Madden v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (Fraser Regional Correctional Centre and Surrey Pretrial Services Centre) and another (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 196

Date Issued: September 10, 2026
File: CS-008019

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Connor Madden
COMPLAINANT

AND:

His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia ARB the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (Fraser Regional Correctional Centre and Surrey Pretrial Services Centre) and Provincial Health Services Authority
RESPONDENTS

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)

Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Connor Madden
Counsel for the Respondent, Provincial Health Services: Alon Mizrahi
Counsel for the Respondent, Ministry of Public Safety: Joni Worton

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Connor Madden filed a complaint alleging that the Provincial Health Services Authority (PHSA) and His Majesty the King in right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (Fraser Regional Correctional Centre and Surrey Pretrial Services Centre) discriminated against him in the area of services, based on physical disability, contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.

[2]             Mr. Madden says he requires the use of a cane because of a leg injury. He alleges that while he was incarcerated corrections officers repeatedly took his cane away due to unfounded claims that he had used his cane as a weapon. He alleges the PHSA contributed to the discrimination by failing to advocate on his behalf for the return of his cane and ensuring he received necessary medical care.

[3]             The Respondents apply to have Mr. Madden’s complaint dismissed on a preliminary basis under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. The Ministry argues that there is no reasonable prospect that Mr. Madden’s complaint will succeed because it is reasonably certain to establish a bona fide and reasonable justification for removing Mr. Madden’s cane: because his use of a cane posed a significant safety and security risk. PHSA argues that there is no reasonable prospect the complaint against it will succeed because advocating for people who are incarcerated is not a service they customarily provide.  

[4]             For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect Mr. Madden could establish that having his cane removed was discriminatory. I therefore dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c). To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

II      BACKGROUND

[5]             Mr. Madden was incarcerated at two correction centres operated by the Ministry, Fraser Regional Correctional Centre and Surrey Pretrial Services Centre. PHSA provides healthcare services to people incarcerated in the correctional centres, including making decisions about whether mobility devices are required. If the PHSA approves a mobility device for an incarcerated person for medical reasons, the Ministry will then review if allowing the person to have the device threatens the safety and security of that person, other people, staff, or property.

[6]             For operational reasons Mr. Madden was transferred back and forth between the two centres between May 5, 2021, until his release on April 27, 2022. When Mr. Madden began his incarceration at Surrey Pretrial on May 5, 2021, he advised the staff that he had a metal rod in his right leg and required a cane to walk significant distances. Mr. Madden was provided a wheelchair while his cane was assessed for safety and security issues. The Ministry approved the use of his cane on May 23, 2021.

[7]             On June 26, 2021, Mr. Madden was placed on suicide protocols involving the removal of all personal items including his cane. His cane was returned to him on June 29, 2021.

[8]             Between July 2, 2021, to July 15, 2021, Mr. Madden used his cane to hit windows and cameras, push trays of food away, refuse requests for inspection, and brandished the cane as a weapon against staff members. As a result of this behaviour the Ministry placed Mr. Madden on special handling protocols and requested he relinquish the cane. Mr. Madden refused, hid his cane, and challenged the staff to attempt to take the cane from him. Mr. Madden eventually relinquished his cane on July 21, 2021.  

[9]             On August 10, 2021, Mr. Madden attacked staff members, throwing an unknown liquid at them, and punching them. He stated that he would remain non-compliant until he was provided a cane.

[10]         On August 18, 2021, Mr. Madden again rushed at staff members challenging them to a fight stating he would not comply with staff unless he was given a cane.

[11]         The Ministry told Mr. Madden that he could not have a cane because of safety and security reasons but offered him the use of a wheelchair which he refused. Mr. Madden was also offered the use of a chair during showers and when making phone calls which he refused. Staff offered to assist Mr. Madden when moving which he also refused stating he would remain non-compliant and antagonistic until he was provided a cane.

[12]          On September 23, 2021, the Ministry offered to allow Mr. Madden the use of a cane during showers provided he return it afterwards. Mr. Madden refused to accept any conditions requiring him to return the cane. Because Mr. Madden did not agree to the requirement to return the cane after use, he was not permitted the use of a cane during showers.

[13]         Mr. Madden remained on special handling protocols due to his continued aggressive behaviour, until his release on April 27, 2022. He continued to have repeated aggressive and violent interactions with staff, remained non-compliant, and verbally and physically threatened staff on occasions. Mr. Madden continued to demand the use of a cane which the Ministry denied because it was deemed a safety and security risk. The Ministry offered Mr. Madden the use of wheelchairs, chairs, and staff assistance which Mr. Madden refused.

III    DECISION

A.    Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success

[14]         The Respondents each apply to dismiss Mr. Madden’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.

[15]         Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.

[16]         The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.

[17]         A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.

[18]         Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.

[19]         To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Madden will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in services, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would shift to the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.

[20]         I first consider the Ministry’s application. For the purposes of this application the Ministry does not dispute that Mr. Madden has a physical disability. Therefore, the first part of the Moore test is not at issue in their application. The Ministry disputes that Mr. Madden’s complaint alleges facts that amount to an adverse impact, or that could be connected with his physical disability. It further argues that it is reasonably certain to prove a defence at the hearing: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117, at para. 50. Specifically, the Ministry say its policies and procedures related to restricting the use of personal effects like canes by incarcerated persons, and how it applied those policies to Mr. Madden, was bona fide and reasonably justified.

[21]         I find it most efficient to consider this application based on the Ministry’s argument that it is reasonably certain to prove a defence. I accept without deciding, for the purposes of this application, that Mr. Madden will prove a prima facie case of discrimination.

[22]         To justify adversely impacting Mr. Madden in connection with his protected characteristic of physical disability, the Ministry would have to prove that: (1) it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed, (2) it adopted the standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that purpose, and (3) the standard was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose. The third element encompasses the Ministry’s duty to accommodate Mr. Madden to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer] at para. 20.

[23]         The Ministry says its function is to safely house adults in custody and its policies and procedures about what equipment incarcerated persons are able to access was adopted in good faith for the purposes of providing safe and secure custody. The Ministry has provided affidavit and documentary evidence about its policies and procedures and the reasons for those procedures. The evidence sets out that incarcerated persons may be restricted from using items that pose a safety and security risk to themselves, other incarcerated persons, or staff.

[24]         Based on the evidence before me, I find that it is reasonably certain the Ministry will be able to prove its policy of limiting access to items that pose safety and security risks is rationally connected to its purpose of ensuring safety and security for its staff and incarcerated persons. I further find the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove that it adopted its policy in good faith, believing it to be necessary to achieve the purpose of safety and security.

[25]         I am also persuaded the Ministry is reasonably certain to prove it met its duty to accommodate Mr. Madden to the point of undue hardship. This is because the undisputed evidence is that Mr. Madden’s use of a cane was only curtailed after specific incidents when he used it in a violent, aggressive, or non-compliant manner. The contemporaneous notes and records of Ministry employees show that prior to Mr. Madden’s cane being removed he used the cane in a manner that caused or threatened to cause physical harm to himself, staff, or other persons.

[26]         The Ministry advised Mr. Madden of other options and accommodations available in lieu of a cane, including the use of wheelchairs, chairs, and the availability of staff assistance which Mr. Madden refused. Further, Ministry staff offered Mr. Madden the use of a cane during specific periods provided he return it which he refused. I appreciate that Mr. Madden does not believe any restriction on the use of his cane was appropriate, however the evidence supports that he was provided an individualized opportunity for accommodation by the Ministry: Grismer, at para. 42.

[27]         Mr. Madden does not dispute that he was offered accommodations in lieu of a cane. He disagrees that he used his cane aggressively and says he used it defensively to shield himself because he was being attacked by Ministry staff. He does not provide a conflicting version of events but says that his use of a cane should not be considered an attack because he did not cause bruising or injuries.

[28]         The central point of Mr. Madden’s response appears to be that he does not agree that any limitation on the use of his cane was appropriate. I appreciate that Mr. Madden believes anything short of a fully unrestricted use of his cane was an unwarranted impairment to his dignity. However, in the face of the Ministry’s evidence that it has in good faith adopted its policies for the purposes of maintaining safety and security, and that it offered Mr. Madden other solutions for his mobility issues I am persuaded that the Ministry is reasonably certain to establish a defense at a hearing.

[29]         For the above reasons, I find that if this matter were to proceed to a hearing, the Ministry would be reasonably certain to prove its policy restricting the use of items that pose a safety or security risk, and how it applied that policy to Mr. Madden by restricting the use of a cane, was justified. Where a respondent is reasonably certain to prove a defence at a hearing, the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.

[30]         Next, I consider PHSA’s application to dismiss the complaint against it under s. 27(1)(c). PHSA’s argument turns on the second element of Moore, whether Mr. Madden was adversely affected in services. PHSA says advocating on behalf of incarcerated persons is not a service it customarily provides to the public and therefore Mr. Madden’s allegation that PHSA discriminated by failing to advocate on his behalf for medical treatment and the use of his cane has no reasonable prospect of success.

[31]         It is undisputed that while PHSA is responsible for providing medical services including patient assessment and recommendations for treatment, the ultimate decision of whether Mr. Madden would be permitted to have a cane fell to the Ministry. PHSA has provided documentary and affidavit evidence which sets out the health services it provides to people incarcerated in the Ministry’s facilities. The evidence supports PHSA’s position that it assessed Mr. Madden’s request for a cane and made recommendations to the Ministry, but the ultimate decision of whether Mr. Madden is permitted to have a cane remained with the Ministry.

[32]         Further, there is nothing before me to suggest that any patient advocacy services the PHSA provides extends beyond making healthcare recommendations. There is nothing before me to support Mr. Madden’s assertion that PHSA denied him a service by not challenging the Ministry’s decision.

[33]         Accordingly, I find there is no reasonable prospect that Mr. Madden’s allegation that PHSA denied him a service based on his protected characteristic will succeed.

IV    CONCLUSION

[34]         I allow the applications and dismiss the complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c).

Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member