AB v. BC Ministry of Health (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 223
Date Issued: October 27, 2026
File: CS-008015
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
AB
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER AND LIMIT PUBLICATION
Rules 5 and 36
Tribunal Member: Christopher J. Foy
On their own behalf: AB
Counsel for the Respondent: Rochelle Pauls
I INTRODUCTION
[1] AB filed a complaint against His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health [Ministry] alleging discrimination based on physical disability and sex in the provision of services contrary to section 8 of the Human Rights Code [Code].
[2] After a review of AB’s complaint, the Tribunal considered it would be fairer and more efficient to allow the Ministry to bring an application to dismiss AB’s complaint. The Ministry applied to dismiss the complaint under s.27(1)(c) of the Code. I granted the Ministry’s application and dismissed the complaint: A.B. v. BC Ministry of Health, 2026 BCHRT 187 [Dismissal Decision].
[3] AB now applies to have the Tribunal reconsider the Dismissal Decision and asks the Tribunal for an order to retroactively limit publication of her name in the Dismissal Decision. The Ministry opposes both AB’s application for reconsideration and her application to limit publication.
[4] In this decision, I exercise my discretion to retroactively anonymize the Dismissal Decision. I deny AB’s application for reconsideration.
II Decision
A. Application To Limit Publication
[5] Complaints at the Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. This openness serves four main goals: maintaining an effective evidentiary process, ensuring that Tribunal members act fairly, promoting public confidence in the Tribunal, and educating the public about the Tribunal’s process and development of the law: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para. 61; JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 25 [JY]. These goals align with the purposes of the Code, which include fostering a more equitable society and identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality: Code, s. 3. The main way that the Tribunal furthers these purposes is through its public decisions: A and B. v. Famous Players Films and C, 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14.
[6] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a). The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private detail in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY at para. 30. This is not an exhaustive list.
[7] It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37. It is not enough to just assert that a person’s reputation may be tarnished: Stein at para. 64(c).
[8] The Ministry argues that it is late in the day to apply for anonymization as the Dismissal Decision has already been publicly available since August 2026 and this weighs against retroactively limiting publication.
[9] Further, the Ministry says that the nature of the complaint concerns the Province’s health policy decisions and the allegations are not of a type, like sexual harassment, that attract greater privacy protections.
[10] The Ministry points out that the Tribunal routinely publishes decisions involving a complainant’s intimate personal details related to a physical disability. In this case, the Ministry says that AB’s medical condition being referenced in the Dismissal Decision without more is not enough to outweigh the public interest in access to the Tribunal’s proceedings.
[11] Finally, the Ministry says there is no harm to AB’s reputation and she merely seeks to avoid “awkwardness”.
[12] While I agree that concerns about privacy interests need to be raised at the earliest opportunity, a failure to do so is not fatal. There are examples where the Tribunal has issued a retroactive anonymization order: Parent W v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) 2024 BCHRT 350; S. v. B. 2025 BCHRT 101.
[13] The Dismissal Decision has been published for a relatively short period, approximately two months. It has yet to be published on all the major case reporting platforms, including Quicklaw.
[14] Although I recognize that the nature of the complaint in this case does not involve a minor or sexual harassment which may attract greater privacy concerns, I am not persuaded by the Ministry’s objections that AB’s privacy concerns do not deserve protection in these circumstances.
[15] Here, the complaint includes allegations of discrimination on the basis of physical disability and sex. The materials before me included a significant amount of medical documentation concerning AB’s physical condition. I have referenced her private medical information in the Dismissal Decision, not only concerning her multiple sclerosis but also her fertility preservation treatment.
[16] AB argues that she “may be exposed to gaslighting for bringing the complaint, both in the medical system and otherwise.”
[17] Although there is no evidence to support an assertion that publication of AB’s name would expose her to “gaslighting”, or “awkwardness”, I am satisfied that AB’s privacy interests in her medical information outweigh the public interest in her name.
[18] In my view restricting publication of her name minimally impairs the openness of this proceeding as the public will still be able to understand the complaint and the Dismissal Decision without knowing her name.
[19] Further, this proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding since the complaint will not proceed from this stage in the process.
[20] Accordingly, I grant AB’s application to anonymize her name. I order the Dismissal Decision be retroactively anonymized and re-published without using AB’s name and that no person may publish AB’s name in connection with the Dismissal Decision.
B. Application To Reconsider
[21] The power to reconsider a decision, once made, is necessarily very narrow. Among other things, this ensures that the resources of the Tribunal and the parties are not endlessly taken up in re-arguing the same issues, which would be neither efficient nor fair: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 at para. 10.
[22] The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions is limited to cases where reconsideration is in the interests of fairness and justice: Zutter v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights) [1995] B.C.J. No. 626 (C.A.); Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at para. 160, upheld on this point in 2016 SCC 25; Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848.
[23] Here, the burden is on AB to show that reconsideration is in the interests of fairness and justice: Grant at para. 10; Rule 36(1).
[24] AB suggests that I did not review her evidence. As mentioned in the Dismissal Decision, I considered all the materials before me. That included, and was not limited to, the videos and articles provided by AB, over the objections of the Ministry. I made various references in the Dismissal Decision to materials submitted by AB. Procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to reference all the evidence submitted.[1]
[25] I have reviewed AB’s application for reconsideration where she argues that the Dismissal Decision failed to resolve issues including, but not limited to, the following:
a. To avoid discrimination in healthcare services, the respondent must provide AHSCT and fertility preservation treatment;
b. Treatment eligibility rates that require a person with MS to fail ineffective drugs before having access to effective treatments/medication discriminate in the provision of healthcare services to people with MS by exposing people with MS to a risk of irreversible disability; and
c. The Tribunal did not consider other adverse impacts including injury to dignity and the denial of services.
[26] In my view, AB’s application for reconsideration repeats arguments that she made or could have made in the original submission process. AB seeks to reargue issues that I have already decided in the Dismissal Decision.
[27] Reconsideration is not an opportunity for parties to “enter new facts that with reasonable diligence were available in the first instance, to make arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to reargue matters that were argued in the first instance in an attempt to achieve a different result”: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13.
[28] Granting AB’s application for reconsideration would undermine the finality of the Tribunal’s process. I decline to exercise my discretion to reconsider the Dismissal Decision as I am not persuaded that it is in the interests of fairness and justice to do so.
III CONCLUSION
[29] I order that the Dismissal Decision be retroactively anonymized and re-published without using the complainant’s name and no person may publish the complainant’s name in connection with the Dismissal Decision.
[30] AB’s application for reconsideration of the Dismissal Decision is denied.
Christopher J. Foy
Tribunal Member
[1] Bernard v. Arts Umbrella Assn. 2021 BCHRT 51 at para. 30