Sharma v. Best Buy Canada (No. 3), 2026 BCHRT 215

Date Issued: October 14, 2026
File: CS-004074

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Vikas Sharma
COMPLAINANT

AND:

Best Buy Canada
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36

Tribunal Member: Amber Prince
For the Complainant: No submissions sought
Counsel for the Respondent: Nicholas Ellegood

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             This is a decision on Best Buy’s request for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s final decision, issued on August 5, 2026, Sharma v. Best Buy Canada (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 173.

[2]             In that decision, I determined that Best Buy’s termination of Mr. Sharma’s employment was discriminatory based on disability, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. I ordered Best Buy to compensate Mr. Sharma for the discrimination under s. 37(2)(d) of the Code.

[3]             I have considered Best Buy’s reconsideration request and decided that it does not set out a basis to reconsider Sharma (No. 2). To arrive at this decision, I considered all of Best Buy’s reconsideration materials but did not find it necessary to seek submissions from Mr. Sharma. I explain my decision below.

II      RECONSIDERATION DECISION

[4]             Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy. That is because, generally speaking, once the Tribunal makes a decision about an issue, that decision is final. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider that issue is “spent”: Goondiwala v. British Columbia Ferry Services Inc. (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 166, paras. 8-10. The principle of finality means that once the Tribunal makes a decision, the parties should be able to rely on it as final and binding. If a final and binding decision could be easily undone, the resources of the Tribunal and the parties would be endlessly taken up in rearguing the same issues. This would not be efficient or fair: Goondiwala, paras. 8-10.

[5]             Thus, reconsideration is not an opportunity for parties to “enter new facts that with reasonable diligence were available in the first instance, to make arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to reargue matters that were argued in the first instance in an attempt to achieve a different result”: Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 5), 2020 BCHRT 7, para. 6, citing Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56, para. 13.

[6]             Consistent with the principle of finality, the Tribunal only has the power to reconsider its own decisions if the interests of fairness and justice require it: Rule 36 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules]. This limited power includes the power to correct non-substantive mistakes; or to address a procedural unfairness in the Tribunal’s process: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499, paras. 160-161; Colbert v. District of North Vancouver (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 46, para. 3.

[7]             The burden is on the person requesting reconsideration to show why the interests of justice and fairness require reconsideration: Gardezi v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2025 BCSC 61, para. 67.

[8]             Best Buy seeks reconsideration of Sharma (No. 2) on three bases, which I will address in turn.

A.    The Wage Loss Order

[9]             Best Buy argues that, in awarding wage loss to Mr. Sharma, I did not consider its closing submission that a wage loss award was precluded by a settlement agreement the parties had reached in another proceeding: reconsideration submission, paras. 11-22. As I understand it, Best Buy argues that the interests of justice and fairness require reconsideration of the wage loss award because I did not consider a central argument it advanced on this issue.

[10]         I disagree. I am not satisfied that Best Buy has established a basis for reconsideration of the wage loss award. I explain why after first setting out the relevant context.  

[11]         By way of background, in addition to his human rights complaint, Mr. Sharma had a small claims action against Best Buy in the Provincial Court alleging wrongful dismissal [action]. The parties settled that action by agreement in January 2023 [agreement]. Best Buy paid Mr. Sharma $17,000 as a full and final settlement of the action. Both the notice of claim in the action and the agreement were part of the evidence before me at the hearing: Exhibit 2, Tab 34 and Exhibit 10.

[12]         At the hearing of his complaint, Mr. Sharma sought compensation for wage loss that resulted from the discrimination. He deducted from his wage loss calculation, the settlement funds he received from Best Buy, on account of the agreement. In response, Best Buy argued that Mr. Sharma’s wage loss claim was bound to fail: closing submissions, paras. 119-123. To that end, one of Best Buy’s arguments was that no wage loss award should be made because the issue of “severance” had been resolved in the agreement. In its closing submission, under the heading “alternative arguments”, Best Buy briefly argued that Mr. Sharma could not “relitigate the amount of severance he was entitled to”, citing “issue estoppel”: closing submissions, paras. 120-123. 

[13]         After hearing the complaint, I determined it was justified, and that Mr. Sharma was entitled to a wage loss award under the Code: s. 37(2)(d)(ii). I deducted the $17,000 settlement amount from the wage loss award, consistent with his request, and to avoid double recovery: Kasagoni v. J Singh Enterprises dba Willingdon Husky and another (No. 3), 2023 BCHRT 65, para. 113.

[14]         In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that Best Buy has established a basis for reconsideration of the wage loss award.

[15]         First, I do not agree that I did not consider Best Buy’s submission. I considered it. As indicated in my reasons, in deciding the wage loss award for Mr. Sharma, I considered all the parties’ evidence and submissions on this point: Sharma (No. 2), paras. 116-137. I referred specifically to the paragraphs in Best Buy’s closing submissions where it argued that a wage loss award was precluded because the “severance” issue had been resolved: Sharma (No. 2), para. 122. It is implicit that Best Buy’s submission was rejected by the Tribunal.

[16]         Second, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal’s rejection of Best Buy’s submission raises an issue of fairness and justice in the circumstances.

[17]         To begin, to the extent Best Buy’s argument was based on a premise that the parties intended the agreement to fully and finally resolve Mr. Sharma’s wage loss claim, before the Tribunal, the evidence before me did not support that premise. I did not have evidence before me that the agreement resolved any aspect of Mr. Sharma’s complaint. Neither the agreement nor the notice of claim, on their face, addressed the complaint. In its submissions, Best Buy did not explain how the words of the agreement were evidence that it resolved any aspect of the complaint.  Mr. Sharma was the only witness who gave evidence about the agreement. When cross-examined by counsel for Best Buy, on this point, he was unshaken in his evidence that the agreement resolved his wrongful dismissal action but not his complaint. As such, it was not apparent to me how the agreement could preclude Mr. Sharma’s eligibility for a wage loss award arising from discrimination under the Code.

[18]         Further, Best Buy’s brief closing submission on this point appeared to overlook a well settled principle in human rights law. Though Best Buy’s submission focused on the fact that the action and the agreement addressed Mr. Sharma’s claim for “severance”, it is well settled that Tribunal orders for wage loss are not based on the employment law concept of reasonable notice. The usual measure of economic loss for wrongful dismissal (reasonable notice), is distinct from how the Tribunal measures lost wages resulting from discrimination under s. 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code: see Vanton v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), (1994), 21 C.H.R.R.D/492, para. 72 and more recently, Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82, paras. 83-86.  

[19]         While the harm in a wrongful dismissal arises from a failure to provide reasonable notice of the termination of employment, the harm in a human rights complaint arises from the impact the discrimination had on the complainant: Benton, paras. 81-83.

[20]         Similarly, the Tribunal has also observed that a claim for wrongful dismissal is a separate and distinct legal claim from a complaint under the Code, though there may be potential overlap in remedial claims: see recently e.g. Truman v. CCON Recon Inc. and another, 2023 BCHRT 63, paras. 42-45; Sheriff v. Fairleigh Dickenson University, 2023 BCHRT 40, para. 46-47. As such, in the absence of any settlement of his complaint, Mr. Sharma was entitled to seek human rights remedies for discrimination before the Tribunal, in addition to a civil remedy for wrongful dismissal before the Court. He was not, as Best Buy argued, estopped from pursuing a wage loss claim before the Tribunal, because he settled the action.

[21]         I found that Best Buy discriminated against Mr. Sharma and ordered it to compensate him for wage loss due to that discrimination. In doing so, I accounted for the $17,000 Mr. Sharma had already received based on the agreement. I am not satisfied that the interests of fairness and justice require reconsideration of this award.

B.    The finding about the elimination of GG’s position

[22]         Best Buy argues that in Sharma (No. 2) the Tribunal materially misapprehended the evidence about whether the position of another employee, GG, was eliminated as part of Best Buy’s restructuring. As I understand it, Best Buy argues that justice and fairness require the Tribunal to reopen the decision to address what they say is a material misapprehension.

[23]         Specifically, Best Buy takes issue with the statement in Sharma (No. 2) that: “There was no evidence before me that GG’s previous Senior Advisor position had been eliminated as part of the restructuring”:para. 42. Best Buy argues that the elimination of GG’s position is material to my finding that its termination of Mr. Sharma’s employment was discriminatory: reconsideration submission, paras. 40-42. Best Buy also argues that the elimination of GG’s position materially affected whether Mr. Sharma would have been reassigned or transferred to at least a Team Lead or equivalent position and, in turn, whether he was entitled to wage loss: reconsideration submission: paras. 37-39. I will address these arguments in turn. 

[24]         First, with respect to my statement at paragraph 42 in Sharma (No. 2),I agree with Best Buy that there is an issue with its accuracy. What I ought to have said was that I had no direct testimony before me that GG’s position was eliminated. I agree with Best Buy that it is possible to infer that GG’s position had been eliminated from two documents that were before me at the hearing: Exhibit 2, Tabs 47 and 57.

[25]         Tab 47 showed that Best Buy recategorized some of its stores from a Level 3 to a Level 4 category. I had other evidence before me that the Senior Advisor positions were eliminated at Level 4 stores, and that GG held a Senior Advisor position before he was promoted: Sharma (No. 2), paras. 41-42. Tab 57 shows that GG had worked at a Level 4 store before his promotion. While no witness specifically testified that GG’s previous Senior Advisor position had been eliminated as part of the restructuring, I could infer it from Tabs 47 and 57, taken together, and coupled with the witness testimony.

[26]         However, even assuming that GG’s position was eliminated, I am not satisfied that this is a basis for reconsideration. I reach this conclusion because the statement at paragraph 42 was immaterial: it would not have made a difference to the outcome in Sharma (No. 2).

[27]         I do not agree with Best Buy that the elimination of GG’s position materially affected my finding that its termination of Mr. Sharma’s employment was discriminatory. My findings of discrimination did not rest on the elimination of GG’s position, but four other bases discussed in the decision: the timing of Mr. Sharma’s termination; a lack of evidence that Best Buy considered a re-assignment or transfer for Mr. Sharma; evidence that Best Buy could have considered a demotion for Mr. Sharma; and evidence that the termination was inconsistent with Mr. Sharma’s work performance and skills: Sharma (No. 2), paras. 62-95.

[28]         Even if GG’s position was eliminated, it was a minor point that did not impact my overall conclusion that Mr. Sharma’s disability factored into Best Buy’s termination of his employment, and Best Buy did not justify that discriminatory termination: Sharma (No. 2), paras. 100-112.

[29]         Further, the elimination of GG’s position was not material to the wage loss award. The elimination of GG’s position does not change the fact that Best Buy opted to promote GG – Mr. Sharma’s junior – to the newly created Team Lead position at Mr. Sharma’s store, instead of considering Mr. Sharma for it at all: Sharma (No. 2), para. 77. What was material was the evidence that: post-rebanding, new Best Buy positions were available, including the Team Lead position at Mr. Sharma’s store; and but for the discrimination, Mr. Sharma would have been re-assigned or transferred to at least a Team Lead or equivalent position: Sharma (No. 2), para. 124.

C.    The treatment of BO’s voluntary demotion

[30]         At the hearing, I heard evidence about another employee, BO, who was demoted during the re-banding process in 2021. In Sharma (No. 2), I stated that “BO’s demotion shows that demotions were a possibility during the re-banding and leading up to Best Buy terminating Mr. Sharma’s employment”: para. 82.

[31]         Best Buy argues that I misunderstood the circumstances of BO’s demotion, compared to Mr. Sharma’s circumstances: reconsideration submission, paras. 44-51. In particular, Best Buy highlights that BO had requested a demotion and Mr. Sharma had not: paras. 46-48.

[32]          I do not accept this basis for reconsideration. I understood Best Buy’s evidence and argument on this point, and grappled with it: Sharma (No. 2), paras. 79-85. Reconsideration is not an opportunity for Best Buy to make the same arguments in the hopes of a different result: Klewchuk, para. 6.

III    CONCLUSION AND ORDER

[33]         I have considered each of Best Buy’s arguments in support of its reconsideration request. Considering each argument separately, and together, I am not persuaded that it is in the interests of justice and fairness to reconsider Sharma (No. 2).

[34]         Accordingly, I deny Best Buy’s request for reconsideration.

[35]         Sharma (No. 2) stands, and this file is now closed.

Amber Prince
Tribunal Member