want Kayla to continue working at the Store long-term for reasons related to her disabilities.

[217]       Major’s statement in his email that staff hours were considerably reduced in the winter is not consistent with the evidence about staff hours at the Store. Mr. Chawla started working at the Store in May 2019, but Major says the Store hired him in April 2019 before Kayla started her wage subsidy period. Major continued working at the Store until August 2019, so he overlapped with Mr. Chawla for four months. He testified that the Store would not support his full-time wages from September 2019 forward, but he also says he was working on other businesses at that time. In 2019 Mr. Katta and Surinder each consistently worked 120 hours per month, as did Mr. Chawla beginning in May. Jodi consistently worked 96 hours per month. Major consistently worked 110 hours per month until August 2019. The total number of hours per month for everyone other than Kayla working at the Store was 446 between January and April 2019, and 456 between September and December 2019, because Mr. Chawla worked more hours than Major. It is not the case that “staff hours were considerably reduced”.     

[218]       The contrast between Major’s emails at the start and end of the wage subsidy period suggests that the Respondents were not satisfied with Kayla’s level of capability by September 2019, and they no longer hoped that she would continue to gain experience and capabilities over the year to be able to work independently by the next busy season. Even if the Store was generally slower over the winter, I find that the Respondents’ dissatisfaction with Kayla as an employee was also a factor in the termination, and that her disabilities were a reason for their dissatisfaction.

[219]       There is no evidence from Jodi or Surinder about why the Store ended Kayla’s employment. In the absence of evidence from them, I draw an adverse inference that if they had testified, their evidence on this point would not have supported their position that they fired Kayla for reasons entirely unrelated to her disabilities.

[220]       Major’s September 2019 email to the client services representative at the end of the wage subsidy period supports a finding that the Respondents were not satisfied with Kayla as an employee for reasons related to her disabilities. Major said that Kayla still had difficulties with basic tasks in the “fast paced environment” of the Store and still needed constant supervision and assistance to prevent mistakes. He said customers could be rude and overwhelming, “not understanding Kayla’s circumstance[s]”. This was in contrast to his April 2019 emails to the ETHOS program coordinator in which he said that Kayla would not get enough hours over the summer without the wage subsidy because it gets busy, the fall would be a more suitable pace for her, and hopefully she would gain enough experience and capabilities over the year to be able to perform and handle the busy season the following year. 

[221]       My findings under the Hurtful Comments Allegation also support the finding of a connection between Kayla’s disabilities and the termination. I found that the Respondents’ evidence about Kayla’s skills and abilities was not a fair assessment of what she was able to do. Jodi called Kayla “slow” and said that customers complained about dog hair and smell on her clothes, although he did not give her any information about those alleged complaints. Surinder told Kayla that she was not capable of working a four-hour day and pushed her out of the way so Mr. Chawla could help customers instead of her doing so. My findings that their comments and conduct were related to Kayla’s disabilities support the finding that her disabilities were a factor in the termination. 

[222]       The Respondents’ obligations under the Code did not require them to employ Kayla indefinitely because they created an accommodated position for her. It was open to end her employment for reasons unrelated to her disabilities. However, I find that Kayla’s disabilities were a factor in the Respondents’ dissatisfaction with Kayla as an employee and the decision to end her employment. This means Kayla has established her case for the Termination Allegation.

3.      No justification for the termination

[223]       Because Kayla’s disabilities were a factor in the termination of her employment, the burden shifts to the Respondents to justify the termination. It is open to them to demonstrate that they could not accommodate Kayla’s disabilities without incurring undue hardship past January 8, 2020. The Respondents have not established that they needed to end Kayla’s employment when they did to avoid undue hardship. This means the termination is not justified.

[224]       I first address the Respondents’ evidence about Kayla’s capabilities. I find that their perception of what work Kayla was able to do, and how well she was able to do it, does not justify the termination.

[225]       An employer’s duty to accommodate an employee’s disabilities includes inquiring into a possible connection between a disability and work performance before making an adverse decision based on performance. Where that connection exists, the employer has a duty to reasonably accommodate the employee’s disability to the point of undue hardship: Martin v. Carter Chevrolet Oldsmobile, 2001 BCHRT 37 at para. 29.  

[226]       The impacts of Kayla’s disabilities beyond her seizure disorder included fatigue and some cognitive difficulties. These impacts, and the fact that working at the Store was her first job, meant that she could not jump into working full-time, and that she needed training and support to do her job. The Respondents accommodated her during her unpaid work experience and wage subsidy periods by training her and assisting her as she was learning and developing as an employee. Major’s September 2019 email suggests the Respondents decided by the end of the wage subsidy period that the Store was too fast-paced for her. However, their duty to accommodate Kayla included setting clear expectations for her and accommodating her disabilities to the point of undue hardship so she could work to meet those expectations.

[227]       The Respondents did not continue to accommodate Kayla after September 2019. Instead, they decided that the Store was too fast-paced for her without discussing their expectations with her of how far they had expected her to come by that point, or how they could continue to accommodate her disabilities to help her continue to learn and improve. I found that the Respondents’ evidence about Kayla’s abilities was not fair to her and did not reflect a realistic picture of what she was able to do, but even if her skills and abilities were not at the level they had hoped by September 2019, they have not introduced evidence to show that they accommodated her to improve. They have not demonstrated that they would have incurred undue hardship by supporting Kayla to meet goals of working with less help, for longer hours, and during busier periods over time.

[228]       If Kayla’s skills and abilities did not continue to increase after the wage subsidy period, the Respondents’ treatment of her is at least one factor in this. The Respondents had already given up on her and treated her as if she were a burden. I explain in the remedy section below that Kayla has since been successful in subsequent jobs. She now works full-time at a grocery store, doing various jobs there and increasing her responsibilities over the years. She was not on the road to reaching her potential at the Store because the work environment became stressful for her. It was not likely that Kayla would be able to learn and continue to improve her skills in this environment.

[229]       The Respondents also have not demonstrated that they would have incurred undue financial hardship by accommodating Kayla.

[230]       Kayla’s evidence is that Jodi told her it would cost him $30 to have an extra person on shift with her. The Respondents submit that the Store could no longer support Kayla’s wages. This could be a justification for ending Kayla’s employment at this time, whether or not they believed in her potential, if the evidence were to establish that continuing to employ her would cause undue financial hardship. I find they have not established this.     

[231]       The Respondents say that Jodi’s message to the case manager was supposed to be that the Store was reducing Kayla’s hours, not that her employment was terminated, but in any case, they submit that this was for financial reasons and the Store could not continue to pay her. However, the evidence does not establish that continuing to pay Kayla to work approximately six hours per week after January 8, 2020, would have created undue hardship.  

[232]       Major testified that Mr. Katta and Mr. Chawla were full-time employees and that it was important for the Store to give them consistent full-time hours. They each worked 120 hours per month. I accept Major’s evidence on this point. The Respondents’ obligations to Kayla did not extend to reducing hours for their full-time employees to continue Kayla’s part-time accommodated position. The relevant question is whether the Store would have incurred undue hardship by continuing to employ Kayla as well as the full-time employees after January 8, 2020.

[233]       Kayla started receiving wages from the Store in May 2019, with the Respondents paying her full wages starting in September 2019, the same month that the Store stopped paying Major wages. Between May and August, the Store paid Mr. Katta, Mr. Chawla, Major, Surinder, and Jodi for a total of 566 hours per month. They stopped paying Major his 110 hours per month in September, so the Store then paid for 456 hours per month. Kayla usually worked 24 hours per month at a rate of $13.85 per hour, for a total of $332.40 per month.

[234]       To demonstrate that the Respondents would have incurred undue hardship to continue Kayla’s employment after January 8, 2020, they would need to establish that it would be undue hardship to continue to pay Kayla $332.40 per month at that point. I understand that the Respondents had to pay Kayla’s full wages after the wage subsidy ended. I also accept Major’s evidence that the Store was slower in winter than summer, however, there is no evidence before me about the difference in the Store’s income between summer and fall 2019, or between the months when the Store paid Kayla’s full wages and December 2019 or January 2020.

[235]       The Respondents submit that $300 per month is not a modest amount for Jodi and Surinder. They submit that they are still working full-time in their 70s to keep the doors of the Store open, and they often put their own wages back into the business. However, there is no evidence about the Store’s finances, and Jodi and Surinder did not testify to explain any impact of continuing Kayla’s employment on their personal finances or on the Store. In the absence of supporting evidence, I cannot find that the Respondents could not afford to maintain Kayla’s employment or that doing so would have created undue hardship.

[236]       I also found above that the Respondents did not establish that they would have incurred undue hardship by allowing Kayla to bring Shadow to work. This relates to their suggestion that it was not financially feasible to continue paying Kayla’s wages if she always worked with someone else, even during slower periods. If Kayla had Shadow at work, and the Respondents had accommodated her to meet a goal of working more independently, she would not have needed to work with someone else all the time. 

[237]       I understand that the Respondents’ position is that they created a position for Kayla to help her in the first place. Having done so does not mean they had to employ Kayla indefinitely. I also understand that the Store is a small family business, not a large and sophisticated employer with experience accommodating employees with disabilities to assist their entry into the workforce. Part of the issue between the parties was based on poor communication on the Respondents’ part. They did not tell Kayla in advance that they only expected to be able to employ her through the fall, and they expected the various employment agencies to understand their intentions and communicate them to Kayla even though communicating to Kayla about her employment at the Store was their own responsibility.

[238]       Poor communication in a situation like this one will not always amount to discrimination. In this case, though, the Respondents’ conduct was more than poor communication. Instead of ever explaining to Kayla that it was only feasible for the Store to have her work part-time to further develop her skills until December 2019, perhaps with a plan of inviting her back for the next busy season as Major suggested in his evidence was a possibility, they abruptly ended her employment through Jodi’s conversation with the case manager. They have not established that they needed to end her employment to avoid undue hardship. This was discrimination.

H.    Cancelled Shifts Allegation

[239]       Kayla’s final allegation is that in the time leading up to the termination of her employment, the Respondents sent her home when she arrived for shifts on two or three occasions. I find that this occurred in one instance, but this was a miscommunication rather than an adverse impact in which her disabilities were a factor.

[240]       Kayla testified that the Respondents cut her hours without any notice, and that, two or three times, Surinder sent her home when she showed up for shifts because she understood that she was working. Kayla kept notes in her phone of the days she worked. She noted December 18 (Wednesday), 25 (Wednesday), and 29 (Sunday), 2019, as days that she was scheduled to work, showed up, and was told to go. In a note dated December 29, 2019, Kayla wrote that she got up, got ready for work, and went only to be sent home because Surinder and Jodi had other family members in town.   

[241]       On January 4, 2020, Kayla texted Major and told him that she showed up for her shift on the Sunday after Christmas (which was December 29) but before she could go into the store, Surinder ran out to tell her to go home because other family members were in town. Kayla said she was also sent home on Christmas day, “but that I can see. Last Sunday getting sent home your sisters were here isn’t a reason to send me home and lose a days worth of pay.” [as written]

[242]       Kayla did not write a separate note or text Major about being sent home on December 18. She also did not testify about a particular incident that occurred on December 18. In her direct evidence she testified that she was sent home the odd time for different reasons during the wage subsidy period and sometimes did not even make it in the door before being sent home, and that this happened one time during the wage subsidy period and other times may have been after. Later in her direct evidence she testified about the time Surinder came out of the Store when she arrived and told her to go home, which, based on her text message to Major, I find happened on December 29. She then testified that other times she would get in the door and be sent home for no reason, and that she showed up and was turned away two times, maybe three, including on December 29 when she did not even get out of her car. She testified that she could not recall what happened on December 18, which she noted as a date she was sent home.

[243]       Sheila also only testified in any detail about the December 29 incident. Sheila says there was one other time that Surinder sent Kayla home in December, and another time, maybe in late summer or September, where something similar happened and Kayla did not make a note of it. Sheila referred in her evidence to Kayla texting her on one occasion to tell her that Jodi had told her to go home, but that was the date that Kayla says she was tired and believes she had a seizure at work, which is a legitimate reason to suggest she go home.

[244]       I find that the incident of Kayla being sent home on December 29 is likely due to poor communication on the parties’ part about when Kayla was working during that week. Kayla knew by this point that the Respondents did not necessarily want her working six hours per week every week; she was understandably upset by this, but it is clear that there were discussions by this point about her hours. Kayla noted on December 12, 2019, that Surinder had told her that she did not need to come in twice per week, and Major told her on December 17 that Surinder could reduce her hours. It was not a given that she would continue to work the same hours throughout December. Kayla told Major by text that she could see why Surinder sent her home on December 25; the fact that she went to work that day suggests it was not clear to her when she was working and when she was not. With this lack of clarity, the evidence does not support a finding that Kayla’s disabilities were a factor in her being sent home on December 29.  

[245]       Kayla says this is an area where she was treated differently from the full-time employees, but this reflects that their positions were different from hers. I accept that it was important for the Respondents to maintain their full-time employees’ hours so they could, in turn, depend on those employees to work their full hours. Their positions also involved flexibility in their duties depending on how busy the Store was and what work needed to be done elsewhere. I do not find Kayla’s experience of being sent home from work on December 29 to be discrimination based on the fact that, to her knowledge, the other employees did not have similar experiences.  

[246]       Kayla has not established that the Cancelled Shift Allegation amounts to discrimination.

[247]       Before I consider the appropriate remedies for the instances of discrimination that did occur, I must address the issue of which respondents are responsible for the discrimination.

I.       Complaint against the individual Respondents

[248]       Under s. 44(2) of the Code, the Store is liable for the conduct of its agents and employees. This means the Store is responsible for Jodi and Surinder’s conduct that I found to be discrimination. The Store is responsible for fulfilling the remedies I order.

[249]       The Respondents submit that Jodi and Surinder should not be found personally responsible for the discrimination. They effectively ask me to dismiss the complaint against them.

[250]       For the following reasons, I do not dismiss the complaint against Jodi and Surinder. I find that they are responsible, along with the Store, for fulfilling the remedies I order.

[251]       The Respondents submit that Kayla was an employee of the Store, so her claims should be specific to the Store. They submit that the evidence does not incriminate Jodi or Surinder personally and does not establish that they are responsible for remedying the discrimination.

[252]       Kayla submits that Jodi and Surinder were the “directing minds” behind the decisions about Kayla’s employment, and that they both directly discriminated against her by making hurtful comments related to her disabilities: Daley v. B.C. (Ministry of Health) and others, 2006 BCHRT 341 at paras. 60-62. Kayla says that the comments Jodi and Surinder made have a measure of individual culpability.

[253]       I find that Jodi and Surinder are responsible for the discrimination. There is no evidence disputing that Jodi and Surinder are both the directing minds behind decisions made for the Store. The evidence also supports that this is the case. For example, when Kayla spoke to Major about her concerns in December 2019, Major told her that Surinder was her boss and could reduce her hours if she wanted to. In the absence of evidence from Jodi and Surinder, I drew an adverse inference that they decided to terminate her employment and found that Jodi communicated this through the employment counsellor.

[254]       I also find that Jodi and Surinder’s conduct related to the Hurtful Comments and Termination Allegations has a measure of individual culpability. They directly discriminated against her with their comments and negative treatment when they decided that she was not a suitable employee for the Store. The termination of Kayla’s employment was related to this negative treatment. It was not a simple business decision but was personal to Kayla for reasons related to her disabilities. The Respondents ended Kayla’s employment because they did not value her as a person with disabilities, and they showed her this through their treatment of her.

[255]       The Service Dog Allegation does not carry the same measure of individual culpability. I found on the evidence that the Respondents did not try to accommodate Kayla’s need to have Shadow with her at the Store and did not demonstrate that they could not do so without undue hardship. However, I have found that the evidence supports Kayla’s submission that Jodi and Surinder were both the directing minds behind decisions related to the Store. They are the individuals responsible for this decision.  

VI    Remedies

[256]       I have found that the Respondents discriminated against Kayla in employment based on physical and mental disability when they failed to accommodate her need to bring her service dog to work, made hurtful comments and treated her badly for reasons related to her disabilities, and terminated her employment. I declare that this conduct was discrimination and order the Respondents to cease the contravention of the Code and refrain from committing a similar contravention: Code, s. 37(2)(a) and (b).

[257]       Kayla seeks compensation for wage loss, injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and compensation for expenses she incurred to attend the hearing. I find she is entitled to compensation under each of these headings.   

A.    Wage loss

[258]       Kayla claims wage loss as a remedy for the termination of her employment.

[259]       The Tribunal may order a respondent to pay compensation for lost wages resulting from discrimination. The purpose of compensation is to restore a person, to the extent possible, to the position they would have been in if the discrimination had not occurred: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 300; upheld in Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia, 2014 BCCA 396. A complainant must establish that they are entitled to compensation by demonstrating a causal connection between the discrimination and the loss claimed: Gichuru at paras. 301 to 302. If a causal connection is established, the amount of compensation is a matter of discretion considering the remedial purposes of the Code and the purpose of a wage loss award: Gichuru at para. 303; Gbedze v. Hilton Vancouver Metrotown (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 225 at para. 96.

[260]       Kayla submits that she would have continued to work at A1 indefinitely had the Respondents not terminated her employment. She says she could not look for new work for about three months after she was fired because of impacts on her of the termination, but she constantly searched for a job after that. She says she sought help from employment agencies again, sent out at least 15 resumes, and did some job interviews, but she was not offered a job until July 2021. She seeks compensation equalling the amounts she would have earned in 2020 and 2021 if the Respondents had not terminated her employment.

[261]       I find that Kayla has established a connection between the discrimination and her wage loss. If the Respondents had not terminated her employment in a discriminatory manner and had supported her to grow as an employee instead of giving up on her and treating her badly, she would have continued working.

[262]       The Respondents paid Kayla $13.85 per hour, plus 4% holiday pay. They paid her semimonthly. Her final pay was for 12 hours between January 1 and 15, 2020, for a total of $172.85. For the remainder of 2020, Kayla submits her wage loss was $4,325.40. However, this calculation is in error. She was paid twice per month, so would have had an additional 23 paycheques in 2020. If she continued to work the same hours at the same rate of pay, this would total approximately $3,975.55 ($172.85 multiplied by 23).

[263]       Kayla earned $3,828.16 in 2021 from a new job that she started in July of that year. She claims the difference between what she would have earned if she continued working six hours per week at A1 for all of 2021 and her earnings that year from her new job. I calculate this amount as $320.24 ($172.85 multiplied by 24 is $4,148.40, minus the $3,828.16 she earned).

[264]       Kayla did not earn any other income between January 2020 and July 2021. She did not qualify for employment insurance or the Canada Emergency Response Benefit [CERB]. Shecontinued to receive government assistance payments for persons with disabilities, which are not deductible from wage loss awards as any offset between wages earned and government benefits are a matter between the complainant and the government: Kelly v. University of British Columbia (No. 4), 2013 BCHRT 302 at para. 70.

[265]       I accept Kayla’s evidence about her efforts to search for a new job. Her evidence was sincere. She testified that she was determined to prove to herself and the Respondents that she was capable of working, and I accept this. Kayla’s determination to work, and belief that she was capable, were evident throughout her testimony. I explain more about the impacts the termination had on Kayla below in my reasons for awarding damages for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect. For the purposes of the wage loss award, I accept that Kayla needed several months to deal with those impacts before she was able to search for new employment. I find that she consistently looked for work until she obtained a new job in July 2021.

[266]       The Respondents submit that they already dealt with Kayla’s wage loss issue through the Employment Standards Branch. The Respondents voluntarily resolved a complaint Kayla made at the ESB, but that complaint was related to alleged unpaid wages and missed shifts in 2019. It is not relevant to Kayla’s wage loss claim from the termination.

[267]       The Respondents submit that the Store was Kayla’s first job and was never meant to be her last job. Major is impressed that Kayla is now working full-time after getting through the period of the COVID-19 pandemic and believes this was a good eventual outcome for her.

[268]       The Respondents submit that the pandemic should impact Kayla’s wage loss award, both because she likely would not have continued working at the Store as of March 2020, and because the length of time it took her to find work is not the Respondents’ fault. Major testified that Mr. Katta and Mr. Chawla had reduced hours when the pandemic happened, then they took leaves from work and collected CERB payments. Major says Mr. Katta eventually got another job after the Respondents realized it was not sustainable to keep two full-time employees, and Surinder and Jodi increased their own hours to keep the business functional. The Respondents submit that Kayla’s inability to find other employment until July 2021 was likely pandemic-related and this is not the Respondents’ responsibility.

[269]       Kayla submits that the Respondents are responsible for her wage loss for the period she claims despite these factors. She acknowledges that the pandemic generally impacted businesses but says the Respondents have not established that they would have ended Kayla’s employment or placed her on leave for pandemic-related reasons. Kayla also submits that she may have qualified to receive CERB payments if she were still working until the start of the pandemic.

[270]       My task is to put Kayla in as close to a position as she would have been in without the discrimination as possible. Whether the pandemic was a factor in the time it took for her to find other employment is not relevant to this analysis because Kayla was only looking for other work at this time because of the discrimination. How the pandemic would have impacted Kayla’s employment at the Store is a relevant factor, however. I must consider, based on the evidence, the likelihood that, in the context of the pandemic, Kayla would have lost wages from the Store in any event. The Tribunal sometimes calls this a “contingency deduction”.

[271]       There is no evidence before me about whether there was a minimum requirement of past income or work hours to qualify for CERB and whether Kayla would have met any such requirements. I do not consider this factor in determining her wage loss award.

[272]       I accept Major’s evidence that the pandemic impacted Mr. Katta’s and Mr. Chawla’s employment. However, the Respondents’ evidence of employee Store hours suggests a minimal impact. Mr. Katta worked 40 hours in April 2020 instead of his usual 120. Mr. Chawla worked 40 hours in May instead of his usual 120.

[273]       Mr. Katta’s last month at the Store was June 2020, and he worked 120 hours. In July and August 2020, Mr. Chawla worked 160 hours. The Respondents did not provide evidence of employee hours after August 2020, but Mr. Chawla’s hours increased by 40 per month at least for July and August. Surinder and Jodi also increased their hours. Surinder began working 160 hours instead of her usual 120 in July 2020. Jodi worked 96 hours per month until June 2020, worked 120 per month in June and July, and 160 in August. 

[274]       This evidence is not consistent with Major’s contention that the Store could not support two full-time employees. Mr. Chawla, Jodi, and Surinder worked enough extra hours to make up for the Store losing Mr. Katta as an employee.

[275]        The pandemic likely would have impacted Kayla’s employment in spring 2020, but the Respondents have not established that it would have impacted her hours after April and May. The fact that Surinder, Jodi, and Mr. Chawla all increased their hours, and the Store having only one full-time employee when Mr. Katta left, suggests that there would have been some hours available for Kayla to work if not for the discrimination. Major also testified that Kayla could have gone back to work in the summer if she had wanted to. I found that she did not actually have this option because the Respondents terminated her employment and did not invite her to return, but Major’s evidence suggests that there would have been hours for her to work if not for the discrimination.  

[276]       Based on my finding that the pandemic likely would have impacted Kayla’s employment to some extent, most likely in the months of April and May 2020, I exercise my discretion to award her 90% of the wage loss she seeks from January 2020 to July 2021, which is $3,866.21. ($3,975.55 plus $320.24 is $4,295.79, of which 90% is $3,866.21.) Liability among the Respondents is joint and several.

[277]       Kayla seeks pre- and post-judgement interest on this amount. I find it appropriate to order the Respondents to pay pre-judgement and post-judgement interest on the wage loss award: Thandi v. British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General), 2025 BCHRT 294 at para. 184.

A.    Injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect

[278]       Kayla seeks an award of $35,000 for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

[279]       To assess compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code, the Tribunal considers the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s social context or vulnerability, and the impact of the discrimination on the complainant: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185, at para 260, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396. A Respondent’s ability to pay is not a consideration in assessing the award: Lloyd v. Fernanda Almeida and others (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 12 at para. 205. The Tribunal must compensate a complainant for the actual injury to their dignity as much as possible: Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 16 at para. 176.

[280]       I begin with the nature of the discrimination. The Respondents did not make submissions about this factor.

[281]       Kayla submits that the nature of the discrimination was serious. In particular, she submits that cases involving termination of employment tend to draw high awards due to the importance of work to a person’s life, dignity, and self-worth. Kayla also points out that she was required to work without Shadow for the duration of her employment and had to endure discriminatory treatment before she was ultimately fired.

[282]       Kayla referred to several cases in which the Tribunal found discrimination in employment in her statement of remedy and submissions. Here I explain the three that I find most relevant to this case. The first is Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82. In that case the Tribunal awarded the complainant, who was fired after working with the respondent for one day, $30,000 compensation for injury to dignity. The Tribunal found that the respondent told the complainant that she was being fired because of her medications and mental illnesses: para. 34. The Tribunal found that the nature of the discrimination was serious because the complainant lost her job, noting that she had been excited to re-enter the job market and had limited options: paras. 67-68. The nature of the discrimination was also aggravated by the respondent’s comments during the termination: para. 70.

[283]       In Wells v. Langley Resources Society, 2018 BCHRT 59, the Tribunal awarded the complainant $35,000 compensation for injury to dignity. The Tribunal found that the complainant’s disability was a factor in the respondent’s decision to terminate her employment immediately after a medical leave. The Tribunal noted that the complainant worked for the respondent for a short time but had made significant life changes to take the job, and that the complainant endured mistreatment during her employment that the respondent did little to address: para. 267. This was a factor warranting a high award.

[284]       In Davis v. Sandringham Care Centre and another, 2015 BCHRT 148, the Tribunal awarded the complainant $35,000 compensation for injury to dignity. In that case the respondent subjected the complainant to intrusive questioning about her health, directed her to go to a hospital against her will, put her on medical leave, and made her feel unwelcome when she returned to the point that she could not continue to work there, all based on stereotypical views about mental disabilities: paras. 292-309. The Tribunal noted that the discrimination was ongoing and took on a variety of forms, and found that is nature was significant: paras. 369-370.

[285]       I find that the nature of the discrimination in Kayla’s case was serious. This factor supports her claim for a significant award.

[286]       The Store was Kayla’s first employment experience after her persistent, determined efforts to break into the workforce despite the barriers she faced because of her disabilities. She did not depend on her wages from the Store for her livelihood while she worked there – she also received disability benefits and lived with her mother, who supported her – but this does not diminish the importance of the job to her life, dignity, and self-worth. It was important to Kayla to work to be on a path to greater financial independence. When the Respondents did not accommodate her to bring Shadow to work, she was forced to choose between having him with her to mitigate the impacts of her seizure disorder and gaining the work experience she wanted to break into employment. Then, once she started working less with Mr. Katta and Major, and more with Surinder, Jodi, and Mr. Chawla, the Respondents treated her not as an employee who was learning and gaining experience, but as a burden, then ended her employment. The several forms of discrimination, the ongoing nature of the failure to accommodate her, and the termination of her employment all make the discrimination serious.

[287]       I next consider the social context. Kayla says she was in a vulnerable position as a young woman with disabilities in her first paid employment. She says that family relationships can create conditions for abuse or mistreatment in employment: Kasagoni v. J Singh Enterprises dba Willingdon Husky and another (No. 3), 2023 BCHRT 65 at para. 72.

[288]       The Respondents do not dispute that Kayla was in a vulnerable position. They were aware that she has disabilities, wanted to work, and was not able to get a job elsewhere. Their position is that they helped her build motivation, confidence, and capabilities, and that her first job at the Store got her on track to full-time employment.

[289]       I find that Kayla was in a vulnerable position as a young woman with disabilities in her first job, who was unable to find a job elsewhere and depended on the Respondents, who were also family members, to break into the workforce. I do not accept the Respondents’ submission that, overall, they helped her while she was in this vulnerable position. First, it is the impact on Kayla that matters, not the Respondents’ intentions: Davis at para. 368, Code, s. 2. Second, while I find that Major’s intentions were good and that he wanted to help Kayla get employment experience, I have not made any findings about Jodi’s or Surinder’s intentions. They did not testify and there is no evidence before me that they wanted to help Kayla enter the workforce. My findings about how they treated Kayla once she worked directly with them more often and they no longer received a wage subsidy for her suggest that they considered her a burden, not that they wanted to help her.

[290]       Third, the Respondents’ position that they were essentially doing Kayla a favour by letting her work at the Store underscores her vulnerability in the employment relationship. In Kasagoni, the Tribunal found that the respondent’s sense that he was doing the complainant favours justified his expectation that she work unpaid overtime for him: para. 72. In Kayla’s case, the Respondents did not abuse Kayla’s reliance on them to gain free labour, but they used their position of control over her situation and their perspective that they were doing her a favour to justify mistreating her. Her vulnerability in this situation is a factor pointing to a high award.

[291]       Finally, I consider the impact of the discrimination on Kayla. I find that the impact was significant, which is another factor justifying a high award.

[292]       Kayla’s evidence about the impact of the discrimination on her was sincere and compelling. She testified that working at the Store without Shadow caused her anxiety at the time. She was more worried that something could happen to her without him there. She was clearly upset and sometimes teary when she testified about the Respondents’ comments that hurt her. She says that after she talked to Major about her concerns, she felt like Surinder treated her as if she were worthless. I accept that this treatment deeply hurt her.

[293]       Kayla testified that she remembers an event related to the Store opening in the 1990s when she was young. I accept that the events were particularly hard for her because the Respondents are family. When testifying about the termination, Kayla said, “so much for family, right.” She testified that the termination really affected her self-esteem. She felt like she was worthless and questioned whether she was good enough to do anything at all. She says she went into a deep, dark depression. Kayla testified that she learned not to work for family, ever. Kayla cried during this part of her testimony about the impact of the termination on her, particularly when she said she learned not to trust family again, and she said, “maybe now the Respondents will know why I am doing this.” The significant impact on her is clear. 

[294]       Kayla continued to cry as she testified about the impact on her mental health and well-being. She testified that she was in a place of “deep, dark depression” for “a good three or four months” before she even tried looking for work again. She did counselling during this time period, and although this service was through an employment agency, the counselling was to address the impacts of the Respondents’ conduct on her. She testified about screenshots of three calendar appointments in February and March 2020, which she did on the phone before the agency had to shut down for pandemic-related reasons. She says she likely would have done more counselling sessions otherwise.

[295]       Kayla’s mother Sheila also testified about the impacts on Kayla that she observed. Sheila says Kayla was very depressed for three to four weeks to the point where she did not want to get out of bed. Sheila says Kayla asked her what the point was of getting up. Sheila testified that she had to try to get Kayla to get up to do things, but it was very hard. Sheila says Kayla was in a very bad state for those first weeks and then started to get better, but slowly.

[296]       I accept Sheila’s evidence about the impacts on Kayla. I accept her evidence that it was very hard for her to see Kayla in this state. She testified that she saw Kayla get very discouraged when she would do a job interview but not get the job, and question whether she was meant for a job, but she was very determined to find self-worth again and earn money.

[297]       In the Respondents’ closing submissions they acknowledged that Kayla enjoyed coming to work, and they knew this. They submit that the period of the pandemic was isolating and impacted everyone, and that Shadow passing away in May 2020 would have compounded any difficult feelings Kayla had. The Respondents submit that they never wanted to stop supporting Kayla emotionally, but they had no idea how she was feeling, did not know Shadow had died, and did not know that she was having a hard time finding other employment because she did not tell them, and they had their own stuff going on. The Respondents submit that it is difficult to help or do anything for someone when they did not know what was going on.

[298]       Again, it is the impact of the discrimination on Kayla that is relevant, not the Respondents’ intentions. In any case, the evidence does not support the Respondents’ contention that they would have continued to support Kayla if they knew she was suffering emotionally. I found that the Respondents mistreated Kayla, then terminated her employment. They did not show signs of caring for her well-being during this time and made no efforts to check on her afterward. I do not accept that they would have been supportive towards her if she had told them how the termination impacted her.

[299]       The Respondents dispute that working without Shadow negatively impacted Kayla. They point to the fact that Kayla did not get another service dog after Shadow died in May 2020 and she has since worked full-time without one. They also submit that Kayla and INEO agreed that Kayla would be better off working without Shadow.

[300]       I have found that Kayla did not agree to work without Shadow or say at any point that it would benefit her to do so. There is also no evidence that anyone from INEO agreed to this. Kayla worked without Shadow because she found out on her first day of her unpaid work experience that she was not allowed to have him at the Store, so she had to choose between having him with her or getting the work experience. I accept her evidence that working without him caused her anxiety.

[301]       Kayla testified in cross examination that it was hard for her to be separated from Shadow not only because of how he assisted her, but also because she could see that he had separation anxiety. Major suggested to Kayla in cross that the issue of their separation was primarily an issue for Shadow because he missed her when she was gone. Kayla testified that she could see that Shadow was distressed and this was upsetting for her, but she was also worried about herself because she did not know whether something would happen to her while she didn’t have him.

[302]       I accept Kayla’s evidence. My finding of discrimination is based on Kayla’s need to have Shadow with her at the time she worked at the Store because he was a support dog for her seizure disorder. Her evidence about her emotional response to being away from him, including that it was difficult to see the impact on him as well as worrying about herself, is all relevant evidence supporting her contention that this discrimination impacted her. I find that the negative treatment towards the end of her employment and the termination had the most significant impact on her, but working without Shadow impacted her as well.  

[303]       The fact that Kayla did not get another service dog after Shadow does not indicate that working without her at the Store was beneficial for her or had no negative impact. Kayla explained that it was not possible for her to get another service dog in 2020 because of the pandemic, but fortunately, her seizure disorder has impacted her less over time with adjustments to medications. 

[304]       I considered that Shadow’s death in May 2020 also impacted Kayla. I still find that the discrimination, on its own, had a significant emotional impact on her. The Respondents terminated Kayla’s employment about four months before Shadow died. I accept her evidence, and her mother’s, that her most difficult days immediately followed the termination. Shadow’s death was a sad and difficult loss for her, but it impacted her differently from the treatment at the Store and termination. She testified that when Shadow passed away it was the worst feeling of her life aside from when she got let go from this job. Kayla was able to get herself out of bed and start looking for other jobs not long after the termination, and there is no evidence that she fell into a similar low period when Shadow died. There is also no evidence that the pandemic impacted Kayla in any way that would overshadow the impacts of the discrimination. Again, her worst weeks and months were right after the termination, before the pandemic shutdowns. Once she started to feel better, she looked for work during the pandemic despite the frustrations of doing so. It is clear that the discrimination, particularly the termination of her employment, significantly impacted her.

[305]       Kayla did not introduce medical evidence in support of her claim and submits that she was not required to do so: Jamal v. Translink Security Management and another, 2020 BCHRT 24 at para. 22. I agree that medical evidence is not required to demonstrate the impact of discrimination. I do not need to find that Kayla was clinically depressed to accept her evidence that she, colloquially, was in a “deep, dark depression” during the months immediately following her termination.

[306]       I have commented that Kayla’s most difficult weeks and months immediately followed the termination of her employment. After a few weeks it became easier for her to get out of bed. After several months she was able to start looking for work again and did so until she finally found a job in July 2021. She did this despite Shadow’s death, which she testified changed her level of independence and the types of accommodations she needed to request in employment. This is evidence that Kayla is resilient, determined, and capable. The impacts of the discrimination were not so significant that they prevented her from looking for a new job and eventually finding one on her own, but she did this despite the impacts of the discrimination, not as a result of her work experience with the Respondents.

[307]       Although the most significant impacts of the discrimination on Kayla were, fortunately, fairly short-lived, it is clear that she carried the emotional impacts with her through to the hearing dates. She was still very emotional about how the Respondents treated her.  

[308]       Considering all of these factors, I find that the award Kayla seeks is justified. I order the Respondents to pay her $35,000 compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect. Liability among the Respondents is joint and several.

[309]       I order the Respondents to pay post-judgement interest on this amount: Thandi at para. 184.

B.     Expenses

[310]       Kayla seeks compensation for the expense of missing four days of work to attend the hearing. The purpose of this compensation is also to place the complainant in the position they would have been in but for the discrimination: Martin v. Grapevine Optical, 2022 BCHRT 76 at para. 78.

[311]       The Respondents submit that they should not have to pay these expenses because Major also had to put in a significant amount of time for the hearing dates and preparation. This factor is not relevant because, again, remedies for discrimination are about the impact on the complainant who experienced the discrimination.

[312]       Kayla introduced recent pay stubs for her current job into evidence. She generally works 8.5 hours five days per week at an hourly wage of $17.70. She seeks $601.80, which is her gross pay for four days of work. I agree that this award is appropriate, and I order the Respondents to compensate Kayla for the expense of attending the hearing in this amount. Liability among the Respondents is joint and several.

[313]       Kayla seeks pre- and post-judgement interest on this amount, which I find is appropriate: Thandi at para. 184.

VII  Costs

[314]       Kayla applies for an order that the Respondents pay her $3,000 for costs.

[315]       The basis for an award of costs at the Tribunal is a finding that the party subject to the order engaged in improper conduct during the course of the complaint, or contravened a rule or order: Code, s. 37(4).

[316]       Improper conduct is not limited to intentional wrongdoing. It includes any conduct that has a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, including conduct that has a significant prejudicial impact on another party: McLean v. BC (Min. of Public Safety and Sol. Gen.) (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 103 at para. 8.

[317]       The purpose of a costs award is to deter parties from engaging in conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Lloyd v. Fernanda Almeida and others (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 12 at para. 218.

[318]       The Tribunal lists examples of conduct that may be improper and result in a costs order on its website. These examples include treating people in the process badly, such as by badmouthing other parties, or causing unnecessary cost or delay, such as by refusing to follow a Tribunal order.

[319]       Kayla submits that the Respondents engaged in improper conduct that is not excused by the fact that they did not have a lawyer represent them in the process. She refers to Asad v. Kinexus Bioinformatics, 2008 BCHRT 293 [Kinexus], in which the Tribunal ordered a self-represented respondent to pay costs of $5,000 for improper conduct, including failure to disclose documents despite several orders to do so, giving evasive and unnecessarily argumentative evidence in cross examination despite directions to answer questions directly, misrepresenting directions that Tribunal Members gave at pre-hearing conferences, and misquoting and misrepresenting evidence that had previously been given: para. 47-56.  

[320]       I find that the following conduct that Kayla sets out in her submissions was improper conduct:

a.    The Respondents failed to disclose relevant documents after multiple requests from Kayla’s counsel. Kayla had to make an application for disclosure of the documents, and the Tribunal had to use its resources to order the disclosure. The Respondents still did not disclose some relevant documents, like Store schedules. They also attempted to introduce a new document on the third day of hearing that they had never disclosed to Kayla.

b.    The Respondents filed their Form 9.3 – Witness List and Form 9.6 – Response to Remedy Sought late and did not file their Form 9.7 – Respondent’s Document Disclosure Regarding Remedy at all.

c.     The Respondents made a baseless application for document disclosure after Kayla had already provided the documents the Respondents sought, including some documents that she took the position were not relevant, and explained that another document did not exist.

d.    In an email to the Tribunal and Kayla’s counsel related to the Respondents’ disclosure application, Major made serious and unfounded allegations against Kayla’s counsel, saying that she unfairly delayed providing documents to prejudice the Respondents, was exploiting Kayla to try to take advantage of a small business, was misleading the Tribunal with “lies” about documents, and intended to have Kayla lie while testifying. Major also said in this email that the complaint was a “malicious and unfounded attempt at coercion”, and that filing it showed “complete disrespect” for the Tribunal.

e.    On the second day of hearing, when Major was scheduled to cross examine Kayla, he was three hours late for the hearing. He said that he was late because of snow in his area but did not explain why he had to travel to attend an online hearing.  

[321]       I find that the Respondents engaged in improper conduct warranting a costs order. Their conduct, especially when considered together, impacted the integrity of the Tribunal’s process. However, I do not order the amount that Kayla seeks. I find that costs of $500 are appropriate in these circumstances.

[322]       The Respondents’ conduct impacted Kayla’s ability to prepare her case when they did not respond to document disclosure requests and orders, did not file their witness and remedy forms on time, and did not provide timely disclosure of their own documents, including a relevant document that they then sought to rely on at the hearing. Their conduct impacted Kayla and her counsel when they put forward serious accusations about her counsel. Major’s late appearance on the second day of hearing caused stress for Kayla when she had to wait hours to be cross-examined on the second day.

[323]       The Respondents did not put forward a reasonable explanation for their conduct. Major noted during the proceeding that the process was difficult for him. When he was late for the second day of the hearing, he said that he left home at 8:00 a.m. for what is usually a four-minute drive to his office, but traffic was stopped because of weather, and he did not arrive at his office until 11:45 a.m. It is difficult to accept that a four-minute drive turned into almost four hours, but in any case, he did not explain why he was in a situation of needing to travel for a video hearing. In the Respondents’ closing submissions, Major said the process was new to him, he tried his best, and Kayla had representation from a good lawyer. He submitted that the Respondents should not be penalized because of his inexperience, and that he hoped he had participated in the process as adequately as possible for everyone involved.

[324]       The Respondents did not explain why they did not seek out legal counsel, including any possibility of free or low-cost legal help, or familiarize themselves with the Tribunal’s Rules and process, much earlier. They did not explain why they did not follow the Tribunal’s Rules and orders for document disclosure and disclosing witness and remedy forms. They did not raise any difficulties with accessing the Tribunal’s information on its website about the process. They also did not explain their baseless comments about Kayla’s counsel in their communications related to their disclosure application.

[325]       It appears that the Respondents did not take the complaint or the Tribunal’s process seriously because they did not believe that they did anything wrong. This approach to a human rights complaint is not advisable. I understand that small businesses may have fewer resources and less relevant experience than large institutions if they find themselves as respondents to a complaint. However, the Store is an employer subject to the Code. If a complaint proceeds through the Tribunal’s initial screening process, this means the Tribunal must deal with the complaint if the parties do not resolve the complaint on their own. Respondents have an opportunity to respond to the complaint. If the Tribunal decides that the complaint will proceed to a hearing, either by denying an application to dismiss (as occurred in this case) or in a case path decision, this means that the Tribunal must hear evidence, make findings of fact, and apply the Code to decide whether discrimination occurred. Respondents have an opportunity to respond to a complainant’s case and present their own, but they must do this according to the Tribunal’s process.

[326]       I order a lower amount of costs than Kayla seeks because I find that $500 is an appropriate amount to sanction the Respondents’ conduct and deter other respondents from engaging in similar conduct. Kayla acknowledged that the conduct at issue in this case is arguably less egregious than that in Kinexus, where the Tribunal ordered $5,000. In Kinexus the Tribunal noted that the respondent was not an unsophisticated party and that the company’s management had “impressive academic and business credentials and experience”: at para. 1005. In contrast, I accept that the Respondents in this case are a family business and did not have the resources and experience that a larger business might. This does not entirely explain their conduct, but it is a factor relevant to the amount of costs I find to be appropriate.

[327]       I also consider that after I told Major that his baseless accusations about Kayla’s counsel were not appropriate and would not help me to make decisions that I need to make about the complaint, he apologized and did not engage in similar conduct again. Major remained respectful throughout the hearing. Although he did not have a good explanation for being late on the second hearing day, I accept that this was not intentional and that being late caused him stress rather than benefiting the Respondents in any way. Finally, none of the Respondents’ conduct ultimately benefited them or interfered with Kayla’s ability to present her case, and the result in this case is also a deterrent to respondents who may not wish to take a complaint seriously.   

[328]       I order the Respondents to pay Kayla $500 in costs for improper conduct, with post-judgement interest on this amount. Liability is joint and several.

VIII           CONCLUSION

[329]       I find Kayla’s complaint of discrimination justified in part. I make the following orders:

a.    I declare that the Respondents’ conduct under the Service Dog Allegation, Hurtful Comments Allegation and Termination Allegation was discrimination contrary to the Code: s. 37(2)(b). 

b.    I order the Respondents to stop the contravention and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention: s. 37(2)(a).

c.     I order the Respondents to pay Kayla $3,866.21 as compensation for wage loss incurred as a result of the contravention: s. 37(2)(d)(ii).

d.    I order the Respondents to pay Kayla $35,000 as compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect: s. 37(2)(d)(iii).

e.    I order the Respondents to pay Kayla $601.80 as compensation for expenses incurred as a result of the contravention: s. 37(2)(d)(ii).

f.      I order the Respondents to pay Kayla costs in the amount of $500: s. 37(4).

g.    I order the Respondents to pay Kayla pre-judgment interest on the amounts awarded for wage loss and expenses, and post-judgement interest on all amounts awarded until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act [RSBC 1996, c. 79].

[330]       I dismiss the parts of Kayla’s complaint related to the Chair Allegation and the Cancelled Shifts Allegation: s. 37(1).  

Jessica Derynck

Tribunal Member