BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI v. BC Ministry of Health (Vital Statistics Agency), 2026 BCHRT 2
Date Issued: January 15, 2026
File: CS-007294
Indexed as: BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI v. BC Ministry of Health (Vital Statistics Agency), 2026 BCHRT 20
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health (Vital Statistics Agency)
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
Articling Student for the Complainant: Mariyam Ali
Counsel for the Respondent: Justin Mason
I INTRODUCTION
[1] One of the legacies of Canada’s cultural genocide against Indigenous peoples is the loss and erasure of Indigenous names. To address this harm, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission called on governments to take steps to enable residential school survivors and their families to reclaim their names: Call to Action 17. BC took up this call, and invited residential school survivors and their families, and people impacted by the Sixties Scoop, to legally change their names.
[2] BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI is Jijawit, Gitxsan, and Nisga’a (through marriage). His registered legal name is Charles Skinner. He applied to the Vital Statistics Agency to change his name to his Gitxsan name, BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI. The Agency advised that it could not make this change because: (1) under the Name Act, a person was required to register a first and last name, and (2) at the time, its system did not support characters with underlining.
[3] In this human rights complaint, BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI alleges that the Agency’s refusal to register his Gitxsan name discriminates against him based on his Indigenous identity, in violation of s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[4] The Agency says that the barrier to registering BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s Gitxsan name was set out in the Name Act. It did not have authority to register the name in violation of that Act. In this circumstance, it says that BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s complaint does not engage a service customarily available to the public under s. 8 of the Code. It asks the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint.
[5] For the reasons that follow, the application is granted in part. I agree that the legislated criteria in the Name Act which prohibits the registration of a single name does not fall under s. 8 of the Code. Its effect is that the Agency does not offer the service of registering a single name, and so this part of BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s complaint cannot succeed. However, the Agency’s services do include registering names containing different characters. In this case, its message to BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI that it could not register his name at least in part because it contained an underlined character could amount to an adverse impact in services, related to BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s Indigenous identity. This part of his complaint warrants a hearing and decision on its merits. It will proceed.
II DECISION
[6] The Tribunal allowed the Agency to bring this application under s. 27(1)(a) of the Code, on the basis that all or part of the complaint may be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. However, for reasons I have explained elsewhere, it is now my view that the issue raised in this application – whether the complaint engages a service customarily available to the public – is not a jurisdictional one: Child L (by Mother L) v. BC Ministry of Education, 2025 BCHRT 27at para. 16. Rather, the issue is better assessed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, which allows the Tribunal to dismiss complaints with no reasonable prospect of success. For that reason, I have considered the parties’ arguments under s. 27(1)(c) rather than s. 27(1)(a). There is no prejudice to them in doing so because all the relevant evidence and argument remain the same.
[7] Section 8 of the Code prohibits discrimination in accommodations, services, and facilities customarily available to the public. To fall within s. 8, the activity alleged to be discriminatory must “be a service, customarily available, and customarily available to the public”: British Columbia v. Crockford, 2006 BCCA 360 at para. 78.
[8] Legislation is not a service customarily available to the public: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 [Andrews/Matson] at paras. 96-98; Phillips v. BC (Ministry of the Attorney General), 2019 BCHRT 76 at para. 14. For that reason, complaints cannot succeed where they are effectively a direct attack on legislation: Startek v. Ministry of Finance and another, 2022 BCHRT 117 at para. 30; Khazbazian-Isfahani v. BC Ministry of Finance (No. 2), 2023 BCHRT 94. In his argument, BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI did not take issue with or dispute these legal principles.
[9] This application turns on whether the substance of BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s complaint engages a service customarily provided by the Agency. The task for the Tribunal was framed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews/Matson as follows:
The critical issue for the [human rights] adjudicators to decide was whether the complaints constituted a direct attack on legislation or whether they concerned discrimination in the provision of a service. It is uncontroversial that actions of the executive in providing services primarily available to the public are reviewable under human rights legislation …. What is controversial is consideration of complaints that, in substance, solely target legislation. In reviewing such complaints, human rights tribunals are faced with the challenging task of distinguishing between administrative services and legislation. [para. 57]
[10] In applying this analysis, I must consider whether:
a. as the Agency argues – the complaint is simply an attack on s. 9(3) of the Name Act, in which case it does not engage a service customarily available to the public and has no reasonable prospect of success; or
b. as BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI argues – the complaint also alleges adverse impacts flowing from the Agency’s delivery of administrative services, in which case s. 8 of the Code is engaged and the complaint should proceed.
[11] I begin with a brief background to the complaint.
[12] The Registrar General of the Agency is responsible for the registration and certification of vital events under the Vital Statistics Act. The Registrar General registers all births, marriages, deaths, and name changes in BC. The Name Act governs eligibility criteria for name changes.
[13] In response to the TRC’s Call to Action 17, the BC government invited Indigenous survivors of residential school and the Sixties Scoop, and their affected family members, to change their names through the Agency. To assist in this process, it waived legislative fees. At or around the same time, the government announced the development and launch of a new font designed to “support special characters and syllabics found in Indigenous languages in BC”. The font made it possible “for community members and the general public to digitally render all characters used in the 34 First Nations languages of this land”.
[14] BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI responded to the government’s invitation. In 2021, he applied to the Agency to change his registered legal name from Charles Skinner to his Gitxsan name, BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI. The Agency’s Registrar General responded as follows:
Unfortunately, section 9(3) of the Name Act states that the registrar general must not register a change of name that would result in the applicant having only one name. In addition, the Agency is unable to register a name that contains special characters other than apostrophes, hyphens and a standard set of French accents.
Based on the above, I am exercising my authority under section 9 of the Name Act to refuse to register the change of name you have requested…
[15] It is apparent from this letter that there were two reasons that the Agency told BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI it would not register his Gitxsan name: because it was a single name, and because it contained a character with underlining.
[16] The single name rule is found in s. 9(3) of the Name Act, whichsays:
(3) The registrar general must not register a change of name that would result in the applicant having only one name.
The Act does not grant the Agency any discretion regarding this criterion.
[17] The underlining issue, as I understand it, was a technical one. The Agency says that, since BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s application, there have been “technological developments” that now allow the use of underlining in a registered name.
[18] In this application, the Agency argues that, because of the legislative criteria in s. 9(3) of the Name Act, it does not offer the service that BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI was seeking – namely, registration of his single Indigenous name. It argues that the underlining issue is irrelevant because, even without the underlining, it could not have registered BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s name.
[19] BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI does not dispute that the Name Act sets out legislative criteria that precluded the registration of his single name. However, he argues this is not a complete answer to his complaint. He argues – and it is undisputed – that the Agency offers the service of registering names. The government committed to implementing Call to Action 17 and aligning its laws and practices with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP]: Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act. To that end, it specifically undertook to develop fonts that could communicate in First Nations languages and invited Indigenous people to reclaim their traditional names: Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act Action Plan, s. 3.15. In this context, BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI says that he was harmed by the Agency’s message that it could not register his traditional name, at least in part, because it contained a character with underlining. He argues:
In the context of the cultural genocide experienced by Indigenous peoples, including the loss of language, the Complainant’s ability to have his traditional name on his birth certificate is significant not only because it is an expression of his Indigenous identity but also because it is a step towards the reclamation of language that was purposefully destroyed by BC and the Government of Canada.
The Complaint outlines discriminatory conduct that not only re-traumatized the Complainant and his community but is also directly contrary to BC’s commitment to including Indigenous languages in official records.
[20] I agree with BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI that, at a hearing, it would be open to the Tribunal to conclude that he was adversely impacted by the Agency’s message that it could not register his Indigenous name, at least in part, because it used a character with underlining. The use of underlining is a matter falling within the Registry’s services to the public – evidenced by the fact that they have since corrected the issue. This part of BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s complaint is not an attack on legislation, and warrants consideration.
[21] Further, at a hearing, the Tribunal would interpret and apply s. 8 of the Code in a manner consistent with UNDRIP: Wilson and another v. Pagalis Sales Ltd. CBA: Canadian Tire Store 608 and others, 2025 BCHRT 241 at paras. 24-30. Though neither party cited it, I note that Article 13 of UNDRIP affirms the rights of Indigenous people to their names and languages, and imposes obligations on states to protect and implement this right:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means.
Among other things, this Article may be relevant to how the Tribunal assesses the harms that BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI says flowed from the Agency’s message that one reason it could not register his name was because it contained a character with underlining. I am not prepared, at a preliminary stage, to conclude that there could not be harm to BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI because, ultimately, the Agency could not have registered his name anyway.
[22] That said, I am mindful that any remedy would have to flow from the harm of being told that the Agency could not register a name with underlining, and not the harm of Agency refusing to register the name. In this regard, I acknowledge and agree with the Agency that it did not offer the service of registering BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s name because it was a single name, which is not allowed under the Name Act. However, I disagree that this renders the underlining issue inconsequential or is a complete bar to the complaint.
[23] Finally, I disagree with the Agency that, in allowing this complaint to proceed, the Tribunal is overstepping its role as an adjudicator of a particular human rights complaint: Adults with Intellectual Disabilities et al (by Judy Hoffman) v. Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction and others, 2022 BCHRT 1 at para. 52; Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 64. The Agency points to BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s arguments that reference reconciliation, reclamation of language, and the relationship between Indigenous people and the BC government, as indications that the complaint is an attempt to adjudicate issues that are properly resolved at the nation-to-nation level. I do not see it that way. BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI applied to change his name and was told that he couldn’t, in part because his Indigenous name contained a character that the Agency could not accept. This is a narrow issue, within the scope of s. 8 of the Code, and properly brought to the Tribunal. To properly understand the issue, however, and especially its impact on BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI as an Indigenous person, it may be necessary for the Tribunal to situate it within the social context of government policies which have systematically stripped Indigenous people of their language and names, and current efforts to remedy that harm through facilitating reclamation of names and languages, under the broad rubric of reconciliation. This broader context does not render the complaint incapable of “resolution within the Tribunal’s process”: Hoffman, at para. 70. To the contrary, it ensures the Tribunal can do its job properly.
III CONCLUSION
[24] A final note. Although I have determined that the legislative criteria set out in the Name Act is not a service under s. 8 of the Human Rights Code, I do observe that BAYT-X̱TSIHATSI’s complaint highlights that s. 9(3) of the Name Act may be inconsistent with Article 13 of UNDRIP. If so, it is incumbent on government to address the inconsistency in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous people: DRIPA, s. 3. Any legal challenge to the inconsistency is properly brought to the courts: Gitxaala v. British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner), 2025 BCCA 430.
[25] The application to dismiss the complaint is denied. The complaint will be scheduled for a one-day hearing.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair