Yntema v. Lafrentz Road Marking, a Division of Canadian Road Builders Inc., 2026 BCHRT 30
Date Issued: January 27, 2026
File(s): CS-006258
Indexed as: Yntema v. Lafrentz Road Marking, a Division of Canadian Road Builders Inc., 2026 BCHRT 30
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Catherine (Sarah) Yntema
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Lafrentz Road Marking, a Division of Canadian Road Builders Inc.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Navpreet K. Gill
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Catherine (Sarah) Yntema alleges that her former employer, Lafrentz Road Marking, a Division of Canadian Road Builders Inc. [Lafrentz], discriminated against her in the area of employment based on the grounds of age and sex, in contravention of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] With the Tribunal’s permission, Lafrentz applied to dismiss Ms. Yntema’s complaint under ss. 27(1)(f) and (d)(ii) of the Code. It says the complaint should be dismissed because of an agreement signed by the parties in settlement of a grievance filed regarding the termination of Ms. Yntema’s employment [Settlement Agreement].
[3] Ms. Yntema did not file a submission in response to Lafrentz’s dismissal application. Despite several attempts to communicate with her, the Tribunal has not heard from Ms. Yntema since September 2024.
[4] I find I can most efficiently decide Lafrentz’s application under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code. For the reasons that follow, the application is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The following information is drawn from the Settlement Agreement. It is not meant to be an exhaustive summary of the information before me. I have considered all the materials filed, but only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact related to the merits of the complaint.
[6] Lafrentz employed Ms. Yntema in May and June, 2020. On June 23, 2020, Lafrentz terminated Ms. Yntema’s employment. Ms. Yntema’s union subsequently grieved the termination on her behalf, alleging that Lafrentz did not have grounds for dismissal and that it had discriminated against her based on sex and age. Lafrentz denied Ms. Yntema’s allegations. It said it dismissed her for safety reasons.
[7] On June 23, 2021, Ms. Yntema filed her human rights complaint, alleging discrimination based on sex and age in the form of bullying, harassment, and mistreatment in the workplace and the termination of her employment.
[8] The parties referred Ms. Yntema’s grievance to an arbitrator, but ended up resolving it on mutually agreeable terms before it reached arbitration. The Settlement Agreement was executed at the end of September 2021. It is just over two pages, and includes the following relevant terms:
14. The Employer will pay the Grievor $26,000 in general damages for injury to dignity, feelings and self respect consistent with the Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210 (the “Payment”) as the sole and exclusive remedy …
…
17. The Grievor, the Union and the Employer hereby release one another from any liability with respect to any claims (grievance, actions, disputes, complaints, etc.) which have arisen or may arise regarding the Grievor’s employment with the Employer or the cessation of that employment, including all claims under … the Human Rights Code …
[9] Lafrentz provided the Settlement Agreement to the Tribunal and Ms. Yntema when it filed its response to the complaint. It asserted that the human rights complaint was resolved and settled in September 2021, as evidenced by the Settlement Agreement. On June 18, 2024, the Tribunal wrote to the parties, asking Ms. Yntema to confirm whether she agreed that the human rights complaint was settled. Ms. Yntema subsequently advised that she did not agree that the complaint was settled, and she wanted it to proceed.
III DECISION
[10] People cannot contract out of the Code’s protections: Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 SCR 145 at para. 158. Accordingly, a settlement agreement between parties to a complaint before this Tribunal does not deprive the Tribunal of its jurisdiction over the complaint: Thompson v. Providence Health Care, 2003 BCHRT 58 at para. 36. However, there are strong public policy reasons for encouraging parties to settle their disputes on a voluntary and consensual basis, and for honoring those settlements: Thompson at para. 38; see Nguyen v. School District No. 52 (Prince Rupert), 2004 BCHRT 20 at para. 15, cited in Patel v. Convertus Digital, 2025 BCHRT 52 at para. 14. As a result, where parties have settled a complaint, the Tribunal can dismiss it under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code on the basis that proceeding with the complaint would not further the Code’s purposes.
[11] Where a settlement agreement is alleged as the basis for an application to dismiss a complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii), the applicant – i.e., the party seeking to rely on the settlement agreement – must establish (1) the existence of the settlement agreement, and (2) that the settlement agreement was intended to release the applicant from any further liability in respect of the human rights complaint in issue: Thompson at para. 46. If the applicant does so, then the burden shifts to the other party to show that despite the settlement agreement’s existence, the complaint should nonetheless be allowed to proceed: Thompson at para. 46
[12] In the present application, Lafrentz argues that, given the Settlement Agreement, Ms. Yntema’s complaint should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) because proceeding with it would not further the Code’s purposes. For the following reasons, I agree.
[13] First, I am satisfied that the Settlement Agreement exists. Lafrentz provided the Settlement Agreement as evidence with its dismissal application. Ms. Yntema is named as a party to the Settlement Agreement. I am satisfied that she signed the Settlement Agreement on September 20, 2021, a union representative signed it on September 24, 2021, and Lafrentz’s general manager and legal counsel signed it September 27, 2021. Lafrentz states that it paid Ms. Yntema the $26,000 amount set out in the Settlement Agreement. This statement is not contested and I have no reason to question it. Nor is it disputed that Lafrentz fulfilled the other terms of the Settlement Agreement, including providing Ms. Yntema with a “confirmation of employment letter.” Lafrentz filed such a letter, dated September 27, 2021, as evidence in support of its application.
[14] Second, I am satisfied that the Settlement Agreement was intended to release Lafrentz from further liability in respect of the complaint before the Tribunal. The language of the Settlement Agreement is clear. It related to allegations that Lafrentz discriminated against Ms. Yntema based on her sex and age, and wrongfully terminated her – which is precisely what her complaint is about. All parties, including Ms. Yntema, agreed to release one another from “any liability with respect to any claims” (e.g., “complaints”) arising from Ms. Yntema’s employment with Lafrentz or the cessation of her employment, “including all claims … under the Human Rights Code.” Ms. Yntema was a party to the Settlement Agreement and signed it. Based on the Settlement Agreement and Lafrentz’s submissions, and in the absence of any contrary information from Ms. Yntema, I am satisfied that there was a “meeting of the minds” of the parties to the Settlement Agreement and they agreed on its essential elements: DCS Employee v. Employer Company and others, 2022 BCHRT 126 at para. 27.
[15] Finally, Ms. Yntema has not met her burden of showing that the complaint should be allowed to proceed in the face of the Settlement Agreement. I appreciate that there may be situations where the terms of a settlement, or the conditions under which it was reached, run counter to the Code’s purposes: Edwards v. Cowichan Valley Regional District, 2018 BCHRT 172 at para. 35; Thompson at paras. 39-46; The Employee v. The Company and the Owner, 2017 BCHRT 266 at para. 35. However, there is no information before the Tribunal regarding any such situation in this case. Ms. Yntema had union representation in negotiating and executing the Settlement Agreement. The language of the release in the agreement is clear and straightforward, such that I have no reason to believe she might not have understood it. There is no evidence of any coercion, duress, or undue influence. The Settlement Agreement granted Ms. Yntema the Code remedy of compensation for injury to dignity, in an amount at the middle of the range of injury to dignity awards in recent employment cases where the complainant lost their employment: see Thandi v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Corrections Branch, North Fraser Pretrial Centre, 2025 BCHRT 294 at para. 182. While the allegations in the complaint are serious, Ms. Yntema has made no submissions as to why they should override what the parties agreed to. On the information filed, I see no reason not to honour the Settlement Agreement.
[16] I therefore find that the Code’s purposes are best served by holding the parties to the bargain they made in September 2021. Proceeding with the complaint would not further the purposes of the Code, so it is dismissed under s. 27(1)(d)(ii).
IV CONCLUSION
[17] Lafrentz’s application is granted. The complaint is dismissed: Code, s. 27(1)(d)(ii).
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member