Awasthi v. Vranakis, 2026 BCHRT 39
Date Issued: February 3, 2026
File: CS-006817
Indexed as: Awasthi v. Vranakis, 2026 BCHRT 39
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Atul Awasthi
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Stavros (Steve) Vranakis
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Theressa Etmanski
On their own behalf: Atul Awasthi
Counsel for the Respondent Anastase E. Maragos
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Atul Awasthi has filed a human rights complaint against Stavros (Steve) Vranakis, his former landlord, based on his race, colour, place of origin, and family status. He says Mr. Vranakis discriminated against him by pressuring him to pay for a leak that occurred in his unit, and by withholding his security deposit. He says this was discriminatory conduct because Mr. Vranakis relied on an inspection report by an insurance claims adjuster which said Mr. Awasthi’s “lifestyle and possibly diet” may have been a cause of the water leak. He says Mr. Vranakis presented this inspection report to the building Strata and the Residential Tenancy Branch in his efforts to recover the cost of repairs.
[2] Mr. Vranakis denies discriminating and says he did not rely on the comments made by the claims adjuster; rather, the cause of the water leak was identified as Mr. Awasthi’s unauthorized installation of a bidet with a faulty water supply line. He says that is why he asked for payment and withheld the security deposit from Mr. Awasthi. He now applies to dismiss the complaint pursuant to s. 27(1)(c) of the Human Rights Code, on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success.
[3] The key issue I must resolve on this application is whether Mr. Awasthi has taken out of the realm of conjecture that his protected characteristics were a factor in Mr. Vranakis’s attempts to recover the costs of the water leak. I find that he has not.
[4] For the following reasons, I grant the application and dismiss the complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II Preliminary objection
[5] As a preliminary matter, Mr. Vranakis says Mr. Awasthi’s response to this application does not contain affidavit evidence, yet his submissions contain new facts not included in the complaint or supported with documentary evidence. He says the Tribunal should give no weight to this information.
[6] I do not see this as an instance where Mr. Awasthi is seeking to expand the scope of his complaint or add new allegations on an application to dismiss. Rather, the examples referenced by Mr. Vranakis are further details of the facts set out in the complaint. For instance, he provides additional details of communications with Mr. Vranakis regarding the leak and the request for payment, information about what Mr. Vranakis communicated to the Strata regarding the leak and payment, and background information about information exchanged at the beginning of Mr. Atwasthi’s tenancy. Accordingly, Mr. Awasthi is not required to apply to amend his complaint with respect to this information: Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 24(4)(b).
[7] The Tribunal has recognized that while an affidavit is the best form of evidence on an application to dismiss, affidavits are not required nor must they be preferred: Becker v. Cariboo Chevrolet Oldsmobile Pontiac Buick GMC Ltd. (No. 2), 2004 BCHRT 80 at para. 17; Edgewater Casino v. Chubb-Kennedy, 2014 BCSC 416 at para. 51. It is permissible for parties to provide their evidence in a form other than a sworn statement, and the Tribunal is generally less concerned about form where, as here, a party is not represented by legal counsel. Instead, the Tribunal will look past differences in presentation to assess the real merits of the application: Becker at para. 57.
[8] For these reasons, I have considered all the information contained in Mr. Awasthi’s response in order to assess the merits of the application.
III BACKGROUND
[9] The following information is taken from the materials provided by the parties. I make no findings of fact.
[10] Mr. Awasthi and his family rented an apartment [Rental Unit] from Mr. Vranakis from April 2018 through July 31, 2021. Mr. Vranakis resided outside of Canada during this period. The building was managed by a Strata Corporation.
[11] On or around March 28, 2021, a leak was discovered coming from the ceiling in the apartment located directly below the Rental Unit.
[12] The Strata paid for the emergency repairs but then sought to recover the costs from Mr. Vranakis. Mr. Vranakis submitted a claim to his insurance company. The insurance company sent a claims adjuster to conduct an inspection into the cause of the leak. The subsequent inspection report was inconclusive about the cause of the leak but recommended denying coverage. One note in the inspection report stated: “the tenant’s lifestyle and possibly diet seem to be contributing to high humidity in the unit.”
[13] Mr. Vranakis subsequently asked Mr. Awasthi to pay for the damages, but Mr. Awasthi refused, stating that his family was not at fault. The parties spoke on the telephone and exchanged several emails regarding this matter.
[14] The parties disagree about the cause of the leak. Mr. Vranakis says that Mr. Awasthi’s unauthorized installation of a bidet in one of the bathrooms, and subsequent kinked pipes, were at fault. Mr. Awasthi disagrees and says it was determined that the absence of silicone wax seals around the base of the toilets – which was the responsibility of the landlord – caused the leak.
[15] On or around the end of June 2021, Mr. Awasthi gave notice to end his tenancy.
[16] Mr. Vranakis brought an application to the Residential Tenancy Branch [RTB] for, among other things, payment from Mr. Awasthi for costs associated with the leak. Mr. Vranakis’s claim was unsuccessful and the RTB ordered that he return Mr. Awasthi’s security deposit.
[17] The parties agree that at some point Mr. Vranakis shared the claim adjustor’s inspection report with the Strata.
[18] Mr. Awasthi’s human rights complaint originally included the corporate claims adjustor who authored the inspection report as a respondent, but that aspect of the complaint was later withdrawn.
IV DECISION
[19] Mr. Vranakis applies to dismiss Mr. Awasthi’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on Mr. Vranakis to establish the basis for dismissal.
[20] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[21] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[22] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[23] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Awasthi will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in tenancy, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would shift to Mr. Vranakis to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[24] Mr. Vranakis does not dispute that Mr. Awasthi has the protected characteristics of race, colour, place of origin, and family status. However, he says that Mr. Awasthi has no reasonable prospect of proving that he experienced an adverse impact, or that his protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact.
[25] Mr. Awasthi says he experienced an adverse impact when Mr. Vranakis asked him to pay for the damage caused by the leak in the Rental Unit. In doing so, he says that Mr. Vranakis disregarded the plumber’s report which stated that the cause of the leak was that silicone wax seals were missing from the base of the toilets. Instead, Mr. Vranakis relied on the inspection report which alleged that Mr. Awasthi was responsible for the leak including the reference to his “lifestyle and possibly diet”. He further says that Mr. Vranakis shared the inspection report with the Strata, which caused reputational damage to him and his family. Finally, he says that Mr. Vranakis referred to the inspection report during the RTB hearing, including the reference to Mr. Awasthi’s “lifestyle and possibly diet” being a reason for the water leak.
[26] It is not necessary for me to determine on this application what caused the leak or whether it was appropriate for Mr. Vranakis to seek payment for the damage from Mr. Awasthi. The RTB has already made certain findings in that regard. For the purposes of this application, I accept, without finding, that Mr. Awasthi will be able to prove that he experienced an adverse impact in relation to these events. I have determined that this application can be most efficiently resolved through assessment of the element of nexus.
[27] As a preliminary matter, I note that Mr. Awasthi has not explained how the alleged conduct is connected to his family status, and I find he has not taken this aspect of his complaint out of the realm of conjecture.
[28] With respect to his other protected characteristics, Mr. Awasthi argues that the claims adjustor made statements about his lifestyle and diet based on his race, colour, and place of origin, without any actual knowledge of his lifestyle or diet. He says that Mr. Vranakis then accepted these statements without further evidence and used them as a basis to demand payment for the leak. In doing so, Mr. Awasthi says Mr. Vranakis ignored all the other evidence which indicated that his family was not responsible for the leak, as he had already made up his mind about them. Mr. Awasthi says that Mr. Vranakis was aware that he and his family had immigrated from India since the beginning of their tenancy, and these actions demonstrate a bias towards them.
[29] Mr. Vranakis denies having any bias towards Mr. Awasthi and says that his correspondence with him consistently focused on the unauthorized installation of a bidet and kinked pipes as the cause of the leak. I agree that the emails provided on this application support that Mr. Vranakis’s concern in his communications with Mr. Awasthi was the installation of a bidet. He reiterated this point on several occasions. Mr. Awasthi’s responses consistently reiterated his position that the bidet was not the cause of the leak. I note that Mr. Awasthi has not alleged a connection between the installation of the bidet and his protected characteristics.
[30] Mr. Awasthi says that Mr. Vranakis made arguments before the RTB which relied on the lifestyle and diet comment in the inspection report, but Mr. Vranakis denies this. A transcript of the RTB proceedings has not been provided; however, the RTB decision summarizes the positions presented by each party at the two hearings on this matter. The summary of Mr. Vranakis’ testimony clearly states his position that the leak originated from the installation of a bidet without permission. The summary also includes a brief reference to the inspection report’s conclusion that “the leak was due to the tenant’s lifestyle and diet, the condensation in the toilet, and mold.” It is not clear if this was the RTB’s recitation of the evidence presented or a specific submission made by Mr. Vranakis. Nevertheless, Mr. Vranakis was not the author of the inspection report, and there is no indication that Mr. Vranakis made submissions that linked the comment in the inspection report to Mr. Awasthi’s protected characteristics. This reference to the report is not sufficient to draw a nexus between Mr. Vranakis conduct and Mr. Awasthi’s protected characteristics beyond the realm of conjecture.
[31] Similarly, Mr. Awasthi says Mr. Vranakis caused him reputational damage by sharing the inspection report with the Strata. Mr. Vranakis acknowledges that this report was shared, but states that Mr. Awasthi has not explained how reputational harm could have occurred because of this action and notes that the inspection report does not identify Mr. Awasthi by name or description. From Mr. Awasthi’s submissions, it is apparent that the alleged harm from this action was the result of being accused (falsely, in his view) of being responsible for the leak and then refusing to pay for the damage. He does not explain how Mr. Vranakis sharing the inspection report with the Strata caused him a discriminatory adverse impact.
[32] Mr. Awasthi speculates that Mr. Vranakis was motivated in the above conduct by bias towards him and his family based on his protected characteristics. Evidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish a claim of discrimination: Code, s. 2. Nevertheless, the evidence before me does not support Mr. Awasthi’s theory beyond the realm of conjecture. Rather, the evidence before me overwhelmingly supports that Mr. Vranakis believed that the leak was caused by the installation of the bidet, and this was the basis for his efforts to recover the costs associated with the leak from Mr. Awasthi. The evidence before me does not support beyond conjecture that the reference to Mr. Awasthi’s “lifestyle and possibly diet” in the inspection report was a factor in Mr. Vranakis’s conduct.
[33] While this conclusion is determinative of the application, I will briefly address Mr. Vranakis’s argument that Mr. Awasthi has not established how the reference to his diet and lifestyle in the inspection report is connected to his protected characteristics. Mr. Vranakis says that high humidity because of someone’s lifestyle could be referring to many different things, including for example, the presence of humidifiers, keeping windows open or closed, using heaters or air conditioners, and similar behaviour, and this is insufficient to satisfy the element of nexus.
[34] I agree that the basis for this statement is unclear and there are a variety of speculations one could make about its meaning. One possible interpretation could be that it is a reference to a stereotypical assumption about Mr. Awasthi’s lifestyle and diet based on his race, colour, or place of origin. I note that the examples offered by Mr. Vranakis do not fully account for the inspection report’s reference to diet, which could support a nexus to Mr. Awasthi’s protected characteristics. However, this is not the basis on which this application has been decided.
[35] Rather, given that it is Mr. Vranakis and not the claims adjustor who is the respondent to this complaint, and my finding that there is no reasonable prospect of proving that this statement in the report was a factor in Mr. Vranakis’ conduct, Mr. Awasthi has not provided a factual foundation to link the reference to his “lifestyle and possibly diet” in the inspect report to the conduct alleged to have caused him an adverse impact by Mr. Vranakis.
[36] I have considered that discrimination based on race is frequently subtle, direct evidence of racial discrimination is rarely available, and discrimination must often be inferred from the conduct in issue: Mezghrani v. Canada Youth Orange Network (CYONI) (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 60 at para. 28. However, there must still be some evidence from which discrimination can be inferred. Here, Mr. Awasthi speculates that the mere fact that Mr. Vranakis presented this report to him, the RTB, or the Strata is sufficient to link the adverse impact of being pressured to pay for the water damage to his protected characteristics. However, I am not persuaded that this is sufficient to take his complaint out of the realm of conjecture.
[37] The BC Court of Appeal has explained that there “will almost always be some evidence of the possibility of discrimination when a member of a minority group is passed over in favour of the majority group”, but more than a “mere possibility” is required to warrant moving a human rights complaint forward to a hearing: Lee v. BC Hydro and Power Authority, 2004 BCCA 457 at para. 26.
[38] This is one of those cases. Accepting that Mr. Awasthi could prove the alleged adverse impacts, I am still satisfied that he has no reasonable prospect of establishing the nexus element of his complaint. I find that Mr. Awasthi has not taken his complaint beyond the realm of conjecture.
V CONCLUSION
[39] The complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. I grant the application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
Theressa Etmanski
Tribunal Member