Morrison v. GardaWorld Cash Services Canada Corporation and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 218

Date Issued: October 16, 2026
File(s): CS-005041

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Shaun Morrison
COMPLAINANT

AND:

GardaWorld Cash Services Canada Corporation and Andrew (Ron) Heyes and Keith Desnoyers and Unifor Local 114 and Mark Misic and Mark Cameron
RESPONDENTS

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)

Tribunal Member: Jess Hadley
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondents GardaWorld Cash Services Canada Corporation and Andrew Hayes and Keith Desnoyers: Lauren Soubolsky

Counsel for the Respondents Unifor Local 114 and Andrew Misic and Mark Cameron: Dijana Simonovic

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Mr. Morrison alleges that he has anxiety which prevents him from wearing a mask. When his employer, GardaWorld, imposed a mask mandate during the COVID-19 pandemic, he did not comply and GardaWorld put him on unpaid leave. Mr. Morrison alleges that GardaWorld, and his former managers Andrew Heyes and Keith Desnoyers, discriminated against him because of his disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code by requiring him to wear a mask and penalizing him for not doing so. He also alleges that his union, Unifor Local 114, and his union representatives Mark Misic and Mark Cameron, discriminated against him contrary to s. 13 by failing to support him in not wearing a mask.

[2]             There are two applications to dismiss before me. GardaWorld, Mr. Heyes and Mr. Desnoyers [the GardaWorld Respondents] have applied to dismiss the complaint under ss. 27(1)(a), (c), and (d)(ii) of the Code. They argue that the complaint is not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction; that there is no reasonable prospect it will succeed; and that proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code. Meanwhile, Unifor, Mr. Misic and Mr. Cameron [the Unifor Respondents] have likewise applied to dismiss under ss. 27(1)(a), (c), and (d)(ii) of the Code, and have also argued for dismissal under s. 27(1)(f) on the basis that the complaint’s substance has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. Both applications seek dismissal of the entire complaint. Mr. Morrison did not respond to either application.

[3]             For the following reasons, I dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) because it has no reasonable prospect of success. My reasons will only address the parties’ submissions under s. 27(1)(c). I have made no determinations under ss. 27(1)(a), (d)(ii) or (f) since those are unnecessary to my decision. Although I have considered all the information the parties filed, my reasons will only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

II      BACKGROUND

[4]             The following background summary is taken from the materials before me. I make no findings of fact.

[5]             GardaWorld is a company that securely transports cash and other valuables. Mr. Morrison was employed there as an armed guard for over 24 years, from August 1998 to January 2023. Mr. Heyes was Mr. Morrison’s supervisor, and Mr. Desnoyers managed the GardaWorld branch where Mr. Morrison worked. Unifor Local 114 was Mr. Morrison’s union while he was working at GardaWorld, while Mr. Cameron was the national representative for Unifor, and Mr. Misic was a servicing representative for Unifor.

[6]             Mr. Morrison’s complaint arose when GardaWorld imposed a workplace mask mandate in September 2020 to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

[7]             Mr. Morrison is a Canadian veteran. His complaint asserts that due to his experiences in the military, he has anxiety that prevents him from wearing a mask. However, he did not submit any evidence about this anxiety or its effect on his ability to wear a mask.

[8]             After the mask mandate took effect, Mr. Heyes told Mr. Morrison he had to wear a mask. Mr. Morrison objected, and Mr. Heyes insisted. Mr. Morrison refused to wear a mask and left work. GardaWorld then put him on unpaid leave beginning October 8, 2020.

[9]             In his first few days on unpaid leave, Mr. Morrison exchanged several emails with his union representative, Mr. Misic. In them, Mr. Morrison objected to the mask mandate, saying that it violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that masks were unsanitary and ineffective. Mr. Misic offered to pursue an accommodation for Mr. Morrison if he had a documented condition that prevented him from wearing a mask, but Mr. Morrison replied without mentioning any such condition, instead continuing to describe masks as an unsanitary, ineffective infringement on his rights. The email exchange ended with Mr. Misic telling Mr. Morrison that masks were safe and advising him to wear one and return to work.

[10]         On October 15, 2020, Mr. Morrison filed a grievance in which he challenged the mask mandate and GardaWorld’s decision to send him home without pay. The grievance did not mention a disability or any medical condition that would affect Mr. Morrison’s ability to wear a mask. GardaWorld refused the grievance on November 10, 2020, and the Unifor Respondents did not take any steps to advance the grievance to the next step.

[11]         After this, Mr. Morrison stayed on unpaid leave for more than two years, even after GardaWorld lifted the mask mandate on May 30, 2022. GardaWorld eventually emailed Mr. Morrison asking him to return to work on January 23, 2023. When he did not return, GardaWorld terminated his employment.

III    DECISION

A.    Section 27(1)(c)

[12]         The GardaWorld Respondents and the Unifor Respondents have separately applied to dismiss the complaint in its entirety on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on the applicants to establish this basis for dismissal.

[13]         Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171.

[14]         Under s. 27(1)(c), the threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27. Another way of saying that is that there needs to be “some evidence” capable of supporting the conclusion the complainant wants the Tribunal to reach: Northwest Plastics Ltd v Bellin, 2025 BCSC 1215 at paras. 33-35 and 45-50.

[15]         The Tribunal must base its decision under s. 27(1)(c) on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at a hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77. Mr. Morrison has not filed a doctor’s note or any other evidence that would support his claim to have a disability. In deciding this application, it is not my role to speculate whether such evidence might exist. I can only look at the evidence that the other parties have put before me.

B.    What Mr. Morrison would need to prove at a hearing

[16]         To prove his complaint of discrimination at a hearing, Mr. Morrison would have to establish three things: (1) he has a disability under the Code, (2) he was adversely impacted in his employment, and (3) his disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would then shift to the respondents to show that the impact was justified by a bona fide occupational requirement; if so, there would be no discrimination.

C.    Mr. Morrison has no reasonable prospect of proving a disability

[17]         The GardaWorld Respondents and the Unifor Respondents argue in parallel that Mr. Morrison has no reasonable prospect of proving the first element of the complainant’s case, as required by Moore. I am satisfied that Mr. Morrison has no reasonable prospect of proving that he has a disability that prevents him from wearing a face mask and that as a result, he has no reasonable prospect of establishing that any of the respondents discriminated against him.

[18]         Mr. Morrison’s complaint asserts that he has a disability, anxiety, which prevents him from wearing a face mask. Anxiety can indeed amount to a disability under the Code: McConnell v. School District No. 8, 2014 BCHRT 239 at para. 59; Widen v. BCGEU and others, 2012 BCHRT 210 at para. 10. However, a mere allegation of anxiety or similar conditions, without more, is not sufficient to establish a disability: Vandale v. Town of Golden and others, 2009 BCHRT 219; Dow v. Summit Logistics and RWU Local 580, 2006 BCHRT 158; Ford v. Peak Products Manufacturing and others, 2009 BCHRT 191.

[19]         Mr. Morrison did not submit any evidence showing that he has a disability that prevented him from wearing a face mask. Mr. Morrison’s bare assertion that he has a disability does not meet the low threshold of bringing his complaint out of the realm of conjecture. My conclusion on this is bolstered by the fact that, when Mr. Misic offered in October 2020 to pursue an accommodation for Mr. Morrison if he had a documented condition that prevented him from wearing a mask, Mr. Morrison did not mention any sort of disability but instead continued to focus on the idea that masks were an unsanitary, ineffective infringement on his rights.

[20]         In reaching this conclusion, I am not saying that Mr. Morrison is being dishonest when he says he has a disability that prevents him from wearing a mask. It is possible that he does. However, there is no evidence before me to show this.

[21]         I am therefore satisfied that Mr. Morrison has no reasonable prospect of proving he has a disability, and therefore no reasonable prospect of proving that any of the respondents discriminated against him contrary to s. 13 of the Code.

IV    CONCLUSION

[22]         I dismiss Mr. Morrison’s complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.

[23]         I do not need to consider the respondents’ arguments under ss. 27(1)(a), (d)(ii), or (f), and I make no findings under those provisions.

Jess Hadley
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal