Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld (No. 11), 2026 BCHRT 50
Date Issued: February 18, 2026
File: CS-001372
Indexed as: Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld (No. 11), 2026 BCHRT 50
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation obo Chilliwack Teachers’ Association
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Barry Neufeld
RESPONDENT
AND:
BC’s Human Rights Commissioner
INTERVENOR
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION FOR COSTS
Section 37(4)
Tribunal Members: Devyn Cousineau, Robin Dean, and Laila Said
Counsel for the Complainant: Lindsay A. Waddell, Alanna Tom, and Stefanie Quelch
Counsel for the Respondent: James SM Kitchen
I INTRODUCTION
[1] The BC Teachers’ Federation, on behalf of the Chilliwack teachers’ Association [CTA], applies for an order that Barry Neufeld pay costs for improper conduct in the course of this complaint: Human Rights Code, s. 37(4). The application is granted.
[2] Throughout the complaint, Mr. Neufeld has repeatedly and flagrantly demonstrated his disregard for the Human Rights Tribunal and its process. He has deliberately violated the Tribunal’s Rules and orders, undermining the fair and efficient processing of the complaint. His conduct has caused the CTA and the Tribunal to divert resources away from a resolution of the complaint on its merits, towards policing and correcting behaviour which Mr. Neufeld knew or ought to have known was wrong. In our view, this conduct warrants rebuke. We order Mr. Neufeld to pay CTA $10,000 in costs.
[3] This decision is released, and should be read, concurrently with the Tribunal’s final decision, finding that Mr. Neufeld violated ss. 7(1)(a), (b), and 13 of the Human Rights Code and ordering remedies against him: Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld (No. 10), 2026 BCHRT 49.
II DECISION
[4] This Tribunal, like other administrative tribunals, is a “master in its own house”: Prassad v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), 1989 CanLII 131 (SCC) at 568-569. It is empowered to control its own procedure, subject to its governing legislation and the rules of procedural fairness. It exercises this authority through its Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], practice directives, policies, and the orders made by its adjudicators: Code, s. 27.3. This authority is critical to the Tribunal’s ability to function effectively and fulfill its legislative mandate.
[5] The Tribunal may award costs “against a party to a complaint who has engaged in improper conduct during the course of the complaint”: Code, s. 37(4). This power is the “muscle” with which Tribunal controls its process and protects the people within it: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 301. In Oger, the Tribunal described the dual purpose of a costs award, both of which are engaged by the current application:
The Tribunal uses this “muscle” to serve two important purposes: the immediate purpose of managing its process and parties’ conduct in an individual complaint and the public purpose of maintaining public confidence in the Tribunal as an arbiter of human rights…. This dual purpose was explained by the Tribunal in Xiaoling [v. Coral Sea Garment Manufacturing Ltd., 2004 BCHRT 13]:
I have noted above that the primary purpose of an award of costs under s. 37(4) is punitive. Punishment of a wrongdoer, however, is not an end in itself. It also, of course, serves as a deterrent to discourage and prevent others from committing the same or similar wrongful acts. Such deterrence is an important consideration in the context of human rights. It is vitally important that complainants and witnesses know that they are protected by the law when they file a complaint or offer evidence. The elimination or denigration of that protection would have a dangerously chilling effect on the willingness of people to come forward to enforce their rights and, perhaps even more so, the rights of others. [para. 33]
[6] Improper conduct is “not necessarily limited to intentional wrongdoing”: McLean v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Sol. Gen.) (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 103 at para. 8. Rather, “[a]ny conduct which has a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, including conduct which has a significant prejudicial impact on another party, may constitute improper conduct”: McLean at para. 8.
[7] The CTA’s application focuses on the following conduct by Mr. Neufeld in the course of the complaint:
a. Surreptitiously recording a pre-hearing conference call [PHC] and posting the recording on YouTube;
b. Recording a second PHC after the Tribunal specifically directed him not to;
c. Publishing privileged information about settlement discussions;
d. Sharing material with a third party that was protected by a Tribunal order prohibiting disclosure, a publication ban, the Rules, and the implied undertaking rule;
e. Distributing dial-in information for the Tribunal’s online hearing in violation of the Tribunal’s process for admitting members of the public and its express direction not to do so; and
f. Publicly deriding the Tribunal as an institution.
[8] We begin by considering these actions separately, to determine whether they constitute improper conduct. In doing so, we consider the documents submitted by the parties in the application as well as Mr. Neufeld’s testimony during the hearing of this complaint. We then consider the appropriate quantum of the award, taking into account the cumulative impacts of Mr. Neufeld’s improper conduct on the integrity of this process.
A. Surreptitiously recording and publishing the April 18, 2024, PHC
[9] We find that Mr. Neufeld acted improperly by surreptitiously recording a Tribunal PHC on April 18, 2024, and then posting the recording to YouTube.
[10] The Tribunal’s hearings are presumptively open to the public: Rule 5(1). Other parts of its process, including PHCs conducted between parties and a Tribunal Member, are not. Participants are not permitted to record any Tribunal process without the Tribunal’s permission. During the relevant time, the Tribunal did not have an express rule or policy prohibiting recording of a PHC. Its Public Access & Media Policy (July 31, 2006, amended January 13, 2020) [Public Access Policy] prohibited recording of any hearing other than by accredited media, and prohibited the publication or broadcast of any part of the hearing. In November 2024, the Tribunal instituted the Participant Access to Complaint Record Policy, which directs that “a participant must not record any part of a Tribunal proceeding”: s. 4.
[11] On April 18, 2024, the Tribunal held a PHC with the parties to discuss various matters, including the CTA’s application for a publication ban to protect its witnesses and Mr. Neufeld’s application to adjourn the hearing [April 18 PHC]. Unbeknownst to the Tribunal or the other participants, Mr. Neufeld surreptitiously recorded the April 18 PHC and posted the recording to his public YouTube account. On April 23, the CTA discovered the recording online. It asked Mr. Neufeld to take it down immediately, failing which it would file an application for costs. Mr. Neufeld did not take it down immediately, prompting the CTA to apply for costs. Mr. Neufeld then took the recording down on April 25, after he received the costs application.
[12] The CTA argues that, by surreptitiously recording and publishing the April 18 PHC, Mr. Neufeld violated the Tribunal’s Rules and Public Access Policy. In response, Mr. Neufeld says that he was self-represented at the time and only recorded the PHC to ensure he had a record, which he could then share with any future counsel. He says he published the recording briefly on YouTube because he understood this was a way to transfer it from his phone to his computer. He thought it was private.
[13] We agree with CTA that Mr. Neufeld’s conduct in recording and publishing the April 18 PHC was improper. We infer that Mr. Neufeld recognized the impropriety of his actions because he did not disclose to any participant that he was recording. A prominent item on the agenda for the PHC was the CTA’s application for a publication ban to address its concerns about the safety and privacy of its teacher witnesses. This was a sensitive topic, engaging important privacy rights of witnesses. Mr. Neufeld’s later conduct, which we address below, confirms that he did not care whether the Tribunal permitted him to record or not, since he viewed it as his right. Regarding the publication on YouTube, Mr. Neufeld’s explanation that this was necessary to “transfer” the recording to his computer is nonsensical and, in any event, does not explain why the recording remained online for several days, even after CTA asked him to remove it.
[14] However, at this stage we disagree with CTA that Mr. Neufeld’s conduct was “serious improper conduct”. We consider that he was self-represented and no Tribunal Rule, policy, or order at the time expressly prohibited him from recording and publishing a PHC. Had his conduct stopped there, we would have awarded only a nominal sum as a rebuke for this conduct. But it did not stop there.
B. Surreptitiously recording the May 16, 2024, PHC
[15] We find that Mr. Neufeld engaged in improper conduct when he violated a Tribunal order by surreptitiously recording a PHC held by the Tribunal on May 16, 2024.
[16] On April 26, 2024, after the CTA had applied for costs as a result of Mr. Neufeld’s conduct regarding the April 18 PHC, the Tribunal Member who had presided over that PHC wrote to the parties. The Member began by confirming the Tribunal’s expectation:
… I begin by making clear that no party is permitted to record telephone case conferences without the knowledge and permission of the Tribunal and other parties. Moreover, no party is permitted to publish the contents of a case conference on the internet.
[17] The Member ordered Mr. Neufeld to delete the April 18 PHC recording, and further ordered that Mr. Neufeld must not:
· Provide any other person with a copy of the recording.
· Upload or permit any other person to upload the recording, or any part of it, or any of its contents to the internet or otherwise make the content available throughout any medium.
[collectively, April 26 Orders]
[18] The Member concluded: “A failure to comply with this order may result in consequences including an order of costs for improper conduct under s. 37(4) of the Code.”
[19] The Tribunal then convened another PHC on May 16, 2024 [May 16 PHC]. Near the end of the call, the Tribunal Member directly asked Mr. Neufeld if he was recording the PHC. Mr. Neufeld admitted that he was. The Tribunal Member asked Mr. Neufeld whether he was seeking permission to record the PHC, and he confirmed he was not: Tribunal letter dated May 16, 2024.
[20] In his evidence, Mr. Neufeld agreed that he knew during the May 16 PHC that he was not permitted to record. However, he disagreed with that ruling. In cross-examination, he testified:
Q: Do you recall that this [April 26 letter from the Tribunal] said you were not permitted to record pre-hearing conferences or any Tribunal proceedings without the permission of the tribunal?
A: Yes, and that’s a rule of the Tribunal. But I was unrepresented by legal counsel. I didn’t know all the rules that govern the Tribunal. I saw nothing unethical or illegal about recording a technical legal conversation because I needed it for my own purposes and also, once I did have a lawyer, to share it with that lawyer.
[21] Mr. Neufeld then testified that he had received legal advice that “you cannot be prevented from recording a phone call for your own purposes. Which is contrary to the rules … of the Tribunal.”
[22] This conduct was a deliberate violation of the April 26 Order. No party is entitled to pick and choose which Tribunal orders they will follow. As the BC Supreme Court explained in Bihari:
A party subject to a lawful order by the court or a tribunal is expected to comply with it in the absence of a proper and timely application to set it aside. They are not entitled to simply refuse to comply with the order because they disagree with it or because, in their opinion, it is not necessary.
Bihari v. Deltec Electric Ltd, 2020 BCSC 1450 at para. 25
Mr. Neufeld took no steps to challenge the April 26 Order through proper channels, instead unilaterally deciding he would disregard it. As the Tribunal warned, this recording constitutes improper conduct warranting an order for costs.
[23] This issue arose a third time, during a PHC on September 12, 2024. At the outset of the call, I asked Mr. Neufeld to confirm that he would not record the call. Mr. Neufeld would not immediately confirm this, advising that he was not recording “yet”, there was nothing stopping him from recording, and recording the call was not against the law. I proceeded with the PHC only after Mr. Neufeld finally confirmed he would not record it. Given that, to our knowledge, Mr. Neufeld did not record this PHC, there was no improper conduct arising from this PHC. However, in our view Mr. Neufeld’s comments reflect his attitude that he did not consider himself bound by the Tribunal’s express orders. This attitude underlay his decision to surreptitiously record the May 16 PHC and, in our view, much of his conduct throughout the complaint.
C. Publishing privileged information about settlement discussions
[24] We find that Mr. Neufeld acted improperly by repeatedly publishing information about the parties’ confidential and privileged settlement discussions.
[25] Settlement discussions are confidential and privileged: Bombardier Inc. v. Carbide Canada Inc., 2014 SCC 35. Settlement privilege plays a vital role in “promoting the settlement of disputes and improving access to justice”: Bombardier, atpara. 1. These common law principles are reflected in the Code and the Tribunal’s Rules. Section 40(2) of the Code provides:
Any information received by any person in the course of attempting to reach a settlement of a complaint is confidential and may not be disclosed or admitted in evidence except with the consent of the person who gave the information.
Rule 14(5) says:
Confidentiality of settlement discussions
(5) Any information received by any person in the course of attempting to settle a complaint, including at a mediation, is confidential and may not be disclosed or admitted in evidence, unless the person who gave the information consents.
[26] The Tribunal takes the confidentiality of settlement discussions seriously. In Chrzanowski v. Mah, 2006 BCHRT 192, the Tribunal said:
The settlement meeting process is a central element of the Tribunal’s processing of complaints. The emphasis on mediation as an appropriate means of resolving complaints has been increased as a result of the direct access system. The Tribunal encourages parties to attend settlement meetings, and provides members or other mediators to assist the parties to find ways of resolving complaints without recourse to formal adjudication. An essential precondition of the fairness and efficacy of the settlement meeting process is the confidential and without prejudice nature of settlement meeting discussions. Any breach of the confidential and without prejudice nature of settlement meeting discussions will have an impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, and is likely to constitute improper conduct… [para. 7]
[27] Beginning in or around late 2023, Mr. Neufeld published or posted information online about the parties’ settlement discussions. In a letter to Mr. Neufeld dated January 30, 2024, his then-legal counsel reiterated the terms on which the CTA was prepared to settle the complaint. The lawyer specifically cited Mr. Neufeld’s conduct in publishing the terms of the offer:
You have engaged in conduct including recent social media posts disclosing terms of this settlement offer. You were specifically instructed not to do so. Despite these actions, BCTF has continued to extend the offer. [emphasis added]
This letter was admitted into evidence after the Tribunal found that Mr. Neufeld had waived privilege over certain communications with his previous counsel: Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld (No. 8), 2025 BCHRT 64.
[28] Mr. Neufeld testified that he took his lawyer’s instructions “with a grain of salt” because he did not feel they were necessarily acting in his personal interests. What this meant, in practice, is that he disregarded it. In February 2024, Mr. Neufeld again published the terms of CTA’s settlement offer, this time in an online newsletter and on Facebook. He told his followers that he “refused to agree to this settlement!”. On August 15, 2024, Mr. Neufeld publicized the terms of CTA’s settlement offer for a third time, in an interview which was posted online.
[29] In his response to this application, Mr. Neufeld appears to accept that this was improper conduct but argues that a costs order should be no more than $1,000. In support of this argument, he says that he only publicized details of the parties’ settlement discussions “to inform his supporters why he rejected settlement”, and not to gain any litigation advantage or pressure the CTA into more favourable terms.
[30] There can be no doubt that Mr. Neufeld’s persistent behaviour in publicizing the confidential and privileged information about the CTA’s settlement offer was a violation of common law settlement privilege, and the confidentiality protections in the Code and the Rules. Mr. Neufeld engaged in the behaviour knowing that it was wrong, after having been told by his legal counsel to stop more than once. In this context, we disagree that the impact of his conduct is mitigated by his alleged intentions. To the contrary, his decision to persist in publicising settlement offers knowing it was prohibited is precisely the type of conduct which undermines the integrity of the Tribunal’s process and warrants a strong rebuke.
D. Sharing complaint related material protected by Tribunal orders and Rules
[31] We find that Mr. Neufeld engaged in improper conduct when he violated the Tribunal’s orders and Rules by sharing confidential complaint-related material with a third party.
[32] There are restrictions on how a party may use and disseminate documents obtained in the Tribunal’s process. The origins and rationale for those restrictions are well expressed in the common law implied undertaking rule, which prohibits the use of documents obtained through a legal process for a purpose outside that litigation: Juman v. Doucette, 2008 SCC 8 at para. 4. The rationale of the rule “rests on the statutory compulsion that requires a party to make documentary and oral discovery regardless of privacy concerns and whether or not it tends to self-incriminate”: Juman at para. 3. The same rationale applies to the Tribunal’s process, which requires disclosure of arguably relevant information not protected by privilege: Juman at para. 20. The rule supports the fair and efficient conduct of litigation, balancing the privacy interests of participants in litigation.
[33] The implied undertaking rule is codified within the Tribunal’s process by Rule 23.1, which provides:
Rule 23.1 – Confidentiality of Disclosed Documents
(1) Documents that a participant obtains through the disclosure process in Part 6 of these Rules are confidential.
(2) A participant must not use a document obtained through the disclosure process in Part 6 of these Rules for any purpose other than the complaint process in which they were disclosed, except:
(a) with the consent of the party who disclosed the document;
(b) by order of the tribunal;
(c) after the document is entered as evidence in a hearing.
Part 6 of the Rules includes document disclosure, witness and remedy disclosure, and disclosure of expert evidence.
[34] By way of background, the CTA has been actively concerned throughout the proceedings about protecting any teachers who may be involved in the complaint. On June 11, 2024, the Tribunal acknowledged the legitimacy of these concerns and ordered that:
No person may publish the names of teachers who testify for the BCTF in connection with this complaint; and
The Tribunal will redact the names of teachers who testify for the BCTF in any of the materials it may make available to the public under Rule 5(10).
[the Publication Ban]
[35] In granting the Publication Ban, the Tribunal cited concerns about the safety and wellbeing of teachers who may testify in this complaint:
It is incumbent on this Tribunal to ensure that people can participate in its process safely, without fear that they will be exposed to harm as a result. Here, I am satisfied that the BCTF has established that the privacy interests of the teachers outweigh the limited public interest in knowing their specific identities. This Tribunal has acknowledged that transgender and gender diverse people in particular “face high levels of stigma and are at an increased risk of violence, harassment, social isolation and discrimination”: JY at para. 32; Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at paras. 60-65. The BCTF’s evidence in the application supports that these concerns may be particularly acute in the education context, where debate about the curriculum on sexual orientation and gender identity has given rise to heated protest and backlash, including against individual teachers. The potential that the teachers may be targeted and accused of sexual misconduct towards children is real. Such accusations threaten their reputations, as professionals who work daily with children and their families. …
Any violation of this order will be taken very seriously and may give rise to an order for costs: Code, s. 37(4). [paras. 9 and 13]
[36] The Publication Ban was subsequently amended to apply to teachers who “may testify” in connection with the complaint, including those “who are identified as potential witnesses but do not testify”: Tribunal letter dated September 13, 2024.
[37] After the Publication Ban was in place, the Tribunal ordered the parties to exchange witness lists identifying, by name, the witnesses they intended to call in the complaint, along with a will-say statement setting out the anticipated nature of their evidence. CTA did this for its teacher witnesses on June 24, 2024.
[38] On September 17, 2024, the CTA sent Mr. Neufeld and his then-advocate an updated witness list and will-say statement. In their covering letter, counsel reminded Mr. Neufeld and his advocate that “the enclosed witness information is protected by a publication ban made by the Tribunal”. They further explained:
… all documents and information disclosed in the course of this Complaint are subject to an implied undertaking of confidentiality which prohibits use of the documents or information outside of this hearing process (unless and until the document or piece of information is entered into evidence or reported in a Tribunal decision such that it becomes part of the public record) …
A party may only use information that is subject to the implied undertaking for a purpose beyond preparation of the case at hand with the consent of the party who disclosed it, or, after seeking and receiving permission from the Tribunal. Where documents are concerned, the Tribunal has also (in addition to the implied undertaking of confidentiality) created a specific rule expressly confirming that documents disclosed in the course of litigation before the Tribunal are to be kept confidential and may not be used for any purpose other than case preparation without the consent of the party who disclosed the document or by order of the Tribunal.
We draw the publication ban, implied undertaking and Rule 23.1 to your attention to ensure that both you and Mr. Neufeld are aware that disclosure of information contained in this Witness List and any other information disclosed leading up to or during the hearing (absent information which is entered into evidence and becomes part of the public record) is protected. The names of witnesses, information about those witnesses and other information disclosed cannot be shared with anyone or used by either of you for any purpose other than preparing Mr. Neufeld’s case for hearing.
A breach of the implied undertaking, Rule 23.1 or the Tribunal’s publication ban may be the subject of a costs order and we hereby put you on notice that our client will vigorously pursue costs and perhaps other remedies for breach of the above…
[39] At the top of their witness list, counsel placed prominent notices advising of the publication ban and implied undertaking of confidentiality.
[40] In the fall of 2024, Mr. Neufeld instructed his “lay advocate” to give all his complaint related materials to a person named Pierre Barns. Mr. Barns was previously listed as a witness for Mr. Neufeld, though he was not called at the hearing. In a will-say statement filed by Mr. Neufeld, Mr. Barns was described as an “advocate for parental rights”. His proposed testimony related to Mr. Neufeld’s good character.
[41] Mr. Neufeld testified that he gave the materials to Mr. Barns because Mr. Barns told him he could store the information on his server. By this time, Mr. Neufeld had retained Mr. Kitchen as counsel but says he wanted to ensure that, if Mr. Kitchen “went rogue”, all the complaint-related material would be easily accessible online. He took no steps to inquire about, or to ensure, that the material would be kept confidential. He testified that he “assumed” they would be protected by a password.
[42] On October 24, 2024, Mr. Barns posted the following on the social media platform X:
Here is the link to access what I understand to be all the evidence provided by the court regarding Barry Neufeld’s cases so far. Note that this seems include all school board meetings since 2017, which, in my opinion, could be used in any future case involving the Chilliwack School Board, Carin Bondar, Willow, etc. The irony of them giving us all this evidence is mind-blowing and shows how ideologically driven and blind these people are. Anyway, it’s available for everyone to see, read, analyze, share, and comment.
[43] This post included a hyperlink to a publicly accessible OneDrive Folder, containing all the complaint-related materials that Mr. Neufeld had shared with Mr. Barns. Among other things, the OneDrive Folder contained documents that Mr. Neufeld had obtained through disclosure in this process and were confidential under Rule 23.1. This included:
a. The CTA’s witness lists and will-say statements, including the names of the witnesses protected by a publication ban;
b. The CTA’s expert witness report; and
c. Lists of documents, and documents, disclosed by the CTA in the proceeding.
[44] The OneDrive Folder also contained a copy of Mr. Neufeld’s recording of the April 18 PHC. Mr. Neufeld provided this recording to Mr. Barns in clear violation of the April 26 Order that Mr. Neufeld (1) delete the recording, (2) not provide any other person with a copy of the recording, and (3) not allow any other person to upload the recording to the internet. By way of explanation, Mr. Neufeld testified that he simply did not believe the Tribunal had “legal authority” to make the April 26 Order.
[45] When counsel for the CTA discovered Mr. Barns’ post and the online materials, they promptly wrote to Mr. Neufeld’s counsel to advise of the situation and ask that he and Mr. Neufeld take immediate steps to have Mr. Barns remove material in violation of the Publication Ban, the Tribunal’s Rules, and the implied undertaking. Later that evening, the CTA’s witness list and will-say statements were removed from the OneDrive folder.
[46] However, the next day, Mr. Barns posted again on X and Facebook. He shared that “the BCTF is not happy that I’ve shared all 63GB of evidence and nonsense they have against Barry with the world”. He again published the link to the OneDrive Folder. In another post, he wrote: “I’m going to sleep so well tonight knowing that I managed to piss off the BC Teachers Federation today”.
[47] In providing Mr. Barns with confidential complaint-related material, Mr. Neufeld plainly violated Rule 23.1, and the April 26 Order. He was aware of the Tribunal’s Publication Ban and the protective purpose underlying it. He was also clearly on notice, from CTA’s counsel, about his obligation to keep that information confidential. His conduct was improper and detrimentally impacted the integrity of the Tribunal’s proceeding.
[48] The most serious consequence of this conduct was that Mr. Barns published the names of CTA’s teacher witnesses, in violation of a Tribunal publication ban. This then led to at least two of those teachers being outed and targeted for online harassment – a fate that the CTA had worked diligently to avoid, and the Tribunal had made orders to guard against.
[49] The publication of the teachers’ names caused the very harm the Tribunal’s Publication Ban was intended to guard against. A member of the public posted identifying information for one of the teachers who testified in the proceeding, identifying their name, workplace, and the contact information for the Principal and Vice Principal of their school. This disrupted the proceedings, as counsel for the CTA was diverted to trying to reassure their witness and have the information removed, via Mr. Neufeld’s counsel, and the Tribunal panel was diverted to address the behaviour of the member of the public.
[50] On November 29, Mr. Barns identified another one of the CTA’s witnesses on X. He tagged Mr. Neufeld’s counsel, Mr. Kitchen, in the post. A comment under the post reads:
Devouring mother needs to be imprisoned and have her children taken away. She’s brainwashed them, sacrificing them at the alter of woke ideology. [as written]
No witness in the Tribunal’s process should be subjected to this kind of hateful comment.
[51] On December 3, after further communication through Mr. Kitchen, Mr. Barns’ social media posts linking to the OneDrive folder appear to have been deleted.
[52] Mr. Neufeld argues that he should not be penalized for Mr. Barns’ conduct. He argues that he did not publish the teachers’ names or directly violate the Publication Ban. When his counsel was alerted to Mr. Barns’ post, he ensured that the offending materials were taken down.
[53] We accept that there is no evidence that Mr. Neufeld violated the Publication Ban directly or instructed Mr. Barns to publish the teachers’ names. However, in our view it was improper to hand over the names of the teachers to a person with no role in the proceeding, who harboured an evident animus towards the BCTF, and who Mr. Neufeld appears to know well enough that he was prepared to call him as a character witness. Given this context, it should have come as no surprise that the teachers’ information was not safe with Mr. Barns.
[54] Mr. Neufeld knew the information in the CTA’s witness lists and will-say statements was confidential under the Tribunal’s Rules and further protected by the Publication Ban. He was aware of the significant lengths the CTA had gone to protect the identities of its witnesses, and the Tribunal’s decision affirming the CTA’s concerns and offering protection to those witnesses. He bears responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of sharing confidential complaint information with Mr. Barns.
[55] Mr. Neufeld’s disclosure of confidential documents he obtained through the Tribunal’s complaint process was very serious misconduct, which had a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s proceeding and warrants strong rebuke.
E. Sharing dial-in information for the online hearing
[56] We find that Mr. Neufeld acted improperly by sharing dial in information for the online hearing, in violation of the Tribunal’s process and direction not to do so.
[57] The Tribunal’s hearings are open to the public: Rule 5(1). For in person hearings, a member of the public can show up and observe a hearing. For online hearings, the Tribunal has a process for granting audio access to members of the public. This process allows the Tribunal and participants to know who is observing the hearing – in the same way they would if they could see a person walk into a physical hearing room. Among other things, this ensures that the Tribunal can enforce exclusion of witness or other orders, and parties can apply to close all or part of a hearing under Rule 5(2).
[58] The Tribunal has information about how to access online hearings on its website. In this case, given the anticipated public interest, the Tribunal proactively advised the parties about how members of the public could access the hearing. In a letter to the parties dated September 13, 2024, I summarized the outcome of a PHC held the previous day and set out information about the hearing. This included the following:
Information about Tribunal’s online hearings
This hearing will be by videoconference using Microsoft Teams. Before the hearing, the Tribunal will send you a link to join the hearing. You are responsible to provide this link to your clients and any witnesses. You are not permitted to share this link with anyone else.
…
Public observers
Any person who wants to observe the hearing may request access by completing and submitting the Tribunal’s agreement to attend the virtual hearing at least one week before the hearing begins.
Members of the public who try to access the hearing without signing this agreement will not be permitted entry to the virtual hearing. Parties should not forward the dial in information to any member of the public. To be clear, however, parties may and should forward the dial in information to their witnesses.
The Tribunal will advise the parties in advance where it has granted audio access to the hearing. [bold emphasis added]
The underlining in this passage reflects hyperlinks to further information on the Tribunal’s website.
[59] Throughout the proceeding, the Tribunal followed its process to grant public access requests to members of the public and the media. Every person who filed a request was granted access and the parties were told that these members of the public would be attending. Each day, the panel checked to ensure that the members of the public who were observing the hearing had been granted access through the Tribunal’s process. This was important to maintain control over the process. For example, after one member of the public posted information about a teacher witness in violation of the Publication Ban, the panel ejected them from part of the hearing. That same member of the public then posted a Tribunal document online, prompting the panel to eject them from the hearing permanently. In order to enforce that ejection, the panel required information about who was observing the hearing each day.
[60] Just before February 24, 2025, the 11th day of hearing, Mr. Neufeld posted the dial in information for the hearing to a private Facebook group, along with the following message:
I am before the Tribunal Monday and Tuesday. The general public cannot WATCH what is going on, but they can dial in and listen. Here is the information:
Several people then attended the hearing who had not been granted access by the Tribunal. The Tribunal identified and removed them from the proceeding.
[61] Mr. Neufeld argues that the Tribunal’s process for allowing public access to its online hearings is “an unjustified infringement of the open court principle, which is guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter” and a violation of his “11(d) right to a public hearing”. He argues that it cannot be improper conduct to provide hearing information to members of the public to allow them to exercise their Charter rights. If the Tribunal were to find otherwise, he argues that “a reasonable person could not help but be concerned the Tribunal was attempting to hide something it should not.”
[62] Mr. Neufeld’s references to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms are not helpful. He has not referred us to any authority for the proposition that the open court principle requires an administrative tribunal to broadcast its hearings without exercising any control over public observers. And, on its face, s. 11(d) of the Charter does not apply. That provision guarantees a person charged with an offence “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”. Mr. Neufeld has not been charged with an offence; he is a respondent to a human rights complaint. In any event, the Tribunal’s hearing was open to the public.
[63] The Tribunal is a master in its own house. It is entitled to make policies, processes, and rules to facilitate the just and timely resolution of complaints: Code, s. 27.3. Further to that authority, the Tribunal has implemented a process for facilitating public access to its online hearings. It clearly told Mr. Neufeld about that process and told him not to share the hearing link with anyone aside from his witnesses. Mr. Neufeld did it anyway. Again, parties cannot pick and choose which Tribunal Rules and processes to follow. This was improper conduct, which disrupted and threatened to undermine the Tribunal’s control of the hearing.
F. Publicly deriding the Tribunal
[64] We do not find that Mr. Neufeld’s public comments deriding the Tribunal constitute improper conduct.
[65] Underlying all of Mr. Neufeld’s improper conduct is his brazen contempt for the Human Rights Tribunal. He expressed this contempt throughout the proceeding, both inside and outside the Tribunal’s process. In part, he did this through online updates about the proceeding which he was using to fundraise for his cause. In its costs application, the CTA points to the following:
a. On September 23, 2024, he described “the saga of my 6 years of persecution by the Human Rights Tribunal”;
b. On February 7, 2025, he accused the Tribunal of “playing fast and loose with the rules” after the Tribunal ruled that some of his proposed evidence was inadmissible; and
c. On March 10, 2025, he called the Tribunal a “Kangaroo Court” on Facebook, which he defined as “a court where the guilty verdict is predetermined”.
[66] We do not find this commentary about the Tribunal amounts to improper conduct warranting costs. We find the circumstances analogous to Oger, in which the respondent Mr. Whatcott made repeated derogatory comments about the Tribunal and adjudicator:
… it is “essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly”: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 20 (SCC), at para. 84. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently recognized the “fundamental importance of open, and even forceful, criticism of our public institutions”: Doré at para. 66. Unlike lawyers, self-represented litigants are not required to meet certain standards of civility in the manner in which they express such criticism. This Tribunal is, and should be, prepared to tolerate public, forceful, and uncomfortable criticism. Its costs authority is not a tool to unduly silence such critics. Rather, a costs award is only warranted where such public criticism has a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process.
In my view, Mr. Whatcott’s public comments about the Tribunal and its members did not significantly impact the integrity of this process. They were not made directly to the Tribunal or any of its staff. Mr. Whatcott’s audience was marginal and likely quite accustomed to such critiques of human rights bodies. Mr. Whatcott continued to participate in the Tribunal’s process and that process was, in my view, not impacted by his public expressions of contempt for it. I do not find it necessary to sanction this conduct through an award of costs.
At paras. 312-313
[67] The same circumstances apply here. We do not find that Mr. Neufeld’s enmity towards the Tribunal, and public comments deriding the Tribunal, amount to improper conduct.
[68] However, before concluding, we must express concern about the role of Mr. Neufeld’s lawyer, Mr. Kitchen, in amplifying and echoing Mr. Neufeld’s contemptuous view of the Tribunal. For example, in his response to this costs application, Mr. Kitchen offers the following defence of Mr. Neufeld’s conduct:
… the Complainant says costs should also be ordered because Mr. Neufeld has said allegedly disrespectful things about the Tribunal. This borders on the absurd, a high bar in the context of this hearing. If costs were awarded every time a party and/or their witnesses or supporters referred to the Tribunal as a ‘kangaroo court’, a small industry would be created and the chill on free expression would be intolerable, even in the current climate of censorship in the name of progress …
…
It is not the hearing process, the possible outcome of the hearing, or the mandate of the Tribunal Mr. Neufeld finds to be a joke, but rather the Tribunal itself, in light of how the Tribunal has conducted itself in this hearing.
… Despite Mr. Neufeld’s admitted lack of respect for the Tribunal, which he submits is, in any event, well-deserved, he has engaged in his two-and-a-half-week hearing in good faith…
[69] The tenor of these submissions is consistent with Mr. Kitchen’s conduct during the hearing in which he, among other things, repeatedly misrepresented the role of the Tribunal in the complaint and accused the Tribunal of “reverse-engineering” the outcome of the proceeding when it ruled against him. This conduct became so disruptive to the proceedings that the panel took counsel aside to remind Mr. Kitchen of his obligations under the Law Society’s Code of Professional Conduct to “maintain a courteous and respectful attitude” and to raise any concerns about the Tribunal’s rulings and impartiality through proper channels. However, in his closing submissions, Mr. Kitchen again expresses his doubt that the “Tribunal can manage a modicum of objectivity and intellectual honesty”. He describes one of the panel’s evidentiary rulings as “a callous move over which hovers the spectre of a results-oriented and reverse-engineered decision in Mr. Neufeld’s matter”. Though the CTA has not applied for costs arising out of Mr. Kitchen’s conduct in the proceeding, we raise the issue to highlight that these types of submissions are unhelpful and unbefitting an officer of the Tribunal.
G. Amount of costs award
[70] The amount of the costs award must be sufficient to signal the Tribunal’s condemnation of Mr. Neufeld’s conduct and to serve the punitive purpose of the award: Ma v. Dr. Iain G.M. Cleator Inc., 2014 BCHRT 180 at para. 285. It must deter others from repeating this behaviour and, in doing so, signal to the public that this Tribunal remains a place to bring forward difficult complaints. In addition, the Tribunal may consider factors including Mr. Neufeld’s ability to pay the award, his relative culpability with respect to the conduct, and any other consequences that he faces as a result of the behaviour: Kelly v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (No. 1), 2007 BCHRT 382 at para. 91.
[71] The CTA argues that an award of $20,000 is warranted by Mr. Neufeld’s improper conduct. It argues:
Taken as a whole, Mr. Neufeld’s conduct … demonstrates clear contempt for the Tribunal, its mandate and its process. Far from legitimately trying [to] defend himself based on the law, including his Charter protected right to freedom of expression, Mr. Neufeld appears to have instead engaged in the Tribunal’s process solely for the purpose [of] campaigning against the Tribunal itself in the court of public opinion. Put another way, Mr. Neufeld is simply using the Tribunal and this Complaint for his own purposes without intention of himself being bound by the Tribunal, its processes or rules.
It argues that these circumstances are similar to those in Oger, and so the same award is appropriate.
[72] In response, Mr. Neufeld argues that any costs award should not exceed $2,500, given that he was self-represented when he engaged in some of the conduct, his intentions were good, and any conduct in violation of the Tribunal’s Rules or orders had only a marginal impact on the Tribunal’s process. He has not cited any Tribunal cases to explain how he arrived at this amount.
[73] On balance, we find that an award of $10,000 is appropriate.
[74] We have found that Mr. Neufeld engaged in the following improper conduct during the course of the complaint:
a. Surreptitiously recording and publishing the April 18 PHC;
b. Surreptitiously recording the May 16 PHC, in violation of the Tribunal’s April 26 Order;
c. Publishing privileged information about settlement discussions, in violation of settlement privilege, s. 40(2) of the Code, and Rule 14(5);
d. Failing to delete the April 18 PHC recording, sharing it with a third party, and allowing it to be uploaded to the internet, in violation of the April 26 Order;
e. Sharing confidential information obtained through the Tribunal’s disclosure process, in violation of the implied undertaking rule and Rule 23.1; and
f. Sharing dial in information for the Tribunal’s hearing, in violation of the Tribunal’s process for facilitating public access to its online hearings.
[75] While not all of this conduct was equally serious, its cumulative effect was to undermine both the Tribunal’s ability to control its process through Rules and orders, and public confidence in the Tribunal as a safe and effective arbiter of human rights. Most seriously, Mr. Neufeld’s conduct undermined the protection that the Tribunal sought to confer on the CTA’s witnesses and exposed at least two of them to the very foreseeable harm that the Publication Ban was intended to prevent. We are gravely concerned about the message this sends to the public about their safety when they participate in the Tribunal’s process. Mr. Neufeld’s ongoing disregard for the Tribunal’s Rules and orders undermined the fair and efficient processing of this complaint and wasted needless resources policing and attempting to correct his behaviour.
[76] We do not consider Mr. Neufeld’s status as a self-represented litigant during some of this conduct to be a mitigating factor. As the CTA points out, Mr. Neufeld is an experienced litigant. Leaving that aside, however, we have found that Mr. Neufeld knew his conduct was improper and did it anyway. It made no difference whether he was represented by counsel or not; for example, even when his lawyer told him to stop publicising settlement offers, he continued to do so.
[77] Nor do we find that Mr. Neufeld’s intentions mitigate the impact of his conduct. At its core, his improper conduct derived from an attitude that he could pick and choose which Tribunal Rules, processes, and orders to follow. This is antithetical to any fair or efficient legal process.
[78] That said, we do not find the circumstances as egregious as in Oger. We have not found that Mr. Neufeld engaged in discriminatory or hateful speech during the proceeding like the Tribunal found Mr. Whatcott did in Oger. In Oger, Mr. Whatcott used the Tribunal’s process to perpetuate further discrimination and harm against Ms. Oger on the basis of her gender identity. He did this flagrantly inside and outside the hearing, repeating statements that the Tribunal ultimately found violated s. 7 of the Code. In contrast here, the CTA did not raise the issue of whether Mr. Neufeld’s conduct during the course of the proceeding included hateful or discriminatory speech.
[79] We also consider that Mr. Neufeld appears to be a man of limited financial means: Oger at para. 321. Though he has not presented evidence about his ability to pay any costs award, we are aware that Mr. Neufeld has had to fundraise in order to pay for his legal counsel and has at least one other court award against him. He has also been ordered to pay significant damages for his violation of ss. 7(1)(a), (b), and 13 of the Code: Chilliwack Teachers’ Association (No. 10).
[80] Considering all these factors, we find an order of $10,000 to be appropriate. This is consistent with other large Tribunal costs awards addressing improper conduct with a significant impact on the Tribunal’s process: e.g. Gichuru v. Purewal and another, 2017 BCHRT 19 at paras. 326-332 ($10,000); MacGarvie v. Friedman (No. 4), 2009 BCHRT 47 at para. 218 ($7,500); and Gichuru v. Vancouver Swing Society (No. 3), 2020 BCHRT 1 at paras. 227-241 ($10,000). In our view, this amount is appropriate to signal our strong condemnation of Mr. Neufeld’s conduct and foster public confidence in the Tribunal as a fair arbiter of human rights.
III CONCLUSION
[81] We order Mr. Neufeld to pay the CTA $10,000 as costs for improper conduct in the course of the complaint.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair
I agree: Robin Dean, Tribunal Member
I agree: Laila Said, Tribunal Member