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Home » Law Library » B.C. Human Rights Tribunal decisions » Recently released decisions » 2026 BCHRT 36

Thompson v. Robson Valley Community Services Society and others, 2026 BCHRT 36

Date Issued: January 29, 2026
File: CS-006683

Indexed as: Thompson v. Robson Valley Community Services Society and others, 2026 BCHRT 36

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Shawn Thompson

COMPLAINANT

AND:

Robson Valley Community Services Society and Donalda Beeson and Jana MacMaster

RESPONDENTS

REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)

Tribunal Member: Theressa Etmanski

On their own behalf: Shawn Thompson

Counsel for the Respondents: Nazeer T. Mitha and Carmelle Dieleman

I          INTRODUCTION

[1]               Shawn Thompson has filed a human rights complaint against his former employer, Robson Valley Community Services Society [RVCSS], and its co-Executive Directors, Jana MacMaster and Donalda Beeson [together, the Respondents]. He alleges discrimination in employment based on his sex and marital status as a man married to the former Executive Director. He says he experienced an adverse impact when the Respondents treated him as if he was unable to do his job because of his protected characteristics, placed him on leave during an investigation related to his wife, and did not provide him with a safe work environment by failing to investigate his internal complaint regarding his human rights concerns.

[2]               The Respondents deny discriminating and dispute Mr. Thompson’s version of events. They bring this application to dismiss the complaint without a hearing pursuant to s. 27(1)(c) of the Human Rights Code. They say Mr. Thompson has no reasonable prospect of successfully proving that he experienced any adverse impact, or that there is a nexus between any alleged adverse impact and his protected characteristics.

[3]               Mr. Thompson has not responded to this application, although he had the opportunity to do so.

[4]               The parties have provided conflicting information with respect to each of Mr. Thompson’s allegations. The primary issue before me is whether the evidence provided by the Respondents on this application reconciles these conflicts and supports their position that Mr. Thompson has no reasonable prospect of proving that he experienced a discriminatory adverse impact in his employment. I find that it does.

[5]               For the following reasons, I grant the application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

II       BACKGROUND

[6]               The following information is taken from the materials provided by the parties. I make no findings of fact.

[7]               RVCSS is a non-profit organization that offers free services to the community in the Robson Valley of British Columbia. Its services include family support, youth services, sexual assault response, and support for women living with or transitioning from violence.

[8]               Mr. Thompson commenced employment with RVCSS as a part-time Specialized Services Responder on or about November 5, 2021. His position included work in serval areas, including Police Based Victim Services [PBVS] and the Sexual Assault Response Program [SARP]. Part of his duties involved being “on-call” as an afterhours Sexual Assault Responder.

[9]               In this position he was a member of the Community Social Services Bargaining Association of Unions [Union].

[10]           At the time of his hire, Mr. Thompson’s wife was the Executive Director of RVCSS [Spouse]. The Respondents say that it was her decision to hire Mr. Thompson, though Mr. Thompson says it was approved by “all stakeholders”.

[11]           In January and February 2022, another employee brought forward complaints against the Spouse, which also referenced concerns involving Mr. Thompson [Employee Complaint]. The Respondents say this prompted RVCSS to enter a period of significant upheaval, including multiple complaints against the Spouse and resignations of various staff and Board members.

[12]           Mr. Thompson was placed on a paid leave in February 2022.  

[13]           The Spouse was placed on paid leave in late March 2022, and an external investigator was retained to investigate the allegations against her.

[14]           On or around April 11, 2022, Mr. Thompson filed an internal complaint against Ms. Beeson, the employee who had filed the Employee Complaint, and RVCSS. He alleged that he was discriminated against by Ms. Beeson, treated unfairly by the employee, and was improperly placed on administrative leave following false and defamatory statements about him in the Employee Complaint. His allegations against Ms. Beeson relate to his work in SARP, for which she was the Program Manager. These allegations are similar to those made in the current complaint before the Tribunal and are discussed further below.

[15]           On the same day, Ms. Beeson was informed that she was being placed on administrative leave related to “complaints” against her. She was later provided a letter written approximately two weeks earlier by the Spouse confirming the same. She states that the Board subsequently informed her that she could return to work.

[16]           On or around April 14, 2022, Ms. MacMaster was appointed acting Executive Director. She informed Mr. Thompson that he was not being investigated with regards to the Employee Complaint. She directed him to return to work, but he declined to do so.

III     DECISION

[17]           The Respondents apply to dismiss Mr. Thompson’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.

[18]           The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.

[19]           A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.

[20]           Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.

[21]           To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Thompson will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in employment, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would shift to the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.

[22]           The Respondents do not dispute that Mr. Thompson has the protected characteristics of martial status or sex. Rather, they say he has no reasonable prospect of proving that he experienced any adverse impact, or that his protected characteristics were a factor in any alleged adverse impact. In the alternative, the Respondents argue that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because they are reasonably certain to prove a defence at the hearing: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117 at para. 50.

[23]           Mr. Thompson has set out the following factual foundation in his complaint. It is not clear to me that each of the following alleged conduct on its own would be an allegation of adverse impact but given the arguments before me I will treat them as such.  

a.    Ms. Beeson called him a “voyeur” when discussing a callout for a client who was requesting support in speaking with the RCMP regarding a sexual assault and denied him the opportunity to provide this support in accordance with the position he was hired for. Instead, Ms. Beeson requested a female colleague with less experience and training to respond, even though the colleague would not be paid overtime to do so. Mr. Thompson says he understands “voyeur” to mean “someone who obtains sexual gratification from observing unsuspecting individuals who are partly undressed, naked, or engaged in sexual acts.”

b.    After he expressed reservations about how to discuss sexual acts with female colleagues in a work setting, Ms. Beeson stated that Mr. Thompson was not able to perform his job because he was a man. Mr. Thompson says he was not offered any further support.

c.     Ms. Beeson continuously stated that he should not be in his job because he was married to the Executive Director, and this created a power imbalance. Mr. Thompson alleges that his marital status was used against him and prevented him from being treated fairly in the workplace.

d.    RVCSS put him on paid leave while conducting an investigation involving allegations of misconduct in the workplace. While he does not specify whose misconduct was being investigated (he mentions that he was told he “did nothing wrong”, and that the investigation involved harassment towards his wife), he alleges this conduct was disciplinary and an attempt to harm his career because of his martial status. I understand this allegation to relate to his leave following the Employee Complaint.

e.    He submitted a formal complaint to RVCSS about his human rights concerns involving Ms. Beeson (as discussed above); however, it was not acknowledged by Ms. MacMaster. He alleges that Ms. MacMaster stated to several people that she “stands in solidarity with [Ms. Beeson].” Mr. Thompson further alleges that Ms. MacMaster brought Ms. Beeson back to work without completing the investigation, which denied him a safe work environment. He believes he was not fairly supported because he is a man married to another employee of the society.

f.      Without warning or explanation, RVCSS removed his access to his emails and the employee server.

[24]           The Respondents say that each of these allegations are refuted by the sworn statements provided in this application. They say their explanation is more likely to be true and accord with the contemporaneous documentary evidence: Melrose v. Immigration Services Society of British Columbia, 2017 BCHRT 236 at paras. 26 and 127. 

[25]           There are clear conflicts in the descriptions of events provided by the parties. Where parties have provided conflicting versions of events, a hearing is sometimes required to address foundational or key issues of credibility. However, on an application to dismiss, the Tribunal can consider whether issues of credibility “can be resolved on the basis of corroborative affidavit and contemporaneous documentary evidence”: Smyth v. Loblaw and another, 2017 BCHRT 73 at para. 42.

[26]           For the reasons that follow, I find that the contemporaneous evidence provided resolves the conflicting information in favour of the Respondents’ version of events. As Mr. Thompson has not responded to this application, he has not provided any information to refute their evidence. Accordingly, I am satisfied that when the allegations are put in the larger context provided in this application, Mr. Thompson has no reasonable prospect of proving that he experienced a discriminatory adverse impact in his employment with RVCSS. I address the Respondents’ response and evidence to each of his allegations in turn.

[27]           First, Ms. Beeson acknowledges that she used the term “voyeur” in a text message with the Spouse. She says the conversation was about who would assist a client make a report to the RCMP afterhours. Mr. Thompson was supposed to be on call for that purpose, but without notice or arranging someone to cover for him, he was out of town that day. The Colleague who had been assisting the client previously was able and willing to attend, but the Spouse did not approve her working overtime and instead suggested that the client wait until Mr. Thompson’s return so that he could “job shadow” the report to the RCMP. Ms. Beeson did not feel this was a trauma informed option, as the matter was time sensitive and the client had never met Mr. Thompson. The relevant text message exchange has been provided. It shows that in the course of this conversation, Ms. Beeson stated “I suspect this client will not want a man’s support or voyeur as she reports, I also do not believe RCMP will allow two in the room, but she can offer that option.” When the Spouse questioned what she meant by the term “voyeur”, Ms. Beeson stated “Wrong choice of words, I mean audience.” She further explained “I just mean onlooker but I understand it has other contexts.”  The Spouse then responded “It only has 1 context. If a male staff ever heard that I hope they quit on the spot.” Ms. Beeson responded again stating, “My apologies […], it has many contexts in my writing experience but agree the main one is sexualized. I only meant to say no one wants an additional person listening to their statement that they don’t have context for.” Ms. Beeson apologized again for using the term at the end of the conversation.

[28]           Mr. Thompson has not taken out of the realm of conjecture that he experienced an adverse impact by Ms. Beeson’s use of the term “voyeur”. I acknowledge that this may be problematic or offensive language when applied to a male staff doing his job which involves supporting women who have experienced sexual violence. However, in this case the evidence supports that Ms. Beeson immediately clarified her meaning and indicated that she misspoke. She was apologetic for her error. I note that Mr. Thompson was not a party to this text exchange, and it is unclear on the record before me how he became aware of it. I am satisfied that the Respondents are reasonably certain to establish that her explanation was reasonable and non-discriminatory in the circumstances.

[29]           Further, based on the evidence before me, Mr. Thompson has not taken out of the realm of conjecture that Ms. Beeson prevented him from performing the duties of his job, including by her use of this term. Rather, the evidence indicates that although Mr. Thompson was on call to provide after hours support, he had traveled out of town and was not available to respond to the client at the time the RCMP were available to meet with her. Ms. Beeson sought permission for the colleague who was already working with this client to attend after hours instead, given the time sensitivity of the matter. However, the Spouse denied this request and the evidence indicates that the client chose to make a report to the RCMP without any support instead of waiting for Mr. Thompson’s return. As a result, I am satisfied that the allegation that Ms. Beeson denied Mr. Thompson this work opportunity has no reasonable prospect of success.

[30]           Second, Ms. Beeson denies that she ever expressed that Mr. Thompson could not do his job, including because he expressed reservations about discussing sexual assault with female colleagues at work. She states that the Spouse told her that after his first training session, Mr. Thompson “was uncomfortable discussing sex at work with female coworkers.” In response she states that she clarified that in their roles they “discuss details of sexual assault, not ‘sex’, and suggested that [they] navigate [Mr. Thompson’s] discomfort by offering support and appropriate training by a neutral third party.” The Respondents have provided a copy of an email Ms. Beeson sent to the SARP team, including Mr. Thompson, the same day, asking what supports they might find useful and highlighting their access to counselling through their benefits plan. She states that Mr. Thompson did not respond to this email. The Respondents have also provided documentation to show that shortly thereafter, Ms. Beeson confirmed training for the SARP to be delivered by the BC Society for Male Survivors of Sexual Assault, which she states she anticipated would be helpful in addressing Mr. Thompson’s discomfort. Following that training session, Ms. Beeson says she raised the concern that the Spouse had conveyed to her about his discomfort and inquired if the training had provided him with sufficient support or if he felt he needed more training or support for his role. She states that Mr. Thompson responded that there had been a miscommunication, and this was not a concern for him at all. As a result, Ms. Beeson did not raise this issue with him again.

[31]           While the parties have provided conflicting versions of these events, I am satisfied they can be reconciled with the contemporaneous evidence provided by the Respondents. The evidence indicates that Ms. Beeson was offering support to Mr. Thompson in his role and in response to his reservations as conveyed to her by the Spouse, including through training. Mr. Thompson has not provided any evidence or argument to dispute the Respondent’s evidence on this issue. Accordingly, I find this allegation has no reasonable prospect of success.

[32]           Third, Ms. Beeson denies stating that Mr. Thompson could not do his job because he is male or married to the Executive Director. Ms. Beeson acknowledges that she raised concerns about the potential conflict of interest of the Spouse hiring her husband before Mr. Thompson was offered the position. She also says she raised concerns that, given the majority of their clients are women who had experienced violence perpetrated by men, some clients might be afraid to be alone with a male responder. Nevertheless, she states that she worked hard to ensure Mr. Thompson was welcomed onto the team and to provide him with the necessary training and support for his position. The Respondents have provided a copy of an email sent by Ms. Beeson to Mr. Thompson welcoming him to the SARP team. The evidence also indicates that she planned a team “meet and greet” for Mr. Thompson, but that he did not attend despite accepting the meeting invitation, so it was rescheduled. As mentioned above, the Respondents have also provided evidence of the support Ms. Beeson provided to Mr. Thompson in his role, including ongoing training. Based on the evidence before me, I find that Mr. Thompson has no reasonable prospect of successfully proving that he experienced an adverse impact with respect to this allegation.

[33]           Fourth, the Respondents deny that the decision to put Mr. Thompson on a paid leave of absence is adverse treatment. They say the decision to put him on leave was requested by the Spouse, expressly to “protect” him following the Employee Complaint.

[34]           The evidence provided by the Respondents includes a series of emails about the decision to put Mr. Thompson on leave following the Employee Complaint, as well as a copy of the Employee Complaint itself. While the Spouse is named as the subject of the Employee Complaint, it also included a reference to serious alleged non-work-related conduct of Mr. Thompson, which the employee had heard second-hand, and caused the employee to have concerns about the Spouse’s decision to hire him. It also included other references to Mr. Thompson, including the “on-call” incident discussed above (see para. 29), and an allegation about an interaction the employee had with him at work which made her feel uncomfortable.

[35]           The emails provided indicate that, following the Employee Complaint, the Spouse went to the Board of Directors and requested that Mr. Thompson be “paid to step away from his duties for two weeks.” An email from the Spouse states that the Board of Directors agreed to this and says: “all agreed that [Mr. Thompson] had done nothing wrong and this was not punitive”. The emails suggest that the Spouse was concerned about Mr. Thompson working with Ms. Beeson until “this was all sorted”. It appears from the evidence that initially there was an intention to investigate the specific allegations against Mr. Thompson in the Employee Complaint, however, it was later confirmed that there would only be an investigation into the Spouse’s conduct. The investigation into the Spouse’s conduct appears to have commenced several weeks after Mr. Thompson was placed on leave. When Ms. MacMaster became the acting Executive Director after the Spouse was also put on leave, she invited Mr. Thompson to come back to work. The Respondents say that Mr. Thompson subsequently went on medical leave and then abandoned his position.

[36]           I accept that a decision to put an employee on a leave from work could be an adverse impact, regardless of whether that leave is paid. However, the evidence before me does not support that this conduct was disciplinary and an attempt by RVCSS to harm Mr. Thompson’s career as alleged, or that Mr. Thompson’s sex or marital status was a factor in this treatment. The information alleged in the Employee Complaint regarding Mr. Thompson raised serious safety concerns. The Spouse also appears to have been concerned about Mr. Thompson’s safety in the workplace with respect to Ms. Beeson. I am satisfied that the Tribunal is reasonably certain find that these were both non-discriminatory reasons to place Mr. Thompson on leave. The evidence indicates that this was a period of significant upheaval and once an acting Executive Director was appointed and a decision about the direction of the investigation was made, she clarified that Mr. Thompson could return to work. Mr. Thompson has not provided any evidence to refute the Respondents’ evidence. I am satisfied that he has not taken this allegation out of the realm of conjecture.

[37]           Fifth, the Respondents deny that RVCSS ignored Mr. Thompson’s internal complaint about Ms. Beeson. They say Ms. MacMaster attempted to investigate Mr. Thompson’s internal complaint, but he refused to cooperate. In support of this position, the Respondents have provided emails between Ms. MacMaster and Mr. Thompson regarding his internal complaint. The emails show that Mr. Thompson forwarded his complaint to Ms. MacMaster on April 19, 2022, after she became the Acting Executive Director. On April 22, 2022, Ms. MacMaster acknowledged receipt of the complaint by email and invited Mr. Thompson to return to work. On April 26, 2022, she assured him that “due diligence is being done, and processes are being followed in regards to [his] complaints.” Mr. Thompson subsequently refused to communicate with Ms. MacMaster in light of her direction that he return to work while his internal complaint, and the current complaint before the Tribunal, were outstanding. I note that Mr. Thompson initially filed his complaint with the Tribunal on April 11, 2022, and amended it on April 22, 2022, to include this allegation about Ms. MacMaster. This timing suggests that his complaint with respect to this allegation may have been premature.

[38]           The Respondents have provided subsequent emails in which Ms. MacMaster attempted to set up an interview with Mr. Thompson about his complaint. On May 6, 2022, she writes:

As your employer, RVCS [sic] has an obligation to address your formal complaint. To determine whether the allegations of your complaint have merit, I will need to speak with you. If you are still refusing to communicate with me, then I will continue with the investigation, and I have nothing else to go off of from you, but your written complaint.

[39]           Mr. Thompson responded stating, among other topics, that he would communicate with Ms. MacMaster if a union representative was present, and requesting that a third-party investigator manage the investigation in light of Ms. MacMaster’s “personal and professional allegiance to [Ms. Beeson].”  Ms. MacMaster then replied citing the Collective Agreement, confirming that he is entitled to union representation during the investigation of the complaint, but he is otherwise expected to communicate with his colleagues and management. It further clarifies the circumstances in which a third-party investigator would be retained and explains why that would not occur with respect to his complaint. Subsequent emails indicate that an investigative interview was scheduled for May 19, 2022, but Mr. Thompson emailed that day stating that he could not attend due to illness. The interview was rescheduled for May 26, 2022; however, Mr. Thompson went on medical leave before that date. He did not report to work following the period of leave authorized by his doctor and did not communicate with his employer about his continued absence. The evidence presented indicates that he moved without providing a forwarding address and blocked his phone number. As a result, RVCSS considered him to have abandoned his position and terminated his employment. Mr. Thompson’s response was to thank Ms. MacMaster “for this wonderful news” and confirm that he wished to end his employment.

[40]           I am satisfied that this evidence supports the Respondents’ position that Ms. MacMaster did acknowledge Mr. Thompson’s internal complaint and attempted to investigate it in accordance with the Collective Agreement. However, the investigation could not be completed given Mr. Thompson’s medical leave, and his subsequent abandonment of his position. Mr. Thompson has not provided any evidence or explanation to refute the Respondents’ position. He has also not provided sufficient particulars or any evidence to support the allegation that Ms. MacMaster stated to several people that she “stands in solidarity with [Ms. Beeson]”.

[41]           With respect to allowing Ms. Beeson to return to work during this time, Mr. Thompson has not presented any evidence to suggest that she was required to be on leave as a result of his complaint against her. While the Collective Agreement contains a provision allowing the employer to take interim measures to separate the complainant and the respondent until the complaint is resolved, the Respondents’ evidence supports that Ms. Beeson was asked to work from home if Mr. Thompson returned to work following his leave. There is no evidence that Mr. Thompson experienced an adverse impact by Ms. Beeson continuing to work while his complaint was outstanding. Accordingly, he has not taken this allegation out of the realm of conjecture.

[42]           Sixth, the Respondents say that removing Mr. Thompson’s IT access while he was on leave was consistent with RVCSS’s general practice when an employee is on extended leave. The Respondents say that there was no adverse impact on Mr. Thompson’s employment, as he was not working at the time: Mikulski v. Richmond (City), 2020 BCHRT 191 at paras 18 and 23. I agree. There is no evidence that this action had any impact on Mr. Thompson, even if it was done without warning to him. Mr. Thompson has provided no evidence that this was not standard practice for a RVCSS employee on extended leave. Emails provided indicate that Ms. MacMaster informed Mr. Thompson that his access would be restored as soon as he confirmed that he would return to work.

[43]           For these reasons, I find that Mr. Thompson’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.

IV    CONCLUSION

[44]           Mr. Thompson has not taken his complaint out of the realm of conjecture. I grant the application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

Theressa Etmanski

Tribunal Member

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