Haug v. Trafalgar Management Ltd. and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 34
Date Issued: January 28, 2026
File: CS-001128
Indexed as: Haug v. Trafalgar Management Ltd. and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 34
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Thomas Haug
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Trafalgar Management Ltd. and Tracey Welsford and Dr. Gordon Keith Chambers
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: No Submissions
Counsel for the Respondents: Andrew Peng
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Thomas Haug filed a complaint against the owner of his apartment, Dr. Gordon Keith Chambers, the property manager, Tracey Welsford, and the property management company Trafalgar Management Ltd., alleging they discriminated against him based on a mental disability contrary to s. 10 of the Human Rights Code. He says he was denied permission to sub-let his apartment while he travels out of the country for his seasonal affective disorder.
[2] The Respondents say the parties settled the complaint on September 11, 2024. They apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) on the basis that it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint in the face of the agreement.
[3] Mr. Haug did not respond to the application. The Tribunal set a schedule for submissions by a letter dated July 14, 2025. On November 18, 2025, Mr. Haug applied to provide a response to the dismissal application verbally by submitting an audio recording. The Tribunal granted Mr. Haug’s application. Mr. Haug sent a test audio recording to the Tribunal and the Respondents on December 22, 2025. The Tribunal and the Respondents confirmed they could receive and access the audio file. Mr. Haug did not provide a response to the dismissal application by the due date of December 30, 2025, or at all.
[4] On January 6, 2026, the Tribunal notified Mr. Haug in writing that it would proceed to decide the dismissal application on the information before it. The Tribunal told Mr. Haug that if he wished to submit a late response, he could apply for permission to do so. While this goes beyond the Tribunal’s usual practice, Mr. Haug has not applied for permission to file a late response nor has he filed a response to the dismissal application.
[5] In these circumstances, I am satisfied Mr. Haug had notice of the application and an opportunity to file a response submission. I find there is no unfairness in making this decision on the materials before me.
[6] For the following reasons, I am persuaded that the purposes of the Code would not be furthered by allowing the complaint to proceed where the parties have settled this complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[7] Mr. Haug filed his complaint with the Tribunal on November 13, 2019. He says he has a mental disability with a significant seasonal affective component, and it is beneficial for him to leave the country each year for five to seven months to spend winter in a sunny climate. He alleges the Respondents have denied him permission to sub-lease his apartment during these periods when he is out of the country.
[8] On September 11, 2024, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving Mr. Haug’s complaint on the following terms:
a. The Respondents will pay Mr. Haug the amount of $55,000.00;
b. The Respondents will permit Mr. Haug to sub-let his apartment for up to seven months each year, provided Mr. Haug has subletting insurance coverage during the term of the sublease;
c. Mr. Haug will withdraw his human rights complaint; and
d. Mr. Haug will sign a release of all claims in favour of the Respondents.
[9] In September 2024, pursuant to the terms of the agreement Mr. Haug cancelled his existing insurance and obtained tenant’s insurance to cover subletting for the apartment.
[10] On or around October 16, 2024, the Respondents sent the settlement funds to Mr. Haug.
[11] Between September 2024 and January 2025, the parties’ discussed with their respective insurance brokers and each other whether Mr. Haug’s insurance coverage was sufficient to satisfy the terms of the settlement. On February 10, 2025, the parties confirmed that the insurance Mr. Haug obtained in September 2024 was sufficient.
[12] On July 3, 2025, Mr. Haug wrote to the Respondents and stated that he had incurred additional losses since signing the settlement agreement for which he wanted to be compensated before signing a release and withdrawing his complaint. Specifically, he said:
a. He did not deposit the settlement funds. Had he done so he would have earned investment income. He sought the loss of investment income;
b. He incurred an insurance policy cancellation fee; and
c. He incurred a loss of rental income because he did not sublet his apartment during the 2024/2025 winter.
III DECISION
[13] Section 27(1)(d)(ii) allows the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint where proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code. These purposes include both private and public interests: s. 3. Deciding whether a complaint furthers those purposes is not only about the interests in the individual complaint. It may also be about broad public policy issues, like the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in a hearing: Dar Santos v. UBC, 2003 BCHRT 73, at para. 59, Tillis v. Pacific Western Brewing and Komatsu, 2005 BCHRT 433 at para. 15, Gichuru v. Pallai (No. 2), 2010 BCHRT 125, at paras. 113-118.
[14] The Respondents argue that it would not further the Code’s purposes for the complaint to proceed because the parties have settled the complaint. The Tribunal may dismiss a complaint under s.27(1)(d)(ii) where the parties have settled the complaint. While a settlement agreement does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction over a complaint, there is a strong public interest in honouring settlement agreements: Thompson v. Providence Health Care, 2003 BCHRT 58 at para. 38. There are also situations, however, where the terms of the settlement or the conditions under which it was reached run counter to the purposes of the Code: Edwards v. Cowichan Valley Regional District, 2018 BCHRT 172 at para. 35; Thompson at paras. 39-46; The Employee v. The Company and the Owner, 2017 BCHRT 266 at para. 35.
[15] There is no dispute that the parties signed a settlement agreement on September 11, 2024. The Respondents submitted a copy of the agreement. The agreement says the parties intend it to fully and finally resolve the entirety of the human rights complaint. Further, the evidence is that Mr. Haug obtained tenant’s insurance to comply with one of the terms of the agreement. From this I understand that there was a meeting of minds between the parties with consensus on the essential elements of their agreement: Poirier v. Nootka Reforestation Inc. and others, 2022 BCHRT 43 at para. 18.
[16] I am satisfied that the parties agreed to terms by which Mr. Haug’s complaint would be resolved, and that the agreement was a valid settlement agreement. I next turn to the question of whether it furthers the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed in the face of the agreement.
[17] The burden is on the person seeking to pursue the complaint in the face of an agreement to persuade the Tribunal that the purposes of the Code are best served by allowing the complaint to proceed: Thompson at para. 46.
[18] Here, I find there are no factors that weigh against dismissing the complaint. The language of the release is clear and unambiguous. Mr. Haug was represented by sophisticated counsel when he entered into the agreement and there is no suggestion that there was any unconscionability, undue influence, or duress when Mr. Haug entered the agreement.
[19] I have considered the issues Mr. Haug raised when he declined to sign a release and withdraw his complaint, specifically that he had incurred some further loss. ON its own, however, this is not the sort of circumstance that would warrant the Tribunal not holding Mr. Haug to his agreement and Mr. Haug did not argue otherwise.
[20] I am persuaded that the parties settled this complaint, that the terms and circumstances surrounding the settlement were not contrary to the purposes of the Code, and that in the face of the settlement it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with Mr. Haug’s complaint.
IV CONCLUSION
[21] The application to dismiss the complaint is granted. I dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii).
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member