Crimp v. British Columbia Rapid Transit Company Ltd., 2026 BCHRT 224

Date Issued: October 27, 2026
File(s): CS-006676

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Simon Crimp
COMPLAINANT

AND:

British Columbia Rapid Transit Company Ltd.
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)

Tribunal Member: Rajwant Mangat

On their own behalf: Simon Crimp

Counsel for the Respondent: Jaime H. Hoopes

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             This decision is about whether to dismiss Simon Crimp’s complaint without a hearing.

[2]             Mr. Crimp says his employer, British Columbia Rapid Transit Company Ltd. [BCRTC], failed to accommodate his religious beliefs and mental disability. In October 2021, BCRTC implemented a mandatory vaccination policy [Policy] requiring all employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless BCRTC agreed to an accommodation.

[3]             Mr. Crimp is Catholic and asked to be exempted from the vaccine requirement because of his religious beliefs. BCRTC denied Mr. Crimp’s request based on the information he provided but said it would consider his request further if he answered some specific questions. Mr. Crimp did not respond because, he says, the questions BCRTC wanted him to answer were ridiculous.

[4]             Mr. Crimp went on medical leave shortly after the Policy was announced. BCRTC sent letters to its employees, including Mr. Crimp, about the Policy and the consequences for non-compliance. Mr. Crimp says BCRTC should not have sent him any letters about the Policy knowing he was on medical leave. Mr. Crimp says BCRTC harassed him by sending the letters and that the letters exacerbated his post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD].

[5]             BCRTC denies discriminating against Mr. Crimp. It says Mr. Crimp’s complaint should be dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success under s. 27(1)(c) of the Human Rights Code. BCRTC makes several arguments for dismissing Mr. Crimp’s complaint. However, I find I can most efficiently decide this application based on its alternative argument that BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove it discharged its duty to accommodate Mr. Crimp. Specifically, this decision turns on whether BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove:

a.                Mr. Crimp did not provide adequate information about why he could not comply with the Policy as a Catholic; and,

b.                that BCRTC did not know, and could not have reasonably known, the letters about the Policy exacerbated Mr. Crimp’s disability.

[6]             For the following reasons, I find that BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove it satisfied its duty to accommodate Mr. Crimp. As a result, I grant BCRTC’s application and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c).

[7]             To make this decision, I have considered all the arguments and evidence filed by BCRTC and Mr. Crimp. In these reasons, I refer only to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.

II      BACKGROUND

[8]             Mr. Crimp worked for BCRTC from November 1995 until March 2025. He worked as a Skytrain Attendant when BCRTC announced plans to introduce and implement the Policy. BCRTC released the Policy in mid-October 2021. Mr. Crimp went on a medical leave of absence in November 2021. While it is not entirely clear from the materials before me, it appears Mr. Crimp’s medical leave was related to a diagnosis of PTSD.

[9]             The Policy initially required all employees to be fully vaccinated by November 29, 2021, unless they had received an accommodation. The November 29 date was later extended.

[10]         On November 28, 2021, Mr. Crimp wrote to BCRTC to ask for an exemption from the Policy based on his Catholic religious beliefs. He said that the Roman Catholic Church teaches that a person may be required to refuse medical interventions, including vaccinations “if his or her informed conscience comes to this sure judgment.” Mr. Crimp identified two teachings of the Catholic Church that he says ground his beliefs on when Catholics ought to refuse vaccines. First, he said vaccination is “not morally obligatory in principle so must be voluntary.” Second, he said Catholics have a general moral duty to refuse to use certain vaccines that are “produced using human cell lines derived from direct abortions. It is permissible to use such vaccines only under certain case-specific conditions, based on a judgement of conscience.” He also said a person’s “informed judgements about the proportionality of medical interventions are to be respected unless they contradict authoritative Catholic moral teachings.” Mr. Crimp attached copies of his baptismal, communion and confirmation certificates to his exemption request.

[11]         BCRTC denied Mr. Crimp’s exemption request on December 7, 2021. BCRTC told Mr. Crimp that his request was not approved based on the information he had provided about his religious beliefs. BCRTC encouraged him to get vaccinated to comply with the Policy, or alternatively, to provide more information about the connection between his religious beliefs, vaccination and other medical treatments.

[12]         Specifically, BCRTC asked Mr. Crimp to respond to two questions: (1) whether his religious belief led him to object to all/other vaccinations, and if yes, to identify them; and (2) whether his religious belief led him to object to other medications/medical treatments, and if yes, to identify them. BCRTC asked Mr. Crimp to provide documentation supporting his responses to its occupational health and safety department.

[13]         Mr. Crimp did not respond, either to answer BCRTC’s questions or to make clear he did not agree that the employer required that information.

[14]         During the rollout of the Policy, BCRTC communicated with employees about its rationale for implementing the Policy and to provide them with information about the vaccine. BCRTC sent letters and bulletins to employees directly, including Mr. Crimp, to update them on the Policy. Mr. Crimp’s union also shared information about the Policy with its members. Mr. Crimp says he got five letters from BCRTC about the Policy while he was on medical leave. He says these letters caused him unnecessary stress and anxiety.

[15]         He received one such letter in late January 2022. The letter asked for an update on Mr. Crimp’s vaccination status. It also said that BCRTC intended to terminate the employment of employees who did not verify that they were fully vaccinated as of March 31, 2022. In early February 2022, a representative of Mr. Crimp’s union told BCRTC that Mr. Crimp had wrongly received that letter which was intended for active employees. BCRTC then contacted Mr. Crimp to explain the error and to advise him that the appropriate letter would be sent to him.

[16]         Mr. Crimp remained on medical leave until he returned to work full-time on April 4, 2022, after getting the COVID-19 vaccine. He filed this human rights complaint shortly after returning to work and retired from his employment at BCRTC in late March 2025.

III    DECISION

A.    Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success

[17]         BCRTC applies to dismiss Mr. Crimp’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on BCRTC to establish the basis for dismissal.

[18]         Before setting out the law applicable to this dismissal application, I note that BCRTC made submissions on why the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of political belief. It is unnecessary for me to address these arguments. The Tribunal did not allow the political belief complaint to proceed past screening. This is reflected in the Tribunal’s notice of complaint proceeding sent to the parties by letter dated July 8, 2025. Therefore, the only grounds before me are religious belief and disability. 

[19]         Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to dismiss complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.

[20]         The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.

[21]         A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.

[22]         To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Crimp will have to prove that he has the protected characteristics of religion and/or mental disability, he was adversely impacted in employment, and his religion and/or his mental disability were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he could prove these three elements, then the burden at a hearing would shift to BCRTC to justify the impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.

[23]         As noted above, I find I can resolve this application by considering BCRTC’s argument that it is reasonably certain to prove its conduct was justified at a hearing: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117 at para. 50. As such, I find I do not have to consider BCRTC’s arguments about Mr. Crimp’s prospect of proving the elements of the complainant’s case. I assume without deciding that he has taken the elements of his case out of the realm of conjecture. Specifically, for the purpose of this application, I assume that receiving BCRTC’s correspondence about the Policy exacerbated Mr. Crimp’s PTSD. And that to return to work he had to get a vaccine that violated his religious beliefs. 

[24]         I now explain why BCRTC has persuaded me that it is reasonably certain to prove its conduct was justified.

[25]          At a hearing, to justify the adverse impacts its conduct had on Mr. Crimp, BCRTC would have to prove that:

a.               it adopted the Policy for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;

b.               it adopted the Policy in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate purpose; and

c.                the Policy was reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose. This third element encompasses BCRTC’s duty to accommodate Mr. Crimp to the point of undue hardship.

British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 54.

[26]         I do not read Mr. Crimp’s arguments on the dismissal application as taking issue with the first two elements of BCTRC’s justification defence. Rather, the focus of his arguments at the justification stage concerns the third element, the duty to accommodate. I therefore focus my decision on this third element of BCRTC’s defence.

B.    Duty to Accommodate

[27]         Whether the duty to accommodate has been met is a question of fact and depends on the “specific circumstances and relevant considerations appropriate to each case”: Purdy at para. 63. In the accommodation process, the employer bears the primary responsibility. However, it is well-established that employees have an obligation to actively participate within that process: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 994 [Renaud]. If an employee fails to take reasonable steps, they frustrate the accommodation process, and the complaint will be dismissed: Renaud at 995.

[28]         Reasonable steps include “bringing to the attention of the employer the facts relating to discrimination”: Renaud at 994. If an employer has no way of knowing an employee is being adversely impacted, there are no reasonable or practicable steps it can take to avoid the adverse impact: Klewchuk v. Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at para. 372.  When an employee does bring to their employer’s attention that they require an accommodation, an employer might reasonably require more information to understand whether there is a duty to accommodate and the kind of accommodation that may be necessary: Kayembe v. Carl Zeiss Canada Ltd., 2026 BCHRT 130 at para. 61. Employees risk frustrating the accommodation process and bringing the employer’s obligations to an end if they fail to bring their need for an accommodation to their employer’s attention or respond to a request for more information.

[29]         As I explain below, I find BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove that Mr. Crimp’s failure to adequately participate in the accommodation process brought its duty to accommodate to an end.

1.     Religious Belief

[30]         Mr. Crimp says the questions BCRTC asked him in response to his religious accommodation request were ridiculous. In effect he argues he gave BCRTC enough information to offer him a religious exemption and it was unreasonable for them to ask for more. Mr. Crimp says that he had “no choice but to finally break down” and get vaccinated so he would not lose his livelihood. He says he did so despite reaching an “informed and sure judgment in conscience” as required by his Catholic faith that he should not receive the COVID-19 vaccine.

[31]         The difficulty I have with Mr. Crimp’s argument is he did not tell BCRTC at the relevant time about his continued religious objection to getting vaccinated against COVID-19 and his view that BCRTC had enough information about his views to accommodate his exemption request.

[32]         I must consider Mr. Crimp’s conduct in the accommodation process to decide if BCRTC is reasonably certain to demonstrate at a hearing that it has justified the adverse impact its decision had on Mr. Crimp: Renaud at 994. BCRTC denied his request but said it might reconsider if he answered questions about whether his religious beliefs had led him to object to or refuse other vaccines, medications or medical treatments, and, if so, to identify them. At the same time, it encouraged him to get vaccinated which he ultimately did. While it is clear from his submissions that he continued to object to getting the COVID-19 vaccine, he did not tell BCRTC that when it told him it was denying his accommodation request. Nor did he give BCRTC the further information it requested.  BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove Mr. Crimp cut the accommodation process short by not responding.

[33]         In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the case law Mr. Crimp put before me. The relevant cases are Matembe v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (Translink), 2025 BCHRT 279; BC Rapid Transit Co.  v. CUPE, Local 7000 (Marzhakov), 2022 C.L.A.S. 565 [Marzhakov] and; Air Canada v. Air Line Pilots’ Association, 2026 CanLII 16803 [ALPA]. Each case addresses complaints about employers’ failure to accommodate employees’ religious beliefs in the context of mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policies. In Matembe, the Tribunal declined to dismiss the complaint against the employer without a hearing: para. 77. In Marzhakov and ALPA,labour arbitrators found the employers had failed to accommodate the grievors’ religious beliefs: Marzhakov at para. 87; ALPA at para. 50.   

[34]         Despite the results in these cases, a close reading shows that they do not assist Mr. Crimp. First, in ALPA, the employer erred by requiring the grievors to provide letters from their religious leaders as a precondition to considering their accommodation request: paras. 21(c)(i) and 36. BCRTC made no such request and therefore this case is of no assistance to resolving the present application.

[35]         Next, in Matembe and Marzhakov the employers asked the employees almost identical questions as BCRTC asked Mr. Crimp: Matembe at para. 16; Marzhakov at paras. 77 and 80. In both cases the employees responded and continued to engage in the accommodation process Matembe at paras. 37-38; Marzhakov at paras. 26 and 79-80. In contrast, Mr. Crimp did not respond. He neither told BCRTC that he objected to the questions, nor answered them. It was not until after Mr. Crimp got vaccinated and returned to work, in the context of this complaint, that he told BCRTC that he thought the questions were unnecessary.

[36]         Further, in Marzhakov the arbitrator did not find fault with the information the employer – BCRTC – sought in the initial stages of the accommodation process. While I am not bound by the arbitrator’s decision, I find his reasoning helpful in deciding whether Mr. Crimp’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. The arbitrator found it was legitimate for the employer to ask the grievor whether his religious beliefs led him to object to all vaccinations or only the COVID-19 vaccination: para. 77. He did not find it was unreasonable for the employer to ask the grievor whether he objected to other medications or medical treatments, but found the employer went “into an inquisition mode” vis-à-vis the sincerity of the grievor’s religious beliefs after that, in a way that went well beyond the inquiries acceptable under Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47: paras. 27, 80-83. Marzhakov persuades me that BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove that the questions it asked Mr. Crimp were reasonable and Mr. Crimp’s failure to answer them frustrated the accommodation process.

[37]         I am sensitive to the fact that the grievor in Marzhakov provided BCRTC the information it requested and BCRTC was not satisfied. Ultimately, this resulted in an arbitrator finding BCRTC went into “inquisition mode” and failed to reasonably accommodate the grievor. In hindsight, it could appear that no matter what information Mr. Crimp provided his employer, it would not have been satisfied. However, because Mr. Crimp did not respond to BCRTC’s questions – which I am satisfied BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove were legitimate – it would be speculative for me to deny this application on that basis. 

[38]         Based on the material before me, I find BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove that Mr. Crimp’s failure to respond to BCRTC’s questions allowed the process to falter and brought BRCTC’s obligations to an end.

2.     Mental Disability

[39]         As I said above, for the purposes of this application, I assume without deciding that Mr. Crimp has taken out of the realm of conjecture that BCRTC’s letters about the Policy exacerbated his PTSD by causing him stress and anxiety, and that this would be sufficient to prove the elements of his case. I must now decide whether BCRTC is reasonably certain to justify sending those letters to Mr. Crimp. This turns on whether BCRTC knew or ought to have known that receiving the letters exacerbated Mr. Crimp’s disability.

[40]         Mr. Crimp suggests that BCRTC knew or ought to have known that its letters about the Policy were harmful to him. However, I have no evidence before me to suggest that Mr. Crimp told BCRTC that the letters were causing him stress and anxiety, or that they were worsening his PTSD. I am aware of no authority that says employers should refrain from communicating with employees on medical leave as a blanket proposition and Mr. Crimp has pointed me to none.  While BCRTC knew Mr. Crimp was on medical leave, it is reasonably certain to prove it could not have known that letters being sent to all employees were impacting Mr. Crimp’s health negatively absent him bringing this to the employer’s attention.

[41]         Here I note that Mr. Crimp’s union representative contacted BCRTC about a letter that should not have gone to Mr. Crimp because it was addressed to employees who were actively working. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the union representative told BCRTC that receiving communication about the Policy generally was worsening Mr. Crimp’s PTSD or asked BCRTC to stop communicating about the Policy. Rather, the evidence suggests the union asked the employer to ensure it did not send employees on medical leave information targeted to those employees who were actively working.  

[42]         An employee has an obligation to bring facts related to their disability and any resulting need for accommodation to their employer’s attention, whether that be through their union or personally: Renaud at 994; Klewchuk at para. 373. Mr. Crimp did not do that in this case.

[43]         I do not doubt that Mr. Crimp was distressed by the letters. However, I do not accept that BCRTC reasonably ought to have known that communicating with him about the Policy would adversely impact him in connection with his disability. Employers need to communicate their policies to their employees, including the consequences for not following the policies. While five letters may seem like a lot in a relatively short period of time, the COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to extraordinary complexities for employers who needed to ensure they met their health and safety obligations in a compressed time frame.  In these circumstances, where there is no basis in the evidence to conclude that BCRTC knew or ought to have known that the letters were exacerbating Mr. Crimp’s disability, BCRTC is reasonably certain to prove sending them was justified.

[44]         Mr. Crimp’s complaint about disability discrimination has no reasonable prospect of success and is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.

IV    CONCLUSION

[45]         BCRTC’s application is granted. The complaint is dismissed in its entirety: Code, s. 27(1)(c).

Rajwant Mangat
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal