Alipour v. BC Ministry of Attorney General (Court Services Branch), 2026 BCHRT 229
Date Issued: November 3, 2026
File(s): CS-005413
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
TOUMAJ ALIPOUR
COMPLAINANT
AND:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
(COURT SERVICES BRANCH)
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT AND LIMIT PUBLICATION
Section 27(1)(c), Rule 5
Tribunal Member: Rajwant Mangat
For the complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Julia Roe
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a decision to dismiss Toumaj Alipour’s human rights complaint without a hearing.
[2] On October 26, 2021, Mr. Alipour was arrested at the Robson Square Provincial Courthouse. Mr. Alipour attempted to enter the courthouse without wearing a mask. At that time, provincial public health orders required that all visitors to indoor public spaces, including courthouses, wear masks to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
[3] In his complaint, Mr. Alipour alleges that a sheriff at the courthouse denied him entry, arrested and handcuffed him, and then forcibly attempted to put a mask over his face. Mr. Alipour says he cannot wear a mask because of a lifelong anxiety disorder and that he has a medical exemption. He alleges that he was denied services at the courthouse because of his mental disability and that this is discrimination contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[4] The Respondent denies discriminating against Mr. Alipour. The Respondent says that Mr. Alipour was barred from entry because he was filming in the courthouse and arrested because he did not comply with sheriffs’ directions to stop filming and he obstructed them in carrying out their duties. The Respondent says Mr. Alipour’s mental disability was not a factor in his treatment.
[5] The Respondent applies to dismiss the complaint without a hearing under ss. 27(1)(c) of the Code. The Respondent argues that Mr. Alipour has no reasonable prospect of proving he has a disability-related barrier to wearing a mask or that he was denied services. The Respondent also applies to limit the publication of the names or identifying information about the sheriffs involved in the events giving rise to Mr. Alipour’s complaint.
[6] Mr. Alipour did not respond to either the dismissal application or the application to limit publication. The Tribunal set a schedule for submission by a letter dated May 8, 2026. The Respondent sought and the Tribunal granted a four-week extension to the submission schedule. The Respondent filed their applications on July 6, 2026, sending copies to Mr. Alipour at his address for service. The Tribunal wrote to the parties on July 14, 2026 restating the submission schedule and informing Mr. Alipour about how to submit a response to the applications. Mr. Alipour did not provide a response by the deadline of August 14, 2026, or at all. I am satisfied Mr. Alipour had notice of both applications and an opportunity to file responses. I find there is no unfairness in making this decision on the materials before me. To understand Mr. Alipour’s complaint, I rely on the allegations he set out in his complaint form and amendment.
[7] The question before me on this dismissal application is whether there is no reasonable prospect of Mr. Alipour demonstrating that the Respondent discriminated against him because of his disability. Specifically, I must consider whether the evidence before me takes Mr. Alipour’s allegation that he was denied access to the courthouse because of a disability-related barrier to wearing a mask out of the realm of conjecture.
[8] For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that Mr. Alipour has no reasonable prospect of proving he was adversely impacted because of his mental disability. I allow the application and dismiss Mr. Alipour’s complaint under ss. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
[9] To make this decision, I have considered Mr. Alipour’s complaint, his complaint amendments, the complaint response, the respondent’s applications and the evidence filed in support of those applications. I note that Mr. Alipour’s complaint and amendments provide scant details about the events giving rise to his complaint. Therefore, I rely primarily on the Respondents submissions in setting out the background below. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[10] Throughout the pandemic, the Respondent implemented health and safety precautions to reduce the transmission of COVID-19 in accordance with orders and guidance from the Provincial Health Officer [PHO]. As of October 2021, the PHO had issued an order that all visitors to indoor public spaces wear a mask. To comply with the order, the Respondent set up health screening stations staffed by sheriffs at courthouse entrances. Sheriffs at the entrances ensured compliance with the order or facilitated accommodation where necessary in consultation with the judiciary or courthouse staff.
[11] Mr. Alipour attended the courthouse on October 26, 2021 where he was met by a sheriff at the health screening station. Mr. Alipour was not wearing a mask and was using his phone to film outside the courthouse. The sheriff asked Mr. Alipour why he was visiting the courthouse. Mr. Alipour’s response suggested to the sheriff that he was there to visit the court registry.
[12] Mr. Alipour continued to film after entering the courthouse. The sheriff explained that filming in the courthouse was prohibited and asked Mr. Alipour to stop. Mr. Alipour refused to stop filming, saying that he could film in a public place. The sheriff then called other sheriffs for support at the entrance.
[13] The sheriff asked Mr. Alipour if he had a mask to wear and Mr. Alipour said he had an exemption. The sheriff explained that Mr. Alipour could not go to the registry without a mask, but that he could seek services through an alternative method – such as by phone or email, or by having a member of the registry help him outside the courthouse.
[14] Mr. Alipour refused to stop filming or to leave the courthouse. He also refused to answer any questions. The sheriff informed Mr. Alipour that he would be removed from the courthouse if he did not stop filming and that he could be arrested for resisting or willfully obstructing the sheriff in carrying out their duties as a peace officer.
[15] The situation continued to escalate. Eventually, the sheriff arrested Mr. Alipour and handcuffed him. The sheriff tried to give Mr. Alipour a mask to wear while he was in custody. Because Mr. Alipour was in handcuffs, the sheriff picked up a new mask from the health screening station and lifted it toward Mr. Alipour’s face. Mr. Alipour pulled back and said no. The sheriff stopped and put the mask down.
[16] Sheriffs put Mr. Alipour in a cell at the courthouse until the Vancouver Police Department arrived to investigate a criminal charge of obstruction. Mr. Alipour remained unmasked while in custody at the courthouse until his release later the same day.
III PRELIMINARY ISSUE: APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION
[17] The Respondent applies to limit publication of any information that might identify the sheriffs named in Mr. Alipour’s complaint. This application is unopposed.
[18] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a). The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private detail in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37.
[19] As I dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success, I agree that the privacy of the sheriffs involved in the incident giving rise to Mr. Alipour’s complaint outweighs any public interest in publishing their names or identifying information about them. The sheriffs’ identity is a sliver of information. Anonymizing them only minimally impairs the open court principle. Accordingly, I anonymize them in this decision. Because the complaint is dismissed it is unnecessary to make any further orders.
IV DECISION
[20] Section 27(1)(c) allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[21] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[22] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[23] At a hearing, Mr. Alipour would have to prove that he has a disability, that he was adversely impacted in the courthouse’s services, and that his mental disability was a factor in that adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. For the purposes of this application, I accept that Mr. Alipour has taken beyond the realm of conjecture that his anxiety prevents him from wearing a mask. However, in my view, there is no evidence capable of supporting a connection between Mr. Alipour’s treatment during his visit to the courthouse and his mental disability. For that reason, his complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.
[24] As I understand Mr. Alipour’s complaint, he says he was discriminated against when he was denied access to the courthouse for not wearing a mask. I understand the negative treatment he alleges to include his arrest, being handcuffed and a sheriff forcibly attempting to make him wear a mask while Mr. Alipour was handcuffed. I appreciate that these actions caused Mr. Alipour distress.
[25] The evidence is clear, however, that Mr. Alipour has no reasonable prospect of proving he was denied access to the courthouse because he could not wear a mask. The respondents’ evidence is clear and undisputed: Mr. Alipour insisted on filming at the courthouse even after being told it was prohibited. He refused to go outside to discuss how he could access court services without wearing a mask. The sheriff warned him that his filming would result in removal from the courthouse. The sheriff also warned Mr. Alipour that his refusal to stop filming and continued obstruction of the sheriffs in carrying out their duties would lead to an arrest. Mr. Alipour did not stop filming, and he refused to answer questions. The sheriffs followed standard practice and procedures concerning courthouse access and filming. On the evidence before me, Mr. Alipour’s negative experience at the Courthouse was because he was filming and refused to stop. There is no reasonable prospect Mr. Alipour could prove he was denied access to the courthouse or arrested because he was not wearing a mask.
[26] Similarly, I find there is no reasonable prospect that Mr. Alipour could prove he was adversely impacted by the sheriff attempting to put a mask on him. First and foremost, Mr. Alipour does not allege that he was forced to wear a mask, and the undisputed evidence is that he did not wear a mask while in custody at the courthouse. Second, at most the evidence shows the sheriff grazed Mr. Alipour’s nose with the mask when he raised it to Mr. Alipour’s face. As soon as Mr. Alipour told the sheriff to stop, the sheriff stopped. There is no reasonable prospect the evidence could support a finding that the sheriff’s conduct amounted to an adverse impact within the meaning of the Code.
[27] There is no evidence before me to take Mr. Alipour’s complaint out of the realm of conjecture.
V CONCLUSION
[28] The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Rajwant Mangat
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal