Speirs v. Coast Mountain College and another, 2026 BCHRT 214
Date Issued: October 14, 2026
File(s): CS-010775
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Mary-Ann Speirs
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Coast Mountain College and Hyeyoung Kang
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
SECTION 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On their own behalf: Mary-Ann Speirs
Counsel for the Respondents: Mariah B. Friedrich, David J. Bell
I INTRODUCTION
[1] The Complainant, Mary-Ann Speirs, filed this human rights complaint on November 3, 2023. She alleges her previous employer, Coast Mountain College [the College] and a supervisor, Hyeyoung Kang [the Supervisor] [together the Respondents] discriminated in employment based on Indigenous identity, ancestry and race contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code].
[2] The Tribunal identified that some or all of the allegations in the complaint appear to fall outside the one-year time limit for filing a complaint. The Tribunal invited the parties to make submissions about whether to accept the complaint under s. 22 of the Human Rights Code. The Complainant and the Respondents provided submissions, and I considered them in making this decision. I have also considered the Respondents’ further submissions and the Complaint’s response for the reasons set out below.
[3] Ms. Speirs acknowledges the Complaint against both Respondents is late filed for all her allegations occurring on one day, September 2, 2022. As such, the only issue I must decide is whether to exercise my discretion to accept the complaint because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: s. 22(3).
[4] For the following reasons, I accept the late-filed complaint because I am persuaded that it is in the public interest to do so. The complaint will proceed.
II APPLICATION TO FILE FURTHER SUBMISSIONS
[5] The Tribunal’s process for addressing the timeliness of a complaint at the screening stage involves three submissions: the complaint form (Form 1, Step 4, Part B), the time limit response (Form 4), and the time limit reply (Form 5): Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 12(3) and (6). The Tribunal may accept further submissions where fairness requires that a party be given an opportunity to respond to new issues raised in reply: Rules 12(7) and 28(5). The overriding consideration is whether fairness requires an opportunity for further submissions: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 201, para. 21.
[6] The Respondents apply to make further submissions because Ms. Speirs raised several issues in her Form 5 that were not addressed in her complaint initiating documents (Form 1 and Form 3). The Respondents submit that Ms. Speirs disclosed that she is an Indian Day School Survivor and a descendent of a Residential School survivor, raised the effect of the conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC] and set out the applicability of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP] to her complaint. The Respondents seek an opportunity to respond to new issues raised as a matter of fairness.
[7] Ms. Speirs asks the Tribunal not to accept the Respondents application. She argues that her references to her Indian Day School experience and intergenerational trauma, the TRC findings, and UNDRIP are not new issues, but rather contextual explanations directly responsive to the Respondents’ submissions. Ms. Speirs submits that allowing the Respondents’ further submissions creates unnecessary duplication and undermines the Tribunal’s mandate for timely, accessible and culturally safe adjudication. Additionally, she submits that the Respondents have not identified any prejudice arising from her Form 5.
[8] After reviewing the parties’ submissions, I have decided to accept the Respondents’ further submissions and Ms. Speirs’ response to those submissions. In making this decision, I agree with Ms. Speirs that her Form 5 provided contextual explanations for her delay in filing related to her Indigeneity that had already been raised in her complaint initiating documents. However, given the detailed further discussion of this issue by Ms. Speirs in her Form 5 and the centrality of it in the application before me, I decided it was necessary to consider the Respondents’ further submissions and Ms. Speirs’ response submissions in rendering this decision.
III DECISION
[9] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code, s. 22. Allegations are timely if they occurred within one year of filing the complaint, or if they form part of a timely continuing contravention of the Code: s. 22(1) and (2). The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision that is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at para. 59. Its purposes are “to require allegations of discrimination to be brought forward in a timely way so that remedial steps can be taken if appropriate” and to protect respondents from having to address dated complaints: School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 79; Kamloops (City) v Spina, 2021 BCSC 723 at para. 80. The Tribunal has discretion to accept untimely allegations of discrimination if it is in the public interest to do so and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3).
[10] Ms. Speirs filed this complaint on November 3, 2023. Any allegations of discrimination after before November 3, 2022, will be untimely unless they are part of a continuing contravention.
A. Allegation of discrimination within one year of complaint
[11] The first issue I must decide is whether the complaint sets out any allegations of discrimination within the one year before the complaint was filed. An allegation of discrimination must set out facts that could, if proven, establish that the complainant had characteristics protected by the Code, experienced an adverse impact in a protected area, and the protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33; Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57 at para. 32; School District at para. 68. This is often referred to as an “arguable contravention” of the Code.
[12] As noted above, Ms. Speirs acknowledges that her complaint was late filed for all the allegations that occurred on one day, September 2, 2022. As such, the issue I must decide is whether to accept the late-filed complaint under s. 22(3) of the Code.
B. Discretion to accept late filed complaint
[13] The Tribunal has discretion to accept a late-filed complaint where it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3). The burden is on Ms. Speirs to persuade the Tribunal to accept the complaint.
1. Public interest
[14] I begin with the public interest. This factor is assessed in light of the purposes of the Code, which include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality, and providing a means of redress for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. The Tribunal may consider factors including the length and reason for the delay in filing, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at paras. 53-81. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55. The inquiry is always fact and context specific.
[15] In this case, the delay in filing is approximately two months for allegations occurring on September 2, 2022. Such a delay is significant, but may not be inordinate or beyond consideration, if other factors support acceptance: Young v. Home Depot and others, 2018 BCHRT 68 at para. 42.
[16] I turn next to Ms. Speirs’ reasons for the delay. The main reason Ms. Speirs provided for the delay is associated with her reaction to the trauma of the Supervisor telling her that she did not like her speaking up about First Nations people on September 2, 2022. She submits that being hushed in this manner by her supervisor on a day when Indigenous culture was being celebrated by raising a new totem pole at the College, caused such humiliation that she was unable to return to work and promptly resigned from her Indigenous recruitment officer position. Ms. Speirs alleges her ineffective coping strategies caused her to escape the traumatic environment at the College by resigning from her position. She further alleges that this triggering event caused the two-month delay in filing the complaint unintentionally. As an Indian Day School survivor and a Descendent of a Residential School survivor, Ms. Speirs submits that she experienced a trauma-based filing delay consistent with her experiences and heritage. She argues that the delay was the direct result of trauma, systemic racialization, and institutional experiences. While admitting that she was able to start an earlier separate human rights compliant in a timely fashion, Ms. Speirs states that trauma responses are not linear or predictable.
[17] The Respondents argue that Ms. Speirs makes sweeping arguments that are unsupported by any concrete information, including explanations or case authorities. While appreciating that the Tribunal must engage in an intersectional consideration of an individual complainant’s circumstances, taking into consideration the complainant’s systemic barriers, the ways in which such barriers have contributed to a delay, and the length of the delay, in this case the Respondents argue that Ms. Spiers has not provided any concrete explanation or reasons for her delay other than vague assertions, combined with reliance on general findings in the TRC. The Respondents argue that Ms. Speirs has not provided any explanation of the effect that any alleged trauma had on her ability to file the Complaint.
[18] After considering the parties’ submissions and the information on file, I have determined that Ms. Speirs’ delay in filing as an escape response to the traumatic work environment on September 2, 2022, attracts the public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed late filed. In reaching this conclusion, I disagree with the Respondents that she has not provided any evidence of a trauma response apart from relying on the combined effect of UNDRIP and the TRC as a mechanism to expand her access to the Tribunal’s process beyond the current time limit. For the purposes of this application, I am satisfied that Ms. Speirs experienced an interaction with the Supervisor on September 2, 2022, that was so humiliating it triggered a flight response that explains the delay in filing. In the context of Ms. Speirs being an Indian Day School survivor with intergenerational trauma, I am satisfied that she has provided concrete information supporting a triggering of an ineffective coping strategy that led her to escape the traumatic environment by avoiding filing a complaint.
[19] I have also considered the Respondents argument that Ms. Speirs’ alleged trauma should not attract the public interest because she has not provided any specific examples or explanation regarding how any intergenerational trauma affected her day-to-day functioning or ability to access resources to support her assertion that a two-month delay is trauma-consistent for an individual with her personal characteristics. In the circumstances of this case, where Ms. Speirs has provided information about a significant event triggering an avoidance reaction, it is unnecessary for her to further adduce evidence about her level of functioning generally. I am satisfied that Ms. Speirs identified an event triggering a coping strategy to not proceed with filing in a timely manner that does not need to be supported evidence about her level of functioning generally and her ability to file. Here, Ms. Speirs is not claiming that she was generally precluded from filing due to decreased functionality, but rather her avoidance of filing was related to a specific escape response associated with interacting with the College. As such, it is not necessary for Ms. Speirs to show that she was in a state that affected her overall functioning.
[20] Ms. Speirs also states that her delay in filing is related to being uncertain about whether her complaint would be taken seriously by the Tribunal. She submits that this institutional mistrust stems from her previous trauma as an Indian Day School survivor and a descendent of a Residential School Survivor. She further submits that she was unaware of the one-year time limit for filing a complaint and says that she was under the impression that making a complaint was something that she could not do because of her historical systemic racialized experience.
[21] The Respondents doubt Ms. Speirs had significant mistrust in the Tribunal because she had filed a previous complaint against a different Respondent. They further submit that Ms. Speirs must have known about the time limit because she had previously filled out a complaint form that included questions about whether a complaint was late filed. The Respondents argue that Ms. Speirs’ ignorance of the Code is not an acceptable reason for the delay because she has not provided any reason why her situation exempts her from the general rule that complainants are presumed to know the law.
[22] These reasons for late filing fit into two categories: 1. Mistrust of the Tribunal as an institution and 2. ignorance of the Tribunal’s process and limitation period. Starting with the issue of whether Ms. Speirs’ institutional mistrust of the Tribunal attracts the public interest in allowing the late filed complaint to proceed, I am not convinced that this reason for late filing attracts any significant public interest. Without doubting Ms. Speirs evidence that she mistrusts colonial institutions, including the Tribunal, the information on file indicates she chose to access the Tribunal on at least one occasion in the past. In circumstances where Ms. Speirs previously demonstrated a trust in accessing the Tribunal’s process within the allotted timeframe for filing a complaint it is difficult to attach much public interest in this reason for her delay in late filing of this complaint.
[23] I have next considered Ms. Speirs’ ignorance of the Code’s protections and the time limit for filing as reasons for late file that attract the public interest. Ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is generally not an acceptable reason, on its own, for the delay in filing: Rashead v. Vereschagin (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 74 at para. 12; Ferrier v. BCAA, 2009 BCHRT 412at para. 31. In this case, the evidence indicates Ms. Speirs knew about the Tribunal’s process and was aware of the time limit or could have easily familiarized herself with it if she had chosen to do so. As such, this reason for late filing does not attract any significant public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed late filed. This conclusion is supported by Ms. Speirs’ Form 5 submission where she admits the delay in this case is not attributable to ignorance of the Code but to trauma-related impacts recognized by the TRC.
[24] Finally, I consider the public interest in the complaint itself. Where a complaint raises a unique or novel issue, it may further the Code’s purposes for the Tribunal to allow it to proceed: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal may consider, for example, whether the complaint raises issues that have already been addressed in its jurisprudence, and/or whether the complaint seeks to advance a systemic or understudied issue on behalf of a vulnerable group: Mzite at paras. 66-67.
[25] There is a public interest in cases which raise allegations highlighting systemic patterns of anti-Indigenous discrimination: PL v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development and others, 2023 BCHRT 58at paras. 52-53.
[26] Ms. Speirs submits that public interest exists in this case because it can educate employers and Indigenous workers that trauma inflicted on Indigenous workers is unacceptable and must be remedied. She further submits that the Complaint is in the public interest because it involves the silencing of an Indigenous worker within the College as a colonial institution.
[27] The Respondents argue this case is not unique or novel for the purposes of attracting the public interest. In their view, it is a typical employment discrimination case. The Respondents distinguish Ms. Speirs’ situation from another case where the Complainant was working in the provincial government’s child welfare services to the Indigenous community: Cooper and another (by Cooper) v. BC Ministry of Children, 2024 BCHRT 197. In the Respondents’ view, this case does not raise a novel issue about a vulnerable group. Rather, it is about alleged comments made to an Indigenous person, about their Indigenous identity, in the course of their employment – a topic that the Tribunal has considered extensively.
[28] While appreciating Ms. Speirs’ complaint is common in the sense that it involves employment and Indigenous identity, in my view it contains a novel issue in that the harm alleged involves an Indigenous worker employed in a role to facilitate the recruitment of Indigenous students in a post-secondary education environment being silenced for speaking up about her First Nations culture at work. In the context of many employers making attempts to respect Indigenous voices, identity and knowledge at work, this case might uniquely explore issues arising from attempting to institute such practices. I am satisfied that this case is unique for the purposes of attracting the public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed late.
[29] In the end, I am satisfied that the complaint attracts sufficient public interest in allowing it to proceed late filed. The complaint is late filed by two months; however, I accept Ms. Speirs’ explanation that being silenced by the Supervisor on September 2, 2022, at an Indigenous cultural event triggered a delay response that outlasted the allotted time for filing. While ignorance of the Code or the time limit for filing does not attract the public interest in this case, I have determined the nature of the complaint involving the alleged silencing of an Indigenous worker employed to promote Indigenous recruitment in a post-secondary education setting attracts the public interest.
2. Substantial prejudice
[30] While the complainant bears the burden under s. 22(3) of the Code, the circumstances which could give rise to substantial prejudice are more likely to be within the respondent’s knowledge than the complainant’s: Ferguson v. Ausenco Engineering Canada and another, 2015 BCHRT 28 at para. 87; Shields v. Source Interlink Canada, 2007 BCHRT 164 at para. 14. Where a respondent alleges that substantial prejudice will result if the complaint is accepted, mere allegations are insufficient. A respondent must provide a specific factual foundation and point to any circumstances that could give rise to substantial prejudice: Rezaei v. University of Northern British Columbia and another, 2009 BCHRT 406 at para. 80. In some cases, the Tribunal may infer substantial prejudice from a long delay in filing a complaint, depending on the circumstances: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170 at para. 30. In these cases, the delay is usually measured in years, not in months: Alford and another v. B.C. (Ministry of Social Development and Social Innovation), 2016 BCHRT 64 at para. 64.
[31] Ms. Speirs submits there is no substantial prejudice in this case given the brief two-month delay and the availability of witnesses. She argues the Respondents are responsible for any missing documents they chose not to preserve and normal staff turnover should not interfere with the Respondents’ ability to make out their case with their witnesses. Ms. Speirs characterizes her case as not being particularly complex as it relates to a single conversation on a specific date.
[32] The Respondents argue substantial prejudice if the complaint is allowed to proceed late filed. They state that some documents and notes are not available from the period, including emails from the former HR director. The Respondents also note that several potential witnesses, including the former HR director and the former executive director of Indigenization, are no longer with the organization. The Respondents note that no formal complaints from Ms. Speirs are found on her HR file. In general, the Respondents are also concerned that memories of Ms. Speirs’ involvement at the College will have faded.
[33] In my view, no substantial prejudice would result to the Respondents in this case because of the delay. I appreciate that a lot of time has passed since Ms. Speirs brief employment at the College and some witnesses are no longer employed there. However, there is no information indicating these witnesses can not be made available with some effort should the Respondents decide it necessary to call them as witnesses in a future hearing. Further, this case involves a specific interaction between Ms. Speirs and the Supervisor, and there is nothing indicating the Supervisor is not available to testify or unable to produce documents from the time that can be found in her records. Overall, I am satisfied that witnesses for the College can be called up to provide testimony without substantially prejudicing the Respondents.
[34] As such, I have determined Ms. Speirs has satisfied the burden of establishing both elements under s. 22(3) of the Code and I cannot conclude that the Respondents would suffer substantial prejudice.
IV CONCLUSION
[35] The complaint is accepted and may now proceed. The Tribunal’s case manager will contact the parties about their next steps.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member