Açar v. Lester B. Pearson College UWC (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 222

Date Issued: October 21, 2026
File: CS-004098

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Nazım Açar
COMPLAINANT

AND:

Lester B. Pearson College UWC
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau

On his own behalf: Nazım Açar

Counsel for the Respondent: David J. Bell and Aleksandar J. Petrovic

Date of Hearing: March 2-6 and May 11-13, 2026

Location of Hearing: Via videoconference

Contents

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Lester B. Pearson College is a boarding school for pre-university students from around the world. Its mission is to bring together emerging leaders in an intercultural learning environment to foster conditions for peace. Nazım Açar was a math instructor at the College, and a highly regarded “houseparent” who lived on campus. In that role, Mr. Açar took pride in fostering dialogue and connection with his students.

[2]             In 2019, Mr. Açar was talking to a 17-year-old Israeli student between classes. The student mentioned that he may be eligible for a scholarship after his military service in Israel. According to the student, Mr. Açar responded “that will depend on how many Palestinians you kill”. The student was very impacted by this comment. He withdrew from Mr. Açar’s math class and made a complaint.

[3]             After its initial investigation, the College concluded that Mr. Açar’s comment was inappropriate. It imposed a five-day suspension without pay, and required Mr. Açar to take a course. Another teacher at the College, who had been supporting the Israeli student, complained that this was not an appropriate response and raised broader allegations of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic sentiment at the College. This prompted the College to escalate its response. It hired Murray Rankin, KC, to investigate Mr. Açar’s conduct in respect of the Israeli student and other issues.

[4]             In his final report, Mr. Rankin concluded that Mr. Açar had violated the College’s Respectful Community Policy. In addition to the comment, Mr. Rankin considered the contents of Mr. Açar’s public Facebook page, which contained many posts critical of the state of Israel. Mr. Rankin found that those posts could reasonably give the impression that Mr. Açar holds an animus towards Israel and this bias may affect his treatment of Israeli students at the College. Notwithstanding this impression, Mr. Rankin found that Mr. Açar did not hold discriminatory beliefs about Israeli students, and that he could safely return to work. He recommended a further three-day suspension.

[5]             The College’s Acting Head, Tyrone Pile, accepted Mr. Rankin’s findings, but not his recommendation. In his view, Mr. Açar had demonstrated a pattern of problematic behaviour and was unlikely to change. A further suspension would be too lenient. At his direction, the College terminated Mr. Açar’s employment. Mr. Açar’s Facebook posts about Israel were a significant factor in this decision.

[6]             In this human rights complaint, Mr. Açar alleges that Mr. Rankin’s investigation was biased because of Mr. Rankin’s ties to Israel, and that the College terminated his employment because of his political beliefs about Israel and Palestine. He argues this is part of the systemic suppression of pro-Palestinian speech, and a violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. He asks for remedies, including reinstatement.

[7]             In response, the College denies that Mr. Rankin’s investigation was biased and says that Mr. Açar’s political beliefs were not a factor in his termination. In the alternative, it says that the termination was justified because the way that Mr. Açar expressed his political beliefs was incompatible with his trusted role as a teacher. The College asks for the complaint to be dismissed.

[8]             I heard this matter over nine days. I am grateful to the parties for their work.

[9]             For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the College did not discriminate against Mr. Açar in respect of Mr. Rankin’s investigation. The evidence does not support that Mr. Rankin held a discriminatory bias towards Mr. Açar, or that the investigation otherwise adversely impacted Mr. Açar in connection with his political beliefs. However, I have found that the College did discriminate against Mr. Açar in respect of his termination. While Mr. Açar’s comment to his student was not protected by the ground of political belief, his Facebook posts about Israel were. Through his social media commentary, Mr. Açar was expressing his political beliefs about the actions of the state of Israel, including through its military. In doing so, he was participating in the political life of the province, triggering the protection of the Code. I am not persuaded that the College fulfilled its duty to accommodate Mr. Açar’s political beliefs before relying on them to terminate his employment. I find that the College violated s. 13 of the Code, and I order remedies.

II      EVENTS GIVING RISE TO THE COMPLAINT

[10]         In this section I set out the relevant events giving rise to this complaint. Most of the important facts are undisputed. I base my decision on the substantial documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as well as the testimony of Mr. Açar and the following witnesses:

a.   Tom Aberman: the Israeli student to whom Mr. Açar made the impugned comment about killing (or shooting) Palestinians in the Israeli military.

b.   Shefa Siegel: the faculty member who complained about anti-Semitism and anti-Israel animus at the College.

c.   Heather Gross: the College’s Vice President of Education and Programming from 2017 to 2021. Ms. Gross was responsible, along with Shelley Seysener, for the College’s initial response to Mr. Aberman’s complaint about Mr. Açar.

d.   Shelley Seysener: the College’s Director of Human Resources from 2019 to 2025. Ms. Seysener was responsible, along with Ms. Gross, for the College’s initial response to Mr. Aberman’s complaint about Mr. Açar.

e.   Désirée McGraw, MNA: the Head of the College, President, and CEO between 2015 and 2019. Ms. McGraw appointed the external investigator to make factual findings about certain events involving Mr. Açar.

f.    Murray Rankin, KC: the external lawyer who investigated allegations of misconduct against Mr. Açar.

g.   Tyrone Pile: the Acting Head of the College, from January to August 2020. Mr. Pile made the decision to terminate Mr. Açar’s employment.

h.   Honourable Anne McLellan, PC, OC, AOE: the Chair of the College’s Board of Directors from November 2017 until November 2022. Ms. McLellan supported the decision to terminate Mr. Açar’s employment.

i.     Thomas Rennie Warburton: a retired professor, who was present at the meeting where Mr. Açar was terminated.

j.     Craig Davis: the Head of the College beginning in August 2020. Mr. Davis responded to complaints from members of the public about Mr. Açar’s termination.

[11]         I am grateful to all the witnesses for their time and effort to participate in this proceeding. I am satisfied that they each testified truthfully and to the best of their ability given the passage of time.

A.    The parties

[12]         The College is a two-year, pre-university school. It hosts students from over 150 countries, between the ages of 16 and 20.  It is part of a network of United World Colleges [UWC], which were created after World War II to make “education a force to unite people, nations, and cultures for peace and a sustainable future”. Its ethos is to recruit emerging leaders from across the world for an intensive intercultural and international residential learning experience. In its “College Credo”, it describes itself as “not primarily an academic institution, but an educational one in the broadest sense, attempting the education of the whole person”.  

[13]         Mr. Açar is Kurdish from Türkiye. Since 9/11 he has searched for ways to live his life meaningfully, including by seeking spaces where Muslims, Christians, and Jewish people live together in peace. He lived and taught in Ethiopia, Bosnia, and Jordan before arriving in Canada in 2010 to live and teach at the College.

[14]         From 2010 until January 2020, Mr. Açar was a math teacher and houseparent at the College. The witnesses were unanimous that he was generous and well-respected in his role as a houseparent and made meaningful contributions to life at the College. He intentionally made space for Palestinian and Israeli students to come together, in the UWC spirit. This was not always easy. Mr. Açar recalls that his students from Gaza and Israel faced very different realities when they went home. One of Mr. Açar’s students from Gaza had to leave his studies. And, tragically, one of his students from Israel died by suicide while serving in the Israeli military. This was very impactful for Mr. Açar.

B.    Tom Aberman complaint

[15]         The incident between Mr. Açar and Mr. Aberman happened in a short break between classes on September 27, 2019. Mr. Aberman was 17 years old.

[16]         Mr. Açar and Mr. Aberman began chatting. Mr. Açar shared that he was busy writing testimonials for students applying to university. Mr. Aberman said that he did not have to worry about university yet because he had to serve in the Israeli military and then may have an opportunity for a scholarship. They disagree about what exactly Mr. Açar said in response.

[17]         Mr. Açar says that Mr. Aberman’s reference to the military immediately evoked for him the memory of his former Israeli student who had died by suicide. From a place of pain and concern for Mr. Aberman, he says he said words to the effect that “you know, serving in the Israeli military will come with the expectation that you shoot Palestinians”. He was hoping to open a genuine dialogue with Mr. Aberman, in which they might reflect on “what contributes to peace building as well as conflict”: email dated October 8, 2019. Based on their past interactions, Mr. Açar says he understood that Mr. Aberman may have been critical of the Israeli military and open to such a dialogue.

[18]         Mr. Aberman has a different recollection. According to him, Mr. Açar said that his scholarship would “depend on how many Palestinians you kill” and then tried to play it off like a joke. This is what he told Mr. Siegel shortly after the incident, and what he reported to Ms. Seysener and Ms. Gross in an email written later that day.

[19]         For the purpose of this decision, I do not find it necessary to make a specific finding about the words that Mr. Açar used. Both witnesses testified credibly and each version is plausible. Below I find that, regardless of what Mr. Açar’s words and intentions were, this comment does not fall within the scope of political belief protected by the Code.

[20]         Nothwithstanding the different accounts presented in this hearing, Mr. Açar did not dispute Mr. Aberman’s wording at the time. From his perspective, the wording was immaterial – what mattered were his good intentions and their alignment with the mission of the College. As a result, the College’s decision making over the following months was premised on its understanding that Mr. Açar had told his student that his scholarship from the Israeli military would depend on how many Palestinians he killed.

[21]         Mr. Aberman was very seriously impacted by Mr. Açar’s comment. He felt like his teacher was calling him a killer. He testified: “I did not expect to hear this sort of sentence coming out of a teacher or faculty member at the College … It felt wrong the moment that I heard it.” The other witnesses who interacted with him in its aftermath, including Mr. Siegel, Ms. McGraw, and Ms. Seysener, corroborated that Mr. Aberman was deeply upset. He was scared to interact with Mr. Açar, and did not want to return to his class. He was not sleeping or eating well. He was visibly disheveled on campus, and his other coursework suffered.

[22]         Throughout the months that followed, and continuing into this proceeding, Mr. Açar has largely stood by his comment. While he regrets the impact it had on Mr. Aberman, and offered to apologize “because I realized I failed in my mission to make space for dialogue”, Mr. Açar maintains that his intentions were good. He argues that the spirit of the comment was in line with the College’s commitment to difficult conversations and that it is not unreasonable to expect a student who is one year away from military service to be faced with the reality of that service. He says that the comment was “justified as a political belief and is warranted by my role and appropriate”. In some of his less generous responses, Mr. Açar has suggested that Mr. Aberman was provoking him by “flaunting” his Israeli military service – a characterisation I reject.

[23]         I accept, and it is undisputed, that Mr. Açar did not intend to harm Mr. Aberman. I accept that he cared about Mr. Aberman and was concerned for him, especially because of what had happened to his other Israeli student. I accept that Mr. Açar thought that he had the type of relationship with Mr. Aberman where such a comment might open a path to meaningful dialogue and insight. Unfortunately, it did not.

[24]         Later that night, Mr. Aberman emailed Ms. Seysener and Ms. Gross to make a complaint about Mr. Açar under the College’s Respectful Community Policy. He set out the details of the incident and also raised two other issues about Mr. Açar’s conduct. The first issue was about occasions when Mr. Açar spoke about “oppressors and oppressed people in the world” during math class. Mr. Aberman wrote that “it was clear he talked about Israel because it was after the Israeli military attacked somewhere”. The second issue was about a conversation that Mr. Açar facilitated between Israeli and Syrian students about an Israeli attack in Syria, in which Mr. Aberman alleged that Mr. Açar was trying to “drift the conversation to a place where [the Syrian student] had the moral high ground and Israel was presented in a very bad way and make some comments about Israel that were in my opinion unnecessary”.

[25]         Mr. Aberman asked to be removed from Mr. Açar’s class. When another Israeli student found out about the comment, she also asked to be removed from Mr. Açar’s class. The College granted their requests. Mr. Aberman was able to transfer to a different math class. However, there was no other class for the second Israeli student, who was instead permitted to self-teach the class using an online program.

C.    First investigation

[26]         Ms. Gross and Ms. Seysener were tasked with responding to Mr. Aberman’s complaint. They both said that this was difficult. They were applying the College’s Respectful Community Policy, which was relatively new. Mr. Pile – who would subsequently decide to terminate Mr. Açar’s employment – was not involved.

[27]         In its Respectful Community Policy, the College acknowledges its “responsibility to provide a respectful working, living and learning environment that is free of discrimination, harassment and bullying and is supportive of personal growth and achievement and one that upholds the dignity, self-esteem and fair treatment of all members of the College Community including employees, volunteers, students, campus residents, contractors and visitors”. To that end, the Policy forbids “any form of racism, sexism, discrimination or any form of social prejudice”. It defines harassment, bullying, and discrimination as:

… objectionable conduct that may have the effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment, interfering with an individual’s professional, academic or work performance, adversely affecting an individual’s relationship within the community and/or denying an individual dignity and respect.

It includes inappropriate conduct or comments by a person towards someone that the person knew or reasonably ought to have known would cause the individual to be humiliated or intimated.

The Policy does not require that the person have intended to harass/bully/discriminate: p. 3.

[28]         Ms. Seysener and Ms. Gross met with Mr. Açar on October 3. Mr. Açar agreed that he had made the statement that Mr. Aberman alleged. Mr. Açar followed up in writing, defending his conduct and offering further context for his mindset in making the comment. In the meantime, he was placed on a leave with pay.

[29]         Ms. Gross and Ms. Seysener tried to arrange an informal resolution between Mr. Açar and Mr. Aberman, but Mr. Aberman was unwilling to meet with Mr. Açar. It is an ongoing source of frustration for Mr. Açar that the matter could not be resolved by dialogue. However, I do not see a basis for his assertion that the College failed to pursue restorative justice or informal resolution under its Respectful Community Policy. As the College’s witnesses point out, such resolutions were only possible with the consent and participation of Mr. Aberman, who was not open to a restorative process.

[30]         Ms. Gross and Ms. Seysener concluded that Mr. Açar had committed a “very serious violation of the Respectful Community Policy”. In a letter dated October 30, 2019, Ms. Gross emphasised that Mr. Açar’s comment caused Mr. Aberman to feel intimidated and harassed and that, as a teacher, Mr. Açar should have known that his comment would have that effect. The College imposed a five-day suspension without pay, and told Mr. Açar he would be required to “take training on teacher student boundaries”.[1]

[31]         In response, Mr. Açar continued to defend his conduct, emphasising his good intentions and support for Mr. Aberman. He deflected the requirement that he take training by suggesting that he would “look for a person to come to the campus both to make this more affordable and beneficial for the community”. Ms. Seysener testified that she was disappointed by this response, which seemed to reflect that Mr. Açar did not take responsibility for his conduct.

D.   Shefa Siegel complaints

[32]         Mr. Siegel arrived at the College in 2018 to teach a Global Politics course. He is Canadian, Jewish, and speaks Hebrew. As such, he found himself, involuntarily, in a position where Israeli students came to him for support. In one communication to the College, he put it this way: “my role and responsibilities at the College have been shifted for no reason other than my religion”: email dated November 11, 2019. Consistent with this, Mr. Siegel was one of the first adults that Mr. Aberman talked to about the incident with Mr. Açar, and was an ongoing support for him. It was Mr. Siegel who encouraged Mr. Aberman to make a complaint about Mr. Açar’s comment under the Respectful Community Policy.

[33]         On November 5, Mr. Siegel joined Mr. Aberman in a meeting with Ms. Seysener and Ms. Gross about the outcome of Mr. Aberman’s complaint. Ms. Gross told Mr. Aberman that his complaint had been substantiated, and that the issue would be resolved through training and by granting the Israeli students’ request to be removed from Mr. Açar’s math class. Mr. Aberman and Mr. Siegel were disappointed with the outcome of the investigation. Mr. Siegel was particularly concerned that part of the College’s solution was to have an Israeli student “self-teach” math. He testified that it was “textbook discrimination”.

[34]         Following that meeting, Mr. Siegel wrote to Ms. Seysener and Ms. Gross that he could not “accept the outcome of the investigation, the path forward as it was articulated, or the defense of the College policy on matters of hate speech, racism, anti-Semitism, and discrimination”: email dated November 5, 2019. Several days later, Mr. Siegel wrote again to say he would no longer be present at any meetings or events where Mr. Açar may be present, and would not participate in any educational or planning meetings that could otherwise be used to resolve the College’s “discriminatory approach to managing the situation”: email dated November 11, 2019.

[35]         On November 15, Mr. Siegel wrote a 12-page letter to the College, with the subject line “Anti-Semitism at Pearson College” [Siegel Letter]. Mr. Siegel says he was moved to write this letter because, from his perspective, the outcome of the College’s response to Mr. Aberman’s complaint was that two Israeli students were left without equitable access to their education. Mr. Siegel was express that he was not filing a formal or official complaint: email dated December 2, 2019.

[36]         In his letter, Mr. Siegel described the incidents underlying Mr. Aberman’s complaint as well as other incidents where Mr. Açar or others at the College had allegedly expressed anti-Israeli sentiments and – in Mr. Siegel’s view – the College had failed to respond appropriately. He described a conversation that he had with Mr. Açar in the fall of 2018, in which he says that Mr. Açar:

turned the conversation toward the decision to create a position to teach Global Politics, and to hire me, asserting that he had been integral in the push to offer this new course, and, in a complete non-sequitur, telling me how influential he had been in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He concluded by saying “Not that I see you as the Jewish teacher at the College”, an admission that had no connection to any part of our conversation.

[37]         Mr. Siegel reported his perception that there was a culture at the College marked by an “unusual, curious, or aberrant interest in whether somebody new to campus was, or was not, Jewish”, and raised wider allegations of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic sentiment across UWC schools. Returning to Mr. Açar, Mr. Siegel referred to posts on his public Facebook page, marked by “an inordinate fixation with Israel” and which included (in Mr. Siegel’s words):

calling Israel an ‘apartheid state’ (May 5, 2019), comparing Israelis to Nazis (Feb. 21, 2019), and referring to ‘Zionist Terrorist Forces’ (March 30, 2018), as well as writing posts openly wondering, for example, whether Turkish and Kurdish extermination of Armenians should properly be called genocide….

[38]         Mr. Siegel called Mr. Açar’s behaviour toward Mr. Aberman “hurtful, hateful, and harmful”, with enduring impacts on Mr. Aberman, current and future Israeli and Jewish students, and on himself. He concluded:

In a knowledge-community where everything depends on authenticity, sincerity, honesty, and idealism, this raises questions about my future working in a place where the institution’s own ethical standards are so loosely observed, and the standard of care provided for students so inequitably applied.

[39]         Though Mr. Siegel’s letter was not an official complaint, the College considered that it raised serious allegations. On November 22, 2019, the College advised Mr. Açar that additional concerns had been brought to its attention which required further investigation. Mr. Açar was placed on administrative leave with pay, pending the outcome of the investigation.

E.    External investigation

[40]         Under Ms. McGraw’s leadership, the College appointed Mr. Rankin to investigate the allegations against Mr. Açar. Mr. Rankin has been a lawyer for 50 years, specialising in constitutional and administrative law. Between 2012-2019, he served as a Member of Parliament, where he held several high-profile roles as a member of the official opposition. During the relevant period, he had returned to his private law practice in Victoria. Mr. Rankin was recommended to Ms. Seysener by a colleague. He was available to start right away. From Ms. McGraw’s perspective, Mr. Rankin’s reputation preceded him, and he was an excellent choice.

[41]         In this complaint, Mr. Açar takes issue with the College’s decision to hire Mr. Rankin, who he describes as a “long time advocate of Israel”. Mr. Açar cites assertions made in a blog post which suggest that, during his time in Parliament, Mr. Rankin was a “leading anti-Palestinian activist” and “blindly pro-Israel”. He questions how Mr. Rankin could be impartial, given his participation on a Parliamentary Friendship Committee with Israel, and past trips to Israel. Below I find that these allegations of bias are unfounded.

[42]         Mr. Rankin had foreseen this criticism. Before confirming the retainer, Mr. Rankin wrote to Ms. Seysener to note that he had a “persistent critic” online, who accused him of being “pro-Israel”: email dated November 20, 2019. In doing so, Mr. Rankin also noted that he had been a strong supporter of local Syrian and Muslim communities. He was confident that he could provide an impartial investigation, but left it up to the College whether to retain him.

[43]         The College determined this was not a cause for concern. Ms. McGraw testified that she is familiar with Mr. Rankin’s online critic, who was known to harass elected officials and, from her perspective, had no credibility. Mr. Pile considered Mr. Rankin’s proactive approach as confirmation of his qualifications and ability to act impartially.

[44]         Mr. Rankin’s mandate from the College was to “conduct a fact-finding inquiry” into the allegations made against Mr. Açar by Mr. Aberman and Mr. Siegel, determine whether professional misconduct had occurred, identify whether authorities were aware of any misconduct, and “provide legal advice and best practice recommendations”.

[45]         On December 9, 2019, Mr. Rankin wrote to Mr. Açar to introduce himself and schedule an interview. He set out the six “key allegations” pertaining to Mr. Açar’s conduct:

a.   The September 27 comment to Mr. Aberman (“‘well that depends on how many Palestinians you kill’ or words to that effect”);

b.   Discussing “oppressors and oppressed people” during math class, while focusing his gaze on Mr. Aberman and a Palestinian student;

c.   Telling his math class that he was “fasting for people starving in Yemen” and then engaging in an “approximately 15-minute-long discussion of this topic”;

d.   Expressing his “personal views about the Israeli government and military” during a facilitated discussion between Israeli and Syrian students about a recent Israeli attack against Syria;

e.   Saying to Mr. Siegel, “Not that I see you as the Jewish teacher at the College”; and

f.    Posting “political commentary on the Israel-Palestine conflict” on his public Facebook page, including posts from a Facebook page called “I Acknowledge Apartheid Exists”.

[46]         Throughout Mr. Rankin’s investigation, Mr. Açar was given the opportunity to ask questions and provide information and documents in response to the allegations, without limitation. He met with Mr. Rankin for about three hours, with Mr. Warburton present as an advocate. Following the interview, Mr. Açar sent Mr. Rankin more documents and written submissions about the allegations. He identified witnesses with relevant information. They spoke two more times, by phone. It is difficult to reconcile these undisputed facts with Mr. Açar’s assertion, in his closing arguments, that “throughout the process leading to dismissal I was denied the opportunity to provide my narrative and explanations”.

[47]         In addition to Mr. Açar, Mr. Rankin interviewed six people, including Mr. Aberman. He did not interview most of the people identified by Mr. Açar, who were not witnesses to any of the relevant events but rather were put forward to attest to Mr. Açar’s good character. Mr. Rankin reviewed the documentary evidence and all the written material.

[48]         Mr. Rankin also reviewed Mr. Açar’s public Facebook posts since January 1, 2018. Many of those posts related to Israel and Palestine, and are critical of Israel. Seventeen of those posts are before me [the Israel Facebook Posts]. Some are from news sources like The Guardian, Al Jazeera, the Huffington Post, and the Washington Post. One is a call to action by Amnesty International, to free a 17-year-old who was imprisoned for protesting settlements in the West Bank. Others contain images or videos showing violence against Palestinians or the destruction of buildings in Gaza. Several posts are from a page called “I Acknowledge Apartheid Exists”, which sometimes uses the term “Zionist occupation”. Another post, mourning the loss of “one of Gaza’s famous sand artist[s]”, says the artist was murdered by “Zionist terrorist forces”. Finally, in one post that Mr. Siegel referred to, Mr. Açar posted an article from middleeastmonitor.com, headlined “Israel pharmaceutical firms test medicines on Palestinian prisoners”. Below the post, someone commented “Didn’t the Nazis conduct medical experiments on Jewish prisoners? I don’t understand why this is happening”, to which Mr. Açar replied, “yes, josef mengele was the doctor” [as written].

[49]         Mr. Rankin issued his final report on January 10, 2020 [Rankin Report]. It was 52 pages long, and comprehensive.

[50]         Mr. Rankin found that some of the allegations against Mr. Açar were not violations of the Respectful Community Policy, specifically:

a.   Mr. Açar’s facilitation of the discussion between Israeli and Syrian students, which Mr. Rankin praised as “successful” and “commendable” (Rankin Report, p. 26);

b.   Mr. Açar’s comments about fasting for Yemen, which Mr. Rankin found were not “discriminatory, offensive or inappropriate” (Rankin Report, p. 29); and

c.   Mr. Açar’s comment to Mr. Siegel about not being seen as the “Jewish teacher” on campus, which Mr. Rankin acknowledged may have been “perceived as odd” but was not discrimination or harassment (Rankin Report, p. 30).

[51]         However, Mr. Rankin concluded that Mr. Açar had violated the Respectful Community Policy and/or engaged in conduct warranting discipline in respect of four issues:

a.   The September 27, 2019, conversation with Mr. Aberman. Mr. Rankin found Mr. Açar’s comment about killing Palestinians was a “serious violation” of the Respectful Community Policy, which demonstrated “an appalling lack of judgment” and “created an intimidating and offensive environment such that Mr. Aberman felt uncomfortable remaining in Mr. Açar’s class”: Rankin Report, p. 22.

b.   Focusing attention on Mr. Aberman and another Palestinian student while speaking about oppression in his math class. On at least one occasion, Mr. Açar was aware this discussion coincided with an Israeli military attack. Mr. Rankin concluded that a reasonable teacher “ought to have known that staring at the Israeli and Palestinian student during discussions about oppressors and oppressed people would make those students feel uncomfortable and singled out”: Rankin Report, p. 28.

c.   The Israel Facebook Posts. Mr. Rankin found that “the sheer volume of posts portraying Israel in a negative light, coupled with the handful of posts that, in my judgment, cross a line into offensive commentary, would reasonably lead someone viewing the page to conclude that Mr. Açar holds animus towards Israel and that this bias may affect his treatment of Israeli students at Pearson”: Rankin Report, pp. 33-34. He noted that past and current Israeli students had taken offence to the posts. In saying this, Mr. Rankin noted “I have not found that Mr. Açar in fact holds discriminatory beliefs with respect to Israeli students”. However, he found that “by sharing these posts publicly, Mr. Açar has undermined his ability to provide an educational environment in which all students, including those from Israel, feel assured that they will be treated fairly and without bias based on their country of origin”: Rankin Report, p. 34. Finally, Mr. Rankin noted that Mr. Açar’s posts created a risk of reputational harm to the College, “particularly in light of its mission to unite people for peace”: Rankin Report, p. 34.

d.   Public Facebook posts about Pearson and the UWC. Mr. Rankin found that three posts about UWC and the College raised reputational concerns for the College. In one, Mr. Açar posted about the UWC delegation being predominantly white men, commenting on “60 years of failure to match the diversity of the student body by the diversity of faculty and management”. In the second, Mr. Açar “loved” a comment comparing the College to an Indian Residential School. And in the third, Mr. Açar posted about a discriminatory comment made by another College faculty member.

[52]         Mr. Rankin considered that Mr. Açar had already been disciplined in respect of the September 27 comment to Mr. Aberman. He recommended that Pearson discipline Mr. Açar with a further three-day unpaid suspension to account for the additional conduct violating the Respectful Community Policy, most significantly the Facebook posts. He also recommended that Mr. Açar be required to compose a written apology to Mr. Aberman, complete the course on professional boundaries, make his Facebook page private, and remove the offending posts. In making this recommendation, Mr. Rankin considered “Mr. Açar’s significant past contributions to Pearson, many of which go beyond his teaching duties” and for which Mr. Açar reasonably felt underappreciated: Rankin Report, p. 45. Mr. Rankin expressed the view that Mr. Açar could safely return to teaching at Pearson:

… I have not found facts suggesting that there is an ongoing risk that Mr. Açar will treat Israeli students unfairly. I note that my concern with respect to Mr. Açar’s Facebook posts about Israel is that they create a perception of bias towards Israeli students. In speaking with Mr. Açar and considering his written submissions, I am satisfied that he is capable and willing to treat all students fairly, and that particularly with the training imposed, he is capable of exercising proper judgment regarding appropriate boundaries for teacher-student communication.

My opinion is that Mr. Açar’s return to teaching at Pearson, with the disciplinary mechanisms outlined above, will not jeopardize Pearson’s ability to fulfill its obligations to provide a discrimination-free educational environment. [Rankin Report, pp. 47-48, emphasis in original]

[53]         Finally, Mr. Rankin acknowledged that “Pearson’s ultimate decision as to what disciplinary measures to impose will depend in part on whether and to what extent Mr. Açar has been subject to discipline in the past”: Rankin Report p. 7.

F.     Termination

[54]         By this time, Mr. Pile had taken over as Interim Head of College. Under his leadership, the College accepted Mr. Rankin’s findings. However, Mr. Pile determined that Mr. Rankin’s recommended discipline was too lenient, considering the effect of the comment on Mr. Aberman, the ramifications for the “small and sensitive” campus community, and potential reputational harm to the College. Based on past interactions with Mr. Açar, Mr. Pile viewed him as an “administratively burdensome” employee, who was difficult and stubborn to work with. Ms. McGraw corroborated this perspective, describing Mr. Açar as well intentioned but “difficult” and “problematic” as a faculty member. Because Mr. Açar did not appear to appreciate the gravity of his misconduct, Mr. Pile did not believe that he would learn from it and avoid similar misconduct in the future. This sentiment was shared by Ms. Seysener, who testified that she struggled to believe that Mr. Açar would avoid repeating the same behaviour.

[55]         Mr. Pile determined that the appropriate outcome was to terminate Mr. Açar’s employment without cause. He informed the Executive Committee of the Board.

[56]         On January 29, 2020, Mr. Açar attended a meeting with Mr. Pile and Ms. Seysener. He was joined by Mr. Warburton. Mr. Pile read a summary of Mr. Rankin’s findings, and then told Mr. Açar his employment was being terminated, without cause. He gave Mr. Açar a summary of the Rankin Report and a termination letter. The College paid Mr. Açar seven months’ salary as severance, and offered an additional payment in exchange for a release. Mr. Açar declined the offer. His severance entitlements were subsequently settled on the eve of a Small Claims trial.

[57]         Following Mr. Açar’s termination, many people wrote to the College to express their objection. These supporters speak highly of Mr. Açar’s character and contributions to the College. In response to these letters, the new College Head, Mr. Davis, reviewed the process that the College had implemented to reach its decision. He determined that the College’s decision was appropriate and did not require a formal reassessment. In a mass email to the College community on September 4, 2020, Mr. Davis expressed that he had undertaken a “thorough examination of the file in this matter” (emphasis in original) and that he was satisfied that the College’s policies had been implemented properly.

[58]         Mr. Açar filed this human rights complaint on January 21, 2021, against the College, Mr. Pile, and Ms. McGraw. He alleged discrimination based on his race, place of origin, and political belief relating to incidents dating back to 2018. His complaint was narrowed in an earlier Tribunal decision finding that some of his allegations were out of time, and that it did not further the purposes of the Code to proceed against Mr. Pile and Ms. McGraw as individuals: Açar v. Lester B. Pearson College of the Pacific and United World Colleges (Canada) Inc. and others, 2025 BCHRT 48 [Dismissal Decision]. Following that decision, Mr. Açar withdrew his allegations of discrimination based on race and place of origin. The remaining allegations are whether the College discriminated against Mr. Açar based on his political beliefs in its investigation into his conduct, and the termination of his employment.

III    DISCRIMINATION BASED ON POLITICAL BELIEF

[59]         The Code prohibits discrimination in employment based on certain protected characteristics. Where those characteristics are not engaged, the Code does not apply, and this Tribunal cannot provide a remedy. Often, there is no issue about whether a protected characteristic is engaged. That is not the case here.

[60]         The first issue I must decide is whether, and to what extent, Mr. Açar’s protected political beliefs are engaged in this complaint. Then I must then decide whether Mr. Açar’s protected political beliefs were a factor in adverse employment impacts arising from Mr. Rankin’s investigation, and/or the termination of his employment. The burden is on Mr. Açar to prove these elements of his complaint: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.

[61]         For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that Mr. Açar’s protected political beliefs were engaged by his comment to Mr. Aberman, or his discussion of oppression in his math class. Any negative employment consequences that flowed from that conduct were not discrimination. I am also not satisfied that Mr. Rankin’s investigation was biased against Mr. Açar based on his political beliefs about Israel and Palestine. These parts of Mr. Açar’s complaint are dismissed.

[62]         However, I am satisfied that Mr. Açar has proven his Israel Facebook Posts engage his protected political beliefs, and were a factor in the termination of his employment. The burden therefore shifts to the College to justify its reliance on these posts by proving that it was applying a bona fide occupational requirement: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC) [Meiorin]. I find that it has not done so, and I order remedies.

[63]         I begin my analysis by defining the scope of Mr. Açar’s protected political beliefs that are engaged in this complaint.

A.    Protected political beliefs: principles

[64]         The Code aims to “foster a society in British Columbia in which there are no impediments to full and free participation in the economic, social, political, and cultural life” of the province: s. 3(a). To that end, it prohibits discrimination based on political belief in three work-related areas: employment advertisements (s. 11), employment (s. 13), and unions and associations (s. 14). When the ground was first included in BC’s human rights legislation in 1973, then-Premier Barrett explained that its purpose was to ensure that a person’s politics would not be a barrier to their employment. He grounded this in his personal experience of being fired from a job because he was a socialist, recounting:

Now, I never forgot that whole experience, Mr. Speaker, where I was denied the right to speak out freely in a society about what I believed in in terms of politics. I was threatened with my job, and when I didn’t withdraw I was actually fired. The records show, Mr. Speaker, that there was nothing against my performance on the job, nothing against my professional commitment to that job, and at no time was there any complaint on the performance of my job. The only thing that was wrong with me was that I thought for myself and I thought socialist. And I was fired.

British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, British Columbia Hansard, 3rd Session, 30th Parliament, (November 5, 1973), pages 1265-66 (Hon. Mr. Barrett).

[65]         Protected political beliefs include beliefs about the form and functions of government, and a person’s participation in partisan politics: Gordon v. Simon Fraser University, 2026 BCHRT 101 at para. 52. The beliefs must be genuinely held, broader than a person’s own personal interests, and “reasonably cogent and cohesive” – meaning “reasonably clear, logical, consistent, and integrated”: Pozsar v. City of Maple Ridge, 2018 BCHRT 107 at para. 34; Maatz v. Interior Health Authority, 2026 BCHRT 27 at para. 52; Gordon at para. 51.

[66]         Like other fundamental rights, the “freedom to hold [political] beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on them”: Trinity Western University v. College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2001 SCC 31 at para. 36.

[67]         In some cases, protected political beliefs may extend to political activity or expression. This reflects a synergy between the Code’s protectionsand the fundamental freedoms underlying Canada’s deliberative democracy, enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In the Charter context, political speech is recognized as “the single most important and protected type of expression”: Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33 at para. 11. Participation in political discourse is “the primary means by which the average citizen participates in the open debate that animates the determination of social policy”: Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 37at para. 29. Protection of political speech is the “linchpin” of Canadian democracy: R. v. Keegstra, 1990 CanLII 24 (SCC); Kljajic v. Vancouver (City), 2014 BCHRT 258 at para. 63; Harper at para. 70.

[68]         To achieve its purpose of fostering full and free participation in political life, the Code’s protection of political belief must encompass, to some extent, the means by which people participate in political life. This includes engaging in “public discourse on matters of public interest which involves or would require action at a governmental level”: Bratzer v. Victoria Police Department (No. 3), 2016 BCHRT 50at para. 271, citing BCTF v. BCPSEA, 2009 BCCA 39 at para. 2 and 37; Fraser v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2019 BCHRT 140 at para. 59. In Bratzer, the Tribunal put it this way:

… where restrictions on the mode of expressing … political beliefs may reasonably interfere with holding or expressing a political belief, then discrimination on the basis of political belief may be found to have occurred. [para. 274]

[69]         In that case, the Tribunal found that Mr. Bratzer’s public advocacy about drug laws engaged the protection of the Code. The advocacy took place outside of Mr. Bratzer’s employment as a police officer, and included public speaking, media interviews, and publications. These activities were the means by which Mr. Bratzer was able to exercise his political beliefs and participate in the political life of the province. They were, properly understood, political activities. In that context, the Tribunal interpreted political belief to ensure “minimal impairment of free expression” and, by extension, minimal interference with Mr. Bratzer’s ability to participate in the political process: Bratzer at para. 276.

[70]         However, the Code’s protection does not extend to every activity connected to, or rooted in, a person’s political belief. The Code “is not meant to protect a person’s ability to act in whatever manner they see fit … as long as their actions are connected in some way to a genuinely held political belief”: Maatz at para. 78. These limits reflect that, while there is a connection between the Code’s protection of political belief and the Charter’s right to freedom of expression, they are not completely overlapping or interchangeable rights: Monkman v. CUPE 561 and others, 2025 BCHRT 189 at para. 29.

[71]         The Code does not protect activities or expressions that run contrary to its purposes, the rule of law, or the fundamental premise of employment or union membership. For example:

a.   Political disagreement with drug laws would not exempt a police officer from having to enforce those laws: Bratzer.

b.   Political disagreement with vaccine mandates does not exempt employees from following provincial laws or occupational health and safety rules: Zhou v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 226; Menekerios v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2026 BCHRT 158; Maatz.

c.   Disagreement with the political and collective actions of a union does not exempt a union member from participating in those actions: Manning v. Sooke Teachers’ Association and others, 2004 BCHRT 281.

d.   Political views expressed through violence or threats of violence are not protected: Chrysanthous v. Engineers and Geoscientists BC, 2020 BCHRT 88.

[72]         In each of these examples, the complainants’ expression or conduct is not (or would not be) an exercise of political participation captured within the statutory meaning of political belief. The conduct itself is incompatible with the fundamental premise of employment (that an employee must follow lawful and reasonable instructions of their employer), union membership (power through collective decision making and action), and/or the purposes of the Code (fostering political participation and a climate of respect). Though the complainants’ conduct may be grounded in a political belief, it is not political activity and is not protected by the Code.

B.    Protected political beliefs: application

[73]         In this case, Mr. Açar’s beliefs about the actions of the state of Israel and their impact on Palestinians are, by definition, political (“of or affecting the State or its government”): Jamieson v. Victoria Native Friendship Centre, 1994 CanLII 18447 at para. 11. I have no difficulty finding that these beliefs are protected political beliefs within the meaning of the Code.

[74]         In reaching this conclusion, I acknowledge that Mr. Açar has described his political beliefs in various ways throughout the complaint process. In his complaint, Mr. Açar described his political beliefs as follows: “I believe in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In particular the articles 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 19, 26 which compel me to pursue this path with the BC Human Rights Tribunal”. In his closing argument, he described his political belief as “humans are equal and should be treated equal”.

[75]         The College argues that the Tribunal must consider political belief as Mr. Açar has articulated it in his complaint, and that to do otherwise would be unfair and create a “moving target”. It argues that Mr. Açar’s articulation of his political belief lacks the requisite cogency and cohesion to trigger the protection of the Code. Respectfully, I disagree.

[76]         Mr. Açar is not a lawyer, trained in how to plead facts in a legal action. He has been representing himself throughout this process. It is the Tribunal’s role to understand and adjudicate his complaint on its merits: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 38. It must do so in a manner that is fair, ensuring that each party understands the case it must meet.

[77]         Here, I am satisfied that College has understood the case it must meet. From the beginning, it was clear that Mr. Açar’s complaint is that he was treated badly because of his beliefs and expression about the state of Israel. As he put it: “complaints raised against me are about my ideas and politics”. In his closing arguments, he explained:

The business of governments is by nature political, power and the exercise of it is by nature political, anything personal in relation to that power is political. At Pearson College I was the subject of contempt for my comment to the Israeli student telling him that joining the military would come with the expectation of shooting Palestinians, for talking about oppression and oppressed, fasting, criticizing Israeli military and the government, all of which are political.

[78]         Throughout this process, Mr. Açar has positioned his case within a broader context of the suppression of pro-Palestinian speech, and argued that the College’s actions were biased by its ties to Israel. The College understood this, and led evidence and argument responding to the merits of the complaint relating to Mr. Açar’s expression of anti-Israel/pro-Palestine beliefs. 

[79]         However, as I have said, the protection from discrimination based on political belief does not extend to all manner of expressing or acting on that belief. In this case, the more difficult issue is whether the way Mr. Açar expressed his political beliefs in the context of his employment is protected.

[80]         There is no dispute that Mr. Açar’s expression of beliefs about the actions of the state of Israel, including through its military, was a factor in Mr. Rankin’s investigation and the termination of his employment. Mr. Rankin found, and the College accepted, that Mr. Açar’s conduct in expressing those beliefs violated the Respectful Community Policy when he allegedly:

a.   told Mr. Aberman that his scholarship from the Israeli military would “depend on how many Palestinians you kill”; and

b.   focused his attention on Mr. Aberman (an Israeli student) and a Palestinian student while discussing “oppressors” and “oppressed” in math class; and

c.   posted negative commentary about Israel on his public Facebook page.

[81]         While Mr. Rankin’s investigation considered other allegations against Mr. Açar that could engage his political beliefs (specifically, fasting for Yemen and supporting Israeli and Syrian students in a conversation), Mr. Rankin found those allegations unfounded. There is no evidence to suggest they played any role in the College’s decision to terminate Mr. Açar’s employment. I do not consider them further.

1.     Comment to Mr. Aberman

[82]         In my view, Mr. Açar’s conduct in making the comment to Mr. Aberman does not engage the Code’s protection for political belief. This action is not properly construed as a political activity or participation in the political life of the province. Rather, it was an interaction between a teacher and his student talking between classes, in a classroom. Though Mr. Açar’s comment may have been rooted in his political beliefs, its expression to a student in his workplace is not political within the meaning of the Code.

[83]         Here I invoke the Tribunal’s observation in Maatz that the Code does not protect “any manner in which a person decides to express their belief”: para. 74 (emphasis in original). It does not exempt an employee from the employer’s reasonable expectations about conduct in the workplace, or transform conversations at work into political activities that attract the Code’s protections: Menekerios at para. 35. In saying this, I appreciate that the College has a unique mandate to “seek growth of international and intercultural understanding”. In its “Essential Agreement”, the College has committed to:

… create discussion cultures where we can engage with contentious and often difficult topics. UWC’s mission that requires each of us to become “a force for peace and sustainability”, needs a resilient mindset. By challenging injustice, we should be prepared to experience forms of discomfort in order to engage with deeper political issues.

I appreciate that, to further its mission, College instructors may engage with their students on difficult discussions and some of those discussions may be about political issues. However, this does not transform interactions between a teacher and student into political activities. This is especially true in this case, where Mr. Açar’s comment to Mr. Aberman took place during what should have been a casual exchange of pleasantries between classes.

[84]         Mr. Açar argues that it was the content of his comment, and the fact that it was directed to an Israeli student, that triggered the College’s response. He submits:

Told to a Chinese, Russian, Saudi, Iranian, Turk, American, Canadian this would be a mundane remark. But told to an Israeli happens to be a totally different thing.

[85]         Respectfully, I disagree. The evidence before me overwhelmingly establishes that the College’s response to Mr. Açar’s comment was rooted in its profound impact on Mr. Aberman, and its assessment that the comment was not appropriate for a teacher to say to a student. While it is possible different students may respond differently to such a comment, I do not accept that it would be considered “mundane” if made to a person of a different nationality. The evidence does not support that the College’s response was based on the political belief underlying the remark. Rather, it was based on the rationale most clearly articulated in Mr. Rankin’s Report:

The Comment constitutes a serious violation of the [Respectful Community Policy]. It created an intimidating and offensive environment such that [Mr. Aberman] felt uncomfortable remaining in Mr. Açar’s class. A reasonable teacher ought to have known that it was inappropriate, unacceptable, and unwelcome to essentially tell a student facing mandatory military services that his scholarship prospects would depend on how many people he killed. The Comment demonstrates an appalling lack of judgment on the part of Mr. Açar. This conclusion holds regardless of Mr. Açar’s intention in making the Comment. [Rankin Report, p. 22]

[86]         Considering the principles I have set out above about the scope of activity engaged by the ground of political belief, I find that Mr. Açar’s comment to Mr. Aberman falls outside that scope. Consequences flowing from this conduct could not amount to discrimination based on political belief, and do not have to be justified by the College under the Code.

2.     Conduct discussing oppressors and oppressed

[87]         Mr. Açar denies focusing attention on his Israeli and Palestinian students during class discussions about oppression. However, the College accepted Mr. Rankin’s finding that he did so and considered this as part of the misconduct giving rise to the termination.

[88]         For the same reasons as the comment to Mr. Aberman, the College’s perception that Mr. Açar engaged in this conduct does not engage the protected ground of political belief. This was behaviour inside a classroom, allegedly directed at students. It could not reasonably be construed as participation in the political life of the province, or otherwise political activity. Consequences flowing from this conduct could not amount to discrimination based on political belief, and do not have to be justified by the College under the Code.

3.     Israel Facebook Posts

[89]         I reach a different conclusion about Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts. Mr. Açar made these posts outside his employment, in his capacity as an engaged citizen. In doing so, he was engaging in “public discourse on matters of public interest which involves or would require action at a governmental level”: Bratzer at para. 271. Social media is a modern means by which people can participate in public debates and try to influence public policy: Figueroa at para. 29. In other words, it is a means of participating in the political life of the province.

[90]         Mr. Açar’s Facebook page was public, inviting a broad audience. He and others were actively engaged in commentary about the subject matter of his posts. At least one post, from Amnesty International, included a call to action. This is similar to the complainant’s public advocacy in Bratzer, which the Tribunal found engaged the ground of political belief. To the extent Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts were an expression about his beliefs about the actions of the state of Israel, including through its military, and its impact on Palestinians, I find they fall within the Code’s protection of political belief.

[91]         In sum, I find that Mr. Açar’s beliefs about events involving Israel and Palestine are protected political beliefs. I find that his expression of these beliefs, outside his workplace, on social media is political, and engages the Code’s protection. I turn next to whether Mr. Açar’s protected political beliefs were a factor in any negative employment impacts arising from Mr. Rankin’s investigation.

C.    Mr. Rankin’s investigation

[92]         Mr. Açar argues that Mr. Rankin’s investigation was tainted by pro-Israel bias, such that both the process and the outcome were discriminatory against him. There are two aspects to this allegation. First, Mr. Açar argues that Mr. Rankin’s alleged ties to Israel are evidence that he was biased against Mr. Açar because of his political beliefs. Second (and putting his arguments at their highest), Mr. Açar argues that deficits in the process and outcome of the investigation support an inference that Mr. Rankin was biased against him because of his political beliefs. Respectfully, I am not persuaded by either of these arguments.

[93]         I begin with Mr. Rankin’s alleged ties to Israel. This allegation rests almost entirely on the contents of an online blog, whose author did not testify. I put no weight on the opinions set out in that blog post.

[94]         Mr. Açar cross-examined Mr. Rankin about his relationship to, and support for, Israel. Mr. Rankin testified that, during his time in Parliament, he participated in several committees, including the Parliamentary Friendship Committee with Israel. He also attended meetings of the short-lived Parliamentary Friendship Committee with Palestine, and was actively involved in working with Palestinian refugees in his constituency. He travelled to Israel twice. He travelled to the West Bank, but could not travel to Gaza because the borders were closed. He made a point of meeting with Palestinian leaders. Mr. Rankin believes Israel “has the right to exist”.

[95]         This evidence falls far short of establishing that Mr. Rankin’s investigation was tainted by a discriminatory animus towards Mr. Açar. At this point I must express my strong disagreement with Mr. Açar’s arguments which appear to suggest that the impartiality of a decisionmaker may rest on their religion or other personal characteristics. For this proposition, Mr. Açar cites the Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s concern about the perceived impartiality of judges wearing religious items:

The case of judges is probably the most complex and the hardest to decide upon. It is essential that the parties involved in a trial, especially the respondent, who may be punished, can assume the judge’s impartiality. Could a Muslim respondent assume the impartiality of a Jewish judge wearing a kippah or a Hindu judge displaying a tilak?

Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (2008), at p. 151

The suggestion that a decision maker may not be perceived as impartial based on their religion is antithetical to the values underlying the Code, and threatens the strength of vital institutions in a multicultural society.

[96]         The legal concepts of bias and impartiality recognize and account for the fact that all human beings are shaped by their lived experiences. Those experiences are not, on their own, proof that a person cannot act impartially. In the case of judges, the Supreme Court of Canada has explained:

Judicial impartiality and neutrality do not mean that a judge must have no prior conceptions, opinions or sensibilities. Rather, they require that the judge’s identity and experiences not close his or her mind to the evidence and issues. There is, in other words, a crucial difference between an open mind and empty one. …

The reasonable apprehension of bias test recognizes that while judges ‘must strive for impartiality’, they are not required to abandon who they are or what they know … A judge’s identity and experiences are an important part of who he or she is, and neither neutrality nor impartiality is inherently compromised by them. Justice is the aspirational application of law to life. Judges should be encouraged to experience, learn and understand ‘life’ – their own and those whose lives reflect different realities …

Impartiality thus demands not that a judge discount or disregard his or her life experiences or identity, but that he or she approach each case with an open mind, free from inappropriate and undue assumptions …

Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 at paras. 33-34, citations omitted

[97]         Though Mr. Rankin was not acting as a judge, I find these principles helpful in assessing Mr. Açar’s allegation of discriminatory animus. The issue is not whether Mr. Rankin has personal views about Israel and Palestine, or personal experience interacting with or supporting the state of Israel. I accept that he does. I further accept that Mr. Rankin’s personal views on these and other issues may not align with Mr. Açar’s. However, this is not enough – on its own – to establish that Mr. Rankin could not conduct an impartial investigation, or be perceived to do so. Decisionmakers are routinely required to impartially adjudicate and uphold the rights of people who hold different or even repugnant views.

[98]         The issue is whether, in investigating Mr. Açar’s conduct, Mr. Rankin’s personal disagreement with Mr. Açar’s political beliefs (assuming there was one) gave rise to negative employment impacts for Mr. Açar – whether through an unfair process or outcome. I find that it did not.

[99]         To begin, it is worth emphasizing that Mr. Rankin found several of the allegations against Mr. Açar unsubstantiated. He found that Mr. Açar was not biased against Israeli students, and could be safely returned to the school environment. He praised Mr. Açar’s efforts to facilitate a late-night mediation between Israeli and Syrian students, and noted that his complaints of feeling underappreciated were not without merit. His only recommendation of discipline was that Mr. Açar receive a further three-day suspension. He did not recommend that Mr. Açar be terminated, and was not involved in that decision.

[100]      Throughout this process, Mr. Açar’s questions and arguments do not appear to accurately reflect Mr. Rankin’s actual findings and recommendations. For example, during cross examination, he suggested that Mr. Rankin had advocated to protect the anonymity of an Israeli student who had complained about him, and supported keeping the student out of his class. This was not true, and there was no basis for the suggestion: see Rankin Report at p. 48. In another example, Mr. Açar asked Mr. Rankin why he had chosen not to interview Mr. Açar’s Jewish witnesses about his character, to consider whether Mr. Açar was anti-Semitic. However, Mr. Rankin was not investigating whether Mr. Açar was anti-Semitic and, in any event, he expressly found that Mr. Açar did not hold discriminatory views about Jewish or Israeli people. I raise these examples because they reflect, in my respectful view, that Mr. Açar’s perception of Mr. Rankin’s process and his report is not completely accurate.

[101]      Mr. Açar takes issue with many aspects of Mr. Rankin’s investigation and analysis. At its highest, I interpret his argument to be that these alleged deficits or irregularities in the investigation support an inference that Mr. Rankin was driven by a discriminatory animus towards him. I do not intend to address each of Mr. Açar’s arguments in detail because they do not, in my view, relate to alleged discrimination. It is not this Tribunal’s role to review workplace investigations, absent allegations of discrimination – that is, adverse employment-related impacts related to a protected characteristic. In this case, I have found that Mr. Açar’s criticisms of Mr. Rankin’s investigation do not raise allegations of discrimination and, in any event, are unfounded. A few examples suffice.

[102]      First, Mr. Açar argues that Mr. Rankin failed to screen allegations about his conduct for timeliness and malice, as required by the Respectful Community Policy. In fact, Mr. Rankin did consider timeliness at pp. 17-18 of his Report. He cited s. 3 of the Policy, which requires complaints to be made “within one year of the last alleged incident”, and provides that “[e]arlier incidents may be included in a complaint provided that the most recent incident occurred within the past year”. In this case, since there were incidents within the last year, there was no issue of timeliness.

[103]      Regarding malice, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Aberman’s complaint or the Siegel Letter were motivated by malice towards Mr. Açar. In saying this, I appreciate Mr. Açar’s argument that Mr. Siegel’s letter was written one day after Mr. Açar had circulated information about an upcoming lecture by a speaker who had been critical of Israel. However, I have found that Mr. Aberman was profoundly affected by Mr. Açar’s comment to him, and this genuine grievance underlay his decision to complain. I further find that Mr. Siegel was motivated to write his letter by a genuine perception that the College’s response to Mr. Aberman’s complaint was inadequate and revealing of a culture that was not safe for Israeli or Jewish students or staff. In the absence of a basis for finding the allegations against Mr. Açar were malicious, Mr. Rankin’s failure to expressly consider this issue is not evidence of discrimination.

[104]      Second, Mr. Açar argues that Mr. Rankin expanded the allegations against him, including by treating the Siegel Letter as a complaint. However, the College’s Respectful Community Policy applies whether or not there is a formal complaint. It says, “Even in the absence of a Complaint, whether it be informal or formal, the College will endeavour to address harassment, bullying, and/or discrimination”. Mr. Rankin was acting within his mandate set by the College. In his report, he noted that it was within his mandate to investigate the concerns set out in the Siegel Letter, even though Mr. Siegel did not intend to make a formal complaint: Rankin Report at p. 29. Mr. Açar had full notice of all allegations against him and the opportunity to respond. Where he takes issues with allegations whose origins are unclear (i.e. fasting for Yemen), I note that Mr. Rankin found that these allegations were unfounded: Rankin Report at pp. 28-29.

[105]      Third, Mr. Açar takes issue with the fact that Mr. Rankin did not interview the Palestinian student in his class, who he was alleged to have focused on along with Mr. Aberman in his discussion of oppressors and oppressed people. In response to this, the College points out that Mr. Açar never suggested Mr. Rankin should talk to this witness, even though he was given – and availed himself of – the opportunity to identify witnesses. Even if Mr. Rankin could or should have spoken to this student, I am not persuaded that, considered holistically, his decision not to supports an inference that his investigation was tainted by a discriminatory bias against Mr. Açar.

[106]      Fourth, Mr. Açar takes issue with the legal standards that Mr. Rankin used to assess his conduct, including the “reasonable person” test and standards of professional conduct which he was not bound by. Mr. Rankin’s analysis of these issues is thoroughly set out in his report, and I do not intend to repeat it here. The “reasonable person” test is based on the Respectful Community Policy, which sets out an objective standard for harassment, bullying, or discrimination. Under that Policy, intent is irrelevant; the issue is “whether a reasonable person ought to have known that the conduct was inappropriate or unacceptable and unwelcome”: Policy, p. 3; Rankin Report at p. 15. This is a standard well known to the law, and not evidence of discrimination.

[107]      Regarding his references to professional teaching standards, Mr. Rankin acknowledged that instructors at the College were not required to hold a certificate of qualification or independent school teaching certificate under the Teachers Act. As such, Mr. Açar was not subject to professional regulation: Rankin Report at pp. 9 and 38. Nevertheless, Mr. Rankin explained that he found it useful to consider professional teaching standards “for comparative context”: Rankin Report at p. 9. In the absence of a professional regulator, Mr. Rankin recommended that “the conduct standards for Pearson teachers should be no less rigorous than the standards for teachers at other independent schools within this jurisdiction”: Rankin Report at p. 9. This recommendation makes good sense, and could not support an inference that Mr. Rankin was driving his analysis to discriminate against Mr. Açar.

[108]      Finally, Mr. Açar objects to Mr. Rankin’s failure to cite and consider the “College mission and Credo”. From his perspective, his conduct was wholly consistent with, and furthered, the College’s unique mission to “seek growth of international and intercultural understanding” and foster resilient mindsets, including through uncomfortable and difficult conversations: Essential Agreement. Respectfully, this argument simply reflects Mr. Açar’s disagreement with Mr. Rankin’s conclusions that some of his conduct violated the Respectful Community Policy. However, Mr. Rankin explained those conclusions thoroughly. In doing so, he was not required to refer to every piece of evidence before him. Regarding the comment to Mr. Aberman, all the College witnesses were unanimous in their view that it was an inappropriate comment for a teacher to make to their student in a passing conversation between classes. They did not see the exchange as an example of engaging productively about a contentious or difficult topic, or an instance where Mr. Aberman should have been more resilient or prepared to feel discomfort. This was also Mr. Rankin’s view, and it is mine. Mr. Açar’s disagreement is not evidence of discrimination.

[109]      I am not persuaded that Mr. Rankin’s investigation was tainted by a discriminatory bias against Mr. Açar based on his political beliefs. I dismiss this part of Mr. Açar’s complaint.

D.   Termination of employment

[110]      The heart of this complaint is whether the College discriminated against Mr. Açar in the termination of his employment. I begin with the elements that Mr. Açar must prove.

1.     Political beliefs a factor in the termination

[111]      Up until the hearing, the College’s position was that Mr. Açar was terminated because of the findings in the Rankin Report. During the hearing, the College applied to amend its response to add new reasons for the termination. Those new reasons related to events that occurred years before the events in the complaint. Some of them arose from events that Mr. Açar had originally alleged were discriminatory, but which the Tribunal dismissed as untimely in its Dismissal Decision. Due to its timing and impact on the Tribunal’s process, I denied the College’s application to amend its response. My decisions on these applications are attached as Appendix A and Appendix B to this decision.

[112]      Notwithstanding my decision not to allow the College to amend its response, I accept that Mr. Pile had many reasons for terminating Mr. Açar’s employment. These include issues that I have found do not engage the Code’s protections, namely Mr. Açar’s comment to Mr. Aberman, his (disputed) conduct in focusing attention on the Israeli and Palestinian students when discussing oppression, his social media posts about the College, and Mr. Pile’s perception that Mr. Açar was difficult to manage. That there were multiple issues at play is apparent from Mr. Pile’s decision to escalate Mr. Açar’s discipline from a recommended eight-day suspension to termination.

[113]      The human rights analysis is concerned with whether any of the College’s reasons for terminating Mr. Açar’s employment related to his political beliefs. Mr. Açar must only prove that his political beliefs were one factor in his termination – they do not need to be the overriding or main factor: Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at paras. 51-52.

[114]      There is no dispute that Mr. Pile’s decision was based, in part, on the findings from the Rankin Report relating to Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts. Mr. Pile testified:

When I did read about [the Israel Facebook Posts] for the first time in the report, I was … quite shocked. Because it is so far reaching. And it affects the entirety of the school, and so much of what we do as an institution. And so I would say it did have a significant role in part of my decision making, in terms of the impact it had to a greater audience. …

…

Those posts are available for everyone to read. …[E]specially for a student from Israel, that would be very challenging to go back into that classroom knowing what those Facebook posts say, and it just creates certainly a noninclusive environment for that particular student. I think I spoke before just how sacred a space the classroom needs to be, in terms of a safe environment. So I believe that those type of posts would have had an impact on the students.

Mr. Pile testified that Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts did not reflect the College’s values, or its mission for peace and justice. He expressed concern that the posts could be seen by a wide audience, including students, donors, patrons, parents, and guardians.

[115]       Above I have found the Israel Facebook Posts engage Mr. Açar’s protected political beliefs. This is sufficient to shift the burden to the College to justify its reliance on those posts to terminate Mr. Açar’s employment based on a bona fide occupational requirement.

2.     Bona fide occupational requirement

[116]      To prove a bona fide occupational requirement, the College must prove that it was applying a workplace standard that was:

a.   adopted for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of Mr. Açar’s job;

b.   adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to fulfil its valid purpose; and

c.   reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose. Here, the College must also prove that it discharged its duty to accommodate Mr. Açar to the point of undue hardship: Meiorin at para. 54.

[117]      To consider the College’s justification, I have relied heavily on Mr. Rankin’s analysis of the Israel Facebook Posts, set out in his report. I understand that this is the analysis that underlay the College’s decision making, and which it argues supports a finding of bona fide occupational requirement. In doing so, I note that Mr. Rankin was not asked to consider Mr. Açar’s Code-protected political beliefs, and did not recommend that Mr. Açar be terminated in connection with the Israel Facebook Posts.

a.     Valid purpose

[118]      At this stage of the analysis, I must consider the general purpose of the impugned standard and determine whether it is rationally connected to the performance of Mr. Açar’s job as a teacher and houseparent: Meiorin at para. 57. The focus is “not on the validity of the particular standard that is at issue, but rather on the validity of its more general purpose”: Meiorin at para. 59. I have no difficulty finding that the College has proven this element of the defence.

[119]      The College has not articulated the workplace standard that it says constitutes a bona fide occupational requirement. At the relevant time, its only rule regarding social media use by teachers was that teachers could not be “friends” with their students on social media. It did not have rules or standards governing the political activities of its teachers, or the content of their expression on social media. In this circumstance, I infer the standard from the Rankin Report, and Mr. Pile’s evidence about what he considered objectionable in the Israel Facebook Posts.

[120]      The standard the College seeks to justify is that a teacher/houseparent at the College must refrain from off duty conduct that impairs their ability to provide a safe and inclusive learning and living environment for their students, and/or impairs the College’s mission and values: Rankin Report at pp. 11-12. This is a standard well known to employment law, including in the context of teachers. It is rooted in an employee’s duty of loyalty to their employer, and the College’s obligation as a service provider to ensure a discrimination-free learning environment for its students: Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, 1985 CanLII 14 (SCC) at para. 1; Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, 1996 CanLII 237 (SCC) at para. 46; Bratzer at para. 323. The purposes of this standard are (1) to protect and promote a safe and inclusive learning and living environment for College students, and (2) to protect the College’s reputational interests: Rankin Report at pp. 11-13 and 33-35.

[121]      These purposes are rationally connected to the performance of Mr. Açar’s job. The College is an educational institution “entrusted with providing a safe and inclusive educational and residential environment for a deliberately diverse group of students, including students from Israel”: Rankin Report at p. 35. As part of the UWC movement, its mission is to “make education a force to unite people, nations and cultures for peace and a sustainable future”: Rankin Report at p. 13. The College’s policies, collectively, express the College’s commitment to a “respectful working, living and learning environment that is free of discrimination, supportive of personal growth and achievement and one that upholds the dignity, self-esteem and fair treatment of all members of the College Community”: Non-Discrimination and Accommodation Policy, p. 1; Respectful Community Policy, p. 2; Rankin Report at pp. 33-35. Given its unique mission and international student body, the College has an obligation to ensure that all students are welcomed on an equitable and respectful basis, without discrimination: Non-Discrimination and Accommodation Policy at p. 2; cited in Rankin Report at pp. 16-17.

[122]      As a teacher and houseparent, Mr. Açar is a “medium” for the College’s message, and “must be perceived to uphold the values, beliefs and knowledge sought to be transmitted” by the College: Ross at para. 44. Teachers “occupy positions of trust and confidence, and exert considerable influence over their student as a result of their positions”: Ross at para. 43. Because of their unique position, teachers are held “to high standards both on and off duty”: Ross at para. 45. These principles are heightened in an environment where Mr. Açar is also living on campus, with responsibilities as a houseparent to students.

b.     Good faith

[123]      At this stage, the College must prove that it “adopted the particular standard with an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose, with no intention of discriminating against the claimant”: Meiorin at para. 60. This is a subjective test, which examines whether the College was acting based on a discriminatory animus. Though intent is not required to find discrimination, a standard cannot be bona fide and reasonably justified if it is intended to discriminate. I find that the College has satisfied this part of the test.

[124]      I understand that Mr. Açar argues that the College was not applying a standard adopted in good faith. By focusing on his posts about Israel, and not other countries, he says the College engaged in deliberate suppression of speech that is critical of Israel, which he situates as part of a systemic trend across Canada. In support, he cites a 2022 report published by Independent Jewish Voices: Sheryl Nestel and Rowan Gaudet, “Unveiling the Chilly Climate: The Suppression of Speech on Palestine in Canada” (Canada, October 2022) [Chilly Climate Report].

[125]      In the Chilly Climate Report, the authors document “dozens of high-profile attacks on activists and academics who have spoken out about Israel’s ongoing violations of Palestinian human rights” and the resulting chilling effect on “knowledge production and activism related to the struggle for justice for Palestine”: p. 5. They identify “unsubstantiated allegations of antisemitic intent and support for terrorism” as common tools to silence pro-Palestine academics and activists: p. 2. They describe “the weaponization of antisemitism”, including by equating anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, as a key political strategy of the Israeli government and others to insulate Israel from criticism: pp. 9-10. The authors argue that this has “significant Islamophobic implications in that it depoliticizes Palestinian resistance and paints advocates of Palestinian human rights as outside of the post-Holocaust Western moral order”: p. 12. This “chilly climate”, they argue, suppresses academic inquiry and activism that is critical of Israel.

[126]      The College objects to my reliance on the findings in the Chilly Climate Report, on the basis that it was not properly proffered as expert evidence and the authors did not testify. During the hearing I exercised my discretion under s. 27.2 of the Code to admit the report. I have considered it as part of the social context for Mr. Açar’s complaint. For the purpose of this decision, I accept its findings. However, I am not satisfied that the report supports Mr. Açar’s theory that the College was intentionally discriminating against him or otherwise engaged in the deliberate suppression of speech critical of Israel.

[127]      As I have said, the College’s standard in this case is one well known to employment law, including in the specific context of teachers. Though there is room for disagreement about whether Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts violated that standard, this is not evidence that the standard itself was adopted to discriminate against Mr. Açar.

[128]      The College hosts students from Israel, who are young and far from home. Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts were brought to the College’s attention by Mr. Siegel, in the wake of Mr. Açar’s comment to Mr. Aberman, and in the context of Mr. Siegel’s broader concerns about a climate at the College that he perceived as hostile to its Israeli students. As the College points out, throughout his ten years of employment, Mr. Açar frequently engaged in efforts to promote dialogue about Israel and Palestine, without discipline. It was only after his comment to Mr. Aberman and the Siegel Letter that the College developed concerns about Mr. Açar’s ability to communicate his political beliefs appropriately, considering his role as a teacher.

[129]      To address its concerns, the College hired an external investigator to carefully consider Mr. Açar’s conduct. There appears to be no dispute that, while Mr. Açar posted about a range of political issues, Israel was the country whose actions he most frequently highlighted. There is no evidence, in the Rankin Report or elsewhere, to indicate that the College was engaged in any of the strategies or patterns identified in the Chilly Climate Report, including conflating anti-Zionism or criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. To the contrary, Mr. Rankin’s analysis of the issue was grounded in the Respectful Community Policy and legal principles governing the on- and off-duty conduct of teachers. It leaves no room to infer a discriminatory animus.

[130]      Through his cross-examination, Mr. Açar attempted to paint a picture of differential treatment for Israeli and Muslim or Arab students, and differential enforcement of College standards for conduct that was discriminatory against Israeli as opposed to Muslim or Arab students. His theory, articulated late in the hearing, was that the College demonstrated less concern for Muslim and Arab members of its community than for Israelis. I accept that such a pattern could support an inference of discriminatory animus towards Mr. Açar based on the content of the political beliefs he was expressing. However, such a pattern would have to be proven through direct evidence of a witness or documents properly admitted in the hearing. Here, Mr. Açar’s theory rests on assertions that he made in his closing submissions and questions posed in cross-examination, with which the witnesses did not agree and for which I do not have a full context. This is not evidence I can rely on to find a pattern of differential, discriminatory, treatment.

[131]      In short, there is no evidence before me that the College adopted its standard to discriminate against Mr. Açar based on his political beliefs regarding Israel and Palestine. Rather, I am satisfied that the College was acting in good faith to ensure a safe and inclusive learning and living environment for its students, consistent with its mission and values, and to protect its reputational interests.

c.      Reasonable necessity and accommodation

[132]      Finally, the College must prove that the standard it applied was reasonably necessary to achieve its purposes. This includes proving that the College did everything reasonable and practical to accommodate Mr. Açar and could not have done anything else without incurring undue hardship: Meiorin. This is where the defence fails.

[133]      I have accepted the legitimacy of the College’s general standard. However, I am not persuaded that the College has justified relying on Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts to terminate his employment, on the basis that it was reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes underlying the standard, and it could not do anything further to accommodate Mr. Açar’s political beliefs. In particular, there is no evidence before me that the College considered how its standard would impact Mr. Açar’s Code-protected political beliefs, and how such impact may be minimized or eliminated without undue hardship.

[134]      Here I return to the College’s standard: teachers/houseparents must refrain from off duty conduct that:

a.   impairs their ability to provide a safe and inclusive learning and living environment for their students, and/or

b.   impairs the College’s mission and values.

[135]      The first type of impairment is about the teacher’s ability to perform their job: Fraser at para. 38; Ross at paras. 46-47. It may arise, for example, where a teacher’s off duty conduct influences how they treat students, creates an educational environment where discriminatory behaviour becomes acceptable, and/or where the teacher can no longer provide an inclusive environment where all students feel safe and supported: Ross at para. 39.

[136]      The second type of impairment is about the College’s reputation and educational environment more broadly: Fraser at para. 38; Ross at paras. 44-45.  This type of impairment may be inferred “on the basis of what is reasonable to anticipate as an effect of the off-duty conduct”: Ross at para. 46. Generally, an educational environment is harmed when “a teacher makes public statements espousing discriminatory views, and when such views are linked to his or her professional position as a teacher”: Kempling v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2005 BCCA 327 at para. 44. In this case, I accept that the integrity of the College and its mission for international peace and sustainability depends on its teachers upholding its core values, including international and intercultural understanding, and mutual respect: Kempling at para. 43.

[137]      These principles have been developed in cases which carefully balance teachers’ duty of loyalty to their employer and their right to freedom of expression under the Charter: Ross, Kempling. They do not support an “absolute prohibition” against teachers speaking about political issues: Fraser at para. 34. In the human rights context, they must be applied carefully to ensure that a person’s Code-protected rights are only restricted to the extent necessary to achieve the employer’s legitimate purposes: Bratzer at para. 276.

[138]      I begin my analysis by recognizing two important contexts underlying the application of these principles in this case. First, the College’s student body is comprised in large part of young people from around the world. Its international students are selected by their home countries and come from all walks of life. For many, their time at the College is their first time away from home, in a foreign country, speaking a foreign language, eating foreign food, and adapting to life in an intensive intercultural environment. Students live on campus, alongside their teachers, who are responsible for their wellbeing inside and outside the classroom. In its “Principles of Good Practice for the Adult Community of Pearson College”, the College acknowledges that there are fewer barriers between Pearson adults and students than in most academic institutions. In these circumstances, adults are called upon to be “especially vigilant about appropriate parameters and clearly agreed and held to forms of communication between adults and students”.

[139]      Second, the College’s values and mission envision an environment where students from around the world can engage in respectful dialogue and learning about issues of international peace and justice. As the College’s witnesses point out, this must be done carefully and deliberately, with consideration for the age and lived experiences of their students. For example, Mr. Aberman testified that he delivered a presentation with a Palestinian student about the Israeli-Palestine conflict, which included facilitating an open conversation with students. The College’s vision is that these students then return to their home countries as ambassadors for peace.

[140]      Accounting for this unique context, I am not satisfied that it is reasonably necessary for the College to restrict public commentary about Israel to achieve its purposes. In fact, there appears to be no dispute that teachers at the College can reasonably engage in off duty political activities, including by public commentary about political issues. This point was made by Mr. Rankin, who acknowledged that:

Engagement with political commentary and criticism of state action is unlikely to violate Pearson’s values or to impugn Pearson’s reputation. In fact, political engagement and responsible dialogue among differing viewpoints would no doubt be considered to be supportive of Pearson’s mission and values … [Rankin Report, p. 35]

Mr. Siegel made the same point in the Siegel Letter, observing, “I don’t necessarily contest Mr. Açar’s use of social media, which includes posts expressing contempt for many forms of state power and defending the rights of numerous oppressed people in the world”.

[141]      Criticism of Israel is not – on its own – equivalent to the type of anti-Semitic or homophobic posts warranting teacher discipline in cases like Ross and Kempling. Rather, such criticisms are about the use and abuse of state power. As Mr. Açar points out, at the time there was growing international concern about Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, including through its laws and military action. Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts reflect these concerns. Many of them are simply news articles, reporting on actions by Israel and its military. While some include the word “apartheid”, I observe that this is a word describing a legal and social structure imposed and enforced by a state. Such posts are not, and could not reasonably be perceived as, discriminatory against Israeli or Jewish people. As I have said, expression about these subjects – including speaking out against injustice – lies at the core of Canadian values underlying free expression. This exercise can be uncomfortable because, as Mr. Açar put it, “when you challenge power structures, there is no pleasing way”.

[142]      At the same time, I accept that there may be a point where a teacher’s off duty political commentary – especially when not done thoughtfully or sensitively – engages the College’s interests. I expect that Mr. Açar would object to any interpretation of his social media activity that may be construed as discriminatory, offensive, or harmful. He was a well-respected teacher and houseparent on campus. Mr. Siegel testified, and I accept, that he was held in very high regard by his students and seen as someone with their best interests at heart. However, once Mr. Açar puts his views out on social media, he cannot control the meaning that people make of his words. Any subtlety, sensitivity, or nuance that he may have intended is lost by the medium.

[143]      Social media is a notoriously fraught medium for engaging in political discourse. Short posts, designed to capture attention, can lack nuance. Good intentions can be lost or misunderstood. Tone can be hard to convey. It can attract, or be perceived as, bad faith engagement on difficult topics. These risks are apparent in some of Mr. Açar’s Israel Facebook Posts. For example, in one post Mr. Açar wrote:

In times of land grab in Palestine and legitimize of it by Trump as the president of the United States, for today, more than anyone else, I care about the opinion of my Jewish Friends. I am listening. [as written]

I assume Mr. Açar’s intention in writing this post was positive, and non-discriminatory. However, as Mr. Rankin points out, one interpretation of the post is that Mr. Açar is inviting or expecting Jewish people to answer for “land grab in Palestine” and President Trump’s role in “legitimizing” it. This interpretation, which I expect Mr. Açar did not intend, is problematic. It gives rise to a concern raised by Mr. Siegel, which is that Israeli and/or Jewish students at the College were being “pushed into the position of having to defend, or being viewed as spokespersons, for a state”. In his report, Mr. Rankin refers to a comment Mr. Açar made further on in the thread, seeking to clarify his intent. This comment is not before me.

[144]      The College reasonably has an interest in ensuring Mr. Açar’s social media activity does not impair his ability to perform his role as a teacher or conflict with its mission and values. This necessarily includes considering how Mr. Açar’s social media posts may reasonably be perceived by an Israeli student, or an Israeli family sending their child across the world to live and study under the care of the College: Rankin Report at pp. 34-35. In doing so, however, it must also ensure it is not infringing on Mr. Açar’s ability to participate in the political life of the province any more than necessary.

[145]      The duty to accommodate Mr. Açar requires the College to undertake some effort to determine how Mr. Açar’s political beliefs may be accommodated without undue hardship. The purpose of this duty is “to ensure that an employee who is able to work can do so” and that “persons who are otherwise fit to work are not unfairly excluded where working conditions can be adjusted without undue hardship”: Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ), 2008 SCC 43at para. 14. Accommodation is not always easy, convenient, or cost-effective. Employers are required to consider options that may result in some hardship: Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp,2017 SCC 30 at para. 128(per Gascon J, dissenting but not on this point); Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15 [VIA Rail] at para. 122. It is only when the hardship becomes “undue” that the duty ends. The point of undue hardship is reached “when reasonable means of accommodation are exhausted and only unreasonable or impractical options for accommodation remain”: VIA Rail at para. 130.

[146]      Here, the College made no efforts to accommodate Mr. Açar’s political beliefs before terminating his employment. As I have said, there was no College standard governing the content of teachers’ social media at the time. There is no evidence before me that the College ever spoke to Mr. Açar about his social media activity at all, over ten years of employment. Though the College appears to recognize that some political commentary is acceptable, it did not attempt to work with Mr. Açar to determine where his commentary crossed the line. It did not ask Mr. Açar to make his Facebook page private and remove the offending posts, as Mr. Rankin recommended. There is no evidence that Mr. Açar would have refused to take those steps or engage in a process to reach some other mutually acceptable solution that met the College’s objectives while accommodating his political beliefs.

[147]      In saying this, I appreciate the College’s concern that Mr. Açar was difficult to manage, and unwilling to accept that any of his conduct was inappropriate. However, it would be pure speculation to conclude that Mr. Açar would not have accepted a reasonable proposal to accommodate his political beliefs. Discrimination cannot be justified by impressionistic evidence or speculation: British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC) [Grismer] at para. 41.

[148]      Even accepting there was some basis for discipline, the evidence falls far short of establishing that the College could not accommodate Mr. Açar’s political beliefs without undue hardship. Mr. Rankin’s recommendation was that Mr. Açar be given a further three-day suspension in connection with both the Israel Facebook Posts and other posts about the College. He expressly found that Mr. Açar could safely return to teaching. I repeat his finding for ease of reference:

… I have not found facts suggesting that there is an ongoing risk that Mr. Açar will treat Israeli students unfairly. I note that my concern with respect to Mr. Açar’s Facebook posts about Israel is that they create a perception of bias towards Israeli students. In speaking with Mr. Açar and considering his written submissions, I am satisfied that he is capable and willing to treat all students fairly, and that particularly with the training imposed, he is capable of exercising proper judgement regarding appropriate boundaries for teacher-student communication.

My opinion is that Mr. Açar’s return to teaching at Pearson, with the disciplinary mechanisms outlined above, will not jeopardize Pearson’s ability to fulfill its obligations to provide a discrimination-free educational environment. [Rankin Report at pp. 47-48]

[149]      This was also the view of Ms. Gross, who was Mr. Açar’s direct supervisor at the time. Ms. Gross testified that Mr. Pile consulted with her before terminating Mr. Açar’s employment. He asked her whether she had any concerns about Mr. Açar returning to his position, and she said she did not. Ms. Gross specifically said that she did not have any concerns about Mr. Açar’s ability to provide a discrimination-free learning environment.

[150]      Mr. Pile testified that the Israel Facebook Posts played “a significant role” in his decision to terminate Mr. Açar’s termination. Given those posts engaged Mr. Açar’s Code-protected rights, it was incumbent on Mr. Pile – and the College – to give careful consideration to other options. There is no evidence that they did so. As such, I am not persuaded that the College has justified relying in part on Mr. Açar’s expression of his political beliefs to terminate his employment.

E.    Conclusion on liability

[151]      I find that the College discriminated against Mr. Açar based on his political beliefs by terminating his employment, at least in part, because of his Israel Facebook Posts. This is a violation of s. 13 of the Code. The next issue I must decide is the appropriate remedy.

IV    REMEDY

[152]      I have found Mr. Açar’s complaint of discrimination justified. I declare the College’s conduct, as set out in this decision, was discrimination in violation of s. 13 of the Code. I order the College to cease the contravention and refrain from committing the same or similar contraventions: Code, ss. 37(1)(a) and (b).

[153]      In addition to these orders, Mr. Açar seeks compensation for wages lost and injury to his dignity, feelings and self-respect. He also seeks an order that he be reinstated to his employment with the College. I consider his requests in turn.

A.    Wage loss

[154]      Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to compensate the person discriminated against for “all, or a part … of any wages or salary lost … by the contravention”. The object of an award for wage loss is to put the person in the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 [Gichuru] at para. 300, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396 [Gichuru Appeal]. To that end, a wage loss award aims to fully compensate the complainant for wages lost“solely as the result of the discrimination”: Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82 at para. 82, quoting Ayangma v. Eastern School Board and another, 2008 PESCAD 10 at para. 70.

[155]      To support his claim for wage loss, Mr. Açar must establish a causal connection between the discrimination and the lost wages: Gichuru at para. 302. Once that connection is established, then the Tribunal has discretion to award full or partial compensation, taking into account the remedial purposes of the Code: Gichuru at para. 303. At this stage, the Tribunal may reduce a wage loss award where a complainant has failed to reasonably mitigate their damages, or to account for other contingencies: Ayangma at para. 67; Gichuru Appeal at para. 46.

[156]      Mr. Açar is seeking an award to compensate him for wages lost for the five years following his termination on January 29, 2020. He says that, accounting for benefits and tax implications, the total amount of his losses is $905,428. The College opposes this order on the basis that it does not account for the 11 months of wages that Mr. Açar has already received, and that Mr. Açar has failed to mitigate his losses. The College has not made any arguments about other contingencies that may support a reduction in damages.

[157]      I have no difficulty finding that Mr. Açar lost some wages as a result of the discrimination in this case, which was the loss of his employment at the College. Mr. Pile testified that the Israel Facebook Posts were a “significant” factor in his termination, and the College has not argued that he would have been terminated without them. To consider how much wage loss to award Mr. Açar, I find it useful to break his claim into four periods.

1.     January – November 2020

[158]      The College has already compensated Mr. Açar for 11 months of wage loss through its severance payment. Mr. Açar argues that this severance payment should be “forfeited” because the College did not pay the full amount owing under his employment contract until the eve of a Small Claims trial two years after his termination. While I appreciate his frustration, this is not a principled basis on which to award what would essentially be double recovery. Mr. Açar is not entitled to compensation for wages he has already received: The Sales Associate v. Aurora Biomed Inc. and others (No. 3), 2021 BCHRT 5 at para. 174; LaFleche v. NLFD Auto dba Prince George Ford (No. 2), 2022 BCHRT 88 at para. 102.

[159]      The effect of the severance payment that Mr. Açar received is that he did not lose any wages during the 11 months following his termination. As a result, I do not award wage losses for this period.

2.     November 2020 – May 2022

[160]      Mr. Açar was not employed during this period. I accept that his wage losses flowed from his termination by the College and, as such, were causally connected to the discrimination. The College has not argued otherwise. The issue I must decide is how much compensation to award, if any.

[161]      The College argues that Mr. Açar did not take reasonable steps to mitigate his losses by looking for work. The duty to mitigate requires a person to take reasonable steps to avoid or reduce their financial losses, including by looking for other comparable work: Gibbons v. CML Contracting and another, 2024 BCHRT 220 at para. 106.  The basic idea is simple: a person cannot recover losses that were within their power to avoid: see generally discussion in Evans v. Teamsters Local Union No. 31, 2008 SCC 20 at paras. 97-100 (per Abella J, dissenting but not on this point). The burden is on the College to prove that Mr. Açar failed to reasonably mitigate his losses. The College must show that Mr. Açar failed to take reasonable steps and that alternative employment could have been found had he taken those steps: Okano v. Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, 2022 BCSC 881 at para. 23.

[162]      There is no dispute that, in the two years following his termination, Mr. Açar applied for two jobs and actively sought reinstatement at the College. At the same time, he elected to complete his master’s degree at UVic. In his evidence, he referred to the pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement as relevant context for his job search during this period.

[163]      I agree with the College that Mr. Açar did not take reasonable steps to mitigate his losses during this period. It appears that, rather than actively search for employment, Mr. Açar elected to focus on his education. While he was certainly entitled to do that, it is not fair or reasonable to charge the cost of this choice to the College. Indeed, that is what the duty to mitigate guards against. During this period, I find that Mr. Açar was not taking reasonable steps to avoid or mitigate his financial losses. I decline to order wage loss during this period.

3.     June 2022 – April 2024

[164]      After Mr. Açar completed his masters’ degree, he remained unemployed. Again, the College has not argued that wages lost at this stage were not causally connected to discrimination. I find that they were. Mr. Açar had worked at the College for ten years and would have continued to do so if he were not terminated.

[165]      Again, the College argues that Mr. Açar was not acting reasonably to mitigate his losses. During this 22-month period, Mr. Açar applied for 10 jobs teaching math or physics, seven of which were at the same institution. Mr. Açar says that his job opportunities were limited on Vancouver Island and that he applied for all math and physics teaching jobs “in the vicinity”. Mr. Açar also applied to one job in New Zealand. In November 2022, he was a top candidate in a job competition, but the employer told him that it was not prepared to move forward until there was “a greater degree of closure to [his] situation” with the College: email dated November 15, 2022.

[166]       In its closing argument, the College argues that “There are more than 200 elementary, secondary, and post-secondary educational institutions located on Vancouver Island” and that “[i]t is trite to infer that more than one annual opportunity arose” during the five years for which Mr. Açar is claiming wage loss. However, I note that the College did not present any evidence about job opportunities that Mr. Açar was qualified for during this period, or put this proposition to him in cross-examination. I cannot put weight on such unsupported assertions made by counsel in closing submissions, and I am not prepared to take notice of the employment opportunities available for math and physics teachers on Vancouver Island.

[167]      That said, I agree that, on its face, ten job applications over a 22-month period do not represent reasonable efforts to maintain Mr. Açar’s income and position: Okano at para. 24. This is similar to the Tribunal’s finding in Gibbons. In that case, the Tribunal found that the complainant’s effort to contact 15 companies over a short period did not represent a diligent job search and was a failure to mitigate: para. 111.

[168]      I am satisfied that Mr. Açar is entitled to some wage loss during this period, but not the full amount. The College made no submissions about how a failure to mitigate should be factored into the calculation of wage loss, other than to say that any award should be “reduced”. In these circumstances, I exercise my discretion to reduce the claim by 50% to account for Mr. Açar’s failure to take more diligent steps to mitigate his losses over a 22-month period.

[169]      The amount of loss is $94,322.35, calculated as follows:

a.   In Mr. Açar’s last full year working for the College (2019), he earned $102,897.11, or $8,574.76 per month: 2019 Tax Return.

b.   $8,574.76 x 22 months is $188,644.70.

c.   Applying a 50% reduction, the amount owing is $94,322.35

[170]      I order the College to pay pre- and post-judgment interest on this amount, and to compensate Mr. Açar for any tax consequences of receiving the amount as a lump sum.

4.     April 2024 – January 2025

[171]      In April 2024, Mr. Açar was hired as a sessional instructor. He worked from April 2024 until September 2025. After that, he has presented evidence that he made one job inquiry in September 2025, which did not lead to employment.

[172]      The College argues that Mr. Açar’s claim for wage loss should end when he found alternative employment, in April 2024. I agree.

[173]      In my view, Mr. Açar has not proven that wage loss during this period is causally connected to the discrimination I have found in this case. He was able to obtain alternative employment, though it ended in September 2025 for reasons that are not before me. This period is more than four years after his employment with the College was terminated, and the connection between any wage loss and the discrimination in this case is too tenuous to support a continued award.

[174]      I decline to award lost wages beyond April 2024.

5.     Wage loss: conclusion

[175]      I order the College to compensate Mr. Açar for $94,322.35 as wages lost because of discrimination. I further order the College to pay pre- and post-judgment interest on this amount, and compensate Mr. Açar for any tax implications of receiving the amount as a lump sum.

B.    Compensation for injury to dignity

[176]      Mr. Açar seeks an award to compensate him for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect. I agree this award is appropriate.

[177]      A violation of a person’s human rights is a violation of their dignity. That is why s. 37(2)(d)(iii) confers discretion on this Tribunal to award damages to compensate a complainant for injury to their dignity, feelings, and self-respect. The purpose of these awards is compensatory, and not punitive. In exercising this discretion, the Tribunal generally considers three broad factors: the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s social context or vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant: Torres v. Royalty Kitchenware Ltd., 1982 CanLII 4886 (ON HRT); Gichuru at para. 260. The quantum is “highly contextual and fact-specific”, and the Tribunal has considerable discretion to award an amount it deems necessary to compensate a person who has been discriminated against: Gichuru at para. 256; University of British Columbia v. Kelly, 2016 BCCA 271 at paras. 59-64.

[178]      In this case, I have found that Mr. Açar lost his job, which he had held for nearly ten years, in part because of his political beliefs. This Tribunal has consistently recognized that the loss of employment is a serious type of discrimination, considering the significance of a person’s employment to their financial and emotional wellbeing. As the Supreme Court of Canada has said,

Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life, providing the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A person’s employment is an essential component of [their] sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being.

Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1987 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at p. 368 (per Dickson CJ)

Because of the significance of employment to a person’s sense of self, cases which involve the termination of employment have often attracted the top end of this Tribunal’s awards: see e.g. Senyk v. WFG Agency Network (No. 2), 2008 BCHRT 376 at paras. 463-470; Benton at paras. 67-68.

[179]      I accept that the discrimination in this case injured an important part of Mr. Açar’s self-perception and dignity. It was apparent to me throughout the hearing that Mr. Açar is a deeply thoughtful person who works hard to ensure his values align with his actions. An important part of this is speaking out against injustice and suffering. He has direct, lived, experience of colonialism and oppression and sees the impact of those structural forces on the children he teaches. Mr. Açar puts it this way:

“Fundamentally, I believe in people’s voice over their reality”.

“To strip a human from his politics denies the potential and reduces one to menial capacity”.  

Mr. Açar’s freedom to hold and express his political beliefs is a core part of his identity, and his perception that he is living a life of meaning.

[180]      Finally, I accept that the injury to Mr. Açar was exacerbated by Mr. Davis’s defence of his termination in a mass email to the College community. In his arguments, Mr. Açar focused in large part on the harms he says he experienced from the “defamation and libel” in Mr. Davis’s communication. In that communication, Mr. Davis said that he had personally undertaken a “thorough examination of the file in this matter” (original emphasis) and was fully satisfied that the College had properly applied its policies and procedures. Though the College points out that Mr. Açar was not named in this communication, I accept that it would have been apparent to many members of the wider community that it was referring to Mr. Açar. News of his termination had spread, and many people spoke up to protest the College’s decision. This is evident by Mr. Davis’s decision to address the issue in a mass email to the whole community. I accept that this email was hurtful and humiliating for Mr. Açar.

[181]      I turn now to quantum. Mr. Açar made no submissions about quantum. The College cited several cases which it says supports a general range of $10,000-$30,000 when adjusted for inflation: Tervit v. Canadian College of English Language, 2014 BCHRT 53 ($10,000), McNair v. International House, 2015 BCHRT 123 ($6,000); Bratzer ($20,000); Fraser ($25,000); Wali ($10,000). It says that the award in this case should fall at the low end of the range, considering that the termination was communicated respectfully and Mr. Açar led very little evidence about the impact on him.

[182]      Considering the parties’ limited submissions, I exercise my discretion to award $20,000 in this case. This is the amount the Tribunal awarded in Bratzer, to a complainant who had similar convictions about expressing his political beliefs. I note that the Tribunal in that case had more evidence about a negative impact on Mr. Bratzer arising from the discrimination, which included “depression, weight gain and loss of feelings and self-worth”: para. 434. At the same time, however, Mr. Bratzer did not lose his job. Mr. Açar did, and that is a loss that must be compensated.  

[183]      Money is not a substitute for dignity. But it is what the law can offer to recognize and compensate the injuries of discrimination. I order the College to pay Mr. Açar $20,000 as compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

C.    Reinstatement

[184]      Mr. Açar seeks an order that he be reinstated to his job at the College. This order is available under s. 37(2)(d)(i) of the Code, which allows the Tribunal to order a respondent to “make available to the person discriminated against the right, opportunity or privilege that … the person was denied contrary to this Code.” The purpose is to put the complainant in the situation they would have been in but for the discrimination. When a reinstatement order will further this goal, it will be appropriate for the Tribunal to make it, unless such an order would not be “viable”: Thandi v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Corrections Branch, North Fraser Pretrial Centre, 2025 BCHRT 294 at para. 135; Kalyn v. Vancouver Island Health Authority (No. 3), 2008 BCHRT 377 at paras. 527-544; Dunkley v. UBC and another, 2015 BCHRT 100 at paras. 736-739; J.J. v. School District No. 43 (No. 5), 2008 BCHRT 360at paras. 504-510. Here, the College opposes an order for reinstatement.

[185]      Reinstatement orders at this Tribunal are relatively rare. The Tribunal most recently set out the relevant principles in Thandi:

The assessment of whether to grant a request for a reinstatement order is necessarily contextual and fact-specific. In the area of employment, relevant factors may include: the scope and nature of the order sought; whether denying the order would constitute continuation of the discriminatory effect on the complainant; whether the respondent opposes the order; serious issues regarding the current state of key working relationships; serious negative impacts on the workplace, or the people in it, if reinstatement is ordered; events subsequent to the discrimination that would make reinstatement impossible; and whether a different type of remedy is more appropriate, given the loss incurred by the complainant as a result of the discrimination… This is not an exhaustive list, and not all of the factors listed will be relevant in every case. [para. 136; citations omitted]

[186]      In this case, there are some circumstances that could support reinstatement. I specifically find that Mr. Açar’s return to the workplace would not create a discriminatory educational environment for his students or colleagues. I put weight on the assessment of Ms. Gross, Ms. Seysener, and Mr. Rankin that the appropriate discipline for Mr. Açar’s primary offence – his comment to Mr. Aberman – was a five-day unpaid suspension, an apology, and training. Mr. Rankin’s express view was that Mr. Açar could return to teaching at the College. This was also the view of Mr. Açar’s direct supervisor, Ms. Gross, who testified that she had no concerns about Mr. Açar’s return. Mr. Açar has support from many members of the College’s wider community, who wrote to Mr. Davis to protest his termination. Throughout the proceeding, Mr. Açar was polite and respectful to College participants, making persistent efforts to find common ground and demonstrate his ability to work civilly through disagreement.

[187]      However, in my view, a reinstatement order is not viable in this case. Here I find the College’s opposition to reinstatement to be determinative. Employment relationships are founded on trust. Employers can unilaterally end the relationship for any reason, subject to their obligations under the Code, employment contract, and other applicable statutes. Where an employer does not want an employee to return – for reasons that are not discriminatory or retaliatory under the Code – it is unlikely that the relationship is going to be viable. In that situation, the Tribunal’s order would be ineffective and counterproductive.

[188]      It is noteworthy that in at least two of the rare cases where the Tribunal has awarded reinstatement, the employer has not argued against reinstatement. For example, in Thandi, the employer’s evidence was that it was prepared to have the complainant return (subject to her physical limitations) and it made no submissions on reinstatement: para. 133. Similarly, in Dunkley, the respondents took no position on reinstatement: para. 737.

[189]      This is not to suggest that an employer’s position is always determinative. Where that position is grounded in discrimination or intended to retaliate against an employee for bringing a human rights complaint, then denying reinstatement would “constitute continuation of the discriminatory effect on the complainant”: Thandi at para. 136. That was the case in Kalyn, where the Tribunal ordered reinstatement over the employer’s objection, which it found was based on sex discrimination: para. 540.

[190]      In this case, I am satisfied that the College’s opposition to Mr. Açar’s return is not based in discrimination or his decision to bring this human rights complaint. There is no evidence to support such a finding, and Mr. Açar has not argued otherwise.

[191]      Rather, I find that the College’s position is based in its perception that the relationship has been irrevocably broken for reasons that do not engage the Code’s protections.

[192]      To reach this conclusion, I consider it significant that Mr. Pile’s decision to terminate Mr. Açar’s employment was also based on factors that were not discriminatory and have not been addressed. Most significant is Mr. Açar’s comment to Mr. Aberman. As the College points out, Mr. Açar still refuses to accept that his comment to Mr. Aberman was inappropriate, and continues to insist that it was in fact consistent with the College’s mission and values. Ms. McGraw made this point several times in her testimony, noting that Mr. Açar’s defence of his conduct in its aftermath and beyond caused her serious concerns about his judgment as a teacher. Given his ongoing disagreement with the College’s position about the inappropriateness of his conduct, the College argues that “there is a clear and appreciable risk that reinstatement would embolden the Complainant, and lead to a similar infraction in the future”. While I do not necessarily accept that reinstatement would “embolden” Mr. Açar, I do give weight to the College’s concern that misconduct cannot be corrected where it is not accepted. This is similar to JJ, wherethe Tribunal found reinstatement was not viable in circumstances where the complainant persistently refused to accept the employer’s conditions and rules, and “refused to accept any view that is different than her own”: para. 509.

[193]       I also consider that, despite his significant efforts to be civil, Mr. Açar has continued to express his strong criticisms of the College throughout this proceeding. The College specifically refers to Mr. Açar’s closing submissions, where Mr. Açar accuses the College of “colonial, objectifying treatment” of its Arab and Muslim students, and queries “if Lester B. Pearson College is to be seen as an extension of Israeli military or government, or grooming ground for it?”: p. 13. Mr. Açar is certainly entitled to these opinions and, as a member of the public, entitled to express them however he chooses. And, as I have said, I do not doubt Mr. Açar’s commitment to returning to a positive working relationship. However, I agree with the College that these types of sentiments are not a healthy foundation for an employment relationship.

[194]      I accept the College’s position that reinstatement of this employment relationship is not viable, and I decline to order it.

V      CONCLUSION

[195]      I have found Mr. Açar’s complaint to be justified. I make the following orders:

a.   I declare that the College’s conduct contravened s. 13 of the Code: Code, s. 37(2)(b).

b.   I order the College to cease the contraventions and refrain from committing the same or similar contraventions: Code, s. 37(2)(a).

c.   I order the College to pay Mr. Açar $20,000 as compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii).

d.   I order the College to pay Mr. Açar $94,322.35 as wages lost because of discrimination: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(ii).

e.   I order the College to pay Mr. Açar an amount, to be verified based on Mr. Açar’s tax records, to compensate him for any tax consequences of receiving a lump sum payment of wages: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(ii).

f.    I order the College to pay Mr. Açar pre-judgment interest on the wage loss award until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.

g.   I order the College to pay Mr. Açar post-judgment interest on all amounts until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.

Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair

VI    APPENDIX A: Letter decision dated March 4, 2026

Dear parties,

Re:                   Nazım Açar v. Lester B. Pearson College UWC (CS-004098)

Subject:           Hearing ____________________________________________________________________________

This hearing is underway. Yesterday, I determined that Mr. Açar had not received notice of material aspects of the College’s defence regarding the reasons for his termination. To address this, I made some procedural adjustments to the hearing. This letter explains my decision, and sets out the next steps in the process.

New issue in the College’s defence

It is a fundamental principle of procedural fairness that a party must know the case against them and have the chance to meet it. In the Tribunal’s process, parties primarily set out the basis of their complaint or defence in their forms, including the complaint form, response form, remedy sought form, and the response to remedy sought form. A case may be further particularized in other parts of the Tribunal’s process, including interim applications. By the time the parties arrive at the hearing, there should be no surprises about what the case is about.

Mr. Açar’s original complaint included allegations which were subsequently defined by the Tribunal as: the internal hiring allegation (2017); the sailing allegation (March-May 2018); the mooring allegation (September 2019); and the investigation and termination allegations (November 2019 – January 2020): Açar v. Lester B. Pearson College of the Pacific and United World Colleges (Canada) Inc. and others, 2025 BCHRT 48 [Dismissal Decision].

In the College’s Form 2 – Complaint Response, it denied all allegations of discrimination. Regarding the termination of Mr. Açar’s employment, the College said, “Mr. Açar’s employment was terminated following a full and fair investigation into allegations against him”: para. 11. It said:

Based on the findings of the investigator [Murray Rankin, KC], including Mr. Açar’s admissions and his social media posts, the College determined that it would terminate his employment without assertion of just cause, and provide him with appropriate severance. Its actions in this regard were based on his admitted breach of policy and were not discriminatory. [para. 18]

The College did not identify any other reasons for the termination. At no time did it amend its response to provide further particulars or set out material facts underlying the basis for the termination.

Through its Case Path Pilot, the Tribunal offered the College an option to apply for dismissal of the complaint under ss. 27(1)(c), (d)(ii), and/or (g) of the Human Rights Code: letter dated May 23, 2023. The College availed itself of the opportunity to apply for dismissal of the complaint against individual respondents under s. 27(1)(d)(ii), and of allegations occurring more than one year before the complaint was filed under s. 27(1)(g). It did not apply for dismissal under s. 27(1)(c), on the basis that the complaint had no reasonable prospect of success.

The College argued that Mr. Açar’s sailing and mooring allegations were out of time and were “not of similar or related character” to his investigation and termination allegations. It argued:

Whereas the Sailing Allegation and the Mooring Allegation relate to the benefits or perks which were allegedly refused to the Complainant during his time of employment, the Investigation Allegation and the Termination Allegation relate to the steps Pearson College took to address serious complaints made against the Complainant by various students and the ultimate termination of his employment without cause. [College argument, para. 36, emphasis added]

The College further argued that it would be prejudiced by allowing these allegations to proceed, given the passage of time: College argument, para. 42.

Ultimately, the Tribunal accepted the College’s position and dismissed Mr. Açar’s internal hiring allegation, sailing allegation, and mooring allegation on the basis that these allegations were out of time: Dismissal Decision. The Tribunal found that the sailing and mooring allegations were not connected to the investigation and termination allegations and so could not form part of a timely continuing contravention. It declined to exercise its discretion to accept the allegations outside the time limit, reasoning in part that they would “expand the scope of the complaint by years in circumstances that are not warranted (in this instance) by the public interest”: para. 60.

Following the Dismissal Decision, the parties understood that the focus of the complaint was on the investigation and termination allegations. Based on the College’s response, I accept that Mr. Açar reasonably understood that its position was that he was terminated in connection with the allegations addressed in Mr. Rankin’s report. On this basis, he withdrew the grounds of race and place of origin from his complaint: Tribunal letter dated January 12, 2026.

On March 2, in his opening statement for the College, Mr. Bell indicated that the College would be leading evidence that there were many reasons for the termination, including the outcome of Mr. Rankin’s report, the “significant administrative burden” required to manage Mr. Açar, and Mr. Açar’s lack of positive response to earlier attempts to manage his conflicts with other administrators and staff. As far as I can tell, this was the first indication that the College may be relying on incidents aside from those addressed through the Rankin investigation as the basis for Mr. Açar’s termination.

Mr. Açar then presented his direct evidence, focusing on the circumstances surrounding the Rankin investigation and his termination.

In cross-examination, Mr. Bell asked Mr. Açar questions, and took him to documents, relating to the incidents that had previously underlay his sailing and mooring allegations. Mr. Açar eventually objected to this line of questioning on the basis that it related to part of his complaint that had been dismissed. He said that he had never been told, either during the termination process or in this proceeding, that his conduct relating to the sailing and mooring incidents formed part of the basis for his termination. In response, Mr. Bell said that this would have been obvious from the scope of the College’s disclosure, and its response to the complaint.

I respectfully disagreed. The response to the complaint addressed the sailing and mooring incidents because they formed part of Mr. Açar’s original complaint. It did not say that these events were part of the reason he was terminated. The scope of the parties’ disclosure would have reflected these original allegations. After the sailing and mooring allegations were dismissed, there is nothing that I can see in the complaint file to suggest that the College was going to be raising those incidents in its defence. Even if this is something that could have been gleaned from the College’s disclosure (and, in my view, it could not), it is unreasonable and contrary to the Tribunal’s process to require a self-represented litigant to infer the case against them based on the documents the parties have exchanged.

In this circumstance, I determined that it would be unfair to allow the College to proceed with the aspects of its defence that relied on reasons for Mr. Açar’s termination that had not previously been disclosed to him, namely incidents unrelated to the Rankin investigation and report. On the other hand, given the College’s position and the stakes in the complaint, I was not prepared to continue without giving the College a chance to rectify the situation.

To ensure each party has a fair process, I have adjusted the hearing process as follows.

Hearing process

This week

Mr. Açar will continue to present those elements of his case that relate to the Rankin investigation and report, including the underlying allegations against him:

–       Mr. Açar has completed his direct evidence and been cross-examined about these issues. The College agreed that he is now released from cross-examination.

–       On March 4:

o   Mr. Aberman will testify from 10:10 – 12:00

o   Craig Davis will testify from 1:00-2:35

o   Rennie Warburton will testify from 2:50-4:25

–       On March 5, Shefa Segal will testify from 9:35-11:50

The College may elect to call Mr. Rankin on March 6, while Mr. Açar’s case is underway.

After this week

At the end of our time together this week, we will set dates for the next steps in the process.

First, we will set a schedule for the College to apply to amend its response to the complaint: Rule 26(2). In its proposed amended response, it must set out all the material facts underlying its defence. Mr. Açar will have a chance to make submissions about this.

Second, I will work with the parties to schedule further hearing dates as soon as possible. During these further dates:

–       Mr. Açar will be recalled to testify and be cross-examined about any new issues raised by the College’s amended response (if accepted). This will not be an opportunity to expand on or repeat evidence that has already been given, in relation to the Rankin investigation and allegations which Mr. Açar has previously understood to underlie his termination.

–       Mr. Açar will complete his case by calling Heather Gross and Anne McLennan.

–       The College will present its evidence.

Conclusion

I regret that we cannot complete the evidence in this complaint as scheduled. I know the parties have been waiting for a long time for a resolution to this complaint and have worked hard to present their evidence this week. However, I do not see any other option that would ensure each party has a full and fair opportunity to present their case.

Thank you for your ongoing work and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Devyn Cousineau

Vice Chair

VII  APPENDIX B: Letter decision dated April 20, 2026

Dear parties,

Re:                   Nazım Açar v. Lester B. Pearson College UWC (CS-004098)

Subject:           Application to amend response

______________________________________________________________________________

This is my decision about the College’s application to amend its response to the complaint.

For the reasons that follow, the application is denied.

I        Decision

The background to the application is set out in my letter dated March 4, 2026, and not repeated here.

The College seeks to amend its response to add the following reasons for terminating Mr. Açar’s employment:

b. Previous events involving the Complainant and the Respondent’s administration and staff, in which the Complainant had repeatedly demonstrated an inability to follow Respondent procedures and/or communicate respectfully and appropriately in his position as a teacher with the Respondent;

c. Repeated issues with respect to the Complainant failing to follow directions from the Respondent’s administration, including with respect to the mooring of his personal vessel at the Respondents’ docks, completion of requisite risk assessments for sailing trips, and the general appropriateness of school-wide email communications; and,

d. The Complainant’s substandard job performance.

The issue is whether allowing the amendment would further the just and timely resolution of the complaint on its merits. In a civil context, courts consider “the interests of justice, balancing the desire for determination of the ‘real issues’ against the need to ensure fairness and an absence of prejudice to the opposing party”: Han v. Han, 2025 BCCA 184 at para. 74. In an administrative law context, there is the added goal of ensuring an expedient and cost-efficient decision.

Relevant factors include the timing of the application, the College’s explanation, whether the amendment is inconsistent with prior evidence or pleadings, any unfairness to the parties, and whether the amendment is necessary to allow the Tribunal to determine the “real issues” in the complaint: see e.g. Lam v. Chiu, 2012 BCSC 677 at para. 10; Langret Investments SA v. McDonnell, 1996 CanLII 1433 (BCCA) at para. 34. I find that these factors weigh against allowing the amendment. I consider each of them in turn.

A.    Timing of the application

This factor weighs against allowing the amendment.

The Tribunal’s Rules and process are designed to ensure that parties have sufficient notice of the issues in a complaint to allow them to fully prepare for the hearing. The Rules set a cutoff of four months before a hearing for amending a complaint or response without an application: Rule 26(2). The closer to the hearing, the greater the potential impact on the process and the stronger the grounds should be for allowing an amendment. In this case, the parties have fully prepared for the hearing, and it is underway. The amendment issue arose after Mr. Açar completed his direct examination, during his cross-examination. As I will explain, the timing of the proposed amendment has significant implications for the just and timely resolution of the complaint.

B.    Explanation for late amendment

This factor weighs against allowing the amendment.

The College says that it had not previously appreciated Mr. Açar’s understanding of its position and the effects of the Tribunal’s decision in Açar v. Lester B. Pearson College of the Pacific and United World Colleges (Canada) Inc. and others, 2025 BCHRT 48 [Dismissal Decision]. The College says that it appeared from Mr. Açar’s June 28, 2021, complaint amendment that he was aware that “previous circumstances not addressed in Mr. Rankin’s external investigation played a role in the Respondent’s decision to terminate his employment.” It argues that Mr. Açar’s interpretation of its defence is based on a misunderstanding of the impacts of the Dismissal Decision, “rather than a strict interpretation of the Respondent’s complaint response”. In response, Mr. Açar points out that, consistently throughout the process, the College has presented a single reason for the termination: the Rankin investigation. He says there was no reason to think that he would have understood earlier that the College intended to rely on other reasons. I agree.

The College has been represented by counsel throughout this process, who are assumed to understand the principles of procedural fairness and the purpose of giving notice of the defence. Throughout the process, the College’s position has been explicit:

Based on the findings of the investigator [Murray Rankin, KC], including Mr. Açar’s admissions and his social media posts, the College determined that it would terminate his employment without assertion of just cause, and provide him with appropriate severance. Its actions in this regard were based on his admitted breach of policy and were not discriminatory. [Complaint Response, para. 18]

… the Investigation Allegation and the Termination Allegation relate to the steps Pearson College took to address serious complaints made against the Complainant by various students and the ultimate termination of his employment without cause. [College argument to dismiss part of the complaint, para. 36]

Respectfully, Mr. Açar’s June 28, 2021 amendment cannot be reasonably interpreted as evidence that Mr. Açar knew the College intended to present alternative explanations for his termination. In this amendment, Mr. Açar alleged that several of the incidents the College now seeks to rely on were discriminatory. His allegations regarding the termination were rooted in the Rankin investigation.

Any doubt about what Mr. Açar reasonably understood about the College’s defence is laid to rest by the College’s arguments in its dismissal application. The College asked the Tribunal to dismiss Mr. Açar’s allegations about events outside the investigation and termination, including on the bases that:

–       Mr. Açar’s sailing and mooring allegations were “separate issues that are unrelated” to the investigation or termination (paras. 7, 36)

–       Allowing Mr. Açar’s sailing and mooring allegations to proceed to a hearing would be significantly prejudicial to the Respondents, given the passage of time (para. 42)

The reasonable interpretation of the College’s response, including as particularized in its dismissal application, is that it intended to rely on the Rankin investigation to explain the termination and that other events – especially relating to the mooring and sailing allegations – were unrelated and would not be addressed in the hearing.

C.    Inconsistency

This factor weighs against allowing the amendment.

The College argues that its amendment is not inconsistent with any of the evidence presented so far in the hearing. That may be true, but the amendment is inconsistent with its position throughout the process that Mr. Açar’s employment was terminated based on the outcome of the Rankin investigation, and that previous incidents between the parties were unrelated. It is also at least partially inconsistent with the Tribunal’s Dismissal Decision finding that incidents relating to the sailing and mooring allegations were unconnected to termination of his employment.

D.   Unfairness to the parties

On balance, I find this factor weighs against allowing the amendment.

Both parties argue that they face the prospect of unfairness.

The College says that the amendment is necessary to ensure that the Tribunal has a complete and accurate understanding of why Mr. Açar’s employment was terminated. It says that, without the amendment, it will be unable to make its defense arguments in full and its witnesses will be required to omit important evidence to explain the termination. It says that the amendment is specifically relevant to its defence of bona fide occupational requirement. I take this to mean that the College intends to argue that, if the Tribunal finds Mr. Açar’s political belief was a factor in his termination, the termination was nonetheless justified because of other non-discriminatory reasons.

Mr. Açar argues that accepting the amendment would “set the clocks back by four years”, further prolonging an already delayed process. He argues that, if the amendment were accepted, he would need the opportunity to apply to address aspects of the Dismissal Decision that no longer seem well founded (including removing Mr. Pile as a respondent and dismissing allegations of discrimination based on his place of origin).

This application has already impacted the timely resolution of the complaint by necessitating an adjournment. In the unique circumstances of this case, I do not agree with the College that allowing the amendment would not have any further impact because the hearing could complete as scheduled on May 11-13. While the College may be prepared to present its amended defense on these dates, I do not think this adequately accounts for how Mr. Açar may be entitled or required to adjust his case.

The most important factor here is the impact that the amendment may have on the outcome of the Dismissal Decision, and the prospect that having to revisit that Decision could significantly delay the resolution of this complaint. In my view, it would be unfair to allow the College to rely on incidents for the termination which Mr. Açar previously alleged were discriminatory and which the Tribunal dismissed based on the College’s submissions that they were unrelated to the termination and would unnecessarily expand the scope of the complaint. Although this may support the College’s ability to present a full defence, it would deprive Mr. Açar of a full offence, including his original argument that some of those incidents were tainted by discrimination. If I were to allow the amendment, I would also allow Mr. Açar to apply for reconsideration of the Dismissal Decision. This would create further delay and present the prospect of reconvening the hearing many months later to decide an expanded complaint. This undermines the just and timely resolution of the complaint and weighs against allowing the amendment.

E.    Necessity to decide the real issues

In my view, the Tribunal can decide the real issues, as the parties have defined them, without allowing the amendment. This factor does not support allowing the amendment.

The College says that the amendment is relevant to its defense. It says that the amendment will allow its witnesses to give complete evidence about “an employment relationship marked by tension and insubordinacy [sic]”, which is necessary to understand why the College terminated Mr. Açar’s employment. I appreciate that this may be relevant context to the termination, but I am not persuaded that – as argued – it is necessary to decide the College’s defense.

At the hearing, Mr. Açar has to prove that his political beliefs were one factor in his termination. They do not have to be the only, primary, or causal factor: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39. The issue turns on Mr. Açar’s argument that the allegations, process, and outcome of the Rankin investigation related to his political beliefs. The issue is unaffected by whether the College had other reasons for the termination.

The defense of bona fide occupational requirement requires the College to justify its reasoning as it related to Mr. Açar’s political beliefs, not other factors: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC) at para. 54. It is not clear to me how other reasons for the termination could justify a partial reliance on Mr. Açar’s protected characteristic of political belief.

II      Conclusion

The application to amend the Complaint Response is denied.

We will reconvene to complete the hearing on May 11-13. In light of this decision, it will not be necessary to recall Mr. Açar.

Yours truly,

Devyn Cousineau

Vice Chair

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[1] Mr. Acar says the suspension was for two or three days, but nothing turns on this discrepancy.