Dhillon v. Interfor Corporation, 2026 BCHRT 246
Date Issued: November 18, 2026
File(s): CS-006051
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jaswinder Singh Dhillon
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Interfor Corporation
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Carol Whittome
On their own behalf: Jaswinder Singh Dhillon
Counsel for the Respondent: Greg Heywood and Jacky Xu
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mr. Dhillon wears a turban as part of his Sikh faith. He worked for more than 25 years at Interfor’s sawmill, where all workers were required to wear hard hats. To comply with that requirement, he wore a smaller turban beneath a hard hat.
[2] In 2021, WorkSafeBC changed its hard hat rules to give employers more flexibility to accommodate Sikh men who wear turbans. Interfor assessed the mill and concluded that Mr. Dhillon would have to continue to wear a hard hat in some areas in and around the mill.
[3] Mr. Dhillon disagreed and did not return to work until the mill was sold. He filed this human rights complaint saying Interfor discriminated against him based on religion regarding his employment, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[4] Interfor denies discriminating against Mr. Dhillon. It says that wearing a hard hat was a safety requirement for his job, and Mr. Dhillon refused to participate in the accommodation process.
[5] Interfor applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, arguing that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. It also applies to dismiss under s. 27(1)(d)(ii), arguing that proceeding to a hearing would not further the purposes of the Code because it made a reasonable settlement offer that remains open for acceptance, and there is no reason to proceed despite this offer.
[6] I can most efficiently address this application under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code. For the following reasons, I dismiss the complaint s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[7] Mr. Dhillon started working at an Interfor sawmill in 1994. At the time this complaint was filed, he worked as a planer-grader, inspecting and grading lumber, and was represented by the United Steelworkers, Local 2009 union.
[8] Since 2008, Interfor has had a policy requiring workers to wear hard hats throughout the mill. To comply, Mr. Dhillon wore a smaller turban under a hard hat at work.
[9] In September 2021, WorkSafeBC (WSBC) changed its rules to give employers more flexibility to accommodate Sikh men who wear turbans. Employers had to assess workplace risks, and they could remove hard hat requirements in areas where risk of injuries were eliminated or sufficiently reduced. In a June 2021 newsletter titled “New hard hat rules make workplaces more inclusive,” the Ministry of Labour explained the changes as follows:
a. Many employers have approached hard hat rules with a blanket requirement for all workers to wear them even in low-risk areas.
b. The Minister of Labour requested WSBC to review hard hat rules and consider changes to make them more inclusive for Sikhs who wear turbans.
c. WSBC held extensive public and stakeholder consultation in 2020 and early 2021 about the proposed amendments.
d. Employers must ensure the health and safety of their workers, as well as accommodate a worker’s religious practices.
[10] In August 2021, Interfor assessed workplace risks and decided workers still needed hard hats in many areas, including outside the mill, because of ongoing safety risks. Although some areas, including the grading station where Mr. Dhillon worked, did not require hard hats, those areas were small and/or connected to parts of the mill where hard hats were required.
[11] Later in August, Interfor met with Mr. Dhillon, and he asked for an exemption from the hard hat policy when entering and exiting the mill. Interfor denied the request and maintained the policy because it believed workers faced risks from slips, falls, and flying debris.
[12] Mr. Dhillon disagreed with Interfor’s assessment. The union filed a grievance, arguing that the hard hat policy conflicted with his religious beliefs and asking Interfor to remove barriers to wearing a turban at work.
[13] Mr. Dhillon also complained to WSBC that Interfor failed to follow the new hard hat rules allowing for more flexibility and were violating his religious beliefs. In October, WSBC went to the mill to discuss the changes. WSBC’s inspection report states:
a. WSBC discussed the new rules and Interfor’s obligation to conduct a risk assessment.
b. WSBC considers safety equipment like hard hats the least effective control measure because it is only a barrier and does not eliminate hazards.
c. WSBC’s role concerns what measures Interfor has taken to eliminate or reduce hazards, and it does not enforce Human Rights Code requirements.
[14] In November, WSBC went back to the mill to assess potential risks and hard hat requirements. Interfor provided its risk assessment to WSBC. In December, WSBC issued its report stating Interfor had complied with its obligations, specifically:
a. Some workstations, including grading stations, have overhead and side protection controls that effectively reduce hazards.
b. Interfor does not require workers to wear hard hats in areas where controls effectively reduce hazards.
c. However, controls reducing hazards do not cover all parts of the mill, and there is a small risk of injury outside of the mill from falling or flying objects, such as branches during windstorms or debris from equipment and machinery.
d. Although the risk of an injury may be low, the consequences could be serious, so it would be prudent to use hard hats in all parts of the mill and outside.
[15] In December 2021, the union conducted its own risk assessment. It identified potential hazards, rated the risk level, and suggested ways to reduce those risks. The union concluded that Mr. Dhillon could safely travel from his vehicle in the parking lot directly to the grading station without wearing a hard hat. Interfor disagreed and said the union’s findings were inconsistent with its and WSBC’s assessments. As a result, Interfor and the union discussed retaining an independent inspector to review the issue.
[16] On January 10, 2022, Mr. Dhillon advised that he disagreed with Interfor’s assessment and its application of the hard hat policy. The union filed another grievance, alleging that the policy violated Mr. Dhillon’s religious beliefs, and Interfor’s assessment was “unrealistic, unreliable, and incomplete.” The grievance sought the removal of barriers for Sikhs who wear turbans and requested they be permitted to enter the worksite and perform their work without any compromise. Mr. Dhillon began an approved paid leave.
[17] Interfor responded to Mr. Dhillon on January 21. It repeated its view that removing the hard hat requirement at the mill was neither practical nor safe. At the same time, it encouraged him to return to work wearing the smaller turban he had previously worn so he could continue earning income while the grievance process unfolded. Interfor also reminded him of his duty to mitigate any income loss by exploring other sources of work.
[18] On January 28, Interfor denied the January 2022 grievance. It again explained its position and encouraged Mr. Dhillon to return to work wearing the smaller turban he had worn before January 10. Interfor also took the position that he should “work now and grieve later.” While it expected him to return to work, it advised it would not terminate his employment if he refused, given the nature of the grievance. However, he would no longer receive pay if he did not return to work.
[19] Mr. Dhillon filed this complaint on January 30, 2022. He did not return to work and Interfor placed him on unpaid leave the following day.
[20] On February 7, 2022, Mr. Dhillon asked Interfor in writing to accommodate his religious beliefs by allowing him to work without wearing a hard hat over his turban. He explained that wearing a turban is a fundamental part of his Sikh identity, faith, and culture and that, out of respect for what he considered a religious crown, he should not have to wear anything over it.
[21] On March 7, 2022, the union wrote to Interfor and stated its understanding of the facts, including that wearing a hat over a turban directly conflicts with Sikh religious beliefs. The union also argued that Interfor’s risk assessment, and WSBC’s review, did not adequately address the issue of accommodation for Mr. Dhillon.
[22] After further discussions with the union, Interfor agreed to retain an independent consultant to conduct another risk assessment. The consultant completed the assessment in April 2022 and concluded that workers did not need to wear hard hats while working at the grading station. However, they also concluded workers should still use hard hats when travelling to and from the station because of risks such as falling or flying debris, emergencies, slips and falls, and contact with machinery or metal structures.
[23] Mr. Dhillon remained off work until Interfor sold the mill on May 12, 2022.
[24] On May 17, 2022 the union advised Mr. Dhillon that the new mill owner would not require him to wear a hard hat on his way to the grading station, and he could return to work immediately without restrictions. The union also advised that it continued to pursue his claim against Interfor for lost wages from January 31 to May 17, 2022.
[25] The next day, the union provided Interfor with an updated understanding of the facts, including its opinion on the consultant’s report. It said that, using the same information but a “more appropriate” risk-rating matrix, it had concluded that the risk of injury without a hard hat was minimal, and any remaining hazards could be managed through engineering, administrative, or other controls.
[26] On May 25, 2022, Interfor offered to settle the grievance by paying $28,101.60, less statutory deductions, for lost wages from January 31 to May 13, 2022. Interfor followed up with the union on August 22, 2022, and again on April 20, 2023. Interfor and the union exchanged some emails, but the settlement offer was not accepted or expressly rejected.
[27] On November 17, 2025, the Tribunal allowed Interfor to apply to dismiss the complaint based on two sections of the Code: s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, arguing that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success, and/or s. 27(1)(d)(ii), arguing that continuing the complaint would not further the purposes of the Code because it has made a reasonable settlement offer.
[28] On December 2, 2025, Interfor made a with-prejudice offer to settle this complaint. It offered Mr. Dhillon $20,601.60, less statutory deductions, for lost wages, and $7,500 for injury to dignity if he agreed to withdraw the complaint. Interfor noted the wage loss was based on the $28,101.60 offer to settle the 2022 grievance minus 25% for failure to mitigate his losses. The offer also stated that it would remain open for two weeks after the Tribunal decided its application to dismiss under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code, regardless of whether Mr. Dhillon initially rejected the offer or how the Tribunal decided this application to dismiss. Interfor followed up on that offer on December 10, 2025.
[29] On January 17, 2025, Interfor filed this application to dismiss.
[30] Mr. Dhillon did not respond to this application to dismiss by the deadline. As a result, on March 27, 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the parties to advise that it had not received a response and to ask whether Mr. Dhillon wished to continue with the complaint. In the letter, the Tribunal advised Mr. Dhillon that he would have to ask permission to file a late response and explain the reason for delay. Furthermore, it stated that the Tribunal would proceed to decide on the application to dismiss with the information it has if Mr. Dhillon did not want to file a response.
[31] On April 1, 2026, Mr. Dhillon confirmed that he wanted the complaint to proceed to a hearing. He maintained that Interfor had violated his religious and human rights, and it had not shown remorse, provided accommodation, or offered fair compensation. Mr. Dhillon did not ask to file a late response and did not file any further submissions.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(d)(ii) – Would not further the purposes of the Code
[32] Interfor argues that it would not further the Code’s purposes to allow the complaint to proceed because it made a reasonable settlement offer: Carter v. Travelex Canada, 2007 BCHRT 275 at para. 23-25, upheld in 2009 BCCA 180.
[33] There are two pre-requisites for the Tribunal to consider dismissing a complaint based on a reasonable settlement offer. First, the settlement offer must be made “with prejudice” because the Tribunal cannot rely on information about settlement discussions that is inadmissible based on privilege: at Dar Santos v. University of British Columbia, 2003 BCHRT 73 para. 64; Carter at para. 25. Second, the offer must remain open for the complainant’s acceptance regardless of the outcome of the application to dismiss: Issa v. Loblaw, 2009 BCHRT 264at para. 35.
[34] In this case, Interfor’s offer was made with prejudice and remains open for two weeks after the Tribunal issues this decision, regardless of whether Mr. Dhillon initially rejected the offer or how the Tribunal decides. Therefore, Interfor’s offer meets the two pre-requisites.
[35] Next, to determine whether it furthers the purposes of the Code to proceed, the Tribunal considers two things. First, it determines whether the offer is reasonable. Generally, it will not further the purposes of the Code to proceed where the respondent has made a reasonable, with prejudice, settlement offer: Dar Santos at para. 59. Second, even if the offer is reasonable, the Tribunal may consider whether there are considerations that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint, considering the purposes set out in s. 3 of the Code.
[36] In assessing whether the offer is reasonable, the Tribunal assumes that the complainant will prove their allegations and considers what the Tribunal would likely order. The offer does not need to mirror exactly what the Tribunal would order: Carter at para. 30. It is not always necessary for a respondent to admit liability: Frick v. University of British Columbia, 2009 BCHRT 85 [Frick] at para. 54. However, the offer must fully address the allegations and available remedies, both monetary and non-monetary. The Tribunal will consider:
· Whether the respondent’s remedial actions adequately remedied the alleged violation and are consistent with the types of orders the Tribunal might make if the complaints were successful; and
· Whether the monetary settlement offered is within the reasonable range that the Tribunal might award if found the complaint was justified.
See Issa at para. 35
[37] I will first address whether the settlement offer is reasonable and then turn to whether there are any considerations that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint considering Code purposes.
1. Is the settlement offer reasonable?
[38] Interfor’s settlement offer is $20,601.60 (less statutory deductions), for lost wages, and $7,500 for injury to dignity (no statutory deductions). The wage loss amount is based on $28,101.60 of actual wage loss minus 25% for Mr. Dhillon’s failure to mitigate his losses. Interfor argues that the total amount of the offer is likely more that the Tribunal would order in a hearing.
[39] Mr. Dhillon did not file a response to this application to dismiss, and he did not set out the remedies he was seeking in his complaint form. The only information I have before me besides the complaint form is his April 2026 letter to the Tribunal confirming he wanted the complaint to proceed to a hearing. In the April letter, Mr. Dhillon maintained that Interfor had violated his religious and human rights, and stated it “had not shown remorse, provided accommodation, or offered fair compensation.”
[40] From his comments about Interfor violating his human rights and its lack of remorse, it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Dhillon is seeking some non-monetary remedies in addition to compensation. However, since Interfor sold the mill, it is no longer Mr. Dhillon’s employer, and therefore it cannot offer most common non-monetary awards. For example, it can not offer accommodation, and an order to stop and refrain from repeating the contravention in relation to Mr. Dhillon in the future is not applicable since it no longer manages the mill. Based on the materials before me, Mr. Dhillon appears to be requesting an apology or some form of acknowledgement that Interfor discriminated against him and will not do it again.
[41] As noted earlier, it is not always necessary for a respondent to admit liability in a reasonable settlement offer: Frick at para. 54. At a hearing, Interfor would not admit fault, and the Tribunal would not order it to apologize or demonstrate remorse: Matembe v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (TransLink) (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 152 [Matembe]at para. 57; Employee R v. B.H. Allen Building Centre Ltd. dba RONA and others, 2026 BCHRT 105 at para. 75.
[42] While Interfor’s settlement offer does not incorporate the non-monetary orders Mr. Dhillon likely seeks, the absence of such orders does not in itself provide a basis for denying the dismissal application: McQueen v. Three Point Motors, 2017 BCHRT 120 at para. 33. Rather, the important consideration is whether the offer presents a reasonable resolution of the complaint: Matembe at para. 56.
[43] I now turn to the monetary offers. The wage loss offer is based on $28,101.60 of actual wage loss, minus 25% for Mr. Dhillon’s failure to mitigate his losses (and less appropriate statutory deductions). Interfor says 25% is a reasonable amount to deduct because Mr. Dhillon refused to return to work or discuss possible accommodations, insisting on a complete exemption from the hard hat policy. It argues he could have reduced his losses by returning to work either in an accommodated capacity or by wearing a smaller turban under his hardhat. Because Mr. Dhillon chose not to mitigate his losses, Interfor says any lost-wage award should be limited.
[44] The duty to mitigate requires a person to take reasonable steps to avoid or reduce their financial losses. The basic principle is that a person cannot recover losses that were within their power to avoid: Michaud v. Ministry of Finance (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 341 at 65, citing discussion in Evans v. Teamsters Local Union No. 31, 2008 SCC 20 at paras. 97-100 (per Abella J, dissenting but not on this point).
[45] The Tribunal has broad discretion to order wage loss compensation under s. 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code. The Tribunal is not required to apply the common law test for mitigation in determining the amount of compensation to award: J.J. v. School District 43 (Coquitlam), 2013 BCCA 67 at paras. 37-39. However, in my view, it is reasonable to conclude that the Tribunal could apply the principles of mitigation to Mr. Dhillon’s wage loss claim. While the evidence that Mr. Dhillon failed to mitigate his wage loss is not strong, I think it is appropriate to account for the possibility that the Tribunal could reduce his wage-loss award because of a failure to mitigate. Mr. Dhillon did not respond to the application to dismiss, so there is no argument or evidence that contradicts the material Interfor has submitted. In these circumstances and based on the materials before me, I think the wage loss offer is reasonable.
[46] I now turn to the $7,500 compensation for injury to dignity (no statutory deductions). Although it is clear Mr. Dhillon is seeking compensation for injury to dignity, there is nothing in the materials before me that indicates he is seeking a particular amount or range.
[47] The Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and/or self respect under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code. The purpose of these awards is to provide compensation to the complainant, not to punish the respondent.
[48] The amount of compensation depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case and relevant factors: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 2), 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396 at para. 260. However, to ensure fairness and consistency, it is helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases. In making an injury to dignity award, the Tribunal generally considers three broad factors: the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 225.
[49] The nature of the alleged discrimination is that Mr. Dhillon was on an unpaid leave of absence for approximately four months because he did not want to compromise his religious beliefs. The Tribunal has recognized that religious beliefs, such as wearing a turban, are fundamental expressions of religion and identity: Sandhu v. BC Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure and another, 2026 BCHRT 200 at para. 37. Interfor told him he was expected to return to work, but he would not be terminated for being away given the nature of the grievance. He returned to the same position with full accommodation after this relatively short period away from work.
[50] I accept that Sikh men who wear turbans in the workplace are vulnerable. The Ministry of Labour’s newsletter explaining the change in WSBC rules sets out the relevant social context and supports this conclusion. For example, the newsletter states that the Sikh community has raised concerns for many years about not being able to fully participate in the workplace, often because some employers have applied the rules in a “blanket” manner to the entire workplace. This has resulted in inequity for Sikh men who wear turbans, and the changes in rules were meant to address this inequity.
[51] I also accept that his unpaid leave from work would have had a negative effect on him. However, there is little evidence in the materials before me about the extent of that impact. In his February 2022 letter to Interfor, it is clear Mr. Dhillon believed that wearing anything over his turban compromised his religious beliefs. From the materials before me, it is also clear that Mr. Dhillon had compromised his religious beliefs for decades by wearing a hard hat over a smaller turban, and that he had done this solely to comply with Interfor’s hard hat policy. It appears he only requested accommodation after WSBC rules were changed to address discrimination. From the materials before me, it appears he was upset about the denial of accommodation, and he refused to return to the workplace rather than continue to compromise his religious practices.
[52] Interfor refers to several cases it says are comparable to Mr. Dhillon’s situation. These cases involve more serious consequences related to religious beliefs, such as not being hired or getting terminated, and the injury to dignity awards are in the range of $2,000 to $8,500. However, these are also cases from before 2016, and the Tribunal’s awards having been trending upwards: Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82 at para 78. While these cases do not mirror the exact circumstances of this case, I have reviewed and considered all of them in reaching my decision under this factor.
[53] In my view, $7,500 is at the lowest end of the reasonable range of injury-to-dignity awards in these circumstances. However, I do not think it is so low as to fall outside that range. The amount is not a token or trivial amount, it provides meaningful recognition of Mr. Dhillon’s injury to dignity, and it is one the Tribunal could reasonably award after a hearing. Although a hearing could result in a substantially higher award, especially given recent trends in Tribunal decisions, an offer need not mirror the likely outcome. It need only fall within a reasonable range, and I find that this offer does.
[54] In conclusion, after looking at the entirety of Interfor’s settlement offer, I am satisfied that it fully addresses the discrimination allegation and available remedies. In my view, it offers compensation that is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order at a hearing.
[55] I now consider whether it will there are any factors that weight in favour of proceeding to a hearing based on the purposes of the Code, despite Interfor’s reasonable offer.
2. Will it serve the purposes of the Code to proceed despite the reasonable settlement offer?
[56] In Dar Santos, the Tribunal set out what was meant by the “purposes of the Code” in s. 27(1)(d)(ii):
… I accept that, the “purposes of the Code” go beyond the individual rights of a complainant and respondent. The purposes of the Code, as outlined in s. 3, include several public policy purposes. Thus, the assessment of whether proceeding with a complaint will further the purposes of the Code, involves more than an assessment of an individual complaint, but encompasses broader public policy issues, such as the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in processing a complaint to a hearing. (para. 59)
[57] Interfor says proceeding with a hearing will not serve the public interest, and there is no reason for the parties to endure the stress and uncertainty of a hearing in these circumstances. It says the allegations are not unique or novel, as other cases have considered issue of whether mandatory work safety policies infringe upon religious rights, particularly for people following the Sikh faith. In support, it cites Singh Toor v. Finlay Forest Industries Ltd., 1984 CanLII 5062 (BC HRT); Bhinder v. CN, [1985] 2 SCR 561; Pannu v. Skeena Cellulose, 2000 BCHRT 56.
[58] In general, it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing where the respondent has made a reasonable settlement offer: Akinbiyi v. Community Builders Benevolence Group (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 177 at para. 46, citing Salanguit v. Parq Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 119 at para. 47.
[59] In this case, there are no factors that weigh in favour of proceeding to a hearing considering Interfor’s reasonable settlement offer. I am not persuaded that the issues are novel or engage broader public policy issues such that it outweighs the strong public interest in parties resolving their disputes, and in not using scarce Tribunal resources after a reasonable settlement offer has been rejected. Allowing this complaint to proceed to a hearing would require considerable resources and would not further the purpose of a just and timely human rights system.
[60] In conclusion, I am persuaded that Interfor made a reasonable settlement offer, and there are no factors that weigh in favour of this complaint proceeding to a hearing.
IV CONCLUSION
[61] Interfor’s settlement offer is reasonable, and it would not further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed. I therefore grant the application and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[62] In considering this application to dismiss, I have assumed Mr. Dhillon would prove his complaint at a hearing. However, there is no guarantee that he would succeed at a hearing. The Tribunal could accept Interfor’s defence and dismiss the complaint, leaving him with no remedy. Interfor’s settlement offer gives him a certain result and avoids the time, expense, and stress of a legal process with an uncertain outcome. As set out in Interfor’s materials, Mr. Dhillon has two weeks following the date of this decision to accept the offer.
Carol Whittome
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal