Balderson (by James Balderson) v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS2130 and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 205
Date Issued: September 24, 2026
File: CS-006647
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Joan Balderson (by James Balderson)
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The Owners, Strata Plan BCS2130 and Brad Fritz and Jim Workman
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
Rule 36
Tribunal Member: Beverly Froese
On their own behalf: Joan Balderson (by James Balderson)
Counsel for the Respondents: Paul G. Mendes
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In April 2022, James Balderson made a complaint on behalf of his wife, Joan Balderson, alleging that the Respondents discriminated against her regarding the services they provided based on physical disability contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the Respondents denied Mrs. Balderson’s request to use an accessible parking spot.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating against Mrs. Balderson. They say that Mrs. Balderson never requested an accessible parking spot before she made this complaint. They also say that after they received notice of the complaint, they offered Dr. and Mrs. Balderson an accessible parking spot, which they refused.
[3] In Balderson (by James Balderson) v. The Owners, Strata Plan BCS2130 and others, 2026 BCHRT 161, I granted the Respondents’ application to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code [ATD Decision]. Based on the materials before me, I was persuaded that even if Mrs. Balderson were able to prove that she had a disability protected under the Code, she has no reasonable prospect of proving she experienced an adverse impact regarding the Strata’s services. I was also persuaded that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because it is reasonably certain the Respondents would be able to prove they met the duty to accommodate Mrs. Balderson’s disability.
[4] Mrs. Balderson has now applied for reconsideration of the ATD Decision. It was not necessary for me to seek submissions from the Respondents before deciding this application. For the reasons set out below, the application for reconsideration of the ATD Decision is denied.
II ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[5] Rule 36(1) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure allows the Tribunal to reconsider a decision when it is in the interests of fairness and justice to do so. The Tribunal’s discretion to reconsider a decision is to be exercised carefully and restrictively in deference to the principle of finality in administrative procedures: Radheshwar v. New Westminster Police Board and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 247 at para. 5. Situations when reconsideration is appropriate include dealing with a question or resolving an issue the Tribunal should have, fixing a mistake, or to properly carry out the Tribunal’s functions and complete its task: Cook B v. OPAL Development Limited Partnership (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 191 at para. 4; Radheshwar at para. 5.
[6] Reconsideration of a Tribunal’s decision is not an opportunity for a party to try to achieve a different result, for example by alleging facts that were known at the time or by making arguments that could have been made at the time: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13; Eddy v. Toby’s Pub and Grill and another (No. 2), 2013 BCHRT 48 at para. 27. The burden is on Mrs. Balderson to show that reconsideration of the ATD Decision is in the interests of fairness and justice: Rule 36(1); Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 at para. 10.
[7] In her submission, Mrs. Balderson says that I made several factual errors in the ATD Decision and that the ATD Decision was based on a false factual premise. Specifically, Mrs. Balderson says that I ignored evidence that supports her assertion that she and Dr. Balderson requested an accessible parking spot as a disability-related accommodation. She also says I ignored the issue of the Strata removing the wheelchair logo from the accessible parking spot I referred to in the ATD Decision as “P10”. In support of her argument, Mrs. Balderson submitted email exchanges that she says clearly show that a request for disability-related accommodation had been made to the Strata. She also submitted emails dated after the ATD Decision was issued stating that since February 2023, P10 has been allocated to the Baldersons for their exclusive use.
[8] I am not persuaded by the additional evidence that reconsideration is justified on this basis. The ATD Decision was based on my review of the submissions and evidence submitted by the parties, including the evidence that was hand-delivered by Dr. Balderson to the Tribunal. I did not make factual findings in the ATD Decision but rather assessed all the evidence submitted by the parties to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The additional evidence that Mrs. Balderson submitted does not affect my analysis or conclusion in the ATD Decision.
[9] Mrs. Balderson also says that I made several legal errors in the ATD Decision. Specifically, she says I erred in law by characterizing the complaint as a “property governance dispute” and ignoring the Strata’s actions that show a discriminatory intent. Mrs. Balderson says I erred in law when I concluded that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. She further says that the ATD Decision, particularly the omission of any reference to the Strata removing the wheelchair logo on P10, does not meet the reasonableness standard set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. This is not an appropriate basis for reconsideration, as Mrs. Balderson’s recourse is to seek judicial review if she feels the Tribunal erred in law.
[10] Last, Mrs. Balderson submits that allowing the ATD Decision to stand “results in a profound miscarriage of justice and creates a dangerous public interest precedent”. Mrs. Balderson says that when I said in the ATD Decision that, in my view, this complaint was really about Dr. Balderson’s conflict with the Strata and personal animosity toward the individual Respondents, I ignored the public interest component of her complaint. Put another way, Mrs. Balderson says that because I treated her complaint “as an isolated, private conflict driven by ‘personal animosity’”, I failed to realize “that the complaint carries a profound public interest”.
[11] Mrs. Balderson says that by dismissing her complaint, I am allowing the Strata to “circumvent municipal zoning protections and systematically strip away accessibility rights from vulnerable residents without any judicial oversight”.
[12] I appreciate that Dr. and Mrs. Balderson may have valid concerns about the Strata’s initial decision to allocate P10 for the exclusive use of the owners of a particular unit. However, my only role when considering the Respondents’ application to dismiss the complaint was to decide whether Mrs. Balderson has no reasonable prospect of proving that she was discriminated against under the Code or whether it is reasonably certain that the Respondents will be able to prove their conduct was justified.
[13] I understand that Dr. and Mrs. Balderson disagree with the ATD Decision. However, I am not convinced it is the interests of justice and fairness to grant this application. In my view, Mrs. Balderson has not established an appropriate basis on which to reconsider a decision. Specifically, she has not established that reconsideration is warranted to resolve an issue that I should have, fix a mistake that I made, or to properly carry out my task of deciding whether the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. In my opinion, granting the application would undermine the principle of finality in the Tribunal’s procedures.
III CONCLUSION
[14] Mrs. Balderson’s application for reconsideration of the ATD Decision is denied.
Beverly Froese
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal