Girard v. Clace Holdings Ltd., 2026 BCHRT 230
Date Issued: November 4, 2026
File(s): CS-006674
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Martin Girard
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Clace Holdings Ltd.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Laila Said
On their own behalf: Martin Girard
Agent for the Respondent: Douglas Bourque
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This complaint arises out of events that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic.
[2] Martin Girard says chronic facial pain prevents him from wearing a face mask. Clace Holdings Ltd. operates a grocery store in Victoria. Mr. Girard alleges that on January 17 and 18, 2022, he was denied a service at the grocery store because he refused to wear a mask. He says this constitutes discrimination based on a physical disability, contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[3] Clace denies discriminating and applies to dismiss the complaint under ss. 27(1)(c) and 27(1)(d)(i) of the Code. Under s. 27(1)(c), Clace argues that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because they are reasonably certain to prove a defense at hearing, namely that Clace satisfied any duty to accommodate because it was Mr. Girard who caused the accommodation process to founder.
[4] I am satisfied that I can decide this application under s. 27(1)(c). The only issue I need to decide this complaint is whether Clace is reasonably certain to prove at the hearing that it satisfied the duty to accommodate Mr. Girard. As I explain below, I am satisfied that they are.
[5] For the following reasons, I allow the application. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties on this application. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[6] As noted above, the allegations in the complaint relate to events on or about January 17, 2022.
[7] There is no dispute that prior to these events, Mr. Girard had shopped at the grocery store during the pandemic without wearing a mask. This appears to have been in accordance with Clace’s COVID-19 policies in place at the time.
[8] There is also no dispute that by January 17, 2022, Clace had updated its policy to require all customers to wear non-medical masks while in the grocery store.
[9] Clace says unmasked customers were offered accommodations in the form of curbside shopping and staff assistance with purchases. I refer to the updated mask policy and these accommodations as the “mask policy”.
[10] Clace says that this mask policy came in the wake of health and safety concerns in the context of the pandemic.
[11] On January 17, 2022, Mr. Girard attempted to enter the grocery store. He was not wearing a mask.
[12] There is no dispute that when Mr. Girard arrived at the grocery store, he saw a sign on the grocery store’s front door notifying the public about the mask policy. There is also no dispute that the sign referred to the Provincial Health Officer [the PHO].
[13] I pause to note that although there is a dispute about whether a true copy of the sign was disclosed by Clace to Mr. Girard, nothing in my s. 27(1)(c) analysis turns on it. Clace does not rely on the document itself to support this application, and there is no dispute about the basic information it contained.
[14] Mr. Girard says that when he attempted to enter the grocery store without a mask, staff “falsely” told him that medical mask exemptions had been revoked by the PHO. He says that he made “numerous attempts to challenge that lie on factual and legal grounds”. He says staff told him to either wear a mask or leave the premises, and that when he “challenged that statement and the legality of their stance”, an employee told him that the store could deny him services because it was a private business.
[15] Mr. Girard says he entered the store and grabbed two meat pies. He said he was ordered by an employee to return them.
[16] An employee told Mr. Girard that online shopping was available, but Mr. Girard said he, “told the staff shopping online wasn’t a reasonable accommodation because [he was] homeless”.
[17] Ultimately a Clace employee called the police when Mr. Girard refused to leave the store. Mr. Girard says he was “manhandled” and “restrained” by Clace employees and a security guard before the police arrived. He says he told them they were “getting physical with a peaceful protestor”, and that he was “unconstitutionally discriminated against on the basis of my physical disability”.
[18] Mr. Girard says that he returned to the grocery store with a “printout of the government’s website” regarding “the mask mandate announcement” and. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He says that by then Clace had made false claims to the police about him and “conspired” to have him charged criminally, and for two months he was denied access to the grocery store by court order.
[19] For its part, Clace says that after he was refused entry on January 17, Mr. Girard declined to engage in discussions about other forms of accommodation. Instead, Clace says, Mr. Girard’s aggressively entered the grocery store without a mask and then refused to leave unless the police were called. Clace says Mr. Girard chose not to discuss appropriate alternative accommodation options and instead chose to argue with staff that by “denying him entry without a mask, the Respondent’s amended policy violated his rights.”
[20] On this application I have before me excerpts of a police occurrence report that captures their involvement with both Mr. Girard’s initial visit and return to the store, and his subsequent in-custody arrest.
[21] The occurrence report indicates that after a call from Clace staff at around 7:40 p.m. on January 17, 2022, a police officer attended the store and found Mr. Girard unmasked inside of the store, refusing to leave. The report indicates that Mr. Girard asked if he was going to be arrested, that the officer told him he was not, and that the officer escorted Mr. Girard out of the store. The officer reported that Mr. Girard said if the officer was not going to arrest him, he would “go straight back to the [store] in protest of government legislation”. The report goes on to say:
[Mr. Girard] stated he had a doctors note stating that he was exempt from wearing a mask due to chronic pain. [The officer] told [Mr. Girard] that he can have an exemption and still be refused entry and service as the [grocery store] is a private business on private properly and that if he chose to access their establishment he would be required to follow their rules. [Mr. Girard] wanted to debate the merits of the provincial health orders with police but ultimately [the officer] would not engage in a debate about the merits of the order. [The officer] escorted [Mr. Girard] across the street and while walking [Mr. Girard] stated you know I’m just going straight back in when you leave.
Once across the street [Mr. Girard] wait[ed] for [the officer] to return back to the market then headed straight back across the crosswalk toward the front doors. [The officer] walked [Mr. Girard] to the police car and told [Mr. Girard] that he was going to be giving him a ride home.
[22] It later states:
At 20:08 hours, [Mr. Girard] acknowledge[d] that he was not allowed to return to the Market but fully intended on returning anyways. [The officer] stood by as [Mr. Girard] entered his residence […].
[23] The report indicates that the officer stood by as Mr. Girard entered his residence. I infer Mr. Girard was living in temporary accommodation at the time.
[24] The report further indicates that approximately 20 minutes later, the officer received a call from the store advising him that Mr. Girard had returned. The officer returned and found Mr. Girard outside of the store. Mr. Girard was arrested for mischief. The officer reported that he told Mr. Girard that he intended to hold Mr. Girard until the shop closed approximately two and a half hours later and then release him. At the time of release, the officer brought the release form which included a condition that Mr. Girard does not return to the store. The report says two officers explained the release documents four times, but Mr. Girard refused to sign them because they contained a condition that he does not return to the store. Mr. Girard refused to sign and stayed in police custody as an in-custody arrest.
[25] Mr. Girard disclosed the occurrence reports to Clace in the Tribunal, and Clace put them before the Tribunal in support of this application. I note here that Mr. Girard says that he challenges the accuracy of the occurrence report, and I will return to that. He denies that he attempted to debate the merits of the public health orders. He frames it instead as “invoking provincial legislation” where he “actually challenged Clace’s PHO statement” and “the complaint plainly states the dispute pertained to the substance of the latest PHO.”
III DECISION
[26] Clace applies to dismiss Mr. Girard’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on Clace to establish the basis for dismissal.
[27] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a full hearing: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 [Berezoutskaia] at para. 24, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171.
[28] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal conducts a preliminary assessment of the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia at para. 22. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[29] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[30] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact in a s. 27(1)(c) application. However, it does assess the evidence: Berezoutskaia at para. 22. It looks for internal and external consistency, places the evidence in context, considers the overall relationship of the parties, and considers all the circumstances in which the alleged acts of discrimination occurred. On this basis, the Tribunal gauges the relative strengths and weaknesses of the case and determines what aspects of the complaint do not rise above conjecture and, in light of all the material, have no reasonable prospect of success: Ritchie v. Central Okanagan Search and Rescue Society and others, 2016 BCHRT 110 at para. 120. As part of this exercise, it is entitled to weigh credibility when assessing whether there is a reasonable prospect that the complaint will succeed: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para. 53.
[31] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 [Evans] at para. 34. The Tribunal must consider whether a credibility issue can be resolved based on corroborative affidavit and contemporaneous documentary evidence: Evans at para. 37; Smyth v. Loblaw and another, 2017 BCHRT 73 at paras. 41-42. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 [Francescutti] at para. 67.
[32] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Girard would have to prove that he has a disability protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in services, and his disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would shift to Clace to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[33] One way to succeed on an application to dismiss is to satisfy the Tribunal that a complainant has no reasonable prospect of proving one of the elements of their case. I do not, however, understand Clace to take issue with Mr. Girard’s ability to prove the elements of his case. As such, for the purposes of my analysis I assume that Mr. Girard has taken those elements out of the realm of conjecture.
[34] Another way to succeed on an application to dismiss is to satisfy the Tribunal that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because it is reasonably certain to prove a justification defence at the hearing: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117 at para. 50. That is the thrust of argument Clace advances.
[35] In brief, Clace argues that after advising Mr. Girard of the mask policy and a possible accommodation, Mr. Girard was unwilling to engage in discussion about other forms of accommodation. Instead, Clace submits, Mr. Girard sought to argue about whether the mask policy violated his rights and to insist that he be permitted to shop without a mask. Clace further says that Mr. Girard’s intention was to protest public health orders in place at the time. In essence they say the search for a reasonable accommodation foundered because of Mr. Girard’s conduct.
[36] In human rights law terms, these are arguments about whether the respondent was reasonably justified in their conduct. Arguments about whether the respondent offered accommodations to an individual who alleges discrimination, and whether the individual engaged in the accommodation discussions, are arguments about whether the duty to accommodate was satisfied.
[37] I am satisfied that there is no unfairness to Mr. Girard in interpreting Clace’s arguments in this way. Mr. Girard has had a fair opportunity to respond to Clace’s argument and did, in his response to this application, argue that Clace has no reasonable prospect of “establishing a bona fide and reasonable justification for its conduct”.
[38] To justify denying Mr. Girard services at a hearing, Clace would have to prove that: (1) they adopted the mask policy for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed, (2) they adopted the mask policy in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate purpose; and (3) the mask policy is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose. This third element encompasses their duty to accommodate Mr. Girard to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer] at para. 20.
[39] On an application under s. 27(1)(c), the Tribunal’s role is not to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the respondent has met its duty to accommodate. Rather, the Tribunal considers the likelihood that the respondent will be able to establish that fact.
[40] In the context of all the materials before me, I am persuaded that Clace that is reasonably certain to establish the first element of the Grismer test. Although Mr. Girard disputes that Clace can satisfy this element, I am satisfied that Clace is reasonably certain to prove that the mask policy is rationally connected to Clace’s obligation to ensure the health and safety of its employees and members of the public, in the surrounding circumstances of a global pandemic and state of emergency in the Province. To the extent Mr. Girard may argue otherwise, I am satisfied that the mask policy was rationally connected to this goal, even if it did not match exactly the precise wording of the guidance or orders issued by the PHO at the time of the incident. Mr. Girard’s other arguments are more appropriately addressed in relation to the other two elements of Grismer.
[41] Turning to the second element of Grismer, I am satisfied that Clace is reasonably certain to establish that it adopted the policy in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary in the circumstances. Clace’s evidence is that the mask policy was an updated or revised version of an existing policy, informed by increasing concerns by its staff and customers about health and safety, as well as its understanding of public health orders and guidance at the time. I am not satisfied that there is evidence before me that undermines Clace’s claim that it adopted the mask policy honestly and in good faith.
[42] Before moving on to the third element, I pause to address two arguments that I understand Mr. Girard to advance regarding the second element of Grismer.
[43] The first is the suggestion that Clace acted in bad faith. I understand the argument to be that bad faith can be inferred because, Mr. Girard says, Clace misrepresented “the latest PHO”. I understand Mr. Girard to mean that on the sign on the front door and/or in its communications with Mr. Girard, Clace misrepresented prevailing public health guidance and/or orders of the PHO at the material time. In my view this argument does not undermine my conclusion that it is reasonably certain to prove it adopted the mask policy honestly and in good faith for two reasons. First, even if Clace was mistaken in its understanding of the prevailing public health guidance and/or orders at the time, it would not necessarily follow that it acted dishonestly and in bad faith. Second, this argument appears to misunderstand the Tribunal’s role under the Code. The Tribunal’s role is not to decide whether service provider’s mask policies align or comply with public health guidance or orders in place at the time. As the Tribunal has previously said, the Tribunal does not apply or enforce Ministerial Orders. The Tribunal deals only with complaints of discrimination contrary to the Code: Jackson v. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. and another, 2022 BCHRT 28 at para. 23; Coelho v. Lululemon Athletica Canada Inc., 2021 BCHRT 156 at paras. 29-30.
[44] The second is Mr. Girard’s argument that in respect of the mask policy, the Tribunal should not rely on documents disclosed by Clace in the proceeding regarding the mask policy, because, Mr. Girard argues, “the files have been modified” since January 2022 and do not reflect the mask policy in any event. I understand this to be an about the reliability of the documents disclosed by Clace in this proceeding, which he seems to suggest should have some bearing on my assessment of whether the mask policy itself was adopted honestly and in good faith. I understand him to say that there is a discrepancy between Clace’s statements in response to Mr. Girard’s application for document disclosure, and what Clace produced in response. He suggests that the documents that Clace disclosed that relate to the mask policy displayed at the store at the time of the alleged discrimination may be forged. He originally argued this on an application for costs, which was denied. In an addendum to his response on this application, he renews his concerns that the documents filed by Clace in support of this application were “forged” or “fabricated”. He opposes the use of the documents as evidence of what Clace says it posted on its door from January 11, 2022 onward.
[45] However, even if I were to accept that there are irregularities in the metadata of the documents as argued by Mr. Girard, the difficulty with these arguments is that the documents Mr. Girard raises issues with have no bearing on my decision under s. 27(1)(c). Clace does not rely on them to support its application. More importantly, there is no dispute that there was a notice posted on the door of the store on the day of the incident telling customers that a mask was required for in-store shopping, with reference to the PHO. As such, the central issue in this application is whether, under the third branch of Grismer, Clace has satisfied the Tribunal that it is reasonably certain to prove that it discharged its duty to accommodate Mr. Girard.
[46] Before turning to the third branch of Grismer, to the extent that Mr. Girard suggests that an award of costs against Clace is appropriate, I decline to make such an order. As noted above, the Tribunal previously rejected Mr. Girard’s application for costs and his request for reconsideration was denied. To the extent Mr. Girard’s submissions could be taken as suggesting the Tribunal ought to reopen the issue, I note Mr. Girard has not applied for such relief. In particular, he did not submit a Form 7.1 application for costs (or reconsideration) with this application. As such, whether an order for costs is merited in the circumstances is not an issue properly before me.
[47] On the third requirement, I am persuaded that Clace is reasonably certain to establish that it discharged its duty to accommodate Mr. Girard. In short, I am satisfied that Clace is reasonably certain to establish that it was Mr. Girard’s conduct that thwarted the accommodation process.
[48] The relevant legal principles are well settled. Accommodation is assessed globally, considering the entire history of the matter: Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employées de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ); 2008 SCC 43 at para. 21. The courts have said it requires “common sense and flexibility”, which will vary according to the specific circumstances: Meiorin at para. 63; McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, 2007 SCC 4 at para. 22.
[49] Further, accommodation is a collaborative process, requiring active participation and cooperation by the parties: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC) [Renaud],
[50] The Tribunal has described the accommodation process as “a cooperative dialogue where the parties work together to find a solution that adequately balances competing interests”: Testar v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR1097, 2009 BCHRT 41 [Testar] at para. 48, citing McLoughlin v. British Columbia (Ministry of Environment, Land and Parks) (1999), 1999 BCHRT 47 (CanLII), 36 C.H.R.R. D/306 (B.C.H.R.T.). Similarly, the Tribunal has said that “the duty to accommodate is dialogic in nature”: see e.g. Emslie v. Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd. (Kamloops), 2024 BCHRT 46 at para. 41. Where a complainant, rather than engaging in a dialogue with the respondent, engages in behaviour that does not further or facilitate the accommodation process, the process may founder: Testar at para. 47.
[51] Finally, it is trite law that a respondent is not obligated to provide a perfect accommodation, but a reasonable one: Renaud at pp. 994-995. A complainant has an obligation to participate in the accommodation process, and to accept solutions that are reasonable, without insisting on perfection: Renaud at p. 994‐995. What is reasonable and what constitutes undue hardship is fact specific and will turn on the specific circumstances of a particular case: Renaud.
[52] There is no dispute here that Clace initially discussed with Mr. Girard an alternative to in-store, maskless shopping: online shopping. I understand Mr. Girard’s submission to be that once he told staff that he was homeless, the offer to accommodate his disability by providing online shopping (and I presume, home delivery) could no longer be considered reasonable. I agree with Mr. Girard in this respect. Offering only online shopping would not have satisfied Clace’s duty to accommodate Mr. Girard to the point of undue hardship.
[53] The accommodation dialogue, however, could have continued. In fact, Clace appeared willing to offer Mr. Girard other options including curbside shopping. On the totality of the materials before me I am satisfied that Clace is reasonably certain to prove that Mr. Girard’s conduct led that dialogue to founder. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons.
[54] First, I am satisfied that Clace is reasonably certain to prove that Mr. Girard’s focus was on debating or arguing about whether denying him entry without a mask violated his rights and was inconsistent with guidance and/or orders of the PHO.
[55] Certainly, the materials before me support the conclusion that Mr. Girard was focused on whether the mask policy aligned with public health guidance and/or orders at the material time. This is apparent on the face of Mr. Girard’s complaint, where he says that claims on the sign were false, and that his “[n]umerous attempts to challenge that lie on factual and legal grounds were met with brusque dismissal.” He maintains in his response materials that Clace at the time “misrepresent[ed] the latest PHO”. This is also supported by the police occurrent report, which documents Mr. Girard’s desire to “engage in debate” regarding provincial health orders. I acknowledge that Mr. Girard disputes the accuracy of the police occurrence report, and in particular the statements in it suggesting that what he sought to debate was the merits of public health orders themselves. However, even accepting Mr. Girard’s submission that the officer misstated what Mr. Girard was seeking to debate, this contemporaneous document is otherwise consistent with Mr. Girard’s own allegations that he sought to dispute and engage in debate.
[56] A difficulty with this is that the focus of the human rights analysis (and the duty to accommodate) is not about enforcement of public health guidance or orders, but about finding a reasonable accommodation in the circumstances. Mr. Girard’s apparent insistence on debating the accuracy of certain statements in the sign about public health guidance and/or orders does not appear to have advanced the accommodation dialogue forward. Though Mr. Girard says it was “my prerogative to disregard any legal gaslighting from the Respondent”, this submission appears to misunderstand his obligations in the accommodation process. Both parties had an obligation to engage in a cooperative dialogue. The evidence here indicates that Mr. Girard, instead, focused on debating the accuracy of statements on the sign.
[57] Similarly, the materials support the conclusion that Mr. Girard was focused debating the legality of the mask policy more broadly. For instance, in the complaint he alleges that he told an employee he was “unconstitutionally discriminated against on the basis of my physical disability”, and that on the second day he brought a copy of the Charter to the store. He described himself as a “peaceful protestor”. This is also supported by the contemporaneous police occurrence report, which document his desire to debate and his repeated attempts to return to the grocery store. Once again, the problem with this that by focusing on debating the legality of the mask policy, and insisting on entering the grocery store maskless, Mr. Girard’s focus does not appear to have been on engaging in a dialogue about how to find an accommodated solution.
[58] Second, I am satisfied that the accommodation dialogue was thwarted by what appears to be Mr. Girard’s insistence on a particular solution.
[59] Mr. Girard frames his complaint as being denied services at a grocery store that would “no longer honour [his] medical mask mandate exemption”. I understand his contention to be that, in order to be a reasonable accommodation, Clace was required to permit him to shop in the store without wearing a mask. I understand from him to argue that only a maskless shopping experience would have been a reasonable accommodation.
[60] However, as noted above, a respondent is not obligated to provide a perfect accommodation, but a reasonable one. And as this Tribunal has said, having a disability-related barrier to wearing a mask “does not then entitle the complainant to simply do what they please”: Coelho v. Lululemon Athletica Canada Inc., 2021 BCHRT 156 at paras. 29-30. As in Coelho, the fact that Mr. Girard said that he could not wear a mask did not require Clace to permit him to shop without a mask on every occasion, even if this had happened previously. Rather, his medical condition obliged Clace to reasonably accommodate him to the point of undue hardship to mitigate the adverse impact he experienced because of the policy: Coelho at para. 31.
[61] I understand from Mr. Girard’s submissions that the only reasonable accommodation would have been for Clace to permit him to engage in maskless in-store shopping. However, as in Coelho, Mr. Girard is essentially “seeking [his] perfect accommodation – to shop freely in-person [at the store] without having to wear a mask””: para. 34.
[62] In view of all of the materials before me, I am satisfied that Clace is reasonably certain to prove that Mr. Girard failed to cooperate in the accommodation process, thereby bringing Clace’s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation to an end. In summary, there is evidence before me that Mr. Girard chose to enter the store despite the sign on the door or the staff telling him about the mask requirement, refused to leave the grocery store, attempted to return immediately after police had arrived to defuse the situation and, after the police had escorted him home, returned to the store to engage in the same debate rather than meaningfully explore the accommodation options that Clace had available. Placing all of the evidence in context, I am satisfied that Clace is reasonably certain to prove that it met its accommodation obligations, and its obligations came to an end when Mr. Girard’s conduct thwarted the accommodation process: Coelho at para. 34.
[63] For the reasons set out above, I am persuaded that Clace is reasonably certain to establish that it discharged its duty to accommodate Mr. Girard. As a result, there is no reasonable prospect Mr. Girard’s complaint will succeed.
IV CONCLUSION
[64] The application is granted and the complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Laila Said
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal