Woo v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and another, 2026 BCHRT 59
Date Issued: March 5, 2026
File: CS-006870
Indexed as: Woo v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and another, 2026 BCHRT 59
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Linda Woo
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and FirstService Residential
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Linda Woo
Counsel for the Respondents: Anil Aggarwal
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Linda Woo is a resident of a multi-unit strata building operated by The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 3011 and managed by its property management company, FirstService Residential [together, the “Respondents”]. Ms. Woo filed an earlier complaint with the Tribunal alleging the Respondents discriminated against her because they did not resolve noise complaints she made about her neighbors. That complaint was resolved by way of a settlement agreement between the parties. In her present complaint, Ms. Woo alleges the Respondents discriminated against her in services based on physical and mental disability contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code, because they are using the terms of the settlement agreement against her.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating and apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. They say Ms. Woo’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because there is no connection between what she alleges and her protected characteristics.
[3] For the following reasons, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint. I am persuaded on the materials before me that Ms. Woo has no reasonable prospect of proving a connection between her protected characteristics and the Respondents’ reliance on the terms of the settlement agreement to address her noise complaints. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[4] Ms. Woo is the owner and occupant of a suite in a multi-unit building operated by the Strata. On March 18, 2021, she filed her first complaint alleging the Strata discriminated against her in its treatment of noise complaints she made about her neighbors. That complaint was resolved by way of a settlement agreement dated August 25, 2021.
[5] The relevant portions of the settlement agreement provide that:
The Strata Corporation shall make the following adjustments to its practice, as it relates to the process followed after it receives a complaint about a bylaw contravention from Ms. Woo:
(a) complaints shall be investigated and a decision made promptly. When the investigation and decision include an accommodation to Ms. Woo, the Strata Corporation shall act on such accommodation promptly instead of waiting for the next strata council meeting.
(b) If Ms. Woo makes a complaint and requests that a strata council member attend at the Unit to witness the noise, the strata council will then request a volunteer to contact Ms. Woo and attend the Unit at a time agreed upon between Ms. Woo and the volunteer strata council member.
(c) If the noise and/or nuisances persist with either unit 212 or unit 412 without fines being imposed upon those units, then the Strata Corporation shall investigate the sound transfer between the noisy unit and Ms. Woo’s Unit at the Strata Corporation’s expense. Within 14 days of the Effective Date, the Strata Corporation will notify the owners of unit 212 & 412 that acoustical testing will be performed if any further noise complaints are made that cannot be resolved.
[6] After the agreement, Ms. Woo continued to complain about noise from her neighbors. The Strata issued warning letters to the neighbors who disputed the noise allegations. On August 10, 2022, the Strata requested Ms. Woo provide access to her unit to investigate sound transfer pursuant to clause (c) of the agreement.
[7] Ms. Woo did not believe it necessary to investigate the sound transfer and ultimately refused to allow the Strata to access her unit and the investigation did not occur.
[8] In March 2023, Ms. Woo complained about noise from a different neighbor. A representative of the strata attended Ms. Woo’s unit on March 8, 2023, to witness the noise level in the suite. Based on its observations the Strata requested access to the suite to test the sound transfer pursuant to the agreement.
[9] Ms. Woo again refused to allow the Strata to access her unit and the investigation did not occur.
III DECISION
[10] The Respondents apply to dismiss Ms. Woo’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[11] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[12] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[13] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[14] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Woo will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, in this case a mental or physical disability, she was adversely impacted in services, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[15] The Respondents’ argument on this application focuses on the third element of Moore. They say there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Woo will succeed in establishing her protected characteristics were a factor in the alleged adverse impact because she has provided no evidence from which the Tribunal could draw such a connection. They argue that Ms. Woo has not taken the allegation that her protected characteristics were a factor in their handling of Ms. Woo’s noise complaints out of the realm of conjecture.
[16] Ms. Woo alleges that her noise complaints have not been dealt with adequately. She asserts that the Respondents have breached the terms of the settlement agreement because they have not addressed and resolved her noise complaints. Ms. Woo says she experienced discomfort due to the level and frequency of noise in her suite. She says the steps taken by the Respondents was inadequate and they ought to have eliminated the noise from her neighbors without the requirement for testing and monitoring. Ms. Woo filed numerous complaints with the Civil Resolution Tribunal which, she says, denied her claims and worsened her situation. What is not in the materials before me is any information or evidence to suggest that the failure of the Respondents to take what Ms. Woo believes to be appropriate actions has a connection with her protected characteristics.
[17] Rather, the materials before me support the Respondents’ position that their response to Ms. Woo’s complaints of noise was wholly non-discriminatory. They have provided a detailed timeline of events, copies of correspondence between the parties, and a detailed explanation for their actions. The materials show that the Respondents issued multiple warning to Ms. Woo’s neighbors about her complaints of noise. They subsequently sought access to Ms. Woo’s suite to investigate the noise complaints and was repeatedly refused by Ms. Woo. The materials support that the Respondents took prompt action to address Ms. Woo’s complaints in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. The evidence supports their assertion that any delay in addressing Ms. Woo’s noise complaints arose solely because Ms. Woo prevented them from accessing her suite to witness or investigate the noise.
[18] Much of Ms. Woo’s arguments in response to the dismissal application are about the merits of her underlying noise complaints. She does not dispute that she did not engage with the Respondents and allow them access to her unit. Instead, she argues that she did not believe the Respondents would provide a fair process to investigate her complaints.
[19] In these circumstances, I am persuaded there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Woo will succeed at proving her protected characteristics were a factor in the Respondents’ conduct. On the whole of the evidence, the Tribunal could not reasonably infer that Ms. Woo’s protected characteristics were a factor in the Respondents’ handling of her noise complaints. Further, the Respondents have satisfied me that they are reasonably certain to prove a solely non-discriminatory explanation. In these circumstances, I am persuaded Ms. Woo’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.
IV CONCLUSION
[20] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member