Roberts v. City of Richmond and another, 2026 BCHRT 231
Date Issued: November 5, 2026
File(s): CS-009854
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Lance Edward Roberts
COMPLAINANT
AND:
City of Richmond and Bryan Shepherd
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION FOR DISCLOSURE
Rules 20 and 23
Tribunal Member: Ijeamaka Anika
Counsel for the Complainant: Larry Smeets
Counsel for the Respondents: Jaime H. Hoopes and Aleksandra Živković
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This decision is about two applications for disclosure in Lance Edward Roberts’ human rights complaint against the City of Richmond and his supervisor, Bryan Shepherd [the Respondents]. Mr. Roberts alleges that the Respondents discriminated against him in employment based on physical and mental disability and family status, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Among other things, he alleges that he was bullied and harassed by Mr. Shepherd. He maintains that the City of Richmond failed to provide a respectful and accommodating workplace despite being aware of the adverse effects the workplace stress was having on his health.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They apply for disclosure of documents under Rules 20 and 23 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules]. The first disclosure application, dated May 11, 2026, seeks Mr. Roberts’ claim file for WorkSafeBC claim number 38354079 [the May 11 application]. It also seeks a declaration that Mr. Roberts has waived solicitor-client privilege, disclosure of his counsel’s solicitor file, and disclosure of his communications with his union representatives and union counsel. The second application, dated May 15, 2026, seeks disclosure of another one of Mr. Roberts’ WorkSafeBC claims with claim number 36977802 [the May 15 application]. Mr. Roberts filed two responses, one addressing both WorkSafeBC claim files and another addressing the solicitor file and communications with his union. Because the applications overlap, I address them together in this decision.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I grant the Respondents’ applications in part. In this decision, I order Mr. Roberts to disclose certain documents to the Respondents. All disclosure is due by no later than November 27, 2026, as set out at the end of this decision.
[4] While I do not refer to it all in my decision, I have considered all the materials filed by the parties.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The following background information is drawn from the parties’ submissions in this application. It is set out here as background; it is not meant to be an exhaustive summary of all the information before me.
[6] Mr. Roberts was employed by the City of Richmond between 1989 and 2024 in various positions. Between 2008 and 2017, Mr. Roberts was employed as a full-time Supervisor 2 in Public Works before he was promoted to a Supervisor 4 position in the same department. Mr. Roberts was a member of Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 394 [the Union]. His employment was governed by the terms of the collective agreement between the City of Richmond and the Union. Mr. Roberts underwent a medical procedure on October 26, 2011. He returned to work on January 23, 2012, with ongoing health limitations.
[7] Mr. Roberts is married to Ms. Roberts. Ms. Roberts is also a City of Richmond employee. Mr. Roberts says that after his wife filed a human rights complaint naming Mr. Shepherd as a respondent, Mr. Shepherd subjected him to increased scrutiny, unwarranted criticism, a lack of managerial support, workplace exclusion, and disciplinary action. Mr. Roberts alleges that this treatment created a hostile and stressful work environment, which exacerbated his medical condition, and ultimately led to a medical leave of absence in August 2022.
[8] Mr. Roberts made at least two claims to WorkSafeBC. In August 2022, Mr. Roberts filed a claim with WorkSafeBC with claim number 38354079 alleging instances of harassment and bullying by Mr. Shepherd resulting in a mental disorder [the first WorkSafeBC claim]. WorkSafeBC denied the claim on the basis that it did not meet the requirements for a mental disorder claim under the Workers Compensation Act. Sometime in April 2024, Mr. Roberts made a further report to WorkSafeBC with claim number 36977802 about stress and anxiety he experienced at work in 2022 [the second WorkSafeBC claim]. On May 22, 2024, WorkSafeBC suspended the claim because Mr. Roberts did not participate.
[9] On March 18, 2026, Respondents’ counsel asked Mr. Roberts’ counsel whether Mr. Roberts consented to the disclosure of his WorkSafeBC claim files in this proceeding. On March 27, 2026, Mr. Roberts’ counsel replied that Mr. Roberts “consents to the disclosure of the WorkSafe documents in the human rights proceeding as requested.”
[10] On April 7, 2026, Mr. Roberts disclosed his documents to the Respondents and filed a Form 9.1. His disclosure included correspondence between himself, his counsel and the Union’s counsel. It also included correspondence between Mr. Roberts and Union representatives.
[11] On April 8, 2026, the Respondents’ counsel wrote to Mr. Roberts’ counsel regarding disclosure. Respondents’ counsel identified an email from Mr. Roberts to his counsel, and several documents on the Form 9.1 that appeared to be correspondence between Mr. Roberts and his counsel. The Respondents’ counsel said they had stopped reviewing those documents and asked Mr. Roberts’ counsel to confirm whether their disclosure was intentional.
[12] On April 17, 2026, Mr. Roberts’ counsel replied as follows:
While I appreciate your effort not to take advantage of any unintended disclosure, the emails were included knowingly in the Book Of Disclosure Documents Of The Complainant. There therefore is no need to remove them from the book, and your client is welcome to make use of them as the case proceeds on to hearing [the April 17 email].
[13] On April 29, 2026, the Tribunal advised the parties that the Respondents could file an application to dismiss the complaint under ss. 27(1)(c), (d)(ii) and/or (g) of the Code. The deadline for that application was set for June 3, 2026.
[14] On May 5, 2026, the Respondents’ counsel requested the complete file for Mr. Roberts’ first WorkSafeBC claim, the solicitor file and the complete Union communications, with a response by May 8. The Respondents say Mr. Roberts’ counsel did not respond to their request. The Respondents then filed the May 11 application. On May 13, 2026, the Respondents’ counsel asked for the complete file for the second WorkSafeBC claim, with a response by May 15. The Respondents say Mr. Roberts’ Counsel did not also respond to this request before they filed the May 15 application. On May 20, 2026, the Tribunal suspended the submissions schedule for the dismissal application pending the determination of the Respondents’ disclosure applications.
[15] In their applications, the Respondents seek orders that:
a. Mr. Roberts disclose his entire claim files for WorkSafeBC Claims [WorkSafeBC Files];
b. the Respondents be permitted to disclose, file and rely on the documents in the WorkSafeBC Files in this proceeding;
c. Mr. Roberts has waived privilege, and must disclose all relevant or arguably relevant documents in his counsel’s solicitor file, including communications between Mr. Roberts, his Counsel and the Union Counsel relating to the complaint;
d. Mr. Roberts disclose all relevant or arguably relevant communications between himself and the Union representatives relating to the complaint [Union Communications];
e. Mr. Roberts file an amended Form 9.1 listing the documents disclosed; and
f. the deadline for the application to dismiss be held in abeyance and reset to 30 days, or another reasonable time, after the requested disclosure.
[16] On the WorkSafeBC Files, the Respondents say both claims concern the same or similar allegations of bullying and harassment as the complaint. Mr. Roberts does not seriously dispute relevance. He says he has already disclosed everything in his possession. He says the proper course is for the Respondents to apply for third-party disclosure from WorkSafeBC under Rule 23, as the respondents did in Jamal v. Translink Security Management and another, 2020 BCHRT 24, or to ask Mr. Roberts to authorize WorkSafeBC to release the documents directly. The Respondents say the documents are within Mr. Roberts’ control because he can request them from WorkSafeBC: Uddin v. ADESA Auctions Canada Corporation, 2026 BCHRT 107 at para. 35.
[17] On the solicitor file, the Respondents say the disclosed documents include privileged communications about legal strategy and matters at issue in the complaint, and an email from Union counsel asking Mr. Roberts to stop contacting her so that she would not become part of the “evidentiary record.” They argue that Mr. Roberts expressly waived privilege in the April 17 email, and that he cannot selectively disclose privileged communications while withholding others on the same subject. Mr. Roberts says the disclosed documents were never privileged because they do not involve seeking or giving legal advice. He says counsel was often only copied on, or later forwarded, communications with the employer and the Union about issues including medical documentation, freedom of information requests and his grievances. He says that if there was no privilege, there was no waiver. In the alternative, he says any waiver is limited to the specific communications disclosed.
[18] On the Union Communications, the Respondents say Mr. Roberts has not claimed privilege over the disclosed communications, and that in any event he cannot disclose some and withhold the rest. Mr. Roberts says the disclosed communications are not privileged, but the communications he has withheld are privileged on a case-by-case basis under the Wigmore criteria.
[19] Mr. Roberts does not oppose resetting the deadline for the application to dismiss.
III DECISION
[20] Parties are obliged to disclose all documents in their possession or control that may be relevant to the complaint or response to a complaint: Rule 20. The test for whether a document should be disclosed is “whether a document may be relevant or arguably relevant; the threshold is not a high one; there must be some nexus between the documents and a fact in issue”: Brady v. Interior Health Authority, 2005 BCHRT 200 at para. 53. While the threshold is low, the Tribunal’s process should not be used as a fishing expedition: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 5), 2010 BCHRT 137 at para. 11. Further, parties are not required to create documents that do not already exist.
[21] The issue in this complaint is whether the Respondents discriminated against Mr. Roberts in employment based on mental and physical disability and family status. Determining the complaint will require a determination on the issues of whether, after Ms. Roberts filed a human rights complaint naming Mr. Shepherd, Mr. Roberts was subjected to adverse treatment connected to his family status, and whether the City of Richmond failed to accommodate the effects of workplace stress on his health. At this stage, documents that are arguably relevant to an issue in the complaint or response must be disclosed.
[22] I address each category of documents in turn.
A. The WorkSafeBC Files
[23] Mr. Roberts does not seriously dispute that the WorkSafeBC Files are relevant, and I am satisfied that they are at least arguably relevant. On the materials before me, the first WorkSafeBC claim concerned alleged harassment and bullying by Mr. Shepherd, like what Mr. Roberts alleges in his complaint. As in Jamal, where the complainant had made substantially similar allegations to WorkSafeBC, the documents WorkSafeBC gathered and any findings it made are likely to bear on the facts at the heart of the complaint: Jamal at para. 11. The second WorkSafeBC file concerns stress and anxiety Mr. Roberts reported experiencing in 2022. WorkSafeBC suspended the claim when Mr. Roberts did not participate. Mr. Roberts does not suggest this file is unrelated to his complaint. I am satisfied that it is also arguably relevant.
[24] I accept Mr. Roberts’ counsel’s confirmation that Mr. Roberts has disclosed every WorkSafeBC document currently in his possession. However, a party’s disclosure obligation under Rule 20 is not limited to documents the party physically holds. It extends to documents within the party’s control. The Tribunal considers documents to be within a party’s control where the party has the right to obtain them, including by requesting copies from third parties: Uddin at para. 35; Union of BC Indian Chiefs v. Provincial Health Services Authority and others (No. 4), 2025 BCHRT 214 at para. 13; CFO v. The Organization (No. 4), 2022 BCHRT 55 at para. 88. In Ghinis v. Crown Packaging Ltd., 2002 BCHRT 30, the Tribunal held that documents relating to a complainant’s long-term disability claim were within her control because she could request them from the insurer.
[25] The same reasoning applies here. Mr. Roberts can request a copy of his own claim files from WorkSafeBC. The complete WorkSafeBC Files are therefore within his control. Mr. Roberts has not indicated that he has taken any steps to obtain them.
[26] I do not agree that the Respondents were required to apply for an order for third-party disclosure from WorkSafeBC instead. That is one available route. It was the route taken in Jamal, where the complainant refused to consent to disclosure of her WorkSafeBC file: Jamal at paras. 9 and 13. However, that is not the more efficient course here. Mr. Roberts has already consented to the disclosure of his WorkSafeBC documents in this proceeding, and an order directed at WorkSafeBC would require notice to WorkSafeBC and a further submissions process. Having received the Respondents’ request in May 2026, Mr. Roberts could have requested the files himself.
[27] Mr. Roberts must request the complete WorkSafeBC Files from WorkSafeBC and disclose them to the Respondents, as set out in the order below. Given this conclusion, I do not need to address the parties’ arguments about the interpretation of Rule 23(2).
B. Use of the WorkSafeBC Files in this proceeding
[28] The Respondents also ask for an order permitting them to disclose, file and rely on the documents in the WorkSafeBC Files in this proceeding. Section 235(1) of the Workers Compensation Act [WCA]restricts a person, other than the worker, who receives information from a claim file from disclosing it further, except in specified circumstances. These include disclosure in compliance with an order made by a tribunal with jurisdiction to compel the production of information under s. 235(1)(b), and disclosure with the consent of the person concerned, given in the manner required by WorkSafeBC under s. 235(1)(d). Under s. 235(2), a tribunal may not admit into evidence information disclosed in contravention of s. 235(1).
[29] Mr. Roberts consented to the disclosure of his WorkSafeBC documents in this proceeding. To avoid any doubt about the use and admissibility of these documents, I order that the parties may disclose, and rely on, the entire WorkSafeBC Files in this complaint, including in any application to dismiss the complaint.
C. Communications with counsel and the solicitor file
[30] The parties disagree about whether any of the communications Mr. Roberts disclosed are protected by solicitor-client privilege. The Respondents point, for example, to an email in which they say Mr. Roberts recounts advice his lawyer gave him, an email setting out his “spitball total losses,” and emails he forwarded to counsel. Mr. Roberts says none of the communications meet the test for solicitor-client privilege set out in R. v. Fox, 2026 SCC 4 at para. 31. He says the communications concern matters such as freedom of information requests, a record of employment, medical documentation and his grievances, and that some were copied to the employer’s human resources staff.
[31] As I explain next, whether any of the disclosed communications are privileged is not determinative of this aspect of the May 11 application.
[32] First, Mr. Roberts disclosed these documents knowingly, and his counsel told the Respondents they were “welcome to make use of them.” The Respondents may use the documents that have already been disclosed. Mr. Roberts does not suggest otherwise. I make no finding about any privilege the Union may hold in the documents Mr. Roberts has already disclosed.
[33] Second, Mr. Roberts must disclose the complete versions of the correspondence he has disclosed only in part. If, as Mr. Roberts says, the communications are not privileged, they are ordinary documents. By disclosing them, Mr. Roberts has indicated that he considers them relevant to his complaint, and Rule 20 requires him to disclose all the relevant documents in his possession or control, not a selection of them. If the communications are privileged, I agree with the Respondents that Mr. Roberts has waived privilege over at least the portions he disclosed. Express waiver arises where the privilege holder knows of the privilege and voluntarily signals an intention to waive it: Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld (No. 8), 2025 BCHRT 64 at para. 23. After Respondents’ counsel raised the issue on April 8, 2026, Mr. Roberts’ counsel confirmed that the emails had been included knowingly and could be used. Further, where a party waives privilege by disclosing part of a communication, fairness may require that the waiver extend to the remainder of the communications on the same subject, so that the other party is not left with a partial or misleading picture: F.C.A.S. v. C.E.S., 2023 BCSC 1098 at para. 14; United States v. Meng, 2020 BCSC 1461 at para. 38; Pacific Concessions Inc. v. Weir, 2004 BCSC 1682 at para. 31.
[34] Subject to para. 39 below, Mr. Roberts must disclose the complete copy of each email thread or other correspondence on his Form 9.1 that he has disclosed only in part, including earlier and later messages in the same chain and any attachments, to the extent they are in his possession or control. This includes, at a minimum, the documents at tabs 142, 176, 177, 179–180, 183–184, 187–190, 192–194, 199, 203, 211 and 213–215 of his Form 9.1. If Mr. Roberts maintains that portions of these communications remain privileged and can be severed from the material already disclosed, he may withhold those portions. Disclosure of material a party considers non-privileged does not necessarily waive privilege over the balance; fairness and consistency remain the governing considerations: Power Consol. (China) Pulp Inc. v. B.C. Resources Invt. Corp., 1988 CanLII 3214 (BC CA). Any withheld portions must be identified on an amended Form 9.1, including the date, author, recipients, and basis for the privilege claim. If the Respondents dispute the claim, they may apply to the Tribunal for a determination, including review of the documents if necessary.
[35] Additionally, I am not persuaded to go further and declare that Mr. Roberts has waived privilege over his solicitor file as it relates to matters at issue in the complaint.
[36] First, the April 17 email addressed the specific emails that had been disclosed. It cannot reasonably be read as evincing an intention to waive privilege over every communication between Mr. Roberts and his counsel about the complaint, particularly when Mr. Roberts’ position is that the disclosed communications were never privileged at all.
[37] Second, the authorities the Respondents rely on extend a waiver to the issues raised in the disclosed communications, not to the whole of a lawyer’s file: F.C.A.S. at para. 14. A declaration of the scope sought by the Respondents would be an unjustified intrusion on solicitor-client privilege: Pacific Concessions at para. 30. Chilliwack does not assist the Respondents on this point. There, the respondent had shared his entire legal file, knowing what it contained: Chilliwack at paras. 29-31. There is no similar evidence of an intention to share Mr. Roberts’ solicitor file.
[38] Third, the Respondents’ request extends to Mr. Roberts’ communications with Union counsel. Those communications raise a question about who holds any privilege. In Meza v. Capilano University and another, 2024 BCHRT 329, the Tribunal held that a confidential relationship privilege attaching to communications between an employee and a lay union representative belongs to the employee who may waive it: paras. 41-42. The Tribunal declined to follow Gardiner v. B.C. (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) and others, 2007 BCHRT 306, in so far as it held otherwise. However, Meza did not decide who holds solicitor-client privilege in communications between a union’s legal counsel and a grievor. On that question, as the Tribunal in Meza noted, the Tribunal in Gardiner stated that, in decisions on solicitor-client privilege as between union counsel and the grievor, “it is the union that holds the privilege, and it is the union’s to waive”: Meza at para. 41 citing Gardiner at para. 35. On the materials before me, the email in which the Union’s counsel asked Mr. Roberts not to continue contacting her, suggests that Union counsel was acting for the Union rather than for Mr. Roberts. The parties have not addressed this question, and the Union is not a party to this complaint and has not had notice of these applications. Therefore, I would not make an order that may affect the Union’s privilege at this time.
[39] Some of the correspondence Mr. Roberts disclosed in part, including at tabs 176–177, involves Union counsel. I do not order Mr. Roberts to disclose correspondence to which Union counsel was a party and that he has not already disclosed. Instead, he must list any such communications on his amended Form 9.1, identifying the date, author and recipients of each, and noting that the Union may claim privilege over them. If the Respondents seek disclosure of those communications, they may apply to the Tribunal, on notice to the Union.
[40] The Respondents also say that communications such as those at tabs 176–177, dated March 30, 2023, are relevant to their application to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code as they contain the reasons for Mr. Roberts’ delay in filing his complaint. In tabs 176-177, Mr. Roberts discloses correspondence between himself, Union Counsel and his counsel dated March 30, 2023, regarding issues in his complaint months prior to filing.Given that those communications involve Union counsel, for the reasons above, I do not order disclosure of any part of them that has not already been disclosed. If Mr. Roberts relies on his communications with counsel to explain his delay in response to an application to dismiss, the Respondents may raise the question of further disclosure at that time, on notice to the Union if necessary.
D. The Union Communications
[41] Mr. Roberts disclosed some of the Union Communications in part and withheld others. The documents include correspondence regarding advice and recommendations from Mr. Roberts’ Union representatives regarding events in the complaint. I am satisfied that communications between Mr. Roberts and his Union representatives about the events in his complaint are arguably relevant, including to whether those events were addressed through the grievance process (s. 27(1)(d)(ii)).
[42] Mr. Roberts says the Union Communications he disclosed are not privileged. In the alternative, he says that any privilege was waived only to the extent of the matters covered in those communications. As with the communications with counsel, Mr. Roberts must disclose complete copies of the Union Communications that he has disclosed in part, including at a minimum the documents at tabs 70, 72, 76–77, 86, 106, 115–117, 122–123, 131, 139, 142–144, 150–154, 158, 165, 174, 177, 201, 203, 208–210, 213–214, 216–217 and 220–221 of his Form 9.1 which concern communications between Mr. Roberts and his Union representatives about the events in his complaint. As with the communication with counsel, if Mr. Roberts claims that any undisclosed portion of these communications is privileged, he may withhold it, but he must list it in accordance with para. 48, and he will bear the burden of establishing the Wigmore criteria if the Respondents dispute the claim. To the extent any of these communications involve Union counsel, my decision in para. 39 above applies.
[43] Mr. Roberts also says the Union Communications he has not disclosed are privileged on a case-by-case basis.
[44] There is no general presumption of privilege over communications between an employee and their union representative. Those communications are presumed not to be privileged, and the party claiming privilege must establish all four Wigmore criteria: Meza at paras. 22–23 and 27–29; R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16 at para. 60. Mr. Roberts relies on Worobec v. University of British Columbia (No. 2), 2010 BCHRT 47 at para. 69, for the proposition that such communications will be privileged in most cases. The Tribunal in Meza declined to follow that interpretation, finding that it is not supported by Vetro v. Klassen and Pacific Transit Cooperative (No. 2), 2005 BCHRT 263: Meza at paras. 27–28. I agree with Meza.
[45] The first Wigmore criterion is that the communications “originate in a confidence that they would not be disclosed”: Meza at para. 23. Mr. Roberts frames this criterion in terms of whether the identity of the informant would be disclosed. I disagree. Rather, the question is whether the communications themselves were made in confidence.
[46] Mr. Roberts has not met his burden. He has not identified the communications he is withholding, described them, or provided any evidence about the circumstances in which they were made. His submissions on the Wigmore criteria are general and could apply to any Union communication. His explanation for the difference between the disclosed and withheld communications, that the former were not made in confidence and the latter were, is unsupported by the materials before me. On this basis, I cannot assess his claim of privilege.
[47] At the same time, I am unable to order disclosure of documents that no one has identified. Rule 20(2) requires a complainant to list on Form 9.1 all documents in his possession or control that may be relevant to the complaint or the response, and to deliver each listed document, excluding documents for which privilege is claimed. A claim of privilege may relieve a party of the obligation to deliver a document. However, it does not relieve the party of the obligation to list arguably relevant documents, and Mr. Roberts has not listed the Union Communications he is withholding.
[48] Therefore, I order that Mr. Roberts list each withheld Union Communication that may be relevant to the complaint or the response on an amended Form 9.1. He must also provide a brief explanation of the basis for his claim of privilege. For each one, he must identify its date, author, and recipients, and its general subject matter. If the Respondents dispute any claim of privilege after receiving this information, they may apply to the Tribunal for disclosure.
[49] Finally, Mr. Roberts says he plans to call on one of the Union representatives in the disclosed Union Correspondence as a witness at the hearing, where the Respondents can cross-examine him. I am not satisfied that this plan adequately addresses the disclosure application. Cross-examination at a hearing is not a substitute for pre-hearing disclosure, particularly where the Respondents seek the documents for a preliminary application.
E. Amended Form 9.1 and the deadline for the application to dismiss
[50] Mr. Roberts must file an amended Form 9.1 listing the documents he discloses under the orders in this decision, together with the withheld Union Communications described above.
[51] The Respondents’ request to reset the deadline for their application to dismiss is unopposed, and I grant it. Mr. Roberts must notify the Respondents and the Tribunal in writing when his disclosure under this decision is complete, and he must do so by the date stated in the Order below. The Respondents must file any application to dismiss within 35 days of that notice.
IV CONCLUSION
[52] The applications are granted in part. I order as follows:
a. By no later than two weeks after this decision is issued, Mr. Roberts must request complete copies of his WorkSafeBC claim files for claim numbers 38354079 and 36977802. He must disclose those files in their entirety to the Respondents by no later than November 27, 2026.
b. By no later than November 27, 2026, Mr. Roberts must disclose complete copies of each email chain or other correspondence with his counsel Union counsel, and Union representatives that he disclosed only in part, subject to paras. 34, 39, and 42, including at a minimum the tabs identified in this decision. The Respondents’ request for a declaration that Mr. Roberts has waived privilege over his entire solicitor file and that the solicitor file must now be disclosed is denied.
c. Mr. Roberts must complete his disclosure by filing an amended Form 9.1 listing the documents disclosed under this decision and communication withheld based on privilege, in accordance with the information set out above in this decision.
d. Mr. Roberts must notify the Respondents and the Tribunal in writing when his disclosure under this decision is complete. The Respondents must file any application to dismiss within 35 days of that notice of Mr. Roberts completing disclosure under this order.
[53] I remind the parties of Rule 23.1 regarding the confidentiality of disclosed documents.
[54] As it appears that some of the documents to be disclosed may need to be requested from third parties, Mr. Roberts should take steps to obtain them as soon as possible to meet the stated deadlines. If Mr. Roberts is unable to comply with any part of this order, he must notify the Respondents and the Tribunal as soon as possible, with an explanation of what steps he has taken to obtain the documents and when he took them.
[55] The parties are represented by experienced counsel. Therefore, I encourage them to make reasonable efforts to resolve any outstanding disclosure issues in accordance with these reasons, without further resort to the Tribunal. Considering the Tribunal’s current caseload demands and associated delays, the cooperative resolution of procedural disputes by counsel can contribute to the efficient administration of the Tribunal’s processes and support the achievement of the purposes of the Code.
Ijeamaka Anika
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal