Cervantes v. Sterling Management Services Ltd. and others, 2026 BCHRT 42
Date Issued: February 4, 2026
File(s): CS-012782
Indexed as: Cervantes v. Sterling Management Services Ltd. and others, 2026 BCHRT 42
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Marianna Cervantes
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Sterling Management Services Ltd. and Matthew Karmal and KKBL No. 629 Ventures Ltd. dba Wildwood Park
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
On her own behalf: Marianna Cervantes
Agent for the Respondents: Matthew Karmal
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Marianna Cervantes alleges that Sterling Management Services Ltd. [Sterling Management], Matthew Karmal, and KKBL No. 629 Ventures Ltd. dba Wildwood Park [KKBL] discriminated against her in the areas of tenancy and the purchase property based on her mental disability and lawful source of income. KKBL is the landlord of Wildwood Mobile Home Park [Wildwood]. Sterling Management manages Wildwood for KKBL. Mr. Karmal works at Sterling Management. In this decision, I will refer to Sterling Management, Mr. Karmal, and KKBL, collectively, as the Respondents.
[2] The Respondents lease mobile home pads at Wildwood to owners of mobile homes. In April 2024, Ms. Cervantes and her husband tried to purchase a mobile home [Home] from an owner at Wildwood and lease a pad [Pad] from the Respondents. She alleges that the Respondents discriminated by preventing her from doing so. Specifically, she says the Respondents discriminated based on her lawful source of income by refusing to sign paperwork for a mortgage that she needed to finance her purchase of the Home, and they discriminated based on her mental disability by rejecting her emotional support animal [ESA] in her tenancy application for the Pad.
[3] The Respondents deny discriminating and apply to dismiss the complaint without a hearing. Among other things, they argue that a mortgage is not a lawful source of income within the meaning of s. 10 of the Human Rights Code and the ESA issue is moot because Ms. Cervantes cannot finance her purchase of the Home. They say the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success and should be dismissed in its entirety.
[4] For the reasons that follow, the Respondents’ dismissal application is granted in part. The part of the complaint that is based on lawful source of income is dismissed because Ms. Cervantes’ circumstances do not engage that ground of discrimination in this case. On the other hand, I am not persuaded that her allegations based on mental disability have no reasonable prospect of success. That part of the complaint will proceed to a hearing.
[5] To make my decision, I have considered all the arguments and evidence filed. In my reasons, however, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[6] The following information is drawn from the materials before me and is set out here as background. It is not meant to be exhaustive.
[7] Wildwood has rules and regulations that govern the park [Park Rules]. The Park Rules state that the maximum allowable height for a pet dog at Wildwood is 16 inches, and there are “no exceptions” to this limit.
[8] Ms. Cervantes emailed a tenancy application for the Pad to Sterling Management on April 16, 2024. She advised that she and her husband had an accepted offer to purchase the Home and were in the process of obtaining a mortgage. She indicated that they were concerned about whether their dog, Caeda, would be allowed at Wildwood. She noted that, if their tenancy application was accepted, there would be a bank document for the landlord to sign. The bank document was a standard form “assignment of lease consent agreement” that banks require landlords to sign before providing financing to buyers of mobile homes [Landlord Consent Agreement].
[9] On April 17, Mr. Karmal responded to Ms. Cervantes’ email, stating that “unfortunately, the dog will not be approved as she is above the 16” height limit.” In a further email on April 17, Mr. Karmal added that that landlord would not sign “any bank financing forms as they are rather restrictive upon the landlord in the case of any default on rent payment.”
[10] Later that day and in the subsequent weeks, the parties exchanged further emails, in which Ms. Cervantes told Mr. Karmal that Caeda is an ESA and requested accommodation. She asked Mr. Karmal what additional information she needed to provide in support of her accommodation request. In the emails before me, Mr. Karmal does not answer her questions.
[11] On April 30, Ms. Cervantes submitted a revised tenancy application with additional information and documentation about Caeda being an ESA. On May 22, Mr. Karmal responded that they had “not received anything … to substantiate the claims of the emotional support animal.” He noted that Caeda “is not a service or guide dog,” and reiterated that “the dog is too large to adhere to the park rules.” He added that he doubted the Residential Tenancy Branch [RTB] would force KKBL to sign Ms. Cervantes’ Landlord Consent Agreement, and that “if that is the case and you require that for financing the purchase then the dog rule may be irrelevant.”
[12] In other email messages to Mr. Karmal, Ms. Cervantes stated that the Landlord Consent Agreement issue was separate from the ESA request and was before the RTB. The materials before me confirm that she was referring to a claim brought by the seller of the Home [Seller] against KKBL, which was the subject of a May 24, 2024 decision by an RTB arbitrator [RTB Decision]. The Seller claimed that KKBL was not complying with the Manufactured Home Park Tenancy Act and related regulations.He said he had attempted to sell the Home several times, but KKBL refused to sign any Landlord Consent Agreements because they were unfavourable to KKBL’s rights as landlord. The arbitrator dismissed the Seller’s claim, finding that KKBL was not required to sign Landlord Consent Agreements on a blanket basis.
[13] On May 30, Ms. Cervantes emailed Mr. Karmal a Landlord Consent Agreement for the landlord’s review and signature. She said it was “the same document from the same bank that was already signed and is currently in force for [the Home] for [the Seller].” She asked for an explanation in the event that the landlord refused to sign. Ms. Cervantes also attached her ESA documentation again, “with the expectation that if these documents are inadequate, you will inform me of what you require as disclosure and documentation.” Mr. Kamal responded to Ms. Cervantes’ email the next day, stating: “We have already responded to this request.”
[14] On July 25, 2024, Ms. Cervantes filed her complaint with the Tribunal.
III DECISION
[15] Under its Case Path Pilot, the Tribunal decided that the complaint would proceed along the “submissions path,” meaning the Respondents were permitted to file a dismissal application: Case Path Pilot Practice Direction at 2. Specifically, in a letter decision on January 9, 2025 [Case Path Decision], the Tribunal allowed the Respondents to apply under s. 27(1)(c). The Tribunal also allowed the Respondents “to apply for dismissal of the complaint against Mr. Karmal under s. 27(1)(d)(ii)”: Case Path Decision at 4. The Tribunal explained that, in certain circumstances, it may dismiss a complaint against an individual respondent if their participation in the proceeding does not further the purposes of the Code.
[16] In the application before me, the Respondents do not reference s. 27(1)(d)(ii) or otherwise seek the dismissal of the complaint against Mr. Karmal because he is an individual. Accordingly, I have not considered whether it would not further the Code’s purposes to proceed with the complaint against him. Nor have I considered the Respondents’ assertion, in its application, that “another proceeding has dealt with the complaint.” This is an argument under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code, which is outside the scope of what was permitted in the Case Path Decision. In general, it is not appropriate for a respondent to add grounds to a dismissal application beyond what was allowed through the Case Path Pilot: Ibrahim v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 1222 and another, 2024 BCHRT 183 at para. 5. There is nothing before me to explain or justify the Respondents’ departure from the Tribunal’s clear instructions in the Case Path Decision, or to persuade me that it would be fair and appropriate to expand the permitted scope of their dismissal application: Potter v. Neal Kandola and others, 2024 BCHRT 267 at para. 21; Buchanan v. The Owners, Strata Plan NWS3275 (Whispering Pines) and another, 2025 BCHRT 235 at para. 6. I will therefore only address the Respondents’ application under s. 27(1)(c) in this decision.
[17] Under s. 27(1)(c), the Tribunal can dismiss complaints that have no reasonable prospect of success and therefore do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. This is part of the Tribunal’s gatekeeping function. The Tribunal’s task under s. 27(1)(c) is to look at the evidence provided to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171.
[18] Ms. Cervantes’ complaint is based on the grounds of lawful source of income and mental disability. The Respondents assert that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success on either ground. I will address the ground of lawful source of income first.
A. Complaint based on lawful source of income has no reasonable prospect of success
[19] Section 10 of the Code, which prohibits discrimination in tenancy, is the only Code provision that includes “lawful source of income” as a protected characteristic. The Tribunal has explained that the reason for lawful source of income’s unique inclusion in s. 10 is that individuals “in receipt of income assistance, disability benefits, or other forms of fixed income, have long faced discrimination in the housing market based on discriminatory assumptions about their ability to pay rent”: McLaren v. Lookout Housing and Health Society, 2019 BCHRT 52 at para. 20. The inclusion of lawful source of income in s. 10 is therefore consistent with the general purpose of the section, which is to prohibit “persons from excluding or treating people adversely in relation to tenancy because of characteristics protected by the Code – characteristics marked by longstanding patterns of exclusion and consequent social inequality”: Vik v. Finamore (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 9 at para. 58. It is also consistent with the overarching purposes of the Code, which include removing impediments to economic participation and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality associated with discriminatory treatment and impacts: Code, s. 3.
[20] Ms. Cervantes alleges that her family’s purchase of the Home and lease of the Pad cannot proceed without the Respondents signing a Landlord Consent Agreement from their lender. It is not disputed that the Respondents refused to do so. Ms. Cervantes says this was discrimination based on lawful source of income:
While some individuals require a government subsidy to afford their rent, we need a mortgage to supplement our income to afford the home and the pad rent. A mortgage is a legal and common way to supplement income to afford a home.
[21] Ms. Cervantes says her circumstances are analogous to a situation where a landlord refuses to rent to a person because they are on a subsidized income. She urges a broad interpretation of the term “lawful source of income,” citing an online publication of British Columbia’s Office of the Human Rights Commissioner, which called for adding “social condition” as a protected characteristic under the Code: see Office of the Human Rights Commissioner, “Adding ‘social condition’ as a protected ground to B.C.’s Human Rights Code” (May 2020). She says her social condition is such that she lacks the intergenerational wealth to purchase the Home with cash, and therefore needs a mortgage to finance her housing.
[22] The Respondents reject Ms. Cervantes’ arguments and assert that her complaint based on lawful source of income has no reasonable prospect of success. They say their refusal to sign a Landlord Consent Agreement from Ms. Cervantes’ lender has nothing to do with her protected characteristics. Rather, their opposition to the document relates to the constraints it places on a landlord’s rights under the prevailing legislation.
[23] The Respondents also argue that Ms. Cervantes’ claim based on lawful source of income does not engage a ground of discrimination. Specifically, they say that “a mortgage, as described by Ms. Cervantes,” does not meet the definition of lawful source of income under the Code. I agree, and I find this to be determinative of the question of whether Ms. Cervantes’ complaint based on lawful source of income has no reasonable prospect of success.
[24] Commonly understood, a mortgage is a source of debt for a borrower (usually in the form of a loan of money), not a source of income. In any event, in my view, the interpretation of s. 10 urged by Ms. Cervantes is inconsistent with a contextual and purposive reading of that provision. I appreciate that tenancy is protected under the Code because it is a “context of vulnerability,” where “there is economic subordination or power imbalances as between landlord and tenant”: McCulloch v British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2019 BCSC 624 at paras. 125-131. Within this context, however, I do not agree that a mortgage loan recipient’s circumstances can be likened to that of a person on income assistance or disability benefits. A person obtains a mortgage by establishing that they have a reliable source of sufficient income. A person qualifies for income assistance or disability benefits by establishing the opposite. The former has options in the housing market; the latter does not. Further, unlike people on income assistance or disability benefits, there is no evidence before me to suggest that mortgage loan recipients have historically experienced patterns of social or economic exclusion, or faced longstanding adverse treatment in the housing market based on discriminatory assumptions about their ability to pay rent. Therefore, considering not only the text of the ground (“source of income”), but also the context of the protection in tenancy and the broad purposes of the Code, I am satisfied that a mortgage is not a “lawful source of income” within the meaning of s. 10. As a result, Ms. Cervantes has no reasonable prospect of establishing that her complaint engages the ground of lawful source of income.
[25] The part of the complaint that is based on the ground of lawful source of income is dismissed.
B. Complaint based on mental disability will proceed to a hearing
[26] The other ground of discrimination put forward in the complaint is mental disability. To dismiss this part of the complaint under s. 27(1)(c), I must be satisfied that either Ms. Cervantes has no reasonable prospect of making her case, or the Respondents are reasonably certain to establish a defence: Lado v. Hardbite Chips and others, 2019 BCHRT 134 at para. 25. I begin with Ms. Cervantes’ case.
1. Ms. Cervantes’ case
[27] To succeed at a hearing, Ms. Cervantes would need to prove the three elements of her case, namely that (1) she had a mental disability, (2) she experienced an adverse impact in tenancy or the purchase of property, and (3) her disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. Regarding these elements, Ms. Cervantes alleges that:
a. She has certain mental health conditions, which she particularizes in her complaint and I need not describe here;
b. The Respondents rejected her tenancy application and, in doing so, interfered with her purchase of the Home; and
c. The Respondents rejected her application because of her ESA (Caeda), which she says is a component of the treatment for her mental health conditions.
[28] The Respondents’ task under s. 27(1)(c) is to persuade the Tribunal that Ms. Cervantes has no reasonable prospect of proving these allegations based on the all the evidence provided.
[29] It is unclear whether the Respondents are disputing the first element of Ms. Cervantes’ case in the present application. In their response to the complaint, they concede that Ms. Cervantes “may have a protected characteristic,” but assert that she “did not provide sufficient proof of her mental disability.” In the submissions before me, they do not directly address her prospects of proving her disability at a hearing.
[30] I am not satisfied that Ms. Cervantes has no reasonable prospect of proving the first element of her case. The evidence before me includes a July 9, 2024 letter from a registered clinical counsellor, which corroborates Ms. Cervantes’ alleged mental health diagnoses, states that her “emotional support animal, Caeda, contributes to her treatment,” and describes the nature of that contribution. In the letter, the counsellor goes on to opine that Ms. Cervantes “will benefit from maintaining this component of her treatment as long as possible.” In my view, this evidence is sufficient to raise the first element of Ms. Cervantes’ case “out of the realm of conjecture,” such that the complaint can continue forward if the other two elements are met: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[31] The Respondents’ main argument regarding the other two elements is that the ESA issue is moot because Ms. Cervantes could not finance the purchase of the Home. They say there can be no violation “if the purchaser has not secured financing.” The Respondents also note that Caeda is not a guide dog or service dog within the meaning of the Guide and Service Dog Act [Dog Act]. In addition, they assert that Ms. Cervantes has no “grounds to show that the landlord has harmed [her].”
[32] To make her case at a hearing, the burden will be on Ms. Cervantes to prove that her disability was a factor in the alleged adverse impacts in tenancy or the purchase of property; she will not need to prove that it was the sole or overriding factor: Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at paras. 45-52. On the materials before me, I am not satisfied that she has no reasonable prospect of meeting this burden.
[33] First, it is not disputed that Ms. Cervantes’ application to lease the Pad was rejected. This is an adverse impact in tenancy: Code, s. 10(1)(a); see McMillan and another (by McMillan and another) v. British Columbia Housing Management Commission (BC Housing) and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 242 at para. 123 [McMillan] at para. 92. Second, based on the email correspondence filed by Ms. Cervantes, the Tribunal could reasonably find that her ESA (i.e., an alleged component of the treatment for her mental health conditions) was a factor in the rejection of her application.
[34] Third, I am not prepared, at this preliminary stage, to conclude that the ESA issue is moot simply because Ms. Cervantes had not secured financing for the Home at the time when her tenancy application was rejected. A complainant who has been denied tenancy may be found to have experienced a disability-related adverse impact even if they would have been denied tenancy in the absence of any discrimination: McMillan at para. 92; see Alexander v. PAL Vancouver (No. 4), 2006 BCHRT 461 at para. 51-59.
[35] Fourth, on the information before me, I am not satisfied that Ms. Cervantes has no reasonable prospect of proving a connection between her disability and an adverse impact in the purchase of property. While the Respondents say Ms. Cervantes could have purchased the Home without leasing the Pad (i.e., she could have purchased the Home and moved it to another location), Ms. Cervantes disputes this. She says the Home was not meant to be transported elsewhere – it was “not a home advertised to be moved; it [was] on a lot with a lease to be transferred with it.” Regardless, in the circumstances of this case, I see no utility or potential efficiency gained from parsing out and dismissing Ms. Cervantes’ allegations under s. 9 of the Code, while allowing her intertwined allegations under s. 10 to proceed forward.
[36] Finally, insofar as the Respondents suggest that Caeda’s status under the Dog Act is determinative of whether Ms. Cervantes can make her case, I reject this argument because it is inconsistent with recent authorities: see, e.g., Daniels v. Strata Plan LMS 1427 and another, 2024 BCHRT 167; Salib v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW386, 2025 BCHRT 119; Lenius v. The Owners, Strata Plan KAS 2959, 2022 BCHRT 515.
2. The Respondents’ justification defence
[37] If Ms. Cervantes succeeds in making her case at a hearing, the burden will shift to the Respondents to justify their impugned rule or conduct: Moore at para. 33. Although a justification defence is not expressly provided in ss. 9 or 10, it is nonetheless available under those provisions: Biggings obo Walsh v. Pink and others, 2018 BCHRT 174 at para. 76; see Sparvier v. Brighton Beach Properties Ltd., 2024 BCHRT 281 at paras. 125-127. Even if Ms. Cervantes makes her case, there is no discrimination if the Respondents establish a bona fide and reasonable justification for their rule or conduct. There are three elements of this justification analysis: see British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer] at para. 20. However, I find I can most efficiently decide the present application in reference to only the final element, which involves considering whether the Respondents met their duty to accommodate.
[38] The Respondents’ task here is to persuade the Tribunal that they are reasonably certain to establish at a hearing that they accommodated Ms. Cervantes to the point of undue hardship or otherwise discharged their duty to accommodate. On the information before me, I find that they have not met this task.
[39] The Respondents’ evidence is that: Ms. Cervantes’ initial application for tenancy on April 16, 2024 did not state that Caeda was an ESA; she later confirmed that Caeda was not a service dog; and the documentation she provided on May 22, 2024 was not from a reputable organization and was not sufficient to substantiate that Caeda was an ESA. If the complaint goes to a hearing, this evidence could support an argument that the Respondents’ duty to accommodate reached its endpoint because Ms. Cervantes failed to do her part in the accommodation process: see Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 944-995. At a hearing, however, the Tribunal would weigh the Respondents’ evidence against the countervailing evidence from Ms. Cervantes. Her evidence includes that: she asked Mr. Karmal what information she needed to provide in support of her accommodation request, but he did not answer her questions; and she put forward options to facilitate her accommodation request, such as proposing that Caeda would not go in areas of Wildwood that were shared with others. In the face of this evidence, I am not satisfied that the Respondents are reasonably certain to establish that Ms. Cervantes prevented them from achieving a reasonable accommodation.
[40] In addition, or alternatively, the Respondents take the position that, since Ms. Cervantes could not secure financing to purchase the Home, reviewing the accommodation request in her application for the Pad would have been waste of time. They do not, however, argue this position in terms of their duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. In response, Ms. Cervantes says that, had the Respondents granted her requested accommodation or told her what additional information she needed to provide in support of her request, she may have pursued financing options that did not require a Landlord Consent Agreement. In these circumstances, at this preliminary stage of the Tribunal’s process where the Tribunal does not weigh evidence or make findings of fact, and without proper legal argument from the Respondents, I cannot say that they are reasonably certain to establish a justification defence. I note that the duty to accommodate is comprised of both procedural and substantive components: Kelly (by Kelly) v. Saputo Dairy Products Canada and another (No. 3), 2021 BCHRT 128 at para. 164. In assessing whether a respondent has met its obligations under the Code, the Tribunal considers not only the substantive outcome of the respondent’s accommodation process and efforts, but also the process and efforts themselves: see Emergency Health Services Commission v. Cassidy, 2011 BCSC 1003 at paras. 34-38.
[41] In sum, for all of the above reasons, the Respondents’ application to dismiss the part of the complaint that is based on the ground of mental disability is denied.
IV CONCLUSION
[42] The Respondents’ dismissal application is granted in part.
[43] The part of the complaint that is based on the ground of lawful source of income is dismissed: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The part of the complaint under ss. 9 and 10 that is based on the ground of mental disability will proceed to a hearing.
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member