Knights v. Seyem’ Qwantlen Business Management Ltd., 2026 BCHRT 53
Date Issued: February 27, 2026
File: CS-005241
Indexed as: Knights v. Seyem’ Qwantlen Business Management Ltd., 2026 BCHRT 53
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Brenda Knights
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Seyem’ Qwantlen Business Management Ltd.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c) and (g)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
Counsel for the Complainant: Gwendoline Allison – No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Scott McCann
I INTRODUCTION
[1] On October 7, 2021, Brenda Knights filed a human rights complaint alleging her former employer, Seyem’ Qwantlen Business Management Ltd., discriminated against her in employment based on her family status, race, ancestry, and political belief contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. She says that between March 2020 and January 2021, she was bullied by employees of Seyem’ Qwantlen.
[2] Seyem’ Qwantlen denies discriminating and applies to dismiss Ms. Knights’ complaint under ss. 27(1)(c) and (g) of the Code. It says Ms. Knights’ allegations of events occurring more than one-year before the complaint was filed are untimely and not part of a continuing contravention. It says that Ms. Knights’ allegations of bullying are unrelated to a protected characteristic and the complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.
[3] Ms. Knights did not file a response to the dismissal application. On February 7, 2024, the Respondent copies Ms. Knights with their application to dismiss the complaint at her address for service. Ms. Knights did not file a response to the application by the deadline of March 13, 2024. On May 14, 2024, Ms. Knights, through her counsel, wrote that she would be seeking an extension of time to file a response to the application. Ms. Knights did not file a response to the application. On December 16, 2025, the Tribunal informed Ms. Knights that submissions for the dismissal application had closed and if she wanted to late file a response, she must make a request to the Tribunal. In these circumstances, I am satisfied Ms. Knights had notice of the dismissal application and an opportunity to respond. I find no unfairness in making this decision on the materials before me.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint. First, I am not satisfied that the allegations of events occurring more than one year before the complaint was filed are sufficiently connected in character and time to the timely allegations to form part of a continuing contravention of the Code. Next, I am persuaded on the materials before me that Ms. Knights’ timely allegations have no reasonable prospect of success because she has not set out evidence that could support a connection between the impugned conduct and her protected characteristics.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] The background is taken from the dismissal application and Ms. Knights’ complaint form. I make no findings of fact.
[7] Ms. Knights began her employment with Seyem’ Qwantlen in 2011. Seyem’ Qwantlen is a business management organization that works with the Kwantlen First Nation to pursue economic opportunities to benefit the Nation’s membership.
[8] Ms. Knights alleges that she was the target of bullying and harassment in her employment due to her family status (she is not related to the Chief), political belief, ancestry (she did not grow up on reserve), and race (she is Indigenous and has Caucasian ancestry). Specifically, she alleges the following.
[9] On March 5, 2020, Ms. Knights was speaking at a meeting with Elders about a potential purchase and development of a parcel of land when she was cut off and yelled at by an Elder.
[10] On March 10, 2020, Ms. Knights was asked by the President of Seyem’ Qwantlen and the Chief of the Nation not to attend a meeting to discuss the potential land purchase.
[11] On November 19, 2020, Ms. Knights felt bullied and harassed because Seyem’ Qwantlen had not yet recruited a board of directors to oversee her work for the potential land purchase.
[12] In or about December 2020, Ms. Knights felt bullied because she was the subject of “rumors, gossip and innuendo” in the community about her dealings with the potential land purchase.
[13] In or about January 2021, Seyem’ Qwantlen hired an auditor to perform an audit of its business group. The auditor sent an email to the business group but did not copy Ms. Knights on the email.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(g)
[14] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code, s. 22. Section 22 is meant to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies promptly so that respondents can go ahead with their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
[15] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened within one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code, s. 22(2); School District at para. 68. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57at para. 23; School District at para. 50.
[16] The assessment of whether discrete allegations are a continuing contravention is a “fact specific one which will depend very much on the individual circumstances of each case”: Dickson v. Vancouver Island Human Rights Coalition, 2005 BCHRT 209 at para. 17.
[17] The burden is on the complainant to establish that their complaint alleges a timely continuing contravention: Dove v. GVRD and others (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 374 at para. 38. If the Tribunal finds that the complaint does not allege a timely continuing contravention and was filed outside the one-year time limit, it can still exercise its discretion to accept the late complaint: Code, s. 22(3).
[18] As Ms. Knights filed her complaint on October 7, 2021, allegations occurring after October 7, 2020, are timely. Alleged incidents that occurred before October 7, 2020, more than one year before the complaint was filed, would be out of time unless they are part of a continuing contravention with a alleged instance of discrimination.
[19] In my view, Ms. Knights’ allegations of events before October 7, 2020, are not of the same character as her allegation of events after that date. This is because each of the alleged events arise from distinct factual events and are separated from the timely allegations by over half a year. Ms. Knights’ first allegation is about the conduct of an Elder who attended a meeting, her second allegation is about being told to refrain from attending a meeting by her superiors. These allegations are distinct from the timely allegations about Ms. Knights feeling bullied because Seyem’ Qwantlen did not appoint a board of directors, that members of the Nation were gossiping about her, or that she was not copied on an email by an external auditor.
[20] In her complaint Ms. Knights says all of the allegations are connected because they all occurred in the course of her employment and the cumulative effect of the conduct has caused her distress. I am not persuaded that the allegations are sufficiently connected simply because they occurred during the same job.
[21] I am unable to see that Ms. Knights’ allegations before October 7, 2020, are the same character as her timely allegations taken individually or as a whole. Further, there is a half year gap between the allegations that is unexplained. Therefore, I find the allegations of incidents before October 7, 2020, are not part of a continuing contravention and untimely.
[22] I next consider whether the to accept the late-filed allegations under s. 22(3). The onus is on Ms. Knights to persuade the Tribunal that it would be in the public interest to accept the late-filed parts of the complaint, and that no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay in filing: A by Parent v. Interior Health Authority and others, 2019 BCHRT 213 at para. 30.
[23] The Tribunal assesses the public interest in a late-filed complaint in light of the purposes of the Code. These include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality and providing a remedy for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. It may consider factors like the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, the respondent’s interest in being able to continue its activities without worrying about stale complaints, whether the complainant got legal advice, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53 and 63; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24; Complainant v. The Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria), 2022 BCHRT 44 at para. 18. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55. The inquiry is always fact and context specific.
[24] The late-filed allegations are approximately seven months late. The Tribunal has said that a delay of several months is significant, but not insurmountable, if other factors militate in favour of acceptance: Shrigley v. City of Burnaby, 2018 BCHRT 73, at para. 12.
[25] Ms. Knights has not provided an explanation for her delay in filing. There is no evidence before me to suggest Ms. Knights could not have filed her complaint within the time limit. Further, I am not persuaded on the materials before me that there are novel issues that weigh in favour of accepting Ms. Knights’ complaint in the public interest. Complaints about workplace discrimination are, unfortunately, common.
[26] Considering all the factors and the circumstances of this case, I am not persuaded that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed allegations.
[27] Having concluded it is not in the public interest to accept the late-filed allegations, it is not necessary to consider whether substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay.
B. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[28] Seyem’ Qwantlen applies to dismiss the remainder of the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on Seyem’ Qwantlen to establish the basis for dismissal.
[29] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[30] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan, 2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[31] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[32] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Knights would have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in employment, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[33] Seyem’ Qwantlen says Ms. Knights has no reasonable prospect of proving a nexus between her protected characteristics and any alleged adverse impacts. I agree. Based on the evidence before me as a whole, I am persuaded that Ms. Knights has no reasonable prospect of proving this part of her complaint. Ms. Knights has not alleged facts that are capable of supporting a reasonable inference that there was a nexus between her protected characteristics and any alleged adverse impacts. Nor is there sufficient evidence before me that takes this part of the Ms. Knights’ complaint out of the realm of speculation and conjecture.
[34] First, Ms. Knights has not particularized in her complaint how her allegations of adverse impact are connected to her protected characteristics. She asserts that she was “feeling bullied and harassed” and that she believes the community was gossiping about her, which her employer did not stop. However, she has given no information or factual basis as to why this conduct is connected to her protected characteristics. Similarly, Ms. Knights has not provided information in her complaint as to why Seyem’ Qwantlen failing to recruit a board of directors or an external auditor not copying her on an email is an adverse impact related to her protected characteristics.
[35] Further, Ms. Knights’ complaint is replete with allegations based purely on speculation and conjecture. She asserts that she is treated differently than others because of her protected characteristics but provides no information to support her belief. Instead, she says, “she believe[s] the leadership are treating [her] differently” and “believe[s] because of [her] ancestry, not having grown up on reserve, [she is] a target of bullying and harassment.”
[36] Ms. Knights’ belief that Seyem’ Qwantlen discriminated, is not, on its own, sufficient to take the connection between her protected characteristics and the alleged adverse impact out of the realm of conjecture. Ms. Knights has provided no details or explanation about her allegations that she was treated differently than others by Seyem’ Qwantlen, that would take her assertion out of the realm of conjecture.
[37] On the whole of the evidence, I am not persuaded that discrimination could be reasonably inferred at a hearing of the complaint based on the materials before me. Ms. Knights has not asserted facts or provided any basis upon which the Tribunal could reasonably find that her protected characteristics was a factor in Seyem’ Qwantlen’s alleged conduct. As such, I am persuaded that Ms. Knights’ complaint has no reasonable prospect of success and dismiss this part of the complaint under s. 27(1)(c).
IV CONCLUSION
[38] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint under s.27(1)(g) and (c) of the Code.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member