Friss v. Provincial Health Services Authority and another (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 199

Date Issued: September 16, 2026
File(s): CS-005768

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Noams Friss
COMPLAINANT

AND:

Provincial Health Services Authority and His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health (Office of the Provincial Health Officer)
RESPONDENTS

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
Rule 36

Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
On his own behalf: Noams Friss
For the Respondents: No submissions sought

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             The Tribunal issued a decision dismissing this complaint on July 17, 2026: Friss v. Provincial Health Services Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 157 [Decision].

[2]             The complaint alleged that the Provincial Health Services Authority [PHSA] and the Office of the Provincial Health Officer [PHO] discriminated against Mr. Friss in the area of employment based on the ground of religion under s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. The complaint arose from Mr. Friss’ non-compliance with PHO orders that required PHSA employees, like him, to be vaccinated against COVID-19 and provide proof of vaccination to their employer. Because of his non-compliance, PHSA terminated his employment.

[3]             In the Decision, I found that Mr. Friss had no reasonable prospect of making his case against the PHO because its alleged conduct did not fall within the scope of the prohibition against “discrimination in employment” under s. 13.

[4]             I also found that there was no reasonable prospect that the complaint would succeed against PHSA. I was satisfied that PHSA was reasonably certain to establish a justification defence because Mr. Friss never disclosed his religious objection to the vaccination requirements, and so PHSA was unaware of his religious beliefs when it terminated his employment.

[5]             On July 27, 2026, Mr. Friss applied for reconsideration of the Decision.

[6]             I do not find it necessary to seek submissions from the Respondents. For the reasons that follow, the application is denied.

II      DECISION

[7]             The Tribunal’s core function under the Code is to make decisions. In principle, once a decision is made, it is final and the Tribunal cannot revisit it. There are only two narrow exceptions to this principle of finality.

[8]             First, the Tribunal has the ability to correct non-substantive mistakes: Rule 35; Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 [Fraser Health] at paras. 135-141.

[9]             Second, the Tribunal can reconsider a decision if the interests of fairness and justice require it to do so: Rule 36(1); see Zutter v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1995 CanLII 1234 (BC CA). This reconsideration power is exercised carefully and restrictively, in deference to the principle of finality: see Zutter at para. 31. The Tribunal can only reopen a decision to properly carry out its function or complete its task. It can reconsider a decision if it failed to resolve an issue that required resolution, or if it made the decision without procedural fairness: Fraser Health at paras. 135-141 and 160.

[10]         Mr. Friss says it was unfair for the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint. He says the Tribunal did not account for the fact that he “lacks the financial ability, the linguistic skills and/or the judicial knowledge to represent [himself] to the level of the professional lawyers” representing the Respondents. More specifically, he argues that it was unfair for the Tribunal to dismiss his complaint against the PHO based on the language of its public health orders, which I found did not require PHSA to terminate Mr. Friss’ employment. He also argues that it was unfair for the Tribunal to dismiss his complaint against PHSA based on his failure to disclose his religious objection. He says this “narrative [was] chosen by PHSA” and “suits the respondent without taking into consideration the picture in its entirety.” He argues that “it would have been completely futile to notify PHSA of any religious objections,” asserting that “even if PHSA would have known about the religious objection, they would have done absolutely nothing to accommodate it, because there were no such options given by the PHO.”

[11]         I decline to reconsider the Decision based on Mr. Friss’ arguments. While he asserts that he experienced an unfair process, what his application really challenges is my analysis and decision-making. The unfairness he alleges centres on my assessment of the information and arguments that were before me. In essence, the application for reconsideration contends that the Decision was wrong, seeks to reargue issues that I have already decided, and asserts that it was unfair, unjust, and inconsistent with human rights principles to dismiss the complaint of a self-represented complainant “based on the opinion of one [Tribunal] member.” These are not proper grounds for reconsideration.

[12]         I am not satisfied that the interests of fairness and justice require the Tribunal to reconsider the Decision. The application for reconsideration is therefore denied.

III    CONCLUSION

[13]         The application is denied. The Decision stands.

Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member