Elshazly v. Vancouver Police Board 2026 BCHRT 195
Date Issued: September 10, 2026
File(s): CS-003436
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Safiya Elshazly
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Vancouver Police Board
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Laila Said
On their own behalf: Safiya Elshazly
Counsel for the Respondent: David T. McKnight and Anja Nel
Date of Hearing: October 22, 2025
Location of Hearing: Virtual
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This complaint is about whether Ms. Elshazly was discriminated against on the basis of her race, colour, and place of origin by the Vancouver Police Board [VPB] members’ conduct during a police encounter, contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] Safiya Elshazly is a Black woman. On December 1, 2020, Ms. Elshazly was one of four backseat passengers in a car stopped by VPB employees Police Constable Aminie and Police Constable Cheng. During the traffic stop, Cst. Cheng asked Ms. Elshazly for her identification. She refused, maintaining she did not have any form of identification on her person, or that she was required to provide him with identification. Cst. Cheng removed her from the vehicle and arrested her for obstruction of justice. Ms. Elshazly says the police officers did not treat the visibly white driver or other passengers who were also non-compliant with traffic rules the same way, and that the escalation and ultimate arrest happened in part because of he race, colour and place of origin.
[3] The VPB says Ms. Elshazly was not adversely impacted by the encounter, as alleged or at all, and that the conduct surrounding the arrest was reasonable and justified.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find the complaint is justified. Ms. Elshazly’s race and colour was a factor in her treatment during the police encounter and is discrimination under s. 8 of the Code. As a result, Ms. Elshazly is entitled to compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self respect, and special damages under s. 37 of the Code.
II EVIDENCE
[5] I base my findings on the evidence given at the hearing by the 6 witnesses. Ms. Elshazly testified on her own behalf and called 2 witnesses: Azra Demirovic, the driver of the car, and Achan Akwai Cham, a backseat passenger in the car. The VPB called Cst. Aminie, the police officer who approached Ms. Demirovic at the traffic stop, Cst. Cheng, the arresting police officer, and Cst. Bokenfohr, the cover officer who responded to the scene in a support role.
[6] In giving their evidence, each witness testified and relied on various documents and audiovisual recordings, which were entered as exhibits during the hearing. I do not refer to all the evidence of every witness. However, I have carefully considered all their evidence in reaching my conclusions in this decision.
[7] The facts of this complaint are largely undisputed. There were instances where two or more witnesses provided conflicting evidence on significant issues. Where the parties dispute material facts, I will explain my reasons for preferring one witness’ evidence over another. In doing so, I have considered the credibility and reliability of each witness’ evidence to make findings of fact.
[8] Credibility and reliability require different considerations. Credibility involves the veracity or truthfulness of a witness. It is about whether a witness is telling the truth. Reliability involves the accuracy of a witness’ testimony: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398, affirmed in 2012 BCCA 296, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 392, at para. 186; Hardychuk v. Johnstone, 2012 BCSC 1359 at para. 10; R. v. S.A.S., 2021 BCPC 69 at paras. 21-27.
[9] For all witness testimony, I start from the presumption that the witness is telling the truth: Hardychuk v. Johnstone, 2012 BCSC 1359 at para. 10. After considering the testimony on a ‘stand alone’ basis, I consider whether the story is accurate and inherently believable: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398 [Bradshaw]. To do so, I consider various factors such as:
[the witness’] ability and opportunity to observe events, the firmness of [their] memory, the ability to resist the influence of interest to modify [their] recollection, whether the witness’ evidence harmonizes with independent evidence that has been accepted, whether the witness changes [their] testimony during direct and cross-examination, whether the witness’ testimony seems unreasonable, impossible, or unlikely, whether a witness has a motive to lie, and the demeanour of a witness generally.
Bradshaw at para. 186.
[10] The evidence of a witness’s story must be assessed for its “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”: Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA) at 357; Jahanian v Jahanian, 2021 BCSC 1890, at para. 8; Gichuru v. Smith, 2013 BCSC 895 at para. 130, aff’d 2014 BCCA 414.
[11] The witnesses testified about events that happened in a short period of time, nearly six years earlier. I consider that over this length of time, memories have understandably faded, shifted, or hardened around a particular version of events: Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 24. In my view, no party’s account of the incident is completely reliable. There are small details in the evidence to support this. In his evidence at the hearing and in the police report, Cst. Cheng claimed that Ms. Elshazly directed many racist comments at him. The only evidence that the VPB can point to is Ms. Elshazly asked, “do you speak English”, and I explain below the context in which I understand it to have been said. At the hearing, Cst. Aminie was able to answer questions posed by the VPB and the Tribunal with ease. Inexplicably, although he had reviewed the information in the evidence and testified about it during direct examination, he was unable to recall that same basic information when Ms. Elshazly raised the subject during cross-examination. Further, when Ms. Elshazly pointed him to a video where it was evident to me that he was the person in the recording, he implausibly denied being able to identify himself with certainty. Similarly, Cst. Bokenfohr testified that, from the sidewalk several meters from the passenger side of the vehicle, he heard Cst. Aminie speaking to the driver. He then testified that he could not hear Ms. Elshazly yelling her full name while he was standing directly beside her. For her part, Ms. Elshazly has been inconsistent from her pleadings, testimony at the hearing, and closing submissions about material matters such as the timing of the events surrounding the incident, what she had firsthand knowledge of, and which friend she spoke to during the arrest about locating her identification. I note Ms. Elshazly told the Tribunal that said she had previously had a concussion, but she did not put into evidence the extent to which it impacted her memory.
[12] On most issues, I have found that the most reliable evidence is contained in documents created at the time of the events, including the audiovisual recordings put into evidence. I have used these documents as a “reliable yardstick against which to compare and assess the reliability of the witness’ testimony”: Boschoff v. Inspired Retreats, 2014 BCHRT 6 at para. 8; Clarke at para. 24.
[13] Before analysing the evidence given at the hearing, I address a preliminary issue raised by the VPB about the reliability of Ms. Elshazly’s closing submissions. I will then set out the background to Ms. Elshazly’s complaint, relying on the documents and videos in evidence and the undisputed facts in this complaint.
III PRELIMINARY ISSUE
[14] Here, I address the VPB’s submission that in her written closing submissions Ms. Elshazly has introduced, and relied on, facts and evidence not led at the hearing. I address the parties’ submissions on Ms. Elshazly’s “Middle Eastern” identity in the analysis section and whether Ms. Elshazly has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that she had established her place of origin.
[15] The VPB submits, and I agree, that in her written closing submissions Ms. Elshazly has introduced evidence that was not led at the hearing and that was not put to any of the witnesses. She also stated facts that are not in evidence and recharacterized some evidence before the Tribunal by attributing statements and actions to witnesses who did not say or do those things, or who explicitly denied them in the course of their evidence.
[16] For example, Ms. Elshazly’s closing submissions include allegations of adverse treatment that were not included in the Complaint Form. These include, but are not limited to, being searched, being threatened with jail, treated as a criminal risk and being placed on the Firearms Interest Police page with the use of “Middle Eastern” as a descriptor in her police file.
[17] The VPB also says the Tribunal should strike alleged adverse impacts related to statements that were made to her by Cst. Bokenfohr that suggested she was intoxicated or a flight risk. These statements were brought into evidence at the hearing by Ms. Elshazly on her direct evidence and cross examination and when she cross examined the officers. The VPB had an opportunity to challenge the statements at the hearing and make written submissions in response to the evidence and Ms. Elshazly’s closing submission. I have considered the VPB’s submission on the officer’s statements to the extent the VPB chose to address them. For those reasons, I am satisfied that prejudice is attenuated and I will consider the statements in the analysis, below.
[18] The VPB also submits that to the extent that Ms. Elshazly relies on assertions that she was fearful, panicked, and/or distressed, this evidence was not detailed during the hearing. The VPB says the Tribunal should not rely on these assertions as a matter of procedural fairness. Further, the VPD submits the objective video record does not support these assertions. They say before the arrest she steps out of the vehicle looking at ease, and in response to her friend’s pleas to cooperate and calm down, she says, “I’m very calm, I’m very calm”. To the extent there is some inconsistent evidence, I analyze the credibility and reliability of these statements considering all the evidence about her demeanour.
IV BACKGROUND
[19] On December 1, 2020, Ms. Elshazly celebrated a birthday dinner with her friend, Mr. Y, and 4 other individuals. After dinner, the group of six decided to continue the celebration with boardgames at Ms. Elshazly’s home. All six rode together in Mr. Y’s car. Ms. Demirovic drove the car and Mr. Y sat in the passenger seat. There is no dispute that there were more people in the rear cabin than there were designated seatbelts. The rear cabin had 3 seats and 3 seatbelts. Ms. Elshazly sat directly behind Mr. Y, Ms. Cham sat in the rear middle seat, and a third individual sat behind the driver. The sixth passenger, Ms. F, sat on Ms. Elshazly’s lap, with her legs draped over the other back passengers.
[20] The VPB is a municipal police board established pursuant to s. 23 of the Police Act, RSBC 1996, c. 367, and employs sworn police officers of the VPB.
[21] Cst. Aminie testified that when the car drove past him on the street, he observed someone in the rear cabin sitting on a passenger’s lap, an offence under the Motor Vehicle Act Regulations, B.C. Reg. 26/58 Division 37 – Safety Code. As a result of the infraction, he and his partner, Cst. Cheng, conducted a traffic stop around 11:45 p.m.
[22] The driver and passenger windows were rolled down.
[23] Cst. Cheng approached Ms. Elshazly’s window and yelled for her to open her window. He testified that he could not see into the rear cabin, even with his flashlight, because the windows were tinted. Ms. Elshazly did not open her window. Ms. Elshazly’s evidence is the child locks were engaged, and she could not open the window. Cst. Cheng then asked Mr. Y, the front seat passenger, to tell Ms. Elshazly to open her window. Ms. Demirovic testified that she tried to lower the window from the driver control panel but could not immediately do so because she was unfamiliar with the car. In the meantime, Cst. Cheng became increasingly agitated that Ms. Elshazly was not complying with his order to roll down her window. Cst. Cheng recalled in his testimony that the front passenger then yelled at the back, “Safiya roll down your window”.
[24] The parties dispute whether Ms. Elshazly was wearing a seatbelt at the time her window was rolled down. Ms. Elshazly says she was wearing a seatbelt and removed it to get out of the car. Cst. Cheng says he reasonably believed she was not wearing a seatbelt. I resolve this dispute by relying on the video evidence where the click of the seatbelt is heard in the recording on Ms. Elshazly’s phone prior to her exiting the vehicle. I am satisfied that the recording captured in Exhibit 1, together with the Provincial Court of BC court decision that found the VPB did not meet their burden of proof for the infraction militates the balance of probabilities in favour of this finding.
[25] Cst. Cheng testified that he told Ms. Elshazly and Ms. F to produce identification because he would issue a violation ticket for not wearing a seatbelt. Ms. Elshazly told him, “I don’t need to give you ID, I don’t have ID.” He told the rear passengers that if they did not produce identification, they would be obstructing his ability to issue the ticket and if they continued to obstruct, they would be arrested for obstruction.
[26] The next 40 seconds unfolded as follows: Cst. Cheng told the back passengers “Come on outside, you’re obstructing right now.” There is the sound of a seatbelt being unclicked and Ms. F is heard saying she does not have identification but only has a bank card. Ms. Elshazly waited for Ms. F to fully get off her lap, then exited the car. Ms. F then exited the car. Cst. Cheng asked for their identification and Ms. Elshazly told him that she did not have it. Ms. F gave Cst. Cheng her bank card and walked away. Officer Cheng told Ms. F that the bank card did not have her name on it. Cst. Cheng did not immediately pursue the matter with Ms. F and turned his attention to Ms. Elshazly. Their exchange is as follows:
Cst. Cheng: “Okay miss. Last time to [pull your ID out].”
Ms. Elshazly :“I don’t have ID”.
Cst. Cheng: “Okay, so right now you’re obstructing us. We’re in a legal execution of our duty. I’ve given you the warning okay right now you’re under arrest for obstruction.”
[27] Every officer testified that when a person does not have their identification, standard police protocol would be to ask the individual for their name, date of birth, address, and other identifying information so that the officer can search for the individual in their database. If the person had a previous encounter with the police, then their photo and identifying information would appear on their system. The VPB did not dispute Ms. Elshazly’s claim that she had previously encountered the VPB during a traffic stop.
[28] Cst. Bokenfohr arrived as backup and began recording Ms. Elshazly. Cst. Cheng arrested Ms. Elshazly. She was placed in handcuffs with her arms behind her back. During the arrest, Ms. Elshazly’s iPhone dropped. Though the screen was shattered, the recording continued. Cst. Bokenfohr is heard saying, “you are one drunk lady.” She replied that she was not drunk and was, “very sober. You asked for my ID, and I don’t have my ID.” She said aloud that the police officer was being “racist” and didn’t ask for her information. Ms. F intervened and offered to find Ms. Elshazly’s identification. Ms. Elshazly told the police officer that she could give him her name to look her up and identify her. She then stated her full legal name and maintained that she did not have ID and did not need to provide it.
[29] Ms. Elshazly and Ms. F exchanged words in English and in a second language. Ms. F said to her, “I know, trust me, we’ve been to this rodeo before.” Ms. Elshazly responded that she had not. Ms. F replied, “then you are right now, so we’ll get them what they need, and we’ll get…out of here.” Ms. Elshazly said she had her ID in her phone, and Ms. F offered to retrieve it. The video recorded an officer in the background telling Ms. Elshazly to stay where she was, because he did not want her to “run off”. Ms. Elshazly had not moved, or objectively indicated that she intended to move, from the spot she had been standing since her arrest.
[30] Two more police vehicles came to the scene, as well as at least three other officers. Ms. Demirovic remained in the car while the police officers removed all the other passengers from the car. Ms. Demirovic was finally escorted from the car by Cst. Amini and walked to a different area of the sidewalk from the other passengers. Ms. F found Ms. Elshazly’s identification and gave it to Cst. Cheng. Ms. Elshazly’s handcuffs were removed.
[31] Cst. Cheng issued a violation ticket to Ms. Elshazly for failing to wear a seatbelt. Cst. Cheng said he did not issue Ms. F a violation ticket because she was cooperative and assisted in getting Ms. Elshazly’s identification. The stop ended and Ms. Elshazly and her friends were allowed to leave. Ms. Elshazly challenged the ticket in a later proceeding before the Provincial Court of BC, and the ticket was set aside.
V ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[32] Section 8 of the Code prohibits a service provider from discriminating against a person regarding any service customarily available to the public because of that person’s race, colour, or place of origin without a bona fide and reasonable justification. In this case, policing is a service customarily available to the public and the police are prohibited from discriminating against a person during a traffic stop based on their protected characteristics: BC/Yukon Association of Drug War Survivors v. City of Abbotsford and another, 2020 BCHRT 86, at para 87.
[33] The issue before me is whether Ms. Elshazly has proven on a balance of probabilities that her race, colour, or place of origin was a factor in her arrest during the traffic stop: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. It is not necessary for Ms. Elshazly’s protected characteristics to be the sole or even primary factor in the VPB’s decision to arrest her: Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30 at para. 46.
A. Has Ms. Elshazly established that she has the alleged protected characteristics under the Code and that she was adversely impacted in services?
[34] Ms. Elshazly has proven the first two elements of the test for discrimination set out in Moore.
[35] First, there is no dispute that Ms. Elshazly has the protected characteristics of race and colour. She identifies as, and is, a visibly Black woman. In her closing submission, Ms. Elshazly said she did not want to pursue the protected characteristic of “Middle Eastern”. She also made submissions about the country she and her father grew up in. The Respondents say, and I agree, that Ms. Elshazly did not lead this evidence at the hearing and it should not be considered in deciding this complaint. I find Ms. Elshazly has not proven that she has the protected characteristics of place of origin.
[36] Second, there is no dispute that Ms. Elshazly was arrested and placed in restraints. The VPB submits that Ms. Elshazly was not adversely impacted at all, and did not make submissions on whether the arrest amounts to an adverse treatment. I have no difficulty in finding that being placed in handcuffs and put under arrest is an adverse impact in services under the Code. Both are extraordinary measures taken by the state that limit a person’s freedom of movement and engage their civil liberties: JKB v. Peel (Police Services Board), 2020 HRTO 172 [JKB] at para 144.
[37] I must now decide whether Ms. Elshazly has proven on balance that the evidence gives rise to an inference that her race and colour was a factor in her arrest. If so, she has established the third prong of the test for discrimination under Moore. The VPB offer a non-discriminatory explanation for their conduct, and I consider whether the inference of discrimination is more probable than the non-discriminatory explanation put forward by the VPB.
B. Was Ms. Elshazly’s race or colour a factor in her arrest during the traffic stop?
[38] In the services context, the protected characteristic need not be the sole or even the primary cause of the adverse impact; it is sufficient that it is one of several factors that influenced the treatment or decision: Moore at para. 33.
1. The parties’ positions
[39] Ms. Elshazly says a connection between her protected characteristics and her arrest can be reasonably inferred by differential treatment between herself and the white driver, and selective enforcement. She says the driver, who also lacked identification, was treated with courtesy, reassured, and spoken to respectfully. In contrast, she was treated aggressively and suspected of intoxication. She also says the police officers engaged in a different pattern of decision-making between herself and the white driver and Ms. F, who were both clearly in violation of the traffic rules. She says the officers were willing to escalate matters with her in a manner they were not willing to do with the driver and Ms. F. She says her treatment by the VPB was driven by subconscious beliefs about Black women’s credibility, cooperation, and threat level.
[40] The VPB submits that the inference of discrimination is far less probable than its credible, non-discriminatory explanation. VPB says no inference of discrimination can be drawn that racial stereotypes and/or Ms. Elshazly’s protected characteristics played any part in Cst. Cheng’s decision to arrest her because his conduct was motivated by her actions, and not her protected characteristics. I address their rebuttal after addressing Ms. Elshazly’s arguments on nexus.
[41] The evidence before me leads me to conclude that, on a balance of probabilities, Ms. Elshazly’s race or colour can be inferred to be a factor in her arrest during the traffic stop.
2. Legal framework
[42] The complainant is required to lead evidence capable of supporting an inference of discrimination from the perspective of a reasonably objective observer: Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 136 [Francis (No. 3)] at paras. 282-283. The subtlety of prejudice, and the availability of the inference, does not create a presumption of discrimination: Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4), 2019 BCHRT 275 [Campbell (No. 4)] at paras. 103-104. Any inference of discrimination must be rooted in the evidence of a particular case: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para. 88; Batson-Dottin v. Forensic Psychiatric Hospital (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 246 at para. 82.
[43] The Tribunal has said that social context of an interaction alone does not prove that a complainant was discriminated against. However, the facts of this complaint – like many race-based complaints – can only be properly understood within their broader social context: Campbell (No. 4) at paras. 16-19. In large part, this is because:
Individual acts themselves may be ambiguous or explained away, but when viewed as part of the larger picture and with an appropriate understanding of how racial discrimination takes place, may lead to an inference that racial discrimination was a factor in the treatment an individual received.
OHRC Guidelines at p 21
[44] The Tribunal has said that a proper understanding of the social context may support a finding that an individual has experienced a race-based adverse impact: Campbell (No. 4) at para. 105. In Young Worker v. Heirloom and another, 2023 BCHRT 137 [Young Worker], the Tribunal offers a helpful compendium of caselaw to highlight the nuances in which anti-Black discrimination exists in Canadian society:
Canadian law recognizes that anti-Black stereotypes, as a type of racial discrimination, continue to seep into our collective psyche whether consciously or subconsciously: R. v. Parks, 1993 CanLII 3383 (ON CA) [Parks]; Balikama obo others v. Khaira Enterprises and others, 2014 BCHRT 107 [Balikama] at paras. 585-586; Turner v. Canada Border Services Agency, 2020 CHRT 1 [Turner] at para. 49; Symonds v Halifax Regional Municipality (Halifax Regional Police Department) (Re), 2021 CanLII 37128 (NS HRC) at paras. 84-85. This social context is inextricably tied to centuries of Black slavery, segregation, colonialism, and other gross inequalities founded on racism: Balikama at paras. 474-476; Knights v. DebtCollect Inc., 2017 HRTO 211 at para. 21; R. v. Morris, 2018 ONSC 5186 at para. 22 (reversed on other grounds in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680).
Given the mandate to identify and eliminate persistent patterns of inequality associated with discrimination, the Tribunal needs to be alert to the ways anti-Black stereotypes may manifest when assessing complaints of anti-Black discrimination: Code, s. 3(d).
Paras. 51-52.
[45] Human rights law recognizes that anti-Black stereotypes or biases may manifest as a Black person being singled out for heightened scrutiny, suspicion, or disproportionately harsh treatment: Young Worker at para. 53, citing Wickham v. Hong Shing Chinese Restaurant, 2018 HRTO 500 [Wickham], McCarthy v. Kenny Tan Pharmacy Inc., 2015 HRTO 1303 [McCarthy], Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 877, Graham v. Enterprise Rent A Car Canada Company representing Enterprise, Alamo, and National Car Rental, 2020 HRTO 424 [Graham]. Young Worker goes on to explain:
[In Graham,] the Tribunal recognized that Black people may be subject to heightened scrutiny based on the stereotype that Black people are prone to criminal behaviour: para. 60. See also: Nassiah v. Peel (Regional Municipality) Services Board, 2007 HRTO 14 at paras. 129, 131 and 134. In Abbott v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 1909 [Abbott], the Tribunal found that a police sergeant’s conduct in arresting a Black woman was consistent with a manifestation of racism “whereby a White person in a position of authority has an expectation of docility and compliance from a racialized person and imposes harsh consequences if that docility and compliance is not provided”: para. 46.
In McDonald v. CAA South Central Ontario, 2018 HRTO 163, the Tribunal recognized that Black women may be stereotyped as “angry” when expressing themselves in ways that would be judged non-offensive in the case of a White person: para. 198. In Graham, the Tribunal found that a Black woman was stereotyped as an “angry Black person”, which led a car rental company to overreact and refuse her a car rental: para. 60. In Buchanan v. Providence Health Care and others, 2023 BCHRT 50, the Tribunal accepted that a physician’s notes referring to a Black woman patient as “entitled and angry” could give rise to an inference of discrimination, based on a stereotype about her race and sex: para. 27. See also: Ontario Human Rights Commission, Racial profiling and human rights, Vol 14. No 1. 2017 (2017) at p. 35. I accept that the “angry Black woman” stereotype exists in Canada and that Black women are uniquely targeted by that stereotype.
[46] With an awareness of this social context, I return to the question of whether it is more probable than not that Ms. Elshazly’s race or colour was a factor in the treatment she experienced during the arrest. I find that it is. I then turn to the VPB’s submission that the inference is far less probable than its credible, non-discriminatory explanation.
[47] Here, I am persuaded that the following evidence about the encounter lead to an inference that race and colour were factors in the VPB arresting Ms. Elshazly during the traffic stop:
a. Cst. Bokenfohr telling Ms. Elshazly, “you’re one drunk lady”;
b. Cst. Bokenfohr telling Ms. Elshazly not to move or “run off”;
c. In cross-examination, Cst. Bokenfohr described Ms. Elshazly demeanor as “belligerent” because the look on her face was “as if [she were] smiling…a certain smugness when she got out of the car” and she was “uncooperative”;
d. Cst. Cheng’s report described Ms. Elshazly as belligerent and exaggerated claims that she was rude and made racist comments;
e. Cst. Cheng’s rapid escalation during the encounter to an obstruction of justice charge and arrest; and,
f. The officer’s imposition of harsh consequences on Ms. Elshazly.
[48] For the following reasons, the officers’ conduct indicates to me that the police response was an overreaction based on “implicit stereotypical associations” that arose because the police saw Ms. Elshazly as more of a threat than she really was: JKB at para. 46. Acting on stereotypes, the police exerted more control over Ms. Elshazly than they would have if she was not Black.
3. The officers’ comments directed to Ms. Elshazly during her arrest
[49] In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the VPB accused Ms. Elshazly of being intoxicated and warned her, without any basis, not to “run off”. Ms. Elshazly testified that being accused of being drunk was “extremely offensive” because she does not consume alcohol for religious reasons. She said, “I may have been confused, frustrated by what’s happening but wasn’t in any way wanting to run away or drunk or didn’t know what I was doing.” Her description of her behaviour accords with what I viewed in the video footage. There was no objective evidence to prompt the officer’s suggestion; the officer did not take any steps that would suggest he was genuinely concerned about her level of intoxication, nor did Ms. Elshazly do anything to cause or reinforce a belief that she was a flight risk. I also consider the officers’ tone in these statements. The comments are said offhandedly with a veneer of denigration, and without any measure of true concern. Suggesting Ms. Elshazly was intoxicated in public and of being a flight risk was disproportionate, unnecessary, and provocative. I find it more probable than not that the stereotype that Black people are prone to criminal behaviour influenced the officers’ behaviour in subjecting Ms. Elshazly to the unfounded, heightened scrutiny and their denigrating comments and accusations.
4. Description of Ms. Elshazly’s conduct and demeanor
[50] For the following reasons, I also find that the officers’ description of Ms. Elshazly as belligerent, and the decision to physically restrain and arrest her for obstruction of justice was tainted by both the “angry Black woman” stereotype and by the disproportionate expectation of docility and compliance by racialized people.
[51] The officers all described Ms. Elshazly as belligerent; however, I find that the evidence does not accord with that description. There is no doubt Ms. Elshazly could have been more tactful; however, she accepted her arrest calmly. Cst. Bokenfohr described Ms. Elshazly as belligerent but agreed on cross-examination that Ms. Elshazly communicated clearly and calmly. He explained that it was her facial expression that caused him to see her as smug and belligerent. Cst. Cheng included similar descriptions in his police report:
Throughout this entire encounter, [Ms. Elshazly] was verbally belligerent and rude toward police. [Ms. Elshazly] made a lot of racist comments toward PC Cheng’s ethnicity and was speaking in a language PC Cheng was unfamiliar of. [Ms. Elshazly’s friend, [Mr. Y] also shouted at [Ms. Elshazly many times to cooperate and to settle down].
[52] At the hearing, Cst. Cheng testified during cross-examination that Ms. Elshazly’s behaviour was not overly aggressive; she did not push him or attempt to run away, and she did not yell at him.
[53] Cst. Cheng testified during direct examination that Ms. Elshazly brought his race up a few times saying, “do you speak English” and made references to his race. It was not put to Ms. Elshazly during the hearing who she was referring to and why she made the statement, and she did not give any testimony about the statement when giving her direct evidence. In reply, she says the statement was directed at Cst. Bokenfohr because he was close to her. However, I have not considered what she has said in her written closing reply because that is not in evidence, nor does it accord with the video evidence. In my view, the evidence shows that Ms. Elshazly directed the comment to Cst. Cheng. The video recordings show that she was near Cst. Cheng and Cst. Bokenfohr when she said, “I’m being arrested for not having my ID by this racist piece of shit…They’re being racist as fuck, they didn’t ask for my information.” Ms. F confirmed with the officer that they needed identification from Ms. Elshazly. She then asked Ms. Elshazly for her ID. Ms. Elshazly then repeated,
I don’t have my ID. I don’t have to legally provide you my ID. But I can give you my name and you can look me up…You want to ask for my information, I’ll give you my information. You want to look up my name? My name is Safiya [Middle name] Elshazly by birthday is [date]…”
[54] An officer interrupts and asks Ms. F to step back. Ms. Elshazly tells an officer that she does not have her identification, but she has her “Apple Pay…You don’t need my ID. You have my information. Do you understand that? Do you speak English? Because I’m speaking English with you.”
[55] I accept Ms. Elshazly’s testimony that at this time she was frustrated. In my view, Ms. Elshazly’s statements “Do you understand that? Do you speak English? Because I’m speaking English with you” were made in the context of repeatedly stating that she did not have identification, was not required to have identification, could provide her information for the officers to identify her, and offering identifying information that was ignored by the officers.
[56] Further, there is no evidence to support Cst. Cheng’s observation that she “made a lot of racists comments toward Cst. Cheng’s ethnicity” or that Mr. Y shouted at Ms. Elshazly many times to cooperate and settle down. This evidence is grossly exaggerated when viewed next to the videos in evidence.
[57] Despite their training, the officers’ descriptions of Ms. Elshazly are consistent with indicators of anti-Black stereotypes that unfairly and disproportionately require humility from Black people as compared to their white counterparts. I also find that the officers’ descriptions of Ms. Elshazly’s demeanor and conduct, and Cst. Cheng’s belief that she made racist comments toward him, appear to be rooted in a perception of her as an “angry Black person”. In my view, however, she expressed herself in a manner that would not be considered offensive in the context in which the statements were made.
5. Imposing harsh consequences on Ms. Elshazly
[58] I further find that the officers’ conduct was tainted by racism because they imposed harsh consequences on Ms. Elshazly when their expectation of docility and compliance from a Black woman was not met. The officers all testified that they are trained to identify people who do not have identification. Ms. Elshazly’s clear, audible declarations that she did not have identification should have prompted the officers to follow the usual procedures applicable in such circumstances. Further, Ms. Elshazly’s first name was known to Cst. Cheng early on. Cst. Cheng testified that when he first approached the vehicle and asked the front passenger to tell the back passenger to roll down the windows, the front passenger yelled something to the effect of “Safiya roll down your window.” The video footage also records those present repeatedly using Ms. Elshazly’s first name, including the other passengers in the car, herself when standing next to Cst Bokenfohr and Cst Cheng himself, and when Cst. Cheng returned to the car and asked the passengers for “Safiya’s ID”.
[59] Furthermore, Ms. F, who was in clear violation of traffic rules and whose behaviour was the basis for the traffic stop was not issued a ticket. Cst. Cheng testified that he exercised his discretion not to do so because Ms. F was “cooperative with the encounter”, even though she gave him a bank card that was not a form of valid identification and walked away. He said he also factored in that Ms. F eventually assisted him in obtaining Ms. Elshazly’s identification. Though both Ms. F and Ms. Elshazly were not immediately compliant with Cst. Cheng’s request for identification, the main difference between the treatment of Ms. F and Ms. Elshazly was that Ms. F was quiet and did not assert herself. I have no reservations in concluding that Ms. F was quiet because it was not her “first rodeo” as a Black woman in a police encounter. I find that Cst. Cheng exercised his discretion to treat Ms. Elshazly more harshly than Ms. F because she did not act with the docility and compliance expected of a Black woman during a police encounter.
[60] Cst. Cheng also exercised his discretion to rapidly escalate the encounter with Ms. Elshazly and arrest her without clearly explaining that failure to provide identification can be considered obstruction and giving her the chance to comply by following the usual process.
[61] Ms. Elshazly was arrested for stating that she did not have identification, did not need to provide it, and telling other passengers that this was their right too. Here, the officer was acting within the scope of his duties and in fact, in accordance with the law when arresting Ms. Elshazly for obstruction of justice: R. v. Moore, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 195. However, the circumstances of this complaint show that the arrest for obstruction of justice was hasty, other people were not arrested, and the officers did not follow the usual procedure to allow her to provide a name so they could search her. I also note that there is no evidence that Ms. Elshazly’s proclamations that other passengers did not have to show their identification had an influence on the other passengers; the other passengers showed their identification immediately. Cst. Cheng then pursued the harshest course of action even though less severe options were available to him.
[62] In all of the circumstances, find that the VPB’s actions were based on an unjustified assessment of her demeanor.
6. Conclusion
[63] In view of all of the above, I am satisfied that Ms. Elshazly has shown that that her race or colour was a factor in being handcuffed and arrested. I now turn to the VPB’s submission that the inference of discrimination is far less probable than the alternative explanation that they have provided in their submission.
7. VPB’s non-discriminatory explanation for their conduct
[64] When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, as in this complaint, the question before the Tribunal is whether an inference of racial discrimination is more probable than the explanation offered by the respondent: Campbell (No. 4) at paras. 102-103. VPB’s submission on nexus, and defense generally, focuses on presenting a credible non-discriminatory explanation for their conduct.
[65] I begin with the VPB’s submission that the Tribunal should scrutinize Cst. Cheng’s actions, independently from the actions of the other VPB’s members. I disagree. The VPB is the named respondent, and the totality of their conduct during the stop is what is at issue in this complaint.
[66] The VPB says Cst. Cheng’s conduct was motivated by Ms. Elshazly’s actions, not her protected characteristics. The VPB’s argument amounts to asking the Tribunal to consider Cst. Cheng’s intent. It is trite law that under the Code, the complainant does not need to show a subjective intention to discriminate by the respondent; the focus is on the effect of the respondent’s actions on the complainant: Code, s. 2; Further, even if I were to accept that Cst. Cheng was responding to Ms. Elshazly’s actions, that does not negate the possibility for implicit bias. Again, Ms. Elshazly’s protected characteristics need only be a factor in the adverse treatment she experienced, and not the sole factor. I turn to Cst. Cheng’s note in the police report, quoted above and to which he spoke to at the hearing.
[67] Cst. Cheng’s evidence is that he recalled Ms. Elshazly being “very rude” and “belligerent” with the police, in general. He testified that she brought his race up a few times saying something like, “do you speak English” and making references to his race. As stated previously, this report is grossly exaggerated, and in cross examination he demurred and agreed that she was not overly aggressive or yelling. Considering all of the evidence, I find that on a balance of probabilities, implicit bias led to Cst. Cheng to perceive Ms. Elshazly as “very rude” and “belligerent” and to his subsequent decision to escalate a routine traffic stop into an altercation between police and a racialized person.
[68] Further, while Ms. Elshazly asked if he spoke English, to use that response as an after the fact justification for restraining and arresting Ms. Elshazly “would be to blame her for refusing to continue to tolerate the discriminatory treatment she was receiving”: Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) and Securiguard Services (No. 3), 2005 BCHRT 302, at para. 484. As stated in JKB, “how we treat a person can in turn influence how they behave. If our expectations are that a person is going to be aggressive and we treat them in a certain way, then our behaviour might drive their behaviour – they might not have acted that way if we hadn’t initially acted in a certain way.” This seems especially relevant in situations where there is a power imbalance between an armed state agent and a civilian.
[69] The VPB says that there is no evidence that Ms. Elshazly was arrested because she did not have identification, but rather because she refused to comply with Cst. Cheng’s lawful direction to produce her identification. In my view, this is a distinction without a difference. Again, the VPB is trained to pursue a line of inquiry when a person does not have identification and instead of doing so, Cst. Cheng chose to escalate the situation. I do not find the VPB’s submissions persuasive.
[70] The VPB also says Ms. Elshazly was the only passenger who refused to give identification and this was the foundation for why she was treated differently, not her race. The VPB submits that the other visibly Black passengers were not treated this way, and that this undermines Ms. Elshazly’s assertion that race was a factor in her arrest. I do not find this argument persuasive. Simply because other Black passengers were not subjected to the same level of escalation as Ms. Elshazly does not by itself mean that race and colour was not a factor in how the VPB treated Ms. Elshazly, a Black woman.
[71] Further, I’m not convinced that the other Black passengers were not treated harshly by the other officers on scene. While Cst. Cheng was addressing Ms. Elshazly and Ms. F on the sidewalk, his partner, Cst. Aminie, was interacting with the driver and other passengers in the car. When the Black passengers asked for Cst. Aminie’s badge number subsequent to the collective arrest, he yelled, “listen, the badge number, you can get it at any point!” He did not give his badge number and the passengers got out of the car. The white driver asked if she had to step out of the car too. From one video, it appears Cst Aminie did not require her to get out of the car while all the Black passengers were required to gather on the sidewalk. In that video, at least four of the passengers are seen on the sidewalk with five officers supervising them. Cst. Aminie is then seen calmly walking with the driver to an area of the sidewalk several meters away from the group; no officer provided Cst. Aminie cover while he was alone with the driver. If all the people in the car were treated proportionately, only Ms. F, Ms. Elshazly, and the driver would have been issued infractions. Instead, all the people in the car except Ms. F were collectively placed under arrest for obstruction of justice and issued infractions, and all the passengers except the white driver were ordered to exit the car. The VPB have not provided an explanation for the differential treatment.
[72] My main issue with the VPB’s submission is that even if the officers considered Ms. Elshazly to be obstructing justice by claiming not to have identification when she did, in fact, have identification, these submissions do not account for the totality of the evidence, including Cst. Cheng’s immediate escalation to arresting Ms. Elshazly, his decision to place Ms. Elshazly in handcuffs for what appears to be a minor traffic violation, and the officers’ denigrating comments to her during the arrest. The submission also fails to account for the social context that the Tribunal has considered in cases of racial discrimination, and which I considered in finding that Ms. Elshazly has established an inference of discrimination.
[73] In all of the circumstances, I am persuaded an inference of racial discrimination is more probable than the non-discriminatory explanation offered by the VPB has. In saying this, I am not suggesting that the VPB’s response stemmed from a conscious bias against Ms. Elshazly as a Black woman. As stated in Abbott at para. 45:
Most often, racial discrimination emanates from unconscious attitudes and belief systems. In a historical context, some of these attitudes and belief systems include that Black persons (and other groups) are expected to “know their place” and that any Black person who talks back or refuses to comply is to be regarded as “uppity” and needs to be dealt with harshly. There is no evidence before me that Sergeant Ruffino consciously subscribes to any such attitudes or belief systems. But these kinds of attitudes and belief systems are part of our historical and social fabric, and are imbued in all of us through social interactions, the education system, the media and entertainment industries, and other means.
[74] Ms. Elshazly has proven the elements of Moore. I infer that her race and colour were factors in the adverse treatment she experienced and that that inference is more probable than a credible, non-discriminatory explanation offered by the VPB in this instance. Ms. Elshazly has established the elements of Moore. I now turn to whether the VPB has established a bona fide and reasonable justification for her arrest.
C. Has the VPB has established a bona fide and reasonable justification for Ms. Elshazly’s arrest?
[75] I must decide whether the VPB has established a bona fide and reasonable justification for Ms. Elshazly’s arrest. I find that they have not.
[76] Under s. 8 of the Code, a respondent to a human rights complaint may defend its actions on the basis that they are not discriminatory because the distinction they made was justified. The onus is on the respondent to prove on a balance of probabilities that the distinction or standard that is discriminatory has a bona fide and reasonable justification because the following criteria are met:
1. They adopted a standard for a purpose or goal rationally connected to the function being performed;
2. They adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose or goal;
3. The standard adopted is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose or goal. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individuals sharing the characteristics of the claimant without incurring undue hardship.
British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 [Grismer] at para. 20.
[77] The VPB made limited submissions on the application of the Grismer test and asserted that its earlier argument is dispositive of the conduct being justified in the circumstances. In effect, they say the conduct at issue was carried out in good faith and for a purpose rationally connected to Cst. Cheng’s functions and duties to enforce the Motor Vehicle Act. Further, they say the conduct at issue was reasonably necessary to accomplish this purpose. I understand the “conduct at issue” to mean requiring individuals to provide identification during a traffic stop so that VPB officers can issue a violation ticket.
[78] I am prepared to accept that requiring individuals to identify themselves with physical identification during a traffic stop to issue a violation ticket is rationally connected to the purpose of fulfilling the VPB’s duty to enforce the Motor Vehicle Act.
[79] Grismer requires that, once the legitimacy of VPB’s more general purpose is established, VPB must demonstrate that it engaged in the conduct with an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose: at para. 20. That is, VPB must demonstrate that they honestly believed that obtaining Ms. Elshazly’s identification was necessary to identify her. I am also prepared to accept that the practice of obtaining physical identification was adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it is necessary to the fulfillment of an officer’s duty to enforce the Motor Vehicle Act.
[80] Under the third step of Grismer, to prove that a standard is reasonably necessary, the respondent bears the burden of demonstrating that the standard incorporates every possible accommodation to the point of undue hardship. “Accommodation” refers to what is required in the circumstances to avoid discrimination: Grismer at para. 22. The burden is on the VPB to demonstrate that, in the course of accomplishing their purpose, they cannot accommodate an individual without experiencing undue hardship. The use of the word “undue” implies that some hardship is acceptable; it is only “undue” hardship that will relieve the VPB from its duty to accommodate Ms. Elshazly. (See also Central Okanagan School District v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970).
[81] Cst. Cheng testified that physical identification is the best means to confirm someone’s identity and satisfy himself that he is issuing a ticket to the person being stopped. That may be the case, but it is not the only way to identify someone for that purpose. Each police witness, including Cst. Cheng, testified that in the event someone does not have identification, they can simply ask the individual for their name, address, or other identifying information. They can run that information in their system and confirm that person’s identity if that person has had a previous encounter with the police. It is not in dispute that the police had previously stopped Ms. Elshazly for a traffic violation. It follows that had an officer simply requested and run her information, they could have been able to identify her. This is not a situation where the officers did everything to confirm the identify of the individual before them: Radheshwar v. New Westminster Police Board and another, 2025 BCHRT 196, at para. 128. I find that insisting on her physical identification and arresting her was not reasonably necessary to accomplish the goal of enforcing the Motor Vehicle Act Regulations.
[82] The VPB has not explained why it would have caused undue hardship to do minimal police work prior to placing Ms. Elshazly in handcuffs and under arrest.
[83] The VPB submits that the officers’ response was justified in all of the circumstances because Ms. Elshazly ultimately had her physical identification on her which confirmed Cst. Cheng’s suspicion that she had it in her possession but was refusing to give it to the officer. The VPB also says that what is paramount in determining justification is Cst. Cheng’s reasonable belief that Ms. Elshazly had identification because someone in the car said, “give them your id” and Ms. Elshazly stated that she did not have to give her physical identification card. The VPB submits that if the Tribunal approaches the analysis from the perspective of Cst. Cheng, the Tribunal will not find a connection between Ms. Elshazly’s protected characteristics and her arrest during the traffic stop. I disagree. I am not persuaded that an after the fact justification fully explains the VPB’s treatment of Ms. Elshazly during the stop. While the review of the evidence undermines the idea that Ms. Elshazly was being obstructive as opposed to not merely having identification, this does not refute the idea that Cst. Cheng could have believed on reasonable grounds that she was obstructing his duties. However, while the after the fact justification may support a finding about his suspicion, it does not explain the disproportionate reaction and escalation, singling her out for harsh treatment, and his choice to depart from usual procedures.
[84] Ms. Elshazly says regardless of whether she had a seatbelt on, nothing about a seatbelt inquiry alone should ever justify the level of force, hostility, or criminalization that followed that night. I agree and extend that logic to conclude the conduct was not justified even if she did not give her identification to the officers knowingly. The police officers did not need to escalate the situation when they had the training and tools available to them to deescalate the encounter.
[85] I find the VPB’s conduct fails the third step of Grismer. The complaint is justified. Ms. Elshazly is entitled to remedies under s. 37(2) of the Code.
VI REMEDY
[86] In addition to the mandatory order under s. 37(2)(a) of the Code, Ms. Elshazly seeks discretionary remedies under ss. 37(2)(d)(ii) and (iii).
[87] In the course of this complaint, Ms. Elshazly filed the Form 9.5 Remedy Disclosure but delayed in filing the Form 9.4 Remedies Sought. At the hearing, I was persuaded by the VPB’s preliminary arguments about fairness and substantial prejudice with proceeding on short notice on all the remedies sought. I was satisfied that Ms. Elshazly had notice and opportunities to file her remedy form in a timely manner. I offered Ms. Elshazly the opportunity to bifurcate the hearing between liability and remedies, or to pursue the remedy of injury to dignity and the repurchase of her iPhone, as these were remedies the respondent could have reasonably foreseen from reading her Complaint Form and Form 9.5. Ms. Elshazly chose not to bifurcate the hearing and agreed to orally amend her remedy form to no longer pursue an order that the VPB pay $96,542.86 for wages or salary lost because of the discrimination, as well as some expenses she incurred as a result of the discrimination. As such, the only discretionary remedies she is entitled to is the cost associated with replacing her damaged iPhone and an injury to dignity award.
A. iPhone
[88] The VPB does not make any argument on the cost of replacing the iPhone. I am satisfied that the iPhone was damaged on account of the VPB’s discriminatory arrest of Ms. Elshazly. Ms. Elshazly put in evidence the invoice showing the cost of replacing the damaged phone. I order the VPB pay $1,398.90 to Ms. Elshazly for the value of its replacement, pursuant to s. 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code.
B. Injury to Dignity
[89] Ms. Elshazly seeks an order of $25,000 for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect. The Respondent says Ms. Elshazly does not provide any analogous case law to support a quantum for injury to dignity. The Respondents submit that any injury to dignity award should be nominal and not exceed $500.
[90] In assessing compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, the Tribunal generally considers three broad factors: the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant: Oger (No. 7) at para. 225. The purpose of this award is to compensate the complainant for the harms of discrimination. It is not punitive. The quantum is “highly contextual and fact-specific”, and the Tribunal has considerable discretion to award an amount it deems necessary to compensate a person who has been discriminated against: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396 at para. 260; University of British Columbia v. Kelly, 2016 BCCA 271 [Kelly] at paras. 59–64.
[91] I begin with the nature of the discrimination. The nature of the discrimination was a single, relatively brief encounter, lasting about 35 minutes. For the majority of the time, Ms. Elshazly was physically restrained, under arrest, and subjected to demeaning comments by the VPB officers.
[92] Next, I find that Ms. Elshazly was particularly vulnerable in this encounter. As stated earlier, any encounter between a civilian and a police officer creates an imbalance of power: Abbott at para. 42; Campbell (No. 4)at para. 152.
[93] I also consider the serious impact of the arrest. Ms. Elshazly was emotional during her testimony on the impact the arrest had on her. When VPB’s counsel asked Ms. Elshazly about a statement she made about having physical pain from the placement of the handcuffs, Ms. Elshazly testified on cross-examination that she was,
[…]in shock…my heart is racing a million heartbeat. I am confused and puzzled and all the different emotions there is…during that time I was thinking a million questions in my head: what’s going on here?…I feel the pain even right now, physically, emotionally, mentally, and it’s recalling in my head…I was confused. I was puzzled. I didn’t know what was going on. This is the first time in my life that I got arrested or been in handcuffs so, no, I didn’t understand what was going on in the moment…I didn’t feel the pain right away, I was in a different mindset. I didn’t know what was going on. I felt like worse than a fucking animal in a cage and – pardon my language – this is how upset I was.
[94] Ms. Elshazly also testified that being called “one drunk lady” was “extremely offensive” because she does not drink for religious reasons. She also said, regarding the officers’ stated concern about her running away,
“I may have been confused, frustrated by what’s happening but wasn’t in any way wanting to run away or drunk or didn’t know what I was doing. Not the first time I was stopped for a vehicle violation but never in a situation like this. After Cheng handcuffed me, he said don’t run away from me. Running away during a traffic stop wasn’t a concern for me.”
[95] The stop initially concerned the driver and the fourth passenger but the officers turned the stop’s focus on Ms. Elshazly in a manner that was traumatic, violent, and unnecessary given the officers’ training on how to identify people without physical identification. An interaction between a police officer and any member of the public inherently involves the exercise of power, given the powers that are granted to a police officer by statute: Abbott, at para. 42. However, the VPB exercised its extraordinary powers of arrest in an interaction with a civilian that, as I have previously found, did not require escalation. I find that the inherent imbalance of power between Ms. Elshazly and the VPB was inappropriately exacerbated due to Ms. Elshazly’s race. The VPB’s conduct reflects a lack of restraint that ultimately erodes trust in a civic institution. The impact of the encounter on Ms. Elshazly was significant.
[96] I find that the depth of the offense to Ms. Elshazly’s dignity was significant. I consider that Ms. Elshazly was not inebriated, was compliant with the officer’s order to exit the vehicle and was compliant during the arrest. She repeatedly and voluntarily offered to give her information, and did so on multiple occasions while arrested, but she was ignored. Her only act of noncompliance was saying she and the others had a right not to provide physical identification to police. At the time of her arrest, the officer had her first name but never tried to ascertain her identity. Soon after, the officers had her full name and date of birth, but the officers did not act upon that information. Finally, while arrested, she was subjected to demeaning conduct by the VPB.
[97] In all of the circumstances, Ms. Elshazly is entitled to the remedy she seeks. I order the VPB to pay Ms. Elshazly $25,000 for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect, pursuant to s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code.
VII CONCLUSION
[98] The complaint is justified. The VPB discriminated against Ms. Elshazly in services on account of her race and colour under s. 8 of the Code. I dismiss the allegations as they relate to her place of origin.
[99] I declare that the VPB’s conduct was discrimination contrary to the Code: s. 37(2)(b).
[100] I order the VPB to stop the contravention and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention: Code, s. 37(2)(a).
[101] I order the VPB pay $1,398.90 to Ms. Elshazly for the value of replacing her iPhone: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(ii).
[102] I order the VPB to pay Ms. Elshazly $25,000 for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii).
Laila Said
Tribunal Member