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Home » Law Library » B.C. Human Rights Tribunal decisions » Recently released decisions » 2026 BCHRT 211

Hildebrand v. University of British Columbia, 2026 BCHRT 211

Date Issued: October 8, 2026
File(s): CS-011019

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Dennis Hildebrand
COMPLAINANT

AND:

University of British Columbia
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION FOR COSTS
Section 37(4)

Tribunal Member: Laila Said
On their own behalf: Dennis Hildebrand
Counsel for the Respondent: Alon Mizrahi

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Dennis “Axle” Hildebrand filed a complaint against the University of British Columbia [UBC] alleging his expulsion from UBC was discrimination in services based on his mental disability, contrary to section 8 of the Human Rights Code.

[2]             UBC denies discriminating. The complaint is ongoing. The issue before me in this decision is UBC’s application for costs. UBC applies for an order of costs for $3000 against Mr. Hildebrand for improper conduct in the course of a complaint: Code, s. 37(4)(a). UBC argues that Mr. Hildebrand breached settlement privilege, after the parties participated in a Tribunal-assisted mediation on February 12, 2026 to explore a resolution of the complaint through settlement. Specifically, UBC argues that, after the mediation, Mr. Hildebrand shared an aspect of their confidential settlement discussions with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario [CPSO].

[3]             Mr. Hildebrand denies that he breached the confidentiality of the settlement meeting. He says the information he shared with CPSO was not confidential information arising from the settlement discussions, but information that arose from UBC both before and after the mediation.

[4]             The issue of whether Mr. Hildebrand engaged in improper conduct turns on whether he breached settlement privilege and the Tribunal’s mediation policy in his communication to the CPSO and, if so, whether this warrants an award of costs.

II      BACKGROUND

[5]             Mr. Hildebrand has been on suspension from UBC since September 3, 2021 for non-academic misconduct. He was assessed by a doctor after being asked by UBC to provide a comprehensive independent medical examination [IME] to assess his fitness to return to the university to complete his final year of studies. The IME is a condition to his reinstatement.

[6]             Mr. Hildebrand attended several appointments with a doctor to complete the IME. The doctor sent Mr. Hildebrand a draft copy dated November 6, 2023 and asked for additional information to complete the report. Mr. Hildebrand provided the draft report to the manager of UBC’s Disability Resource Centre [UBC’s DRC]. The date he submitted the draft report is unclear.

[7]             On January 7, 2026, UBC’s DRC manager emailed Mr. Hildebrand confirming receipt of the draft IME. The manager wrote that they needed updated documentation and details about his current situation including, among other things, a signed final version of the doctor’s IME report.

[8]             The parties then attended Tribunal-assisted mediation on February 12, 2026. On March 4, 2026 Mr. Hildebrand emailed UBC’s DRC manager and requested a meeting. The manager replied in part,

I believe the questions you have outlined below were addressed during the mediation process that took place [in February]. I am currently drafting the letter to [the doctor] requesting a final, signed copy of her [IME] assessment report. I will send that letter along with a consent to release information form to you in the next few days. Once I have received [the doctor’s] report, all documentation will be assessed together to determine how to move forward.

[9]             I understand from this email that information, including the signed IME, that UBC requested on January 7, 2026 remained outstanding and was discussed at the mediation.

[10]          Mr. Hildebrand wrote to the CPSO on March 19, 2026 requesting their assistance in getting the doctor to sign the IME report. He also stated that UBC rejected his readmission at the Tribunal-assisted mediation solely because the report lacked the doctor’s signature. The language at issue in the communication to CPSO reads, “February 12, 2026 BCHRT mediation: UBC rejects IME solely for lack of your signature, sole readmission barrier.”  

[11]         UBC emailed Mr. Hildebrand to say that the letter to CPSO misstates their position and violates the confidentiality of the Tribunal’s mediation process. UBC requested that he immediately withdraw the communication and resend it without the reference to the confidential information and the Tribunal’s mediation process.

[12]         It is not in dispute that as of the date of closing submissions on this application, Mr. Hildebrand did not take any steps to withdraw the communication and resend it without the reference to the confidential information and the Tribunal’s mediation process.

III    DECISION

[13]         For the following reasons, I deny the application for costs and issue a warning to Mr. Hildebrand. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

IV    APPLICATION FOR COSTS

[14]         The Tribunal may award costs “against a party to a complaint who has engaged in improper conduct during the course of the complaint”: Code, s. 37(4). The purpose of a costs award is punitive: Terpsma v. Rimex Supply (No. 3), 2013 BCHRT 3 at para. 102. It aims to deter conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 246.

[15]         Improper conduct is “not necessarily limited to intentional wrongdoing”: McLean v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Sol. Gen.) (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 103 at para. 8. Rather, “[a]ny conduct which has a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, including conduct which has a significant prejudicial impact on another party, may constitute improper conduct”: McLean at para. 8.

[16]         UBC argues that costs are appropriate because Mr. Hildebrand’s March 19, 2026 letter to the CPSO breached the expectation of confidentiality in the Tribunal’s mediation process because it disclosed settlement discussions and misstated UBC’s position. UBC submits that Mr. Hildebrand’s breach of confidentiality harms the integrity of the Tribunal’s process, degrades the trust between the parties at an early stage in the complaint process, and warrants an order for costs.

A.    UBC’s argument about settlement privilege

[17]         Settlement privilege is a class privilege which “wraps a protective veil around the efforts parties make to settle their disputes by ensuring that communications made during the course of these negotiations are admissible”: MacGillivary v. Parkland Refining (BC) Ltd. (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 233, at para. 14, citing Sable v. Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2013 SCC 37 at para. 2. The test for settlement privilege is that:

a.   a litigious dispute was in existence or within contemplation;

b.   the communication was made with the express or implied intention that it would not be disclosed to the court (or tribunal) in the event negotiations failed; and

c.   the purpose of the communication was to attempt to effect a settlement:

MacGillivary at para. 15.

[18]         It is up to the party claiming the privilege to establish it, here UBC: MacGillivary at para. 16.

[19]         I am not persuaded by the materials before me that Mr. Hildebrand’s communication to the CPSO breached settlement privilege. While the complaint is a live issue awaiting adjudication, the information that Mr. Hildenbrand attended a Tribunal-assisted mediation and required a signed and completed IME cannot be considered communication made with the express or implied intention that it would not be disclosed to the Tribunal. The requirement that he complete an IME was listed as a prerequisite for reenrollment when he was suspended in 2021, approximately five years before the mediation, and repeated in UBC’s correspondence in January 2026. Further, the impugned statement to the CPSO alone does not appear to be for the purposes of attempting to effect a settlement, but to get the signed IME that Mr. Hildebrand was told prior to mediation was one of several prerequisites for his reenrollment. I am not persuaded that Mr. Hildebrand’s communication to the CPSO has placed UBC in a position to have to compromise their position in order to resolve the complaint: MacGillivary at para. 18.

B.    UBC’s argument about the Tribunal’s mediation policy

[20]         In my view, the application is properly considered under UBC’s submissions about the conduct being a breach of the Tribunal policy. Parties participating in Tribunal-assisted mediation must adhere to the Tribunal’s mediation policy which is posted on the Tribunal’s website and states that “mediations are private and confidential. This is so the parties can speak freely. No one can use information that a party gives in a mediation against them later on”: p. 4.

[21]         UBC relies on: Mah No. (2) and Wittworth v. ARO, 2016 BCHRT 24 in support of their position that the Tribunal has ordered costs against a party for disclosing information obtained through Tribunal-assisted settlement discussions. UBC points to the Tribunal’s decision in Chrzanowski v. Mah (No. 2), at para. 7, which emphasized the importance of confidentiality attached to the settlement process, at para. 20:

The settlement meeting process is a central element of the Tribunal’s processing of complaints.  The emphasis on mediation as an appropriate means of resolving complaints has been increased as a result of the direct access system.  The Tribunal encourages parties to attend settlement meetings, and provides members or other mediators to assist the parties to find ways of resolving complaints without recourse to formal adjudication.  An essential precondition of the fairness and efficacy of the settlement meeting process is the confidential and without prejudice nature of settlement meeting discussions.  Any breach of the confidential and without prejudice nature of settlement meeting discussions will have an impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, and is likely to constitute improper conduct. 

[22]         In Mah (No. 2), the respondent referred to the contents of Tribunal-assisted settlement discussions in their Form 2- Complaint Response for the purpose of seeking to discredit the complainant. The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the complainant $500.00 for breaching the confidentiality of settlement discussions.

[23]         UBC also relies on Wittworth. In that complaint, the respondent referred to statements the complainant’s lawyer made at a Tribunal-assisted settlement meeting in their Form 2-Complaint Response. The Tribunal awarded $1,500, taking into account that the damage done by the disclosure had been remedied by the Tribunal Member redacting portions of the Respondent’s submissions to the application to dismiss that referenced admissions or submissions that could only have come from the settlement meeting.

[24]         UBC submits that the primacy of the confidentiality attached to Tribunal-assisted settlement discussions highlights the fact that a breach of settlement privilege occurred inherently harms the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Wittworth at para. 34; Mah (No. 2) at para. 7. UBC says in this complaint, disclosure of settlement discussions was made to a non-party to the complaint for the purpose of benefiting the complainant by revealing to third parties information that he believes would get the College to act to get the doctor to issue the signed report. Further, UBC says the communication itself could be brought forward as evidence at some point in the complaint process. In line with the reasoning in Mah No. 2 and Wittworth, UBC submits that the Tribunal’s focus in respect of finding improper conduct and awarding costs ought to focus on the inherent harm of Mr. Hildebrand’s breach of settlement privilege on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process and on the relationship between the parties.

[25]         The cases UBC cites are not analogous to the alleged breach before me for six reasons. First, Mr. Hildebrand has contacted the CPSO for assistance with a report which UBC would allegedly not accept otherwise. This is about Mr. Hildebrand’s evidence and does not seem to be about information that UBC produced to him confidentially. Second, since UBC says the position is in any event, misrepresented, Mr. Hildebrand does not appear to have revealed the content of settlement discussions or anything he received from UBC. Third, it does not appear that Mr. Hildebrand’s reference to the mediation benefitted him in any way; the parties’ submissions are unclear as to whether Mr. Hildebrand’s efforts produced the signed IME. Fourth, I am not persuaded that contacting the CPSO due to Mr. Hildebrand’s understanding of UBC’s position that he needed to submit a signed IME is using that information “against” UBC. Fifth, the disclosure does not go to the core of settlement discussions, but rather a procedural issue. Finally, it is unclear how Mr. Hildebrand’s revelation that UBC would not accept a medical report without a signature causes UBC prejudice in participating in the Tribunal process or undermine UBC’s trust of the proceeding; there is no indication that the disclosure impedes UBC’s ability to participate in the proceedings, or that the CPSO would take the information and take some proceeding against UBC. In other words, it seems the principles in those past cases do not apply cleanly here.

C.    Confidentiality of settlement discussions

[26]         I have also considered Mr. Hildebrand’s submissions on settlement privilege and a breach of the mediation policy.

[27]         He says it was UBC’s DRC’s manager who first introduced a reference to the mediation into the post-mediation correspondence and breached the confidentiality of mediation discussions. I have reviewed the communications Mr. Hildebrand points to. First is an email from the manager date March 5, 2026, that states, “I believe the questions you have outlined below were addressed during the mediation process that took place on February 13th.” He also points to the manager’s email dated March 11, 2026 that states,

The letter from Dr. Stevens, alone, does not meet the requirements outlined in the decision letter from the President’s office dated September 3, 2021. The final draft, signed by [the doctor] of her [IME] assessment report fulfills that requirement.

[28]         I am satisfied that the two emails from UBC’s manager after the mediation were not breaches of the Tribunal’s mediation policy or settlement privilege. These emails are properly understood as communications between the parties to the complaint in furtherance of discussions at the mediation.

[29]         Mr. Hildebrand also submits that the protection in s. 40(2) of the Code, which says information discussed at settlement meetings is confidential and without prejudice, extends to information “received” during settlement attempts and does not extend to information that was communicated outside the settlement process and that exists independent of the mediation. Mr. Hildebrand says UBC’s DRC’s manager’s January 7, 2026 email confirms UBC required a “signed, final version” of the doctor’s report to proceed with readmission consideration. He says this was a documented administrative possession communicated independent of the mediation. He says the information he shared with CPSO was not confidential information arising from the settlement discussions, but information that arose from UBC’s DRC both before and after the mediation. He also submits that costs are not warranted because the mediation did not produce a settlement agreement.

[30]         To briefly address Mr. Hildebrand’s submission that costs are not warranted because the mediation did not produce a settlement agreement, I note that confidentiality applies regardless of whether the parties reach an agreement. I agree with Mr. Hildebrand that in this instance, mentioning the IME as a requirement to reenrollment was not information received during the settlement agreement but was a preexisting pre-requisite to considering his reenrollment. However, Mr. Hildebrand did not need to refer to the mediation to ask the CPSO for assistance in obtaining a signed IME.

[31]         In my view, Mr. Hildebrand knew or should have known that information discussed at the settlement meeting is confidential and without prejudice, as all participants in settlement meetings are required to sign an agreement under which they agree to those conditions. When requested and given the opportunity from UBC to retract the letter and resend it without reference to the settlement meeting – to use Mr. Hildebrand’s own words – “Axel did not comply. He was not required to do so.”  I disagree; the reference to the mediation alone in the context of his request suggests he was trying to influence the CPSO to get them to act in assisting him with communicating with the doctor. I find that it was improper and unnecessary for Mr. Hildebrand to refer to the mediation in his communication with the CPSO.

[32]         UBC submits that the Tribunal must condemn Mr. Hildebrand’s conduct and make an order for costs for improper conduct to ensure the integrity of its processes. UBC submits that an award of costs in the amount of $3000 would serve the purpose of holding Mr. Hildebrand accountable for his conduct, deterring him from engaging in similar improper conduct in the future, and encouraging him to carefully assess how to conduct himself in the Tribunal’s proceedings. UBC says as the complaint is in the early stages of the Tribunal’s process, so if Mr. Hildebrand’s conduct is not sanctioned at this time, the prospects of settlement between the parties would be derailed.

[33]         I am not persuaded that settlement discussions would be derailed without an order for costs. UBC’s claim that settlement is on track appears inconsistent with their prior refusal to settle the complaint and the bringing of this application due to Mr. Hildebrand trying to get materials which could potentially lead to settlement. I also consider UBC’s position that the complaint is in the early stages of the Tribunal’s process. In my view, a cost award at this stage has the potential to inflame matters between the parties instead of leading to a just and timely resolution of the complaint.

[34]         While I agree that the reference to the mediation suggests he was trying to influence the CPSO to act, as stated above, I am not persuaded that there is serious or significant prejudice to UBC in this instance. I also agree with UBC that the Tribunal must condemn Mr. Hildebrand’s conduct, but an award of costs is not warranted in the circumstances. Instead, a warning is proportionate and sufficient to deter future conduct that may constitute a breach of the Tribunal’s mediation policy. In coming to this conclusion, I take into account that the nature of the behaviour being sanctioned in this application is the disclosure of information that is, in relevant part, public and made prior to the mediation. I find this conduct does not rise to the level of seriously and significantly impacting the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes. As such, Mr. Hildebrand’s culpability with respect to the behaviour in question is a neutral factor.

[35]         I also consider other mitigating factors for not ordering costs. Mr. Hildebrand is self-represented, and this appears to be a one-time incident that, in different circumstances, could have warranted costs. There is no indication at this stage that warnings or other measures have proven ineffective in deterring improper conduct. I do not anticipate that denying an order for costs for this conduct will impact on further Tribunal proceedings, such as the possibility of settlement or an exacerbation of conflict.

[36]         Considering these factors, I find that in all the circumstances of the case, an award of costs is not appropriate. I do, however, put Mr. Hildebrand on notice that the Tribunal takes the confidentiality of its Tribunal-assisted mediation processes seriously, and will not tolerate disclosure of information obtained in mediation. 

[37]         This decision does not limit UBC from applying for costs under s. 37(4)(a) of the Code should Mr. Hildebrand engage in improper conduct in the future.

V      CONCLUSION

[38]         UBC’s application for costs is denied.

Laila Said
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal

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