Anjum v. Provincial Health Services Authority (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 212

Date Issued: October 08, 2026
File: CS-005857

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Muhammad Ramzan Anjum
COMPLAINANT

AND:

Provincial Health Services Authority
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36

Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On his own behalf: Muhammad Ramzan Anjum
For the Respondent: No submissions sought

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Muhammad Anjum filed a complaint alleging that his former employer, the Provincial Health Services Authority [PHSA], discriminated against him based on his disabilities and retaliated against him for filing a human rights complaint, in violation of ss. 13 and 43 of the Human Rights Code. In an earlier decision, I determined that it did not further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed in circumstances where the parties had settled issues arising out of Mr. Anjum’s employment, and Mr. Anjum had signed a release. I dismissed the complaint: Anjum v. Provincial Health Services Authority, 2026 BCHRT 136 [Decision].

[2]             Mr. Anjum now applies to have me reconsider the Decision, and allow his complaint to proceed. I have not found it necessary to seek submissions from the PHSA.

[3]             For the reasons that follow, the application for reconsideration is denied.

II      DECISION

[4]             As a preliminary matter, I exercise my discretion to accept Mr. Anjum’s reconsideration application after the 14-day deadline for filing: Rule 36(2). The application was only one day late, after Mr. Anjum narrowly missed the 4:30 pm filing deadline. I have considered the application in its entirety.

[5]             The Tribunal is cautious in exercising its power to reconsider, with due consideration given to the principal of finality in administrative decision-making: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 at para. 10.  Among other things, this ensures that the resources of the Tribunal and the parties are not endlessly taken up in re-arguing the same issues, which would be neither efficient nor fair. As the Supreme Court of Canada has explained:

Litigants hope to have their legal issues resolved as equitably and expeditiously as possible by an authoritative adjudicator. Subject only to rights of review or appeal, they expect, in the interests of fairness, to be able to rely on the outcome as final and binding…

British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52 at para. 1.

[6]             The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions is limited to cases where reconsideration is in the interests of fairness and justice: Zutter v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1995 CanLII 1234 (BCCA); Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at para. 160, upheld on this point in 2016 SCC 25; Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, 1989 CanLII 41 (SCC). This may occur where the Tribunal makes a non-substantive “slip” or mistake, or where the Tribunal fails to exercise the jurisdiction given to it: Fraser Health at para. 141. This includes reconsideration where there has not been procedural fairness: Fraser Health at para. 161.

[7]             On the other hand, the Tribunal does not have authority to reconsider a decision based on an argument that the decision was wrong or unreasonable or because there has been a change of circumstances: Fraser Health at paras. 135 and 160. Reconsideration is not an opportunity for parties to “enter new facts that with reasonable diligence were available in the first instance, to make arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to reargue matters that were argued in the first instance in an attempt to achieve a different result”: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2),2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13.

[8]             The burden is on Mr. Anjum to show that reconsideration is in the interests of fairness and justice: Grant at para. 10; Rule 36(1).

[9]             Mr. Anjum argues that reconsideration is warranted because:

a.   The Tribunal failed to “fully engage with the framework established in Thompson v. Providence Health Care, 2003 BCHRT 58”, including by failing to consider whether Mr. Anjum actually understood the effects of the release on his human rights complaint, what he was told or advised by his Union representatives, and broader circumstances surrounding the execution of the release.

b.   The Tribunal failed to consider the public interest in allowing his allegation of retaliation to proceed, separate from his allegation of discrimination in employment.

c.   The Tribunal “misapplied the settlement authorities by treating the absence of evidence as evidence of informed consent”. In doing so, it wrongly drew an inference that Mr. Anjum understood the legal consequences of signing the release, in the absence of facts to support the inference.

d.   The Tribunal failed to address material evidence that PHSA had agreed, as part of the settlement, to remove certain materials from his employment file. This was important context for the settlement between the parties.

e.   The Tribunal “improperly equated union representation with informed consent”, in the absence of evidence about what the Union had advised Mr. Anjum and what Mr. Anjum in fact understood about the release.

f.    Mr. Anjum was representing himself and misunderstood what evidence he was required to adduce in support of his complaint. He did not appreciate that the Tribunal would require evidence about the advice he was given by his Union, whether he was given the opportunity to review the release, and “whether he genuinely understood that he was relinquishing pending discrimination and retaliation complaints before the Tribunal”. He reasonably thought that his submissions would be sufficient.

[10]         With respect, Mr. Anjum’s submissions fall squarely within the circumstances that the Tribunal has held do not warrant reconsideration. They seek to “enter new facts that with reasonable diligence were available in the first instance, to make arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to reargue matters that were argued in the first instance in an attempt to achieve a different result”: Ramadan at para. 13. In particular, to the extent his arguments relate to perceived flaws in the Tribunal’s analysis or treatment of the evidence, or disagreement with the Decision, those arguments are not grounds for reconsideration.

[11]         Further, I am not persuaded that the process underlying the Decision was procedurally unfair. I appreciate that Mr. Anjum was representing himself. I do not, however, accept the argument that he misunderstood the Tribunal’s process or the evidentiary burden that applied. Mr. Anjum was aware that he bore the burden of persuading the Tribunal that the complaint should proceed in the face of the settlement agreement. This point was made in the PHSA’s dismissal application (para. 52) and acknowledged in Mr. Anjum’s response (para. 23). The PHSA relied on the circumstances of the settlement process, including that Mr. Anjum was represented by the Union and that he had acknowledged the opportunity to seek independent legal advice (para. 53). In his detailed response, Mr. Anjum argued that the circumstances in which he signed the settlement agreement supported allowing the complaint to proceed. In doing so, he correctly identified relevant factors at para. 22 of his response, and addressed those factors throughout his submissions. In short: Mr. Anjum had a full opportunity to know the issues he had to address, and to address them. He did so, and I considered all his submissions and evidence carefully when I made the Decision.

[12]         This is not a circumstance like Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union (No. 2), 2024 BHCRT 206, a case relied on by Mr. Anjum. In Sun, the complainant had raised new issues in her reply. The Tribunal accepted that the respondent’s counsel had made an error in failing to apply to file further submissions, based on a misunderstanding about the Tribunal’s procedures: para. 29. Based on counsel’s error, the respondent did not have the opportunity to address material issues and the Tribunal determined reconsideration was in the interest of justice and fairness.

[13]         In contrast here, Mr. Anjum had notice of the PHSA’s arguments and his burden in the application. Unlike in Sun, I am not satisfied on the materials before me that he misunderstood his burden or the Tribunal’s process. He had the opportunity to make submissions and file evidence, and did so. That he now seeks to file more evidence is not a basis to reconsider the Decision. To the contrary, allowing reconsideration in this circumstance would undermine the finality of the Tribunal’s decision making.

[14]         The application for reconsideration is denied.

III    CONCLUSION

[15]         My decision to deny Mr. Anjum’s application for reconsideration is grounded in the paramount principle of finality in Tribunal decision making. This principle is foundational to the Tribunal’s ability to adjudicate human rights complaints fairly and efficiently. It allows for limited exceptions, which are not present here.

[16]         The application for reconsideration is denied, and the Tribunal’s file remains closed.

Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair