Important: Email to the Tribunal must be sent during our business hours of 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday to Friday, except statutory holidays for B.C. government employees.

BC Human Rights Tribunal

BC Human Rights Tribunal

  • Home
  • About us
  • Who can help
  • Rights and remedies
  • Complaint process
  • Law library
  • Contact us
  • Login for mediators
Skip to Main Content
Skip to Navigation
Accessibility Statement
Home » Law Library » B.C. Human Rights Tribunal decisions » Recently released decisions » 2026 BCHRT 200

Sandhu v. BC Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure and another, 2026 BCHRT 200

Date Issued: September 17, 2026
File(s): CS-006801

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Harminder Sandhu
COMPLAINANT

AND:

His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure and Ian S. Anderson
RESPONDENTS

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c) and (d)(ii)

Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
Counsel for the Complainant: Umar Sheikh
Counsel for the Ministry: Joanne Kim
Counsel for Mr. Anderson: Eve Moore

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Harminder Sandhu alleges that the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure and Ian S. Anderson [Respondents] discriminated against him in the area of employment based on the ground of race in contravention of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Mr. Sandhu is employed by the Ministry as a communications technician. From March 2021 to May 2022, Mr. Anderson was his direct supervisor. Mr. Sandhu’s complaint arises from Mr. Anderson’s alleged conduct during that time period, which Mr. Sandhu says created a poisoned work environment.

[2]             Each of the Respondents deny discriminating and apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) and (d)(ii) of the Code. They say the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success and proceeding with it would not further the Code’s purposes. In particular, the Ministry relies on the evidence of its investigation of Mr. Sandhu’s allegations (and its subsequent corrective actions) to support the complaint’s dismissal.

[3]             For the reasons that follow, the dismissal applications are denied.

[4]             To make my decision, I have considered all the arguments and evidence filed. In my reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact related to the merits of the complaint.

II      BACKGROUND

[5]             The following information is drawn from the materials before me and is set out here as background. It is not meant to be exhaustive.

[6]             Mr. Sandhu is a practicing Sikh who wears a turban, which he says is a fundamental expression of his faith and identity. He filed his complaint to the Tribunal on May 6, 2022. In it, he alleges that his supervisor, Mr. Anderson, made racist remarks. Specifically, the complaint alleges that:

a.   While at work, Mr. Anderson told Mr. Sandhu a childhood story about an Indian neighbour, and about his father using a slur to refer to Indian people [Slur Allegation];

b.   During a social situation on a work trip with their spouses, Mr. Anderson asked Mr. Sandhu’s then-girlfriend (now wife) about turban colours and Mr. Sandhu’s choice of turban [Turban Allegation];

c.   In a September 27, 2021 “reply all” work email response to a “Truth and Reconciliation” message from Mr. Sandhu about Indigenous Medicine Wheels and local Sweat Lodge ceremonies, Mr. Anderson said he did not want to receive “this kind of recruitment stuff,” and that he was “no more interested in pandering to this hucksterism than say a recruitment to the Taliban” [Email Allegation];

d.   Mr. Anderson did not want Mr. Sandhu to burn sage in the warehouse and said burning sage “was a made up lie European settlers made for [Indigenous people] to follow” [Sage Allegation].

[7]             I will refer to these allegations, collectively, as the Alleged Conduct.

[8]             I note here that the slur in question in the Slur Allegation is described by the Oxford English Dictionary as a “slang (offensive and chiefly derogatory)” term, referring to a “person of Pakistani (also more generally, South Asian) birth or descent”: Oxford English Dictionary, December 2025, online: <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1019190585>. I take notice that the word is a widely-known slur and find it unnecessary to repeat it in this decision. Instead, I will refer to it as the Slur.

[9]             In addition to filing his complaint to the Tribunal, on May 9, 2022, Mr. Sandhu made a complaint to WorkSafeBC about workplace bullying and harassment. In relation to the WorkSafeBC matter, the Ministry conducted an internal investigation between August 2022 and January 2023, during which it interviewed Mr. Sandhu and Mr. Anderson and reviewed documents [Investigation]. During the Investigation, each party was asked about the Slur Allegation, the Turban Allegation, and the Email Allegation. They were also asked about an allegation, made by Mr. Sandhu, that, while they were on a job in June 2021, Mr. Anderson commented that “natives are savages” and they “take slaves from different nations” [Comments Allegation].

[10]         The Ministry investigators conducting the Investigation [Investigators] were tasked with deciding if Mr. Anderson had “discriminated against First Nations” or made “racial slurs.” They issued a final investigation report on January 4, 2023 [Investigation Report]. Regarding the Comments Allegation, they concluded that Mr. Anderson had not discriminated. They reported that, while Mr. Anderson had admitted to saying “that First Nations take slaves from other nations,” he had explained that his comments “were meant to be educational, and simply to provide a historical fact.” The Investigators found that “although the topic may have not been appropriate for workplace discussion, there was no discriminatory intent towards First Nations in [his] comments.”

[11]         Regarding the Slur Allegation, the Investigators concluded that Mr. Anderson had not made a racial slur. They reported that, while he had admitted to saying the Slur in a conversation with Mr. Sandhu, he had explained that “the conversation originated from a discussion” about housing unaffordability and smart financial decision-making on the part of his Indian neighbour.[1] The Investigators reported that Mr. Anderson had “clarified that the comment … was not a slur from his father.” Rather, his evidence was that he had talked to Mr. Sandhu about how “the term originated from the British who called East Indian’s [the Slur],” and how this “was based on ignorance because East Indians are not from Pakistan.”

[12]         The Investigators also concluded that the Turban Allegation was unsubstantiated, noting that Mr. Anderson could not recall discussing turbans with Mr. Sandhu’s girlfriend.

[13]         The Investigators did not deal with the Sage Allegation in the Investigation.

[14]         In their final analysis, the Investigators stated that they “were unable to find corroborating evidence to substantiate the claims” against Mr. Anderson, who they “deemed credible, while [Mr. Sandhu’s] testimony lacked detail or corroboration.” However, in relation to the Email Allegation, they did find that Mr. Anderson “made inappropriate comments in the workplace, particularly in the email exchange and in that instance [he] breached the Standards of Conduct for Workplace Behaviour.” They added that Mr. Sandhu’s behaviour had also been inappropriate, in that he had emailed his work group “to educate them on issues outside the workplace” and had circumvented his supervisor.

[15]         In follow-up to the Investigation on February 9, 2023, the Ministry gave Mr. Anderson a two-day suspension. The letter of suspension stated that his “behaviour and conduct demonstrated significant disrespect towards staff and our First Nations partners, failed to meet acceptable standards and did not contribute to a positive work environment.” In the letter, the director of the Construction and Maintenance Branch of the Ministry went on to tell Mr. Anderson that it was “deeply concerning that we continue to meet with you to discuss this pattern of behaviour as we have had numerous discussions regarding your communication over the years.”

[16]         On March 23, 2023, the Ministry directed Mr. Anderson to take four internal courses (“HR Foundation for People Leaders,” “Supervisor Essentials,” “Learn at Work Week – A leader’s response to conflict,” and “Addressing Discrimination, Bullying, and Harassment in the Workplace”) and to develop an implementation plan for using the knowledge he gained from them.

III    DECISION

[17]         Each of the Respondents applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) and (d)(ii) of the Code, on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success and proceeding with it would not further the Code’s purposes. I begin with the applications under s. 27(1)(c).

A.    Applications to dismiss the complaint because it has no reasonable prospect of success

[18]         Under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, the Tribunal can dismiss complaints that have no reasonable prospect of success and therefore do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. This is part of the Tribunal’s gatekeeping function. The Tribunal’s task under s. 27(1)(c) is to look at the evidence provided to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The onus is on each of the Respondents to establish that Mr. Sandhu’s complaint against them should be dismissed. To meet this onus, they must each persuade the Tribunal that either Mr. Sandhu has no reasonable prospect of making his case against them, or they are reasonably certain to establish a defence: Lado v. Hardbite Chips and others, 2019 BCHRT 134 at para. 25.

[19]         To make his case at a hearing, Mr. Sandhu would need to prove he experienced a race-related adverse impact in employment: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. The Respondents argue that he has no reasonable prospect of doing so. As I explain next, I am not persuaded by their arguments.

1.     Slur Allegation and Turban Allegation

[20]         The Ministry argues that Mr. Sandhu has no reasonable prospect of proving an adverse impact in employment in relation to the Slur Allegation or the Turban Allegation. In support of this argument, it puts forward “the full record of evidence regarding the Investigation,” including the Investigators’ interview notes, and supplementary documentary evidence they reviewed. The Ministry says this evidence shows that the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation were thoroughly investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. It argues that the Tribunal can dismiss these allegations under s. 27(1)(c) on this basis.

[21]         For his part, Mr. Anderson’s evidence is that he did not tell Mr. Sandhu that his father used the Slur on the occasion when they discussed his Indian neighbour, or on any other occasion. Rather, he says they had a separate conversation about the Slur and its origins. In any event, Mr. Anderson argues that, even if Mr. Sandhu’s version of events is accepted, it “fails to disclose any facts setting out how his race was a factor in the alleged comments.” Further, he argues that a “single instance of feeling uncomfortable in a conversation in which [Mr. Sandhu] was not the subject does not constitute an adverse impact in [his] employment.”

[22]         Similarly, Mr. Anderson denies having a conversation with Mr. Sandhu’s girlfriend about turbans. In any event, he argues that the Turban Allegation has no reasonable prospect of success because it “does not describe conduct by [Mr. Anderson] towards [Mr. Sandhu].”

[23]         In response, Mr. Sandhu argues that the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation each engage his intersectional racial and religious identity as “a racialized Sikh man who wears a turban.” Mr. Sandhu’s evidence is that Mr. Anderson used the Slur casually, which immediately made Mr. Sandhu shocked and uncomfortable, as it is “a well-known racial slur used against people of South Asian descent like myself.” Regarding the Turban Allegation, Mr. Sandhu states that the alleged conversation between Mr. Anderson and his girlfriend made him feel like “Mr. Anderson was treating [his] religious practice as some kind of curiosity, oddity or joke.”

[24]         In reply, both Respondents stress that Mr. Sandhu’s girlfriend is not a party to the complaint and Mr. Sandhu has not proffered an affidavit of her evidence. They assert that the Turban Allegation is supported by vague and “unreliable hearsay evidence.” They add that, during the Investigation, Mr. Sandhu told the Investigators that he “didn’t find [Mr. Anderson’s questions about turbans] as bad, but [his] girlfriend didn’t feel that was appropriate,” whereas he now states that he “felt humiliated and angry” at the time. In addition, the Ministry asserts that Mr. Sandhu’s evidence lacks meaningful particulars regarding the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation, “such as a detailed account of the comments … or context around these alleged interactions.”

[25]         For the following reasons, I am not persuaded to dismiss the Slur Allegation or the Turban Allegation under s. 27(1)(c).

a.   There are key credibility issues

[26]         To start, I do not agree with the Respondents that this is a case where the issues of credibility can be resolved in a dismissal application. In my view, “there are foundational or key issues of credibility” in this complaint, which means “the matter must go to a hearing”: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para. 67. Whether the Slur Allegation amounted to discrimination and caused or contributed to a poisoned work environment will turn, in large part, on an assessment of the credibility and reliability of the parties’ differing versions of events. As I discuss below, I do not agree with Mr. Anderson’s assertion that, even if Mr. Sandhu’s version is accepted, he still cannot make his case.

[27]         Similarly, a hearing is required to assess the credibility and reliability of the parties’ evidence regarding the Turban Allegation. I acknowledge that Mr. Sandhu’s evidence supporting this allegation is lacking. It is sparse and second hand. In addition, his evidence regarding how he felt about Mr. Anderson’s alleged behaviour appears to have shifted since the Investigation. However, despite these significant deficiencies, on the evidence before me I am not satisfied that the Tribunal is reasonably certain to prefer Mr. Anderson’s version of events at a hearing.

[28]         The clarity and certainty of Mr. Anderson’s evidence appears to have initially fluctuated, and seems to have grown stronger with the passage of time. In the affidavit supporting his dismissal application, his recall is solid and his evidence is unequivocal:

… I met [Mr. Sandhu’s] girlfriend on a work trip where our spouses joined us. This was a 4-day trip on Vancouver Island. I deny making comments about [Mr. Sandhu’s] turban to [his] girlfriend at any time during that trip, as he alleges or at all.

[29]         In contrast, the Investigators’ notes indicate that, when asked about the Turban Allegation on August 12, 2022, Mr. Anderson’s evidence was less certain: “No, I don’t recall this conversation.” According to the notes, he told the Investigators he spent several days with Mr. Sandhu’s girlfriend during their work trip, and they had many meals together, but he did not recall any of their conversations from that time.

[30]         The notes from a November 15, 2022 follow-up interview with Mr. Anderson muddy his evidence further. On one hand, they indicate that, when asked about his alleged conversation with Mr. Sandhu’s girlfriend, Mr. Anderson initially answered: “I can tell you it never existed.” However, his evidence subsequently became muddled. He stated that he recalled the Investigators saying in the previous interview that he had specifically talked to Mr. Sandhu’s girlfriend about his “turban being black,” to which the Investigators replied: “There is nothing in the notes that mention a black turban.” The notes of the exchange then continue as follows:

[Investigators] … did you ask about different coloured turbans? Do you recall? [Mr. Anderson]: No, I mean, Jagmeet Singh’s turban is colorful. I don’t get how that’s derogatory or offensive. I don’t get that question.

[Investigators] There’s no inference that this question was derogatory, I am just asking the question. [Mr. Anderson]: No, I don’t think I ever did that.

[Investigators] Why would it be reported that you specifically asked about turbans and different colours. [Mr. Anderson]: No, I don’t think I ever did that.

[Investigators] Can you explain the discrepancy in information? [Mr. Anderson]: Before that, he said I asked questions to his girlfriend.

[Investigators] Yes, about his girlfriend. Inquiring about the meaning of the colours of the turbans. [Mr. Anderson]: That question has changed since the first time, but I’m telling you I don’t know why I would ask it. I don’t believe I asked it. … There were a lot of topics that night, there were two nights we were all together. I have no idea.

You don’t recall a conversation with her about turbans? [Mr. Anderson]: No, neither does anyone else that was there.

[31]         Mr. Anderson’s evidence in this exchange is unclear and equivocal. Considering the whole of the evidence before me, I cannot say with any reasonable certainty what findings of fact would be made on a balance of probabilities regarding the Turban Allegation. A hearing is needed to assess the parties’ credibility and the reliability of their evidence about what happened. As with the Slur Allegation, I do not agree with Mr. Anderson’s assertion that, even if Mr. Sandhu’s evidence regarding the Turban Allegation is accepted, he cannot make his case.

[32]         I note that discrimination based on race is often subtle; clear and direct evidence is rarely available, and “bright lines” are uncommon: see Brar and others v. B.C. Veterinary Medical Association and Osborne, 2015 BCHRT 151 [Brar] at paras. 715-716. These “are difficult, nuanced cases,” where the discrimination “can often only be detected upon examining all of the circumstances”: Brar at para. 714. Context is critical; individual acts themselves may be ambiguous or explained away, but when closely examined as part of a larger picture, may lead to an inference that racial discrimination was a factor: Brar at para. 714. Beyond manifesting in slurs and jokes, racial discrimination can also occur in more subconscious and subversive ways, based on deeply rooted attitudes, values, and stereotypical beliefs: Brar at paras. 712-713. In my view, these well-established concepts and principles serve to heighten the foundational significance of the evidentiary issues in this case.

b.   The allegations could succeed

[33]         Given the key issues of credibility in respect of the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation, I am not satisfied that Mr. Sandhu has no reasonable prospect of proving his version of those alleged events. Further, as I touched on above, I do not agree that he cannot make his case if his version of events is accepted.

[34]         The Tribunal takes “all the circumstances” into account when considering whether a comment could contravene the Code: Pardo v. School District No. 43, 2003 BCHRT 71 at para. 12. Relevant factors include the egregiousness of the comment, the nature of the relationship between the involved parties, the context in which the comment was made, whether an apology was offered, and whether or not the recipient of the comment was a member of a group historically discriminated against: Pardo at para. 12. In my view, upon considering these factors in respect of the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation, the Tribunal could reasonably conclude that Mr. Sandhu experienced an adverse impact in employment with a nexus to his race.

[35]         Regarding the Slur Allegation, at a hearing, the Tribunal is reasonably certain to accept Mr. Sandhu’s description of the Slur as being “a well-known racial slur used against people of South Asian descent like myself.” On this basis, the Tribunal could reasonably find that the alleged utterance of the Slur was egregious, even (or especially) in the context of a casual conversation in the workplace. Further, it is not disputed that the parties were in a supervisor-subordinate relationship, which could militate in favour of finding a Code violation: see generally British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62. In addition, there is no evidence that an apology was offered after Mr. Anderson learned of the Slur Allegation. Last, the Tribunal would consider the Slur Allegation in the context of Mr. Sandhu’s undisputed evidence that he was “one of few turbaned Sikhs and visible minorities” in the Ministry, which, in my view, could reasonably support a finding of heightened vulnerability.

[36]         Regarding the Turban Allegation, it is disputed whether Mr. Sandhu took offense to Mr. Anderson’s alleged behaviour at the time. Mr. Sandhu’s stated perception now is that the conduct amounted to treating his religious practice as an oddity or curiosity. While Mr. Sandhu and Mr. Anderson were in a supervisor-subordinate relationship, the alleged behaviour involved Mr. Sandhu’s girlfriend, not the complainant himself. Mr. Sandhu’s evidence suggests this was an aggravating factor (“The fact that Mr. Anderson chose to question my wife about my religious practices rather than speaking to me directly made me feel demeaned and excluded,” and “reinforced my sense of being treated as an outsider in my workplace”), while Mr. Anderson’s submissions suggest the opposite. Similar to the Slur Allegation, there is no evidence that an apology was offered after Mr. Anderson learned of the Turban Allegation. Also, the Tribunal would consider the allegation in the context of Mr. Sandhu’s undisputed evidence that he was one of few turbaned Sikhs and visible minorities in the Ministry.

[37]         Considering these factors, the Tribunal’s assessment of the Turban Allegation at a hearing could be a close call. I do not agree with Mr. Anderson that the allegation has no reasonable prospect of success because it does not describe conduct that was directly towards Mr. Sandhu. Depending on the circumstances, a supervisor’s comments to a third party can amount or contribute to an adverse impact in a subordinate’s employment. I am also mindful that Mr. Sandhu describes his turban as a fundamental expression of his faith and identity, and that the concept of race “is a socially constructed way of judging, categorizing and creating differences among people”: Brar at para. 712. I take notice that the turban worn by a practicing Sikh forms part of their racialized identity.

[38]         Still, on the evidence before me and viewed in isolation, Mr. Anderson’s alleged behaviour would seem to fall on the lower end of the egregiousness scale. Further, I note that subjective feelings are not enough, on their own, to ground a human rights complaint: Chow v. Save-on-Foods and another (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 140 at para. 47. On the other hand, I also note that determining what constitutes a “reasonably objective observer in the context of race discrimination cases is challenging,” making a contextual analysis that much more important: Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 136 at para. 284; Smith v. Mohan (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 52 at para. 187. In this regard, in its assessment of the Turban Allegation (and the Alleged Conduct generally), it would be open to the Tribunal to consider that racism can be expressed “through everyday behaviour that involves many small events in the interaction between people”: Brar at para. 713. This “everyday racism” is “very subtle in nature,” while “being plain to the person experiencing it,” and the “cumulative effect of these everyday experiences is profound”: Brar at para. 713. In some circumstances, “everyday racism, as part of a broader context, may be sufficient to be considered racial discrimination”: Brar at para. 713; see also Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 64 (“micro-discriminations”).

[39]         Ultimately, the burden in a dismissal application is on the respondent to satisfy the Tribunal that it should dismiss the complaint (or a part of it) and, as a consequence, foreclose the complainant’s right to an oral hearing (in whole or part): Larssen v. City of Port Coquitlam and others (No. 2), 2005 BCHRT 548 at para. 19. In contrast, the threshold to advance a complaint (or a part of it) to a hearing is low; there must only be some evidence capable of raising the complainant’s case “out of the realm of conjecture”: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.

[40]         At a hearing, the Tribunal would not consider the evidence regarding the Turban Allegation in isolation. Rather, it would assess the Turban Allegation within the full context of the parties’ evidence as a whole. Viewed in this way, and considering the factors and principles discussed above, I am not able to conclude that the evidence before me could not reasonably support a finding that Mr. Anderson’s alleged behaviour amounted or contributed to an adverse impact in Mr. Sandhu’s employment, with a nexus to his racialized identity. I find that the evidence filed is capable of raising the Turban Allegation out of the realm of mere speculation and conjecture.

c.   The Investigation-related evidence is not a full answer

[41]         The Ministry relies on the Investigation-related evidence as a full answer to the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation. It is not a full answer. Evidence of this nature (e.g., interview notes, investigation reports, documents considered) is a factor in the Tribunal’s “global assessment” of a complaint’s prospects; it is not determinative: Halabi v. Coast Mountain Bus Company, 2006 BCHRT 310 at para. 23; Barton v. Ministry of Education and others, 2025 BCHRT 207 at para. 63. In the present case, the Investigation-related evidence is not sufficient to convince me to dismiss the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation. On the contrary, it supports my view that these allegations should proceed to a hearing.

[42]         The Investigation Report reflects that the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation do not simply “invoke a credibility question,” but rather involve foundational credibility issues: Francescutti at para. 67. In their assessment of Mr. Sandhu’s credibility, the Investigators commented on his failure to provide witnesses and documents to support his allegations, and found that “his reactions [during their interview] demonstrated a personality conflict, which placed [his] credibility into question.” The Investigators felt that Mr. Sandhu “left out critical information,” “portrayed details that were self-serving,” and “appeared to be motivated to ensure [Mr. Anderson] be removed permanently as his supervisor.” Regarding the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation, the Investigators found that Mr. Sandhu “was not forthcoming in providing either a formal complaint or follow up documentation,” and “was vague” when “pressed for details.” In questioning his credibility and/or the reliability of his evidence, they commented that his “statements were emphatic, and he expressed that although the discriminating comments and racial slurs were not directed at him, he could extrapolate from [Mr. Anderson’s] comments, discrimination, and racism that may extend to him.” In stark contrast, the “Investigators found the evidence provided by [Mr. Anderson] to be direct and credible.”

[43]         With respect, I am not persuaded by the Investigators’ credibility findings. The Investigation Report is not clear about what critical information Mr. Sandhu is alleged to have left out, or which details were allegedly self-serving (and how). Nor does the report describe the reactions that allegedly demonstrated a personality conflict, or how such a conflict undermined the credibility of Mr. Sandhu’s evidence. In addition, it is not clear to me why the absence of a “formal complaint” and “follow up documentation” regarding verbal exchanges raised doubts regarding Mr. Sandhu’s version of events. Overall, the Investigators’ analysis of the parties’ oral evidence is incongruent with my impressions based on their interview notes.

[44]         I commend the Ministry for conducting the Investigation and putting the Investigation-related evidence before the Tribunal in this application. However, I am not persuaded to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) based on those materials and the evident findings and conclusions of the Investigators.

2.     Email Allegation and poisoned work environment

[45]         In the affidavit supporting his response to the Respondents’ dismissal applications, Mr. Sandhu says Mr. Anderson’s September 27, 2021 email was shocking and hurtful to him. He characterizes the email as “comparing Indigenous spiritual practices to terrorism and dismissing them as ‘hucksterism.’” He says the “reference to the Taliban felt particularly pointed given my appearance as a turbaned Sikh man.” He says many “Sikhs have faced discrimination and violence due to being mistakenly associated with terrorism because of our appearance,” and Mr. Anderson’s email “reinforced these harmful stereotypes.” He adds that the email “was sent to multiple colleagues, compounding the humiliation,” and he was worried about how they would perceive him.

[46]         The Ministry does not dispute that the language in the email “was unacceptable regardless of [Mr. Anderson’s] intent and context.” However, it argues that “any adverse impact in this instance is not connected to [Mr. Sandhu’s] protected characteristic of race.” It says the complaint “does not raise Indigenous Identity as a protected characteristic, nor is there any indication in the complaint that [Mr. Sandhu] has a connection to Indigenous identity or Indigenous culture.” In addition, it says that “none of the comments alleged to have been made by [Mr. Anderson] were directed” at Mr. Sandhu. Further, the Ministry argues that:

To the extent that [Mr. Sandhu] is extrapolating discrimination from the email exchange as against himself as a racialized person, or broadly alleging the Ministry’s failure to provide a respectful work environment that is free from discrimination … [his] allegations do not rise above the level of speculation and conjecture. Respectfully, the evidence in this case would not establish, to the reasonable bystander, that a poisoned workplace has been created. … [Mr. Sandhu’s] subjective feelings or ‘even genuinely held beliefs’ are insufficient to create a poisoned environment. The overall context of the complaint is also crucial here, particularly that a reasonable and appropriate investigation found [Mr. Sandhu’s] allegations of racist or racialized comments by [Mr. Anderson] to be unsubstantiated.

[47]         The Ministry adds that, even if Mr. Sandhu can make his case regarding the Email Allegation, his claim has no reasonable prospect of success because the Ministry “is reasonably certain … to demonstrate its actions were bona fide and reasonably justified.” The Ministry argues that “it acted in good faith and for the rational purpose of ensuring a workplace free of discrimination,” and it “took all reasonable and practical steps to respond to [Mr. Sandhu’s] allegations … including by ensuring a reasonable and appropriate investigation into the allegations.” Further, the Ministry asserts that it “accommodated [Mr. Sandhu] to the point of undue hardship” by ensuring his “ability to participate fully and meaningfully in the Investigation” and “by fully investigating [his] allegations.”

[48]         Mr. Anderson’s arguments overlap with the Ministry’s. He “agrees that the content of the September Email is regrettable and unprofessional.” However, he argues that the complaint does not disclose any facts that could support either a connection between the email and Mr. Sandhu’s race, or that he experienced an adverse impact in employment.

[49]         In response, Mr. Sandhu argues that the email was “deeply problematic on multiple levels.” Among other things, he asserts that the email linked him to “Islamic extremism, invoking harmful stereotypes about brown-skinned individuals and terrorism,” and dismissed “Indigenous spiritual practices as ‘hucksterism,’ revealing discriminatory attitudes toward non-Western spiritual traditions.” He adds that “racial discrimination can manifest in various forms, including overt comments or actions that link racialized individuals to negative stereotypes, such as terrorism.”

[50]         Referring to the Slur Allegation, the Turban Allegation, and the Email Allegation, collectively, Mr. Sandhu asserts that Mr. Anderson’s “conduct has created a hostile workplace that has profoundly impacted [his] employment.” He states that he continues “to feel anxious and uncomfortable around Mr. Anderson and in the workplace generally,” has lost confidence and enjoyment in his work, and avoids workplace social events at the risk of facing humiliation. He argues that the “cumulative effect of separate incidents can create a poisoned work environment, even where individual incidents might not, on their own amount to discrimination.” Mr. Sandhu asserts that this case must be understood within in its broader social context. As I have referenced above, he submits – and neither of the Respondents deny – that “he is one of few turbaned Sikhs and visible minorities” in the Ministry. He argues that this makes him more vulnerable and less empowered to challenge workplace discrimination.

[51]         I decline to dismiss the Email Allegation. I am not persuaded that Mr. Sandhu has no reasonable prospect of proving that Mr. Anderson’s email caused or contributed to a discriminatory adverse impact in the form of a poisoned work environment for Mr. Sandhu with a nexus to his status as a subordinate, racialized employee.

[52]         A poisoned work environment is created by conduct that is sufficiently serious to create a hostile or intolerable work atmosphere: General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Johnson, 2013ONCA 502 [General Motors] at paras. 66-67. The “test” for a poisoned work environment has been described as being “an objective one”: Francis at para. 373; General Motors at para. 66. However, an objective assessment based on a “reasonable person” standard is never conducted in the abstract; the standard “imports a consideration of context”: Canadian Jewish Congress v. North Shore News and Collins, 1997 BCHRT 35 at para. 247. In determining whether conduct is discriminatory, the Tribunal’s analysis combines both subjective and objective considerations: Chow at para. 54; Clarke at para. 103; Francis at para. 283. This approach accounts for the perspective and characteristics of the person subjected to the behaviour, including their awareness of the social and historical context surrounding the discrimination alleged: Chow at para. 54; Clarke at para. 103; see Francis at para. 284 and Smith at paras. 187 and 215. Consistent with this approach, well-known factors and principles for determining whether a work environment is poisoned include that:

a.   The determination is based on the nature of the impugned conduct and its impact in employment;

b.   Even a single incident, if sufficiently serious, can create a poisoned workplace;

c.   Where there are multiple incidents, their impact is considered holistically without parsing or assessing each incident individually;

d.   Any person can create a poisoned work environment, regardless of their position of authority or status;

e.   Behaviour need not be directed at, or witnessed by, any one individual; and

f.    A person can experience a poisoned environment even if they are not a member of the racialized group that is being targeted: Brar at para. 741; Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld (No. 10), 2026 BCHRT 49 at para. 86.

[53]         In my view, applying the above analysis, the evidence before me could reasonably support a finding of a poisoned work environment in which Mr. Anderson’s email was a contributing factor. In reaching this conclusion, I consider the Email Allegation in the context of the evidence regarding not only the Slur Allegation and the Turban Allegation, but also the Comments Allegation and the Sage Allegation. In this regard, I acknowledge that Mr. Sandhu did not include the Comments Allegation in his complaint to the Tribunal, and no party made submissions about it. Still, Mr. Sandhu’s description of the Comments Allegation and Mr. Anderson’s response to it are canvassed in detail in the Investigation-related evidence filed. This evidence forms part of the record in the Respondents’ dismissal applications and, in my view, provides relevant context for my analysis. I similarly acknowledge that Mr. Sandhu did not address the Sage Allegation in his response to the dismissal applications. I deal with the Sage Allegation below.

[54]         The Respondents do not dispute that Mr. Anderson’s email was inappropriate. In the Ministry’s letter of suspension to Mr. Anderson, it described the email as “inflammatory, insensitive, disrespectful, and contrary to the public services values and the Standards of Conduct,” noting that the email did not contribute to a positive work environment. In my view, at a hearing the Tribunal could reasonably go further and conclude that the email was sufficiently serious to contribute to a poisoned workplace for Mr. Sandhu, regardless of whether it accepts his evidence and arguments regarding the nexus to his specific racialized identity.

[55]         The evidence of the Investigation does not change this conclusion. Nor do the Ministry’s related arguments regarding a justification defence. In a complaint like this one, if Mr. Sandhu succeeds in making his case, a justification defence under s. 13(4) of the Code – based on the analysis set out in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 – will not be available to the Respondents.

[56]         The Ministry also suggests that it bears no liability for the alleged discrimination because it met its obligation to respond appropriately to Mr. Sandhu’s allegations by conducting the Investigation and taking corrective action. I am not persuaded that this argument is reasonably certain to prevail at a hearing. While an investigation may form part of an appropriate response to an allegation of discrimination, “it is not an escape hatch from liability”: McMillan and another (by McMillan and another) v. British Columbia Housing Management Commission (BC Housing) and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 242 at para. 157. Under human rights law, employers are liable for the discriminatory acts of their employees in the course of their employment: Code, s. 44(2); Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 SCR 84 at paras. 15-17; Knowles v. Ontime Moving Corporation, 2025 BCHRT 183 at para. 12. I appreciate that, depending on the circumstances, an organization’s response to an allegation of discrimination can mitigate the impact on the person who experienced the discrimination and reduce the resulting harm and damage: McMillan at para. 181; Hale v. University of British Columbia Okanagan (No. 5), 2023 BCHRT 121 at para. 16, citing Robichaud at para. 19. However, as I discuss below under s. 27(1)(d)(ii), on the information before me I am unable to conclude that the Ministry appropriately addressed the impact on Mr. Sandhu.

3.     Sage Allegation

[57]         Finally, each of the Respondents urge the Tribunal to dismiss the Sage Allegation. The Ministry argues that, even accepting that the allegation is true, Mr. Sandhu has no reasonable prospect of proving a related adverse impact with a nexus to his race. For his part, Mr. Anderson denies making the alleged comments regarding European settlers and Indigenous people, and, in any event, argues that there is nothing to connect the comments to Mr. Sandhu’s race. Further, in reply he asserts that the allegation should be dismissed because Mr. Sandhu did not address it in his response to the dismissal applications.

[58]         I decline to dismiss the Sage Allegation. First, Mr. Sandhu is under no obligation to address every aspect of the Respondents’ applications under s. 27(1)(c). The burden here is on the Respondents. Second, the Sage Allegation involves a key issue of credibility. Whether Mr. Anderson made the alleged comments regarding European settlers and Indigenous people will turn on an assessment of the credibility and reliability of the parties’ differing versions of events. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that Mr. Sandhu has no reasonable prospect of proving his version. Third, for the reasons discussed regarding the Email Allegation, I am not satisfied that Mr. Sandhu has no reasonable prospect of proving that the comments and behaviour alleged in the Sage Allegation contributed to a discriminatory adverse impact in the form of a poisoned work environment for Mr. Sandhu with a nexus to his status as a subordinate, racialized employee. Last, and in any event, there is no efficiency to be gained by carving out and dismissing the Sage Allegation. As I have discussed, at a hearing, the Tribunal will consider Mr. Sandhu’s allegations in the full context of the parties’ evidence as a whole, which will include evidence about the Sage Allegation regardless: Fraser v. Tolko Industries Ltd. and others, 2021 BCHRT 118 at para. 216; Barton at para. 65.

[59]         In sum, the Respondents’ dismissal applications under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code are denied.

B.    Applications to dismiss the complaint because it would not further the purposes of the Code

[60]         Section 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code allows the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint where proceeding with it would not further the Code’s purposes. Deciding to dismiss a complaint on this basis is a discretionary, case-by-case determination: Stengert obo others v. Strata Plan BCS2427, 2018 BCHRT 70 at para. 13. A variety of circumstances may justify the Tribunal’s exercise of this discretion, including where the underlying dispute has been resolved or the respondent has already taken reasonable and effective steps to remedy or otherwise address the alleged discrimination: see generally Williamson v. Mount Seymour Park Housing Co-operative and others, 2005 BCHRT 334. For the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) on the basis that the respondent has appropriately addressed the alleged discrimination, the respondent must persuade the Tribunal that:

a.   The respondent took the complainant’s discrimination claim seriously;

b.    The respondent appropriately addressed the impact on the complainant; and

c.   Where necessary, the respondent took appropriate steps to ensure the discrimination would not happen again: Tambour v. Teamsters Union Local 155, 2024 BCHRT 20 at para. 23; Salanguit v. Parq Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 119 at para. 22; Moghaddam-Ghadimi v. 0704121 BC Ltd. dba Gandy HVAC and others, 2024 BCHRT 274 at para. 69; see, e.g., Horner v. Concord Security Corp, 2003 BCHRT 86; Williamson; Aflakian v. Fraser Health Authority, 2011 BCHRT 170; Baker v. Brentwood College School and another, 2011 BCHRT 170; Stengert.

[61]         The Tribunal’s analysis under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) is contextual and case-specific. Alongside the above requirements for dismissing a complaint on the basis that the alleged discrimination has been addressed, the Tribunal may also consider relevant contextual factors, such as: the seriousness of the alleged discrimination; the timeliness of the respondent’s response to the allegation; the nature of its response (e.g., whether the respondent investigated the allegation); whether the respondent acknowledged the discrimination; whether the complainant was compensated for their losses; whether the respondent has a discrimination policy; and the importance of encouraging parties to address allegations of discrimination in a timely and constructive manner: Tambour at para. 24; see Baker at para. 47.

[62]         In the present case, the Ministry argues that the complaint should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) because it “has already reasonably and appropriately addressed the concerns raised” in it. The Ministry says the Investigators followed a reasonable process, in which Mr. Sandhu participated fully and meaningfully. In addition, after the Investigation concluded, it “took reasonable steps to demonstrate its commitment to a healthy work environment … such as through disciplinary action for [Mr. Anderson] and the requirement for further training and education around expectations for his conduct as a supervisor.” Mr. Anderson similarly argues that it would not further the Code’s purposes to have a hearing regarding “the very same allegations [that were] conclusively investigated by the Ministry through an independent investigator.” He adds that he participated in the Investigation honestly and to the best of his ability, and completed the training directed by the Ministry.

[63]         I am not persuaded to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii). While the steps taken by the Ministry in response to Mr. Sandhu’s allegations factor in support of its dismissal application, they are not enough to justify dismissing the complaint without a hearing. The evidence supports that the Ministry took Mr. Sandhu’s allegations seriously. It conducted a timely and professional internal investigation, and acted on the Investigators’ findings. The evidence does not support, however, that either of the Respondents appropriately addressed the impact on Mr. Sandhu.

[64]         Mr. Anderson denies much of the Alleged Conduct and argues that Mr. Sandhu did not experience an adverse impact in employment. There is no evidence that he offered an apology after learning of Mr. Sandhu’s allegations. On the contrary, the Investigators’ notes from their interviews with Mr. Anderson suggest that he viewed the discrimination claims against him as payback for raising concerns about Mr. Sandhu’s job performance (“I put the complaint in with HR about a guy who won’t do his job – he spins that into all these things against me”). Mr. Anderson is recorded as having described Mr. Sandhu’s concerns as “imaginary ones, the ones where people make up issues.”

[65]         For its part, while the Ministry appears to have made genuine efforts to respond appropriately to the Alleged Conduct, on the evidence, I am not satisfied that the steps taken addressed the impact on Mr. Sandhu to any reasonable standard. I also note that, in its present application, the Ministry takes the position that Mr. Sandhu did not experience an adverse impact.

[66]         The evidence of the steps taken by the respondent-employer in Salanguit provide a useful contrast to the circumstances before me.

[67]         In Salanguit, there was evidence that, upon learning of the complainant’s allegations, the respondent connected her with its employee assistance program, where she was able to access counselling. In addition, the respondent not only disciplined the employee who engaged in the misconduct, but also required the employee to apologize to the complainant for their harmful and offensive behaviour. Moreover, beyond delivering the employee’s apology letter to the complainant, the evidence in Salanguit showed that the respondent offered to arrange a meeting between the parties, to allow them to discuss what happened.

[68]         In the present case, the standard that applied to the Ministry was not one of perfection: Salanguit at para. 32; Baker at para. 56. Nor was the Ministry necessarily required to do everything that the respondent did in Salanguit. The reasonableness of a respondent’s efforts to address the impact on a complainant will always depend on the circumstances. The problem in this case is that the evidence suggests that the Ministry did very little, if anything, to address the impact on Mr. Sandhu, despite finding that some of Mr. Anderson’s impugned conduct towards Mr. Sandhu was inflammatory, insensitive, disrespectful, and not supportive of a positive work environment.

[69]         For these reasons, the Respondents applications under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) are denied. I am not satisfied that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing.

IV    CONCLUSION

[70]         The Respondents’ dismissal applications are denied. The complaint will be scheduled for a hearing. In the meantime, I encourage the parties to make efforts to settle this matter, including by making use of the Tribunal’s mediation services.

Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member


[1] The neighbour’s name was also “Mr. Sandhu.”

  • Report a problem with this page
  • Disclaimer
  • Privacy
  • Accessibility
  • Copyright
  • External links
  • Site map