Radheshwar v. Abbotsford Police Department and another (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 235
Date Issued: November 6, 2026
File(s): CS-004708
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Sundar-Jovian Radheshwar
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Abbotsford Police Department and Randy Riehl
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Carol Whittome
On her own behalf: Sundar-Jovian Radheshwar
Counsel for the Respondents: Thea Hoogstraten
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Dr. Sundar-Jovian Radheshwar describes himself as a South Asian man with brown skin colour. Two New Westminster police officers mistakenly identified him as a suspect described as “Middle Eastern” and questioned him based on his appearance. After several investigations failed to find misconduct, Dr. Radheshwar filed this human rights complaint saying the independent investigators, Seargeant Randy Riehl and the Abbotsford Police Department, discriminated against him based on race, colour, ancestry, and/or place of origin, regarding services contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] In his complaint, Dr. Radheshwar says Sgt. Riehl conducted a hostile and biased investigation and inappropriately racialized him in the report, and the Abbotsford Police Department unreasonably concluded the officers had not committed misconduct under the Police Act.
[3] The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) because they say there is no reasonable prospect that the complaint will succeed. They say that Dr. Radheshwar has not brought his complaint out of the realm of speculation and conjecture. They deny discriminating against Dr. Radheshwar and say he has not connected his race, colour, ancestry, and/or place of origin to any alleged service-related adverse treatment.
[4] To decide this application, I must assess the whole of the evidence to determine whether there is no reasonable prospect that Dr. Radheshwar could prove that one or more of his protected characteristics was a factor in how the Respondents investigated the complaint or decided that the New Westminster officers had not engaged in misconduct.
[5] For the following reasons, I find there is no reasonable prospect of success, and I grant the Respondents’ application and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c). To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[6] On July 27, 2020, Dr. Radheshwar was stopped by two New Westminster police officers who mistakenly thought he was a suspect described as “Middle Eastern.” After stopping and questioning him, the officers determined he was not the suspect and left.
[7] Following the police stop, Dr. Radheshwar made several complaints to the Police Complaint Commissioner and the Tribunal, including the complaint before me. The complaints arising from the police stop were addressed through different processes and involved different respondents. One Tribunal complaint focused on the officers’ conduct during the stop, while the other complaints related to investigations into the officers’ conduct. The related complaints and their outcomes are summarized below to provide context for the allegations in the complaint before me against independent investigators Sgt. Riehl and the Abbotsford Police Department.
[8] I begin with the Tribunal complaint about the police stop itself. Dr. Radheshwar filed a human rights complaint against one of the officers involved in the stop and the New Westminster Police Board. After a hearing, the Tribunal found the officers reasonably, although mistakenly, believed Dr. Radheshwar was the suspect they were looking for, and the stop was necessary to confirm his identity. The Tribunal found that some of the officer’s conduct was inappropriate and unprofessional. However, it concluded the conduct did not amount to racial profiling or discrimination and dismissed the complaint: Radheshwar v. New Westminster Police Board and another, 2025 BCHRT 196.
[9] I will now turn to the complaints about the investigations into the officers’ conduct. Shortly after the stop, Dr. Radheshwar filed a misconduct complaint with the Police Complaint Commissioner. He alleged the officers had racially profiled him and behaved aggressively towards him. The Commissioner directed the New Westminster Police Board to review the complaint, and the Board dismissed it.
[10] Dr. Radheshwar then filed a human rights complaint with the Tribunal about how the New Westminster Police Board handled the misconduct complaint. The Tribunal dismissed the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) because it found no reasonable prospect Dr. Radheshwar could prove the New Westminster Police Board’s investigation was discriminatory: Radheshwar v. Coté and others, 2025 BCHRT 83.
[11] On November 16, 2020, Dr. Radheshwar filed a second misconduct complaint with the Commissioner about the July 2020 police stop. The Commissioner directed the Abbotsford Police Department to conduct an independent investigation, and Abbotsford’s Chief Constable appointed Sgt. Riehl to investigate and write a final report.
[12] In July 2021, Sgt. Riehl gave his final report to Abbotsford’s Chief Constable, who concluded the officers of the New Westminster Police Department did not commit misconduct of abuse of authority or neglect of duty. Specifically, they determined the New Westminster officers had not racially profiled Dr. Radheshwar during a street check, and they had not detained him when they stopped and questioned him based on a suspect’s reported appearance.
[13] Dr. Radheshwar received Abbotsford’s decision and complained to the Commissioner. The Commissioner determined there was a reasonable basis to believe the Respondents erred in applying the facts to the relevant law and policies, including those governing detentions based on identity factors such as race. The Commissioner also stated his view that the evidence could support a finding that Dr. Radheshwar had been briefly detained.
[14] Therefore, the Commissioner appointed a retired judge under the Police Act to review Sgt. Riehl’s report, the evidence and records, and the relevant law and policies, and to make their own decision on whether misconduct occurred. The retired judge concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse of authority or neglect of duty, and the misconduct allegations were not proven. The retired judge also noted that Sgt. Riehl and Abbotsford had carefully analyzed the misconduct issues before them in their report.
[15] On February 29, 2024, the Tribunal accepted Dr. Radheshwar’s complaint filed against Randy Riehl, and it added the Police Complaint Commissioner and Abbotsford Police Department as respondents because they were “apparently responsible as employer of Randy Riehl.”
[16] The Commissioner denied it was a proper respondent and applied to the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint for having no reasonable prospect of success under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. The Tribunal dismissed the complaint because the Police Act defines and limits the role of the Commissioner in investigations, and Sgt. Riehl was not the Commissioner’s employee or an agent: Radheshwar v. Police Complaint Commissioner and others, 2025 BCHRT 233 at para. 39.
[17] In the complaint and amendment to the complaint, Dr. Radheshwar says Sgt. Riehl and the Abbotsford Police Department discriminated against him in investigating and determining there was no misconduct. Dr. Radheshwar says:
a. Sgt. Riehl and his colleague conducted a hostile and biased interview which left him feeling “no justice would be forthcoming.”
b. The New Westminster officers admitted they stopped him because they thought he was “Middle Eastern,” and one officer inappropriately used the term “olive” to describe his skin colour. Words like “olive” or “eggplant” to describe skin colour are “part of a lively chorus of racist metaphors used in the history of racism to dehumanize people of colour.”
c. Sgt. Riehl validated discrimination against him by accepting and repeating the New Westminster officer’s incorrect racialization of him as a Middle Eastern man with “olive” skin colour.
d. Sgt. Riehl and the department incorrectly found the officers of the New Westminster Police Department did not commit misconduct when they stopped him based on appearance.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[19] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense or a hearing.
[18] The Respondents apply to dismiss Dr. Radheshwar’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[20] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 [Chan] at para. 77.
[21] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They must only show the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[22] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[23] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Dr. Radheshwar will have to prove he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in services, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would shift to Sgt. Riehl and the Abbotsford Police Department to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[24] For the purposes of this application to dismiss, the Respondents do not dispute Dr. Radheshwar has a protected characteristic of race, ancestry, colour, and/or place of origin, or that he experienced an adverse impact regarding services. They focus on the argument that there is no connection between a protected characteristic and any adverse impact.
[25] The Respondents say the discrimination allegations are speculative, and Dr. Radheshwar has not provided facts to support an inference of discrimination and cannot show that his protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse treatment. They also say the previous misconduct decisions made under the Police Act, as well as the Tribunal’s decision in Radheshwar v. New Westminster Police Board and another, 2025 BCHRT 196, all found that the New Westminster officers’ actions were reasonable considering the circumstances.
[26] Dr. Radheshwar says that racialized people often face stereotyping and increased police scrutiny, and men perceived as Middle Eastern face particular negative stereotypes. As I understand it, Dr. Radheshwar alleges that Sgt. Riehl and Abbotsford Police Department covered up an inappropriate (and, in his view, discriminatory) police stop. He says they did so because of one or more of his protected characteristics, and because they are biased towards other police officers and were “tipping the scales of justice in favour of the Blue Wall of Silence.” Dr. Radheshwar makes discrimination allegations about the investigation, some language used in the report, and the decision to dismiss the misconduct complaint.
[27] I will first set out the social context, and I will then turn to the arguments and evidence for the discrimination allegations and consider them separately and together in context.
[28] Dr. Radheshwar’s complaint arises in the social context of race-based over policing. Racism, including in the subconscious application of negative stereotypes, can seep into the “interstices of our institutions:” R v. Parks 1993 CanLII 3383 (ON CA). The Tribunal is expected to understand the social factors that contribute to inequality and can take judicial notice of context that reasonable people could not dispute: Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4), 2019 BCHRT 275 [Campbell] at para. 38.
[29] The Tribunal has accepted, without expert evidence or secondary source materials, that race-based over-policing is a social fact, and it is important to consider the social context of disproportionate policing of racialized communities: Radheshwar v. New Westminster Police Board and another, 2025 BCHRT 196 at paras. 10, 119, and 120.
[30] While social context alone does not prove that a person was discriminated against, complaints based on characteristics like race can only be properly understood within their broader social context: Elshazly v. Vancouver Police Board, 2026 BCHRT 195 [Elshazly] at para. 43, citing Campbell at paras. 16-19.
[31] Social context can support an inference of discrimination, and it can help interpret individual incidents which may otherwise be “ambiguous or explained away”: Elshazly at para. 43; Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 100; Campbell at paras. 104 and 105.
[32] However, the subtlety of prejudice, and the availability of inference, does not create a presumption of discrimination: Elshazly at para. 42; Campbell at paras. 103 and 104; Dibah v. Veraart and others, 2013 BCHRT 218, at para. 72; Zhou v. Copper Mountain Mine (BC), 2017 BCHRT 22 at para. 51.
[33] Accordingly, the social context of race-based over-policing is an important part of the analysis, but it does not determine the outcome. The allegations must still be assessed against the evidence to determine whether there is no reasonable prospect that the complaint could succeed at a hearing.
[34] I now turn to the discrimination allegations about the investigation, report, and misconduct decision. I will set out Dr. Radheshwar’s arguments and evidence below and consider them individually and together within the social context of race-based over policing.
1. Investigation Allegations
[35] Dr. Radheshwar says the investigation was opaque and not comprehensive, Sgt. Riehl and his colleague were hostile and aggressive, and the interview and/or process left him feeling discouraged. He says the interview contains “direct evidence of bias in the form of badgering and bullying of a vulnerable individual seeking justice.”
[36] For the purposes of this application to dismiss, I accept Dr. Radheshwar had a negative interview experience with Sgt. Riehl and believed that “no justice would be forthcoming” after the interview. However, the only evidence I can rely on to infer discrimination during the interview process are Dr. Radheshwar’s general assertions about hostility, his statement about feeling discouraged after the interview, and the social context. This is not, in my view, enough to connect any negative interview experience with one of his protected characteristics and bring this allegation out of the realm of conjecture.
2. Report Allegations
[37] Turning to the language in the report, Dr. Radheshwar says words like “olive” and “eggplant” to describe racialized skin tones have historically been used in racist and demeaning ways. As I understand it, he says these food-based descriptions are dehumanizing.
[38] Dr. Radheshwar says using the word “olive” to describe his skin colour, first by the New Westminster officer and then by Sgt. Riehl, is evidence of “subconscious bias” and “casual racism.” Specifically, he says Sgt. Riehl’s “casual acceptance and validation” of this language allows for “sloppy, rights-violating, and unprofessional policing.”
[39] I accept that Dr. Radheshwar is upset and offended that a New Westminster officer first used the word “olive” to describe skin colour, and that Sgt. Riehl then repeated this in his investigation report. In the context of his lived experiences with racism, as well as his education and academic career, I understand Dr. Radheshwar’s concerns about people using certain words, including food-based ones, to describe another human being’s skin colour. However, other than Dr. Radheshwar’s bare assertion, there is no material before me that leads me to conclude such a connection could be proven at a hearing.
[40] To be clear, I agree that, depending on the context, food-based or other descriptions of skin colour could be relied on to directly establish or infer discrimination. However, there is no evidence which suggests such a context here, and the fact is not so notorious as to be properly subject to judicial notice: Kandola v. University of British Columbia and others (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 391 at para. 21. I cannot speculate about what evidence, including expert reports or secondary materials, might be provided at a hearing that could be relied on to infer discrimination in this context. Rather, I must base my decision on the materials the parties have filed: Chan at para. 77.
[41] Based on the materials before me, I am not persuaded that Dr. Radheshwar has taken it out of the realm of conjecture that Sgt. Riehl’s repetition of another officer’s use of the word “olive” in the context of writing an investigation report reflects stereotypes, unconscious bias, or casual racism. My conclusion does not change when viewed in context of the other evidence Dr. Radheshwar refers to.
3. Abbotsford Decision Allegations
[42] Dr. Radheshwar also provides information he says supports his allegation that Sgt. Riehl’s investigation and Abbotsford’s misconduct decision was discriminatory:
a. The Commissioner appointed the retired judge because Sgt. Riehl and the Abbotsford Police Department did not “fully appreciate the context in which a racialized person experiences a police stop.”
b. In Radheshwar v. New Westminster Police Board and another, 2025 BCHRT 196, the Tribunal found that a New Westminster officer acted in an unprofessional manner. The Respondents never considered this unprofessional behaviour in their investigation because they do not understand or appreciate how systemic racism works.
[43] It is not the Tribunal’s role to review the correctness of the retired judge’s decision or Sgt Riehl’s report, so my analysis focuses on whether Dr. Radheshwar could prove that the Sgt. Riehl’s investigation or Abbotsford’s decision was discriminatory.
[44] I begin with the Commissioner’s appointment of the retired judge to review Abbotsford’s decision. It is clear the Commissioner appointed the retired judge to review the Respondents’ decision because the Commissioner was concerned the Respondents did not fully consider how characteristics such as race can factor into police stops, especially detainment.
[45] Dr. Radheshwar describes the Commissioner’s appointment of the retired judge as “overturning” the Respondents’ decision. However, that is not the Commissioner’s role. In Radheshwar v. Police Complaint Commissioner and others, 2025 BCHRT 233, the Tribunal notes the Commissioner has a gatekeeping role to ensure complaints are properly investigated. While the Commissioner has oversight responsibilities, they do not get directly involved with deciding misconduct complaints or allegations on their merits.
[46] Furthermore, the retired judge’s decision does not support the conclusion that the Respondents failed to fully consider how characteristics such as race can factor into police stops. After reviewing the evidence, including Sgt. Riehl’s report, the retired judge came to the same conclusion that there was no misconduct in the circumstances. The decision notes the Respondents had “carefully analyzed” the two issues before them. There is nothing in the decision to suggest, despite the Commissioner’s initial concern, the Respondent’s conduct or decision was inappropriate or they failed to consider appropriate policies and law.
[47] Given the Commissioner’s role and the retired judge’s decision and comments about the Respondents’ analysis, the evidence does not support an inference of discrimination in these circumstances.
[48] I will now turn to the issue of the officer’s unprofessional conduct during the police stop. As I understand it, Dr. Radheshwar says that Sgt. Riehl should have commented on, or otherwise considered, that the New Westminster officers behaved unprofessionally towards Dr. Radheshwar when they stopped him. He says the failure to consider the unprofessional behaviour was because the Respondents do not understand or appreciate how systemic racism works.
[49] The Respondents say the previous Police Act decisions, as well as the Tribunal’s decision in Radheshwar v. New Westminster Police Board and another, 2025 BCHRT 196, all found that the New Westminster officers’ actions were reasonable considering the circumstances.
[50] They also say this complaint is like the first human rights complaint Dr. Radheshwar made against the New Westminster Police Board in Radheshwar v. Coté and others, 2025 BCHRT 83. In that complaint, Dr. Radheshwar alleged that the New Westminster Police Board investigation was conducted in a racially motivated manner, some language used in a letter tried to deflect accountability, and the respondents “misled” him and “stifled the matter” so that he would be discouraged from seeking accountability. In dismissing the complaint, the Tribunal noted, “just because the investigation of the complaint did not lead to the outcome Dr. Radheshwar desired does not mean that the investigation was discriminatory.”
[51] I accept that some of the New Westminster officer’s conduct was unprofessional, but there is no evidence before me about whether Sgt. Riehl considered this when he wrote the report. Assuming he did not consider the officer’s unprofessionalism in his misconduct assessment, it does not follow that this was because he did not understand systemic racism or was discriminating against Dr. Radheshwar. Sgt Riehl’s investigation was in context of other decisions finding no misconduct, and I am not satisfied that Dr Radheshwar can prove that an inference of discrimination is more probable of than a non-discriminatory explanation offered by the Respondents: Elshazly at para. 64. Therefore, I am not persuaded Dr. Radheshwar has taken this aspect of the complaint out of the realm of speculation and conjecture.
[52] I have considered Dr. Radheshwar’s allegations separately, and now I consider them together. Dr. Radheshwar says, assessed together with appropriate social context, the hostile interview, repeating the word “olive” to describe Middle Eastern skin colour, and the incorrect decision that the officers did not commit misconduct based on the failure to understand the context in which a racialized person experiences a police stop, led to discrimination regarding services provided by the Respondents.
[53] Dr. Radheshar says that a hearing is required because “we can only determine the logic of Officer Riehl’s process […] through discovery that would occur in a full hearing.” He also says that the interview contains “direct evidence of bias in the form of badgering and bullying” and Sgt. Riehl’s documents must be subpoenaed and examined so Dr. Radheshwar can be “given an opportunity to make this case with physical evidence.” Dr. Radheshwar is concerned that dismissing the case will reinforce racial stereotypes and further undermine public trust in the police. This was a recurring theme in Dr. Radheshwar’s submissions.
[54] I accept that Dr. Radheshwar genuinely feels wronged, believes that he had been discriminated against, and wants an oral hearing to obtain evidence to prove his case and see accountability. However, I must base my decision on the materials the parties have filed and cannot speculate about what evidence might be provided at a hearing: Chan at para. 77.
[55] As well, a sincere belief that discrimination occurred, or a desire to have a hearing, is not enough on its own to show that the complaint has a reasonable chance of succeeding or that an oral hearing is necessary: Geraskina v. Immigrant Services Society and another (No. 2), 2008 BCHRT 323 at para. 43.
[56] In my view, there are no foundational issues of credibility, nor any compelling evidence that supports Dr. Radheshwar’s request for a hearing. Considered in context, there is no evidence from which the Tribunal at a hearing could infer that a protected characteristic was connected to any adverse effect regarding services. Dr. Radheshwar’s argument is built on his perception that the New Westminster officers discriminated against him by targeting him because of his appearance, and that Sgt. Riehl and Abbotsford Police Department were complacent and/or complicit in this discrimination and then perpetuated it. Though this may genuinely be his feeling and belief, it is not one that the Tribunal could accept at a hearing based on the information and evidence before me on this application.
[57] Therefore, I am not persuaded Dr. Radheshwar has taken this complaint out of the realm of speculation and conjecture. I am satisfied there is no reasonable prospect he could prove that the investigation, language used in the report, or resulting decision were discriminatory. Accordingly, he has not met the low threshold required for the complaint to proceed to a hearing.
[58] In dismissing the complaint, I appreciate that Dr. Radheshwar’s strong feelings and beliefs are supported by his lived experience with racism and notable academic credentials; however, based on the materials before me, the evidence does not support that Tribunal could make an inference of discrimination at a hearing.
IV CONCLUSION
[59] The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Carol Whittome
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal