Vowles v. Vancouver Island Health Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 35
Date Issued; January 28, 2026
File: CS-010647
Indexed as: Vowles v. Vancouver Island Health Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 35
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Kevin Vowles
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Vancouver Island Health Authority and
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health (Office of the Provincial Health Officer)
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On his own behalf: Kevin Vowles
Counsel for VIHA: Annie Olson
Counsel for the Ministry of Health: Alexandra MacCarthy
I Introduction
[1] On October 16, 2023, Kevin Vowles filed a complaint of discrimination in employment based on physical disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against Vancouver Island Health Authority [VIHA] and His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health (Office of the Provincial Health Officer) [the Ministry].
[2] The issue before me with respect to timeliness is whether to accept the complaint against VIHA and the Ministry. I make no findings regarding the merits of this complaint.
[3] VIHA provided an unsolicited reply to Mr. Vowles reply submission without applying to make further submissions. As such, I have not considered VIHA’s further submissions in rendering this decision.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find that it is not in the public interest to accept the late filed complaint for filing.
II Background to complaint
[5] Mr. Vowles reports having an anaphylactic allergy to polyethylene glycol. He claims this compound is found in the Province’s COVID-19 vaccines that were mandated during the recent pandemic.
[6] In the autumn of 2021, Mr. Vowles worked as an injury and violence prevention education consultant for VIHA. When the Ministry mandated COVID-19 vaccinations for workers by early 2022, Mr. Vowles sought an exemption for reasons related to his anaphylactic allergy.
[7] On February 8, 2022, Mr. Vowles alleges a Ministry physician denied his request for a vaccination exemption because he was unable to secure an appointment with an allergist to confirm his inability to receive the shot within the two-week timeframe permitted to provide such an opinion.
[8] On March 7, 2022, Mr. Vowles alleges VIHA fired him from his position for failing to receive the Ministry mandated COVID-19 vaccination. Mr. Vowles alleges VIHA proceeded with the termination despite him informing the employer of his allergy to vaccinations and his inability to secure an appointment with allergist within the allotted timeframe.
[9] Also on March 7, 2022, Mr. Vowles alleges seeing an allergist who informed him that it was necessary to be tested before taking a vaccine for safety reasons. From my review of the complaint information, I am unable to see whether the COVID-19 vaccination was ultimately found safe for Mr. Vowles after testing.
[10] Since leaving his position with VIHA, Mr. Vowles reports depression and suicidal ideation as he processed what occurred. He alleges that these disabilities were exacerbated by his pre-existing PTSD condition. Mr. Vowles reports making a gradual recovery and healing from the effects of being terminated.
III ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[11] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit
[12] The complaint was filed on October 16, 2023. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after October 16, 2022.
[13] The most recent allegations of discrimination in this case occurred on March 7, 2022. As such, the complaint is late-filed and I proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[14] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[15] I have first considered the length of delay in filing. The allegations of discrimination in this case occurred in the first months of 2022 ending when Mr. Vowles was terminated on March 7, 2022. The complaint was, therefore, approximately 7 months late filed, which is significant, but not insurmountable, if other factors favour acceptance: Robertson v. ContainerWest Manufacturing, 2015 BCHRT 173 at para. 27 and Ferrier v. BCAA, 2009 BCHRT 412 at para. 28. A seven-month delay weighs against accepting the complaint for filing: Paneswar v. Future Shop and others, 2012 BCHRT 297 at para. 27.
[16] Mr. Vowles provides several reasons for his delay. First, he submits that compromised mental health left him unable to take action to remedy the discrimination he suffered. He alleges that after being terminated by VIHA he experienced a prolonged period of significant mental impairment associated with his complex PTSD. During this period, he reports having regular contact with his family doctor regarding his mental health and functional capacity, including discussions about the impact of the job loss and making applications for medical employment insurance benefits. Mr. Vowles alleges his post termination mental condition substantially affected his executive functioning, ability to organize, and decision-making abilities. He claims this impairment prevented him from meaningfully engaging with legal processes and persisted for a significant period of time after leaving VIHA. Mr. Vowles offered to obtain medical evidence to support his claim of impairment from filing a complaint after claiming that he was unable to obtain such evidence during the timeframe for making submissions in this application.
[17] VIHA and the Ministry argue Mr. Vowles mental disability following his termination is not a compelling or cogent explanation for his delay in filing. In order for a medical condition to justify a significant delay they submit that it must be disabling from filing and usually accompanied by some medical evidence of its existence. The Respondents ask the Tribunal to distinguish between Mr. Vowles’ inability to work for mental disability reasons and his ability to file a complaint for mental disability reasons. In their view, these actions require different capacities, and Mr. Vowles has not provided evidence of disability from filing a complaint just because he was unable to work. Allowing a complainant to postpone filing a complaint until they consider the timing suitable and healthy would in the Respondents’ opinion render the time limits provisions under the Code meaningless.
[18] Where delay is due to a disabling condition, the Tribunal has observed that it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42. Disabling conditions can include physical and mental ailments resulting in great trouble coping with even the basic daily tasks of life: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170 at para. 21.
[19] I accept Mr. Vowles’ evidence that he has a PTSD condition that was exacerbated by being fired from his job with VIHA. There is no reason to reject his evidence that his mental disability involved depression and suicidal ideation. I further accept that his condition rendered him unable to work such that he applied for and received medical employment insurance for an unspecified amount of time. The more difficult question here, however, is the level of disability experienced by Mr. Vowles as it relates to his ability to file a complaint with the Tribunal. After reviewing the evidence on file and the parties’ submissions, I am not convinced that he was precluded from filing at the Tribunal based on his mental disabilities. While appreciating that Mr. Vowles claims his limited functionality prevented him from filing a complaint, including impairment in executive functioning, organization and decision making, he has not provided any specific details related to his activities of daily living that support a finding that he could not file in time. On the contrary, Mr. Vowles’ evidence indicates he received ongoing treatment for his mental disability from his family doctor and was able to initiate an application for medical employment insurance. While recognizing there are differences between starting a claim for medical based employment insurance and starting a human rights complaint, in my view Mr. Vowles’ ability to make an employment insurance claim indicates a level of functionality suggesting he could have also started a complaint at the Tribunal.
[20] In addition, Mr. Vowles has not provided any specific evidence related to the period of time when his mental disability precluded him from filing a complaint with the Tribunal. While he notes that his impairment persisted for a significant period, he has not provided any details related to his level of disability during the more than 18 months that passed from the time he was let go by VIHA until the date he filed the complaint. Without more particulars related to the timeframe of the impairment it is difficult to conclude with any certainty that it was ongoing for a period sufficient to attract the public interest.
[21] Overall, while appreciating the mental health difficulties Mr. Vowles was experiencing during the relevant time, there is a lack of evidence indicating his mental disabilities precluded him for filing a complaint sufficiently to attract the public interest in this case.
[22] Before leaving this issue, it is necessary to note that I have considered Mr. Vowles’ submission that he has medical evidence of disability from filing a complaint but was unable to secure it in the time permitted by the Tribunal’s submissions process. I appreciate the timeline for replying is brief, however, Mr. Vowles’ approach of stating the evidence exists and not providing it because the timeline is too tight for doing so is not the path to take when the onus is on him to prove the necessary level of impairment. Given the challenge associated with obtaining medical evidence from busy family practitioners, the more prudent approach was to find out how long it would take to get the opinion and seek an extension from the Tribunal in order to obtain the necessary evidence. Such requests are not unreasonably denied. In these circumstances, I found Mr. Vowles’ assertion that medical evidence of disability exists but could not be produced in the allotted timeframe not particularly helpful in weighing the evidence of disability from filing.
[23] Mr. Vowles also submits that his limited financial resources meant he was unable to get legal advice until just before filing a complaint with the Tribunal. He straightforwardly admits that once he saw a lawyer he realized that the events in question were allegations capable of forming a complaint of discrimination under the Code. After this was revealed, he diligently filed with the Tribunal.
[24] VIHA argues Mr. Vowles could have filed his complaint on his own without the assistance of counsel. They submit that initiating a complaint is relatively easy for complainants given the Tribunal’s online information and filing options. As such, financial hardship delaying access to a lawyer is not a reason for late filing that attracts the public interest. The Ministry agrees with VIHA that Mr. Vowles was not prevented from filing a timely complaint because he did not have timely access to a paid lawyer.
[25] I agree with the Respondents that access to legal counsel is not necessary to file a timely complaint with the Tribunal. The information necessary to decide whether allegations of discrimination exist and the forms necessary to start a timely complaint are easily accessible on the Tribunal’s website. In this case, Mr. Vowles has not provided any information, apart from medical disability discussed above, indicating he lacked the necessary capacity to file a complaint on his own without counsel. Further, he has not indicated whether he tried to access various free legal resources that could have assisted him with identifying the human rights issue and timeline for filing complaint with the Tribunal. In these circumstances, I am not convinced that a lack of financial resources necessary to seek advice from a paid lawyer attracts the public interest.
[26] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BHCRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 244 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[27] Mr. Vowles seeks justice for being fired for not receiving a COVID-19 vaccination. He also more broadly believes the public will benefit from a proceeding about the need to accommodate a medical disability in the context of public health orders and employment termination. In his view, such matters continue to affect public confidence in human rights protections.
[28] VIHA argues the case does not raise a novel issue that should be heard to advance the purposes of the Code. Such vaccination cases have already been heard by the Tribunal with more in process that will likely result in published decisions of public benefit.
[29] The Ministry argues the nature of this complaint is of limited public interest because it is about the core issue of disability in the workplace that is often considered by the Tribunal in an area of the law that is settled.
[30] On one level I agree that this case is a routine employment and disability matter that is not unique or novel for the purposes of attracting the public interest. On another level, however, I believe this case is unique as it involves mandatory vaccinations and the workplace during a global pandemic. Ultimately, I conclude that the nature of this case does not attract the public interest where many timely complaints concerning this issue are currently proceeding at the Tribunal with some now scheduled for a hearing on the merits. With this in mind, I am confident that this issue will be fully canvassed in future public decisions such that it is not in the public interest to allow this late filed case to proceed.
[31] In circumstances where the complaint is significantly late filed, Mr. Vowles has not provided significant reasons for late filing, and the nature of the complaint is not particularly unique or novel, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV Conclusion
[32] For these reasons, the complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member