Mohr v. Power Flagging and Traffic Control (Power Earth) and another (No. 3), 2026 BCHRT 40
Date Issued: February 3, 2026
File: CS-000283
Indexed as: Mohr v. Power Flagging and Traffic Control (Power Earth) and another (No. 3), 2026 BCHRT 40
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jeannie Mohr
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Power Flagging and Traffic Control (Power Earth) and Gilles Gagnon
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Jeannie Mohr
On their own behalf: Gilles Gagnon
For Power Flagging and Traffic Control (Power Earth): Richard Jackson
Location of Hearing: 100 Mile House
Dates of Hearing: December 2 – 3, 2025
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Jeannie Mohr and Gilles Gagnon were employees of Power Flagging and Traffic Control. Ms. Mohr alleges that between 2016 and 2018, Mr. Gagnon sexually harassed and assaulted her at work. She says she reported his conduct to her supervisor at Power Flagging who took no action. She says Power Flagging subsequently terminated her employment because she came forward about the sexual misconduct. Ms. Mohr says she was discriminated against in employment, based on her sex, in violation of s.13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] Mr. Gagnon denies engaging in any discriminatory behaviour and says all of Ms. Mohr’s allegations about his conduct are lies.
[3] Power Flagging says the company restructured and is currently under new ownership. Its new owner, Richard Jackson, represented Power Flagging at the hearing. He said he has no knowledge of what steps, if any, Power Flagging took in response to Ms. Mohr’s complaint of sexual harassment.
[4] In this decision, I must decide whether Ms. Mohr has proven the facts she alleges underlying the harassment and termination allegations. If so, the second issue I need to decide is whether those facts amount to discrimination based on sex contrary to s. 13 of the Code.
[5] The parties called witnesses and introduced evidence over the course of a two-day hearing. While I do not refer to it all in my decision, I have considered all the evidence and submissions of the parties. This is not a complete recitation of that information, but only what is necessary to come to a decision.
[6] For the following reasons, I find Ms. Mohr has not established that she was assaulted and harassed, and I dismiss the complaint as against Mr. Gagnon.
[7] I reach a different conclusion on the complaint against Power Flagging. Based on the evidence before me I am satisfied that Ms. Mohr has established that she made a complaint about being harassed to Power Flagging and this complaint was a factor in its decision to terminate her employment. I find that Power Flagging breached the Code.
II BACKGROUND
[8] Ms. Mohr began working as a roadside flagger for Power Flagging’s northern division in 2015.
[9] Ms. Mohr worked with Mr. Gagnon and the two would often drive to job sites together. Ms. Mohr alleges that starting in 2016, Mr. Gagnon sexually harassed and assaulted her at work. I describe the specifics of this allegation below.
[10] In or about Mary 2017, Ms. Mohr made a complaint to her supervisor at Power Flagging, Sue Gunn saying that Mr. Gagnon had inappropriately groped her.
[11] After making her complaint, Ms. Mohr continued to work with Mr. Gagnon. She alleges that on January 9, 2018, Mr. Gagnon made her stand during her shift without any breaks. She says she had a dizzy spell at the end of the day.
[12] Mr. Gagnon reported Ms. Mohr’s dizzy spell to Ms. Gunn. Ms. Gunn placed Ms. Mohr on a medical leave in January 2018 and said she could not work “until you have been three months at least without dizzy spells”.
[13] While she was on medical leave, Ms. Mohr went to her union on February 16, 2018, to report the harassment and assault by Mr. Gagnon.
[14] Power Flagging terminated Ms. Mohr’s employment in March 2018. Ms. Mohr was given a letter dated March 15, 2018, stating that her employment was being terminated effective March 31, 2018, because the company was shutting down its operations in the region.
III ANALYSIS AND DECISION
A. General Legal Principles
[15] To prove her discrimination case under s. 13 of the Code, Ms. Mohr must prove that: (1) she has the protected characteristic of sex; (2) she experienced an adverse impact in her employment; and (3) her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. The standard of proof in a human rights tribunal proceeding is on a balance of probabilities, meaning that a scenario is more likely than not: FH v. MacDougall, 2008 SCC 53.
[16] It is undisputed that Ms. Mohr has the protected characteristic of sex. Therefore, the first issue I must decide is whether Ms. Mohr has established, on a balance of probabilities, that she experienced an adverse impact in employment.
B. Allegations against Mr. Gagnon
[17] The central allegations in this complaint are disputed. Ms. Mohr alleges that between 2016 and 2018, Mr. Gagnon sexually harassed and assaulted her at work. Mr. Gagnon denies doing any of the things Ms. Mohr accuses him of.
[18] Because the parties fundamentally disagree on what happened, I must assess the credibility and reliability of the witnesses’ evidence to make findings of fact. Credibility and reliability are distinct concepts. Credibility considers the truthfulness of a witness’s testimony while reliability considers its accuracy: Christensen v. Save-a-Lot Holdings Corp. (No. 3), 2023 BCHRT 125 at para. 13.
[19] In assessing a witness’ credibility and reliability I have considered such factors as the witness’ ability to accurately observe, recall, and recount what occurred, whether the evidence is plausible, whether supporting or contradictory evidence exists, and whether their evidence is internally or externally consistent: Harder v. Tupas-Singh and another, 2022 BCHRT 50 at para. 6.
[20] The parties did not address the issue, but I find it important to take judicial notice of myths and stereotypes regarding sexual assault. These are common misconceptions or oversimplified conceptions about how a victim of sexual assault “should” behave. These stereotypes include that:
a. A person who is the victim of sexual assault should be visibly traumatized: Employee v. Employer, 2020 BCHRT 4 at para. 81.
b. A person who is the victim of sexual assault will report the assault immediately: Basic v. Esquimalt Denture Clinic and another, 2020 BCHRT 138, at para. 104.
c. If a person does not appear to be emotionally distraught afterwards, or their behaviour is unchanged, they are more likely to have consented to the sexual activities in question: R. c. Burke, 2021 QCCCQ 3626 at para. 288.
d. If a person continues to associate with or does not avoid the person they say sexually assaulted them it suggests that they must have consented to the sexual act: R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7 at para. 41.
[21] It is an error to make credibility determinations by relying on these myths and stereotypes because credibility findings must be grounded in the evidence: R. v. Sandhu, 2024 BCCA 34, at paras. 18-21. My findings are rooted in the evidence of the parties and I have not relied on these myths, stereotypes, and generalizations about victims of sexual assault.
[22] I begin by considering the evidence before me.
[23] Ms. Mohr testified that on several occasions between 2016 and 2018, Mr. Gagnon sexually harassed and assaulted her at work. She said that at various times Mr. Gagnon: grabbed her breast; stuck his tongue in her mouth; told her repeatedly that he would “fuck her some day”; threatened to throw her out of a moving vehicle; and grabbed her hand and placed it on his genitals. Ms. Mohr said she reported Mr. Gagnon’s behaviour to her supervisor, Sue Gunn, in May 2017.
[24] Ms. Mohr said that after she reported Mr. Gagnon’s harassment and assaults Power Flagging continued to assign her shifts with Mr. Gagnon. She said that on January 9, 2018, Mr. Gagnon made her stand for a nine-hour shift without any washroom breaks, food or drink. She said she had a dizzy spell while walking to the work truck at the end of that day.
[25] Mr. Gagnon denies engaging in any of the conduct alleged. He concedes that Ms. Mohr had a dizzy spell on the job but disputes that it was because he denied her washroom breaks, food and drink. He says Ms. Mohr’s allegations are not supported in the evidence. He says he was criminally charged with sexual assault because of Ms. Mohr’s allegations, and he was acquitted of all charges against him after a trial by a judge.
[26] For the following reasons, I am not persuaded by Ms. Mohr’s version of events on a balance of probabilities.
[27] I begin by noting that there are no first-hand witnesses to any of the events alleged. The evidence of the parties’ witnesses does not assist me in determining if Mr. Gagnon harassed Ms. Mohr.
[28] Ms. Mohr called her adult daughter as a witness. The daughter testified that Ms. Mohr told her about Mr. Gagnon’s harassment and assault sometime after Ms. Mohr had reported it to Ms. Gunn.
[29] Mr. Gagnon called a co-worker at Power Flagging, and his spouse as witnesses. The co-worker testified that Ms. Mohr told them about Mr. Gagnon harassing her sometime in 2017 and they advised Ms. Mohr to report it to Ms. Gunn. Mrs. Gagnon testified that she learned about the allegations against Mr. Gagnon in 2018 when the union started an investigation into Ms. Mohr’s complaint. She said Mr. Gagnon denied all the allegations.
[30] Evidence that the parties each told their version of events to witnesses is an attempt to bolster a witness’ credibility by introducing prior statements they made. It is unhelpful to the issue I must decide because it adds nothing new to the evidence: Becker v. Cariboo Chevrolet Oldsmobile Pontiac Buick GMC Ltd. (No. 2), 2004 BCHRT 80, at paras. 29-31. Consistency does not enhance credibility, and the fact that the parties have consistently told the same version of events does not increase the likelihood that it is true: R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114 at para. 41.
[31] I am also not helped in the task of assessing the credibility of the parties by evidence of their good character. Ms. Mohr’s daughter said her mother is a truthful person. Mr. Gagnon’s witnesses said he is not the kind of person who would sexually harass someone. Further, Mr. Gagnon submitted several letters from community members saying they do not believe the allegations made against him. Evidence whose sole purpose is to bolster the credibility of a witness by attesting to their good character is inadmissible and has little probative value: Becker, at paras. 23-25. I find these are merely assertions of good character and do not consider this evidence with respect to the issue I must decide.
[32] Next, the documentary evidence submitted by the parties does not assist me in my task. Ms. Mohr provided excerpts from undated text message conversations with a friend where she referenced Mr. Gagnon’s harassment. She wrote, “Gillis grabbed my boo[sic] at work and told me not to say anything”. She also submitted portions of an interview transcript with the RCMP and WorkSafeBC records. Ms. Mohr says she has consistently made the same allegations about being harassed and assaulted by Mr. Gagnon. This is another attempt to bolster Ms. Mohr’s version of events by providing instances where she made the same allegation about Mr. Gagnon. It is not helpful to me for the same reasons as the consistent statements made to other witnesses. Further, many of the documentary materials before me are undated and appear to be excerpts from larger files so that I cannot determine their original context. For these reasons I find the documentary evidence is of little probative value.
[33] The parties agree that Mr. Gagnon was charged with sexual assault and he was acquitted of all charges against him in a criminal proceeding. This is not of assistance to me because the legal framework and standard of proof in a human rights complaint differ from those in a criminal proceeding: Q v. Wild Log Homes and another, 2012 BCHRT 135 at para. 34. Further, the parties did not put before me any reasons for judgement, nor did they argue that the trial judge made finding of fact that I ought to be bound by.
[34] Finally, with no external evidence that materially tips the scales in favour of Ms. Mohr or Mr. Gagnon’s version of events I have reviewed the testimonies of the parties. Here, I find each party to be a credible and reliable witness. Both Ms. Mohr and Mr. Gagnon presented their evidence in a straightforward manner. They answered questions in cross-examination and from the Tribunal to the best of their ability. Each acknowledged that the passage of time had eroded some of their memories about specific details, but each were consistent in their testimony about the central allegations in this complaint.
[35] Ms. Mohr testified about her employment with Power Flagging and her recollection of being harassed and assaulted by Mr. Gagnon. She gave evidence about reporting her complaints to Power Flagging, her union, an employment centre, and the RCMP. She says she was not taken seriously and treated poorly by the organizations she reported to. She gave evidence of difficulties she had in other areas of her life such as her tenancy which she attributes to everyone in the community taking the Respondents’ side.
[36] Mr. Gagnon testified about the flagger role and why Ms. Mohr’s allegations are unlikely. He testified that Power Flagging placed tracking devices on the company trucks so their location on the road, and whether the people inside are wearing seatbelts can be monitored by the manager. He said the model of the company truck he regularly used had a partition between the driver’s seat and the passenger seat. He said these features would prevent him from groping Ms. Mohr while inside the vehicle as alleged. He said that flaggers routinely carry their food and water with them so they can eat and drink on the job site. He denies making Ms. Mohr work without breaks and said that normally flaggers will radio someone else to cover their position and take breaks as necessary.
[37] The parties disagreed on some of their recollection about the details of their employment at Power Flagging. For example, the parties disagreed on which company vehicle Mr. Gagnon regularly used, what retail store was near a worksite, or whether Power Flagging conducted a hearing test for its employees on a specific date. There was no evidence before me to determine whose recollection was accurate. In any event, I find that witnesses’ fading memories of details of events occurring seven to nine years ago is to be expected. This does not undermine a witness’ credibility to such an extent that I can conclude that one party’s evidence is more credible than the other on the central issue. On the central issue of whether Mr. Gagnon harassed and assaulted Ms. Mohr, the parties provided consistent, unwavering, and irreconcilable testimony.
[38] I have determined that both Ms. Mohr’s and Mr. Gagnon’s accounts are equally credible. When two directly contradictory versions of events that I find are equally credible are put before me I cannot say that one scenario is more likely than the other. I am unable to rationally articulate reasons for preferring the evidence of one witness over the other. Therefore, this is one of those rare cases that turns on the burden of proof. I find Ms. Mohr has not established on a balance of probabilities her allegations of sexual harassment and assault. Consequently, I dismiss the complaint as against Mr. Gagnon.
C. Allegations against Power Flagging
[39] I next turn to the allegations against Power Flagging. Ms. Mohr says she first reported Mr. Gagnon’s conduct to her supervisor in May 2017 and Power Flagging took no action. She says she made a complaint through her union in February 2018 and was subsequently fired in March 2018.
[40] Employers have an obligation under the Code to adequately respond to complaints of discrimination by its employees: Kingston v. Fairmont Hotel Vancouver and others (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 259 at para. 88. An unreasonable or inadequate response may itself amount to discrimination “regardless of whether the underlying conduct subject to the investigation is found to be discriminatory”: Employee v. The University and another (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 12 at para. 272.
[41] Termination of employment is an adverse impact under the Code: s. 13(1)(a) and De Medeiros v. Rovalution Automotive Ltd. and another, 2023 BCHRT 182 at para. 22.
[42] It is undisputed that Ms. Mohr reported Mr. Gagnon’s conduct in May 2017. It is further undisputed that Ms. Mohr employment was terminated. Therefore, the issues for me to determine is whether Power Flagging’s response to Ms. Mohr’s complaint was reasonable and whether her making a complaint was a factor in her termination. For the following reasons, I am satisfied that Power Flagging’s response was not reasonable, and Ms. Mohr’s complaint was a factor in her firing.
[43] First, the evidence before me is that Power Flagging did not investigate Ms. Mohr’s complaints about Mr. Gagnon. Both Ms. Mohr and Mr. Gagnon testified they continued to work together until Ms. Mohr went on medical leave in January 2018. Mr. Gagnon testified that he first became aware of Ms. Mohr’s allegations in 2018, after Ms. Mohr went on leave, when he was contacted by the union. From this I understand Power Flagging’s response to Ms. Mohr’s complaint did not involve any steps that could be expected from an employer when there is a complaint of workplace harassment such as informing Mr. Gagnon about the allegations made against him, reassigning tasks so that the parties involved in the complaint do not continue to interact, or investigating the allegations.
[44] Next, Ms. Mohr complained to the union on February 16, 2018, and her employment was terminated by a letter dated March 15, 2018. The temporal proximity of the incidents supports an inference that Ms. Mohr’s complaint was a factor in the termination. Further, while every other person who was employed by Power Flagging was invited to continue working under Ms. Gunn who restructured Power Flagging’s business, Ms. Mohr was issued a Record of Employment stating she was not returning.
[45] Based on this evidence, I am satisfied that Ms. Mohr has proved on a balance of probabilities that her complaint of sexual harassment was a factor in the termination of her employment. I note, finally, that Mr. Jackson stated in his closing submissions that “there is a high probability that [Ms. Mohr’s] termination was a strategic move [by Power Flagging]”. I understand from this that Ms. Mohr’s termination was not solely because Power Flagging closed its business but was done, at least in part, because of Ms. Mohr’s complaint.
[46] Based on the evidence and submissions before me, I conclude that Power Flagging did not investigate Ms. Mohr’s complaints about Mr. Gagnon. I further find that Ms. Mohr’s complaints about Mr. Gagnon was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment. Therefore, I find Ms. Mohr has established this part of the complaint on a balance of probabilities.
D. Remedies
1. Section 37(2)(a) Cease the Contravention
[47] Having found that Power Flagging discriminated against Ms. Mohr based on sex, contrary to s. 13 of the Code, I order Power Flagging to cease and refrain from committing the same or similar discrimination, pursuant to s. 37(2)(a) of the Code.
2. Section 37(2)(b) Declaratory Order
[48] Under s. 37(2)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is contrary to the Code. In the circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to make such an order. I declare that Power Flagging’s conduct-by failing to investigate Ms. Mohr’s complaint of sexual harassment, and terminating her employment based on that complaint-is discrimination contrary to s. 13 of the Code.
3. Section 37(2)(d)(iii) Injury to Dignity, Feelings, and Self-Respect
[49] Under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code, the Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity. The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. Determining the amount of an injury to dignity award depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases.
[50] The Tribunal considers several factors including the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s social context or vulnerability; and the specific effect the discrimination had on the complainant: Basic v. Esquimalt Denture Clinic and another, 2020 BCHRT 138 at para. 193. I consider each of these factors in turn.
[51] This is a case where the discrimination affected the employment relationship until it ultimately ended. Ms. Mohr reported she was being harassed and assaulted by Mr. Gagnon. Power Flagging took no action.
[52] The Tribunal has described termination of employment as the “ultimate employment-related consequence”: Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd. dba Buono Osteria and others, 2021 BCHRT 137at para. 129. The Tribunal has recognized that loss of employment often warrants compensation at the high end of the range given the significance of employment to a person’s identity, self-worth, and dignity: Ms. K v. Deep Creek Store and another, 2021 BCHRT 158 at para. 131.
[53] Next, the social context of the discrimination is one of employer and employee. There is an inherent power imbalance between employers and employees that make employees vulnerable, especially at the time of termination: Senyk v. WFG Agency Network (No. 2), 2008 BCHRT 376 at paras. 463-464.
[54] Finally, I consider the effect of the discrimination. Ms. Mohr gave evidence about the upheaval to her life since she reported the harassment to her supervisor at Power Flagging. However, much of the effects she says she experienced is not attributable to the contravention. Ms. Mohr says she found it difficult to repeat her allegations to investigators and psychologists and in the criminal proceeding. She said she was treated poorly and questioned by investigators. Ms. Mohr further says it was humiliating to be cross-examined during the court proceeding and to have her personal history including her past medical history scrutinized. I appreciate that it is difficult to give testimony in a court proceeding and be challenged on one’s evidence. However, I find this is not attributable to Power Flagging’s discrimination. Similarly, the evidence that Ms. Mohr felt devastated when the court acquitted Mr. Gagnon is not relevant to an assessment of the impact of Power Flagging’s discrimination.
[55] There is little evidence before me about how Power Flagging failing to investigate Ms. Mohr’s complaints affected her. Ms. Mohr testified that after she reported Mr. Gagnon’s conduct to Sue Gunn in 2017, she continued working at Power Flagging with no disruption or changes to her work duties. She said she generally enjoyed working with Mr. Gagnon even after she reported her concerns to Ms. Gunn. Ms. Mohr also gave evidence that the termination of employment had little effect on her as she immediately took jobs with other companies.
[56] Ms. Mohr submitted into evidence pages she says are from her WorkSafeBC file. These include what appear to be pages from a psychological assessment report, and a medical review. The psychological assessment report states that Ms. Mohr exhibited mild symptoms consistent with anxiety and depression in November 2018.
[57] I approach the documentary evidence with caution and place limited weight on it. This is because what was put before me are pages from what appear to be longer reports. The portions that were submitted provide no context about why these reports were written, who wrote them, what the writer’s qualifications are, and what information they used in preparing the reports.
[58] Ms. Mohr says that an award for injury to dignity of $50,000 is appropriate. She cites the following cases to support this award: Araniva v. RSY Contracting and another (no. 3), 2019 BCHRT 97 ($40,000); Ms. K v. Deep Creek Store and another, 2021 BCHRT 158 ($45,000). I find these cases are distinguishable as they are cases where the complainant established that they were sexually harassed in employment and the amounts of the awards reflects the serious impact of the sexual harassment in those cases.
[59] Here, I have found that Ms. Mohr has not established the underlying conduct of Mr. Gagnon but have found that the response by Power Flagging amounts to discrimination. Although there is little evidence before me of the impact to Ms. Mohr from Power Flagging’s discrimination, I find that such injury can be inferred from the very failure to investigate a complaint of harassment and the loss of a job. The evidence supports that most of the impact to Ms. Mohr is attributable to the court proceeding and its outcome rather than to Power Flagging’s conduct. However, in extricating the impact of the discrimination from the other events in Ms. Mohr’s life, I have no difficulty accepting that the contravention impacted Ms. Mohr’s dignity, feeling, and self-respect.
[60] The quantum of an award of injury to dignity is “highly contextual and fact-specific”: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 256, affirmed in 2014 BCCA 396. On balance, considering the seriousness of a termination and failing to investigate a complaint of harassment, I find that an award of $17,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect is appropriate.
4. Interest
[61] The Tribunal has the discretion to award interest on awards. An award of interest is part of the compensatory nature of the Tribunal’s awards, recognizing that but for the discrimination a complainant would have had use of the money now awarded. The interest places the complainant in the economic position they would have been in but for the discrimination: Vasil v. Mongovius and another (No. 3), 2009 BCHRT 117.
[62] I find it appropriate to order post-judgment interest on the award as part of an attempt to fully compensate Ms. Mohr for her loss and injury. I order Power Flagging to pay Ms. Mohr post-judgment interest on the amount awarded, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
IV CONCLUSION
[63] I dismiss the complaint against Mr. Gagnon.
[64] I find that Power Flagging discriminated against Ms. Mohr in employment based on her sex, in violation of s. 13 of the Code. I make the following orders:
a. I order Power Flagging to cease and refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention of the Code: s. 37(2)(a).
b. I declare that Power Flagging’s conduct in failing to investigate a complaint of sexual harassment and terminating Ms. Mohr’s employment for making that complaint contravened s. 13 of the Code: s. 37(2)(b).
c. I order Power Flagging to pay Ms. Mohr $17,000 as compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect: s. 37(2)(d)(iii).
d. I order Power Flagging to pay Ms. Mohr post-judgment interest on the amount awarded until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member