Mudaliar v. Fort Park Property Management and Real Estate Ltd., 2026 BCHRT 193
Date Issued: September 9, 2026
File(s): CS-006490
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Sabrina Mudaliar
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Fort Park Property Management and Real Estate Ltd.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Ijeamaka Anika
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Aleksandar J. Petrovic; Kelly Hodder (dismissal application)
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In this decision, I explain why I allow Fort Park Property Management and Real Estate Ltd.’s application to dismiss Sabrina Mudaliar’s complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Human Rights Code on the basis that Ms. Mudaliar has no reasonable prospect of establishing that Fort Park discriminated against her contrary to the Code.
[2] Ms. Mudaliar lives in a building operated by the Owners, Strata Plan NWS 1348 [the Strata]. Ms. Mudaliar’s parent’s own the strata lot where she lives. Fort Park Property Management and Real Estate Ltd. is the property management company retained by the Strata to assist its Strata Council with the administration of the building. Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint alleges that Fort Park discriminated against her in tenancy based on race, ancestry, and mental and physical disability, contrary to s. 10 of the Human Rights Code. She alleges that Fort Park did not respond to her concerns about an offensive note referencing her disability that was left in her mailbox, or to police after she reported the incident. She alleges members of the Strata Council stood outside her window and made derogatory racial and sexual slurs at her and made comments about her body. She also alleges that Fort Park and the Strata Council excluded her from strata services and deliberately made her living conditions intolerable because of her disabilities, in an effort to make her move out of her home. I refer to this complaint as the Original Complaint.
[3] On September 11, 2025, Ms. Mudaliar amended her complaint to add allegations of discrimination and retaliation. The amendment alleges ongoing harassment, criminal threats, vandalism, and targeted sexualized degradation. The amendment raises the grounds of sex and religion, which were not pleaded in the Original Complaint. The Tribunal accepted the amendment and informed Fort Park on October 31, 2025, that it could file an amended response by November 21, 2025. Fort Park did not do so.
[4] Fort Park denies discriminating and applies to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. Fort Park argues that it is reasonably certain to prove that it is not a proper respondent to the complaint, because among other things, it acts solely on the instructions of the Strata Council and has no independent decision-making authority. Further, it argues that if it owed Ms. Mudaliar a duty under the Code, it is reasonably certain to prove it fulfilled that duty by requesting information about her disability and accommodation needs, which she did not initially provide, and which did not indicate she needed particular accommodations.
[5] Ms. Mudaliar did not respond to the dismissal application. As set out below, I am satisfied she had notice of the application and an opportunity to respond to it, and I decide the application on the materials before me.
[6] For the following reasons, I dismiss the complaint. While I am not persuaded that Fort Park is an improper respondent, and I am satisfied that the complaint is properly characterized as a complaint of discrimination in services under s. 8 of the Code, and I am satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar has no reasonable prospect of proving that Fort Park discriminated or retaliated against her. I have considered all the materials before me and refer only to those necessary to explain my decision.
[7] Ms. Mudaliar also filed a complaint against the Strata and two individual respondents which are currently going through the Tribunal’s process. I make no findings about the Strata’s conduct in the first complaint, and nothing in this decision affects the Tribunal’s findings in that proceeding.
II BACKGROUND
[8] Ms. Mudaliar is a South Asian woman with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD], general anxiety disorder, and brain trauma causing migraines and cognitive issues. She moved into the Strata in 2016. Her Strata lot is owned by her parents and according to Ms. Mudaliar, she is the proxy of her parents concerning the lot.
[9] Some of the background information concerns events that took place before Fort Park became the Strata’s property manager.
[10] The parties disagree about when Ms. Mudaliar first disclosed a disability and whether she requested accommodation. Ms. Mudaliar says that by 2018, she had advised the Strata Council and the then-property manager of her medical condition. On Fort Park’s version of events, Ms. Mudaliar first mentioned her medical condition in correspondence with the Strata in early 2019.
[11] Sometime between November and December 2020, someone left an offensive note at Ms. Mudaliar’s front door. Ms. Mudaliar says that the note told her to move out of the building because “people in the building hate [her]” and made disparaging remarks regarding her disability. The note predates Fort Park’s involvement as property manager. Ms. Mudaliar reported the incident to police. She told the police she thought a particular Strata Council member left the note. Fort Park says that police investigated the matter and found insufficient evidence that the Strata Council member identified by Ms. Mudaliar had left the note.
[12] Fort Park and the Strata entered into an agreement on April 6, 2021. Under the agreement, Fort Park provides property management services to the Strata, including assisting the Strata Council with the administration of common property, correspondence, bylaw enforcement, financial matters, and communications with owners and residents. Fort Park says it does not maintain a physical presence at the building and that its interactions with Strata Council members, owners, and residents occur by telephone, email, or video conference.
[13] In April 2021, Ms. Mudaliar filed a complaint with the Tribunal against the Strata and several other individuals, including Strata Council members, raising the same or similar allegations.
[14] In May 2021, Ms. Mudaliar emailed the Strata to complain of a number of incidents that she characterized as harassment from other residents and provide information about her medical condition. For example, she alleged that Strata Council members falsely accused her of installing cameras, left garbage and contaminated food at her door, threatened to poison her dogs, looked into her windows and photographed her, and made loud noises outside her unit at night. On June 7, 2021, the Strata wrote to Ms. Mudaliar requesting details about any accommodation she was seeking, together with supporting documentation. The Strata also asked her to provide further particulars of the incidents and concerns she had reported. Ms. Mudaliar responded the following day that she was not seeking any specific or special accommodation and repeated her concerns about the ongoing conflicts with other residents. In response, the Strata confirmed that Ms. Mudaliar was not requesting a specific accommodation.
[15] In September 2021, Ms. Mudaliar emailed Fort Park regarding the ongoing issues she was experiencing. Ms. Mudaliar reiterated that she had a disability and asked Fort Park to address her ongoing concerns about squeaky floors in the unit above, which she said were causing noise disturbances and adversely affecting her health and quality of life. She told Fort Park that she had “spoken to the human rights tribunal clinic and they said this request [for medical information] violates my human rights and is intrusive.” She also told Fort Park that she had filed complaints with the “civil rights tribunal.” It is unclear whether Fort Park responded to this email.
[16] Ms. Mudaliar says that on March 7, 2022, Strata Council members stood outside her window, called her derogatory names, including racial and sexual slurs, and made comments about her body. She further alleges that a second offensive note was left in her mailbox in March 2022. She reported the note to Fort Park and the Strata, informing them she would report the incidents to the police. On April 7, 2022, the Strata responded to Ms. Mudaliar’s report of the offensive note, stating that it could not act because the allegation was based on her suspicion and there was insufficient evidence identifying who had left the note. The Strata also advised that, because Ms. Mudaliar was not the registered owner of the strata lot, any future complaints would need to be submitted by her parents as the owners, in accordance with strata bylaw.
[17] On May 17, 2023, Ms. Mudaliar provided a medical report to Fort Park. The medical report described several medical conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. It did not identify or recommend any specific accommodation.
[18] In 2025, Ms. Mudaliar’s unit lost hot water and heating on a number of occasions. She sent several emails to Fort Park about the outages. In one of her emails, Ms. Mudaliar stated:
My water in my shower has been shut off illegally because the people I filed a complaint against including City Hall are angry. I heard them talking around the building and they shut off my water in my bathroom so I can’t clean myself.
[19] Fort Park responded to Ms. Mudaliar’s emails. In its email regarding the hot water issue, it explained that the building’s plumbing system does not allow hot water service to be interrupted to a single unit and that no other residents had reported similar problems. It suggested that the issue may have originated within Ms. Mudaliar’s unit, recommended that she have the landlord (her parents) contact a plumber to investigate, as part of their duty under the bylaws to repair and maintain their strata lot. Fort Park forwarded their email to Ms. Mudaliar to her parents; they responded that they would look into the issue themselves.
[20] On September 5, 2025, Ms. Mudaliar informed Fort Park that her mother’s vehicle was vandalized. She also says that before the incident she heard voices threatening to “do something” to her.
[21] Ms. Mudaliar amended her complaint on September 11, 2025. In addition to the vandalism, the amendment alleges the following:
a. Since filing the Original Complaint, Strata Council members have continued to threaten her and her family with financial penalties, including increased levies and hidden fees. She named a Strata Council member, who she says told her that pursuing the complaint could result in increased levies and financial harm to her family.
b. She was singled out with a $900 “City Hall cleanup” levy that was not applied to any other owners.
c. She and her parents were denied access to financial records to which they are entitled and have been excluded from participation and decision-making in the building’s governance.
d. She continues to be targeted in her home through surveillance, verbal harassment, and degrading behaviour by individuals she associates with the Strata Council and property management, including repeated sexualized and gender-based attacks and mocking of her dance practice.
e. Individuals connected to the building, the Strata Council, and property management have stereotyped her based on her appearance, clothing, and physical features, labelling her a “stripper” and a “hooker” because of her clothing choices. A former colleague referred to her as a stripper while she was employed at a vehicle services company, and the former colleague’s husband appears to have an interest in the building along with the previous property manager.
f. Other residents ridiculed a dancer’s pole installed in her home, which she says holds personal spiritual significance, and used it to justify harassment, surveillance, and trespass.
g. Other residents interfered with and ridiculed her spiritual practices and directed a racial slur at her call to prayer.
III PRELIMINARY ISSUE
A. Is Ms. Mudaliar a tenant within the meaning of s. 10?
[22] Ms. Mudaliar brings her complaint under s. 10 of the Code. Fort Park disputes that Ms. Mudaliar is a tenant within the meaning of the Code. It says she resides in a strata lot owned by her parents, that it is not party to any tenancy or occupancy agreement with her, and that any tenancy obligations lie between her and the registered owners.
[23] I am also aware that Ms. Mudaliar is self-represented, and her materials in appear at the Tribunal’s gate “in ragged form”: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority, 2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 38; Rush v. Fraser Health Authority (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 13 at para. 28; PL v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development and others, 2023 BCHRT 58 at para. 30. The Tribunal’s duty of fairness requires it to look past that form to the substance of what a self-represented complainant is trying to advance, and to be cautious about dismissing a complaint that may have merit despite its form.
[24] Based on the materials before me, I am satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar sets out a complaint that alleges discrimination under the Code. While Ms. Mudaliar ticks the box for discrimination in tenancy, I understand that her complaint may be more appropriately characterized as discrimination in services. Section 8 of the Code prohibits stratas from discriminating in its services: Stengert obo others v. Strata Plan BCS2427, 2018 BCHRT 70, at para 19; Leary v. Strata Plan VR1001, 2016 BCHRT 139, at para 65. Deciding this complaint under s. 8 rather than s. 10 raises no issue of procedural fairness. I note that Fort Park recognizes this possibility in its submissions; arguing in the alternative that it does not itself provide a service to Ms. Mudaliar within the meaning of s. 8 and citing authorities in support. Ms. Mudaliar did not address this in her complaint and as I noted above, she did not make submissions in the application to dismiss. Therefore, I must only consider the evidence before me: Chan at para. 77.
[25] I therefore consider whether Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of proving discrimination in services under s. 8 of the Code.
IV DECISION
[26] Fort Park applies to dismiss Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on Fort Park to establish the basis for dismissal.
[27] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[28] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, it looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[29] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[30] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[31] As stated above, I am satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar received notice of Fort Park’s application to dismiss her complaint. On August 28, 2025, the Tribunal sent the parties a submissions schedule for the dismissal application. Fort Park filed its dismissal application on October 30, 2025, copying Ms. Mudaliar at her email address for service. Ms. Mudaliar’s response to Fort Park’s application was due on November 6, 2025. She did not file her response. On December 30, 2025, the Tribunal followed up with Ms. Mudaliar. It informed her that the dismissal application would proceed without her response and told her the process for filing a late response to the dismissal applications. Ms. Mudaliar did not respond to this email. I am satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar had an opportunity to put forward any evidence or arguments she considered relevant to the dismissal application. She did not. Therefore, the only materials before me from Ms. Mudaliar are the Original Complaint and amendment.
[32] I now turn to Fort Park’s arguments.
[33] Fort Park argues that Ms. Mudaliar has no reasonable prospect of proving her complaint because it acts solely as the Strata’s management agent and has no independent decision-making authority. It says there is no tenancy agreement between Fort Park and Ms. Mudaliar, who resides in a strata lot owned by her parents, and any tenancy-related obligations would arise between Ms. Mudaliar and her parents. Although Ms. Mudaliar advised Fort Park that she had authority to act on her parents’ behalf in relation to the strata lot, Fort Park says it did not receive a formal notice of an assignment. Fort Park further argues that it does not provide a service to Ms. Mudaliar within the meaning of s. 8 of the Code, bears no responsibility for accommodation decisions, and acted only within the scope of its agency agreement with the Strata. It says that any allegations concerning the administration of the Strata are properly directed at the Strata, which is already a respondent in a separate application filed by Ms. Mudaliar. Fort Park argues in the alternative that it is reasonably certain to prove it met any accommodation duties it owned to Ms. Mudaliar.
[34] I will address each of the arguments in turn.
A. Is Fort Park properly named as a respondent to this complaint?
[35] Fort Park accepts it is an agent of the Strata. The Code provides that “an act or thing done or omitted by an employee, officer, director, official or agent of any person within the scope of the person’s authority is deemed to be an act or thing done or omitted by that person”: s. 44(2). As the Tribunal has explained, s. 44(2) fulfills the purpose of the Code by “ensuring that corporate and institutional entities are held responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees and the other listed representatives”: Daley v. B.C. (Ministry of Health) and others, 2006 BCHRT 341 at para. 48. Fort Park’s argument is that, because of this agency relationship, it is not a proper respondent to the complaint.
[36] Fort Park relies on Kallstrom v. Strata Plan BCS1437 and others, 2019 BCHRT 215 and McDaniel and McDaniel v. Strata Plan LMS 1657 and others, 2012 BCHRT 42 to argue that a strata property manager is not a proper respondent unless it acted outside the scope of its delegated authority. I do not read either case as supporting Fort Park’s position.
[37] In Kallstrom, the Tribunal’s finding that the property manager and its employee should not remain named respondents was made under s. 27(1)(d)(ii), focusing on whether proceeding against them would further the purposes of the Code, not under s. 27(1)(c). It turned on the strata corporation’s acknowledgment that it would satisfy any remedial order the Tribunal might make, and on the absence of any evidence that the property management company or its employee acted outside the normal course of their employment, were the directing minds behind the alleged discrimination, or made the impugned bylaw-enforcement decision themselves. In McDaniel (decided under s. 27(1)(c)), the Tribunal found the property manager had no authority to impact the strata’s decisions and no duty to mediate the underlying dispute; the complainants’ choice to direct their concerns to the strata manager did not change that. In both cases, the managers’ roles were passive and limited to communicating decisions made by the strata corporations.
[38] In contrast, Fort Park, on its own submissions, made repeated direct requests to Ms. Mudaliar for information about her disability and the accommodation she required, and it is that engagement that is at issue in this complaint. Fort Park says it did so on the Strata Council’s direction and that the Strata Council holds the decision-making power. That may be so, but as I explained, Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint is in substance about how her reports were handled, not about who ultimately decided them. Unlike in McDaniel, Fort Park does not say it played no role in the accommodation process; it says it discharged that role reasonably. That is its defence on the merits which I address below. I am not satisfied on the materials before me that Fort Park is not a proper respondent. And unlike in Kallstrom, this application does not come with an acknowledgment from the Strata that it takes responsibility for Fort Park’s conduct, nor is this a s. 27(1)(d)(ii) application. Fort Park acted as the Strata Council’s representative when it corresponded with Ms. Mudaliar about her accommodation request.
[39] While I accept that Ms. Mudaliar has an outstanding complaint against the Strata regarding similar issues to this complaint, I am not satisfied that Fort Park is reasonably certain to prove that it is not a properly named respondent with respect to Ms. Mudaliar’s allegations in this complaint. On the evidence before me, Fort Park together with the Strata Council, corresponded with Ms. Mudaliar regarding the issues she was experiencing. Part of Ms. Mudaliar’s allegations is that Fort Park did not respond to her or the police. The remainder of her complaint concerns what she alleges Fort Park did or did not do regarding the hot water, offensive notes, squeaky floors. Fort Park says those outcomes were for the Strata Council to determine. Whether Fort Park is reasonably certain to prove that it lacked control over those matters is an outstanding question that I am unable to determine on the materials before me. Fort Park’s own materials describe strata management services as including the supervision of contractors engaged by the Strata and enforcement of its bylaws, and the extent of what it was delegated to it turns on its agreement with the Strata. Further, Fort Park provides no evidence that the Strata has accepted responsibility for the allegations in this complaint. Fort Park was acting as the Strata’s agent, within the scope of its authority, when it corresponded directly with Ms. Mudaliar about her accommodation request. That is enough to engage s. 44(2).
[40] Next, I turn to whether Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of proving her substantive complaint.
B. Does Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint have a reasonable prospect of success?
[41] Read as a whole, Ms. Mudaliar’s allegations against Fort Park fall into two groups. The first concerns Fort Park’s response to what she reported to it: the notes, the incident outside her window, and the ongoing harassment described in her amendment. Her allegation against Fort Park is that Fort Park did not properly respond to her complaints regarding her issues with other residents. In her complaint she says Fort Park “has not responded to any emails or phone calls from the police or me” and has “refused to handle any of my strata issues because of my disability.” The second group concerns accommodation: the flooring and noise from the unit above hers, and later the heat and hot water outages, which she says Fort Park failed to address in light of her disabilities.
[42] I consider first whether Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of establishing that Fort Park’s response to her reports was discriminatory, and second whether she has a reasonable prospect of establishing that Fort Park failed to accommodate her disabilities. I address her allegations of retaliation separately, under s. 43 of the Code.
1. General Principles
[43] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Mudaliar will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in services, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she does that, the burden will shift toFort Park to justify the impact as bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[44] Much of Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint concerns how Fort Park responded to what she reported. The Tribunal has explained the “duty to respond” to alleged discrimination in Hale v. University of British Columbia Okanagan (No. 5), 2023 BCHRT 121 at paras. 13–17. Although Hale concerned a university’s response to a report of sexual assault, the same principles apply outside that setting: Bighorn v. Board of Education of School District No. 39, 2024 BCHRT 153 at para. 38.
[45] In Hale, the Tribunal explained the duty to respond. It stated the following: the duty to respond is not a standalone, actionable duty under the Code; the test for discrimination remains the Moore test; and the burden remains on the complainant to prove adverse impact and a connection to a protected characteristic: at para. 13. The Tribunal in Hale also stated that an effective response can mitigate or eliminate adverse impacts and restore a discrimination-free environment, while a failure to respond reasonably can exacerbate the harms of discrimination or cause further harm: at paras. 16–17. A response therefore bears on whether there was an adverse impact and on its extent. A response which takes all reasonable and practical steps to address allegations of discrimination may support a reasonable justification defence: Hale at para. 16, citing British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 868[Grismer] at para. 20.
[46] For the purposes of this application, I assume without deciding that Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of proving her protected characteristics within the meaning of the Code.
2. The offensive notes
[47] Regarding the second element of Moore, I accept, for the purpose of this application, Ms. Mudaliar was adversely impacted by being subjected to a note referencing her disability, and to racial and sexual slurs directed at her in her home.However, I am satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar has no reasonable prospect of proving she was adversely impacted in the area of services by Fort Park regarding those notes.
[48] Regarding the first note, Fort Park became the Strata’s property manager sometime in April 2021. The November 2020 note was reported before that date. I am satisfied that Fort Park could not have failed to respond to a report made before it was engaged, and Ms. Mudaliar does not allege that it did. To the extent Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint concerns the November 2020 note, it has no reasonable prospect of success against Fort Park.
[49] Turning to the second note, Ms. Mudaliar reported the note left on March 13, 2022, to Fort Park and to the Strata Council. Ms. Mudaliar had her suspicions about who left the note in her mailbox. She told the Strata and Fort Park that she would report the matters to police, and she did. In response to the report, the Strata informed Ms. Mudaliar that no action could be taken because the allegation rested on her suspicion and there was insufficient information identifying who had left the note. It also told her that, because she is not the registered owner, future complaints would need to be submitted by her parents, under a strata bylaw.
[50] I understand that Ms. Mudaliar may have regarded that response as inadequate. Even assuming the response fell short, Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint still requires a connection between the response and a protected characteristic: Moore at para. 33; Hale at para. 13. The reasons given for the response were that the author of the note could not be identified, and that Ms. Mudaliar was not the registered owner of the Strata lot. Neither reason refers to, or on its face turns on, Ms. Mudaliar’s protected characteristics. She has not identified anything in the way her reports were handled that differed from how a report by any other resident would have been handled. While a complainant need not prove her case at this stage, she must show that the evidence takes her complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Hill at para. 27. On the materials before me, and as Fort Park argues, there was insufficient information to identify who was responsible for the note.
[51] I am not satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar’s allegation of discrimination based on the offensive notes has a reasonable prospect of success against Fort Park. This allegation is dismissed.
3. The allegations added by the amendment
[52] In the amendment to her complaint, Ms. Mudaliar alleged the following conduct: surveillance in her home, sexualized commentary and stereotyping, ridicule of her spiritual practices, and the vandalism of her mother’s vehicle. Ms. Mudaliar attributes this conduct to Strata Council members, to individuals she describes as connected to the building, to a former colleague, and to persons associated with a local business. She does not attribute these allegations to Fort Park or its representatives. Therefore, I understand her to argue that Fort Park had a duty to respond in those circumstances. Consistently with the approach I have taken to the rest of the complaint, the question is whether Fort Park responded reasonably to what Ms. Mudaliar reported, and whether her protected characteristics were a factor in that response.
[53] I am not satisfied on all the materials that Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of proving Fort Park did not fulfil its duty to respond to her complaints. In her amendment, Ms. Mudaliar does not set out what she reported to Fort Part, when she did so, or what Fort Park did in response. I cannot speculate about what evidence that may be called at a hearing in this regard: Chan at para. 77. On the materials before me, there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Mudaliar could establish that Fort Park’s response to these reports adversely impacted her in a manner connected to her protected characteristics.
[54] This allegation is dismissed.
[55] Next, I assume, without deciding, that Ms. Mudaliar has taken out of the realm of conjecture her claim that Fort Park discriminated against her, in connection with her disability, by failing to address her ongoing concerns about squeaky floors in the unit above and other conduct that she says caused noise disturbances and adversely affected her because of her disability. I turn to whether Fort Park is reasonably certain to prove that it satisfied any duty to accommodate Ms. Mudaliar to the point of undue hardship.
4. Did Fort Park have a duty to accommodate Ms. Mudaliar in services?
[56] To justify its conduct at the hearing, Fort Park must justify the impact of its conduct as a bona fide reasonable justification. The three elements of the legal test that are well known: see British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 54. The first two elements are not in dispute. Rather, on the materials before me, the issue between the parties is whether Fort Park satisfied its duty to accommodate Ms. Mudaliar to the point of undue hardship: Meiorin at para. 54.
[57] Regarding this element of the test, to meet their duty under the Code, a respondent must show they took all reasonable and practical steps to accommodate the complainant’s disability.
[58] The parties disagree about when Ms. Mudaliar first told the Strata and Fort Park that she had a disability. I do not need to resolve that disagreement, because the evidence about what happened after the disclosure, whenever it occurred, is not materially in dispute and is sufficient to decide this part of the application. Based on the materials before me, in an email on June 8, 2021, following multiple requests from Fort Park regarding the accommodation she required, Ms. Mudaliar informed Fort Park that she did not require any accommodation.
[59] On the materials before me, I am satisfied that Fort Park is reasonably certain to prove that it took Ms. Mudaliar’s complaints seriously and attempted to address it. Both parties to an accommodation process have responsibilities; a complainant must provide detailed or specific information about the severity of her condition, how it affects her functioning, and how the requested accommodation would address it: Lylack v. The Owners, Strata Plan Number LMS1755 and others, 2022 BCHRT 16 at para. 52. After Fort Park repeatedly requested information regarding the accommodation Ms. Mudaliar was seeking and the nature of her disability, Ms. Mudaliar responded in June 2021 that she did not require any accommodation. When she eventually provided medical documentation on May 17, 2023, Ms. Mudaliar did not identify what accommodation, if any, she required.
[60] Therefore, I am satisfied that Fort Park is reasonably certain to prove that it met its duty to accommodate Ms. Mudaliar. My conclusion here also applies to the heating and hot water issues. Fort Park’s 2025 correspondence explained the building’s shared systems and offered a path to reimbursement for any repair connected to common property. Ms. Mudaliar did not respond to Fort Park on this.
[61] Next, I turn to Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint of retaliation.
C. Did Fort Park retaliate against Ms. Mudaliar because of her human rights complaint?
[62] I understand from the materials that Ms. Mudaliar alleges the following conduct by Fort Park is retaliation for filing the Original Complaint (together, the impugned conduct):
a. She was assessed a $900 “City Hall cleanup” levy that was not applied to other owners;
b. A member of the Strata Council told her that pursuing this complaint could result in increased levies and financial harm to her family;
c. She and her parents were not permitted to participate in Strata activities and were excluded from decision-making in the building’s governance;
d. She and her parents were denied access to financial records to which they are entitled;
e. Her mother’s vehicle was vandalized on September 5, 2025; and
f. She was subjected to ongoing harassment, including ridicule of a personal item in her unit and of her religious observance.
[63] Section 43 of the Code protects people from certain kinds of retaliatory conduct for participating in a human rights complaint process:
A person must not evict, discharge, suspend, expel, intimidate, coerce, impose any pecuniary or other penalty on, deny a right or benefit to or otherwise discriminate against a person because that person complains or is named in a complaint, might complain or be named in a complaint, gives evidence, might give evidence or otherwise assists or might assist in a complaint or other proceeding under this Code.
[64] To succeed in her complaint of retaliation at a hearing, Ms. Mudaliar will have to prove that: (1) Fort Park was aware of the Original Complaint at the time of the impugned conduct; (2) Fort Park engaged in or threatened to engage in conduct of the kind described in s. 43 of the Code; and (3) there is a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the human rights complaint: Gichuru v. Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78 [Pallai] at para. 58.
[65] Section 43 protects a person who complains, and also a person who might complain. Ms. Mudaliar told Fort Park in September 2021 that she had sought advice about her rights and had filed complaints elsewhere. The Tribunal notified Fort Park of the Original Complaint on June 14, 2024. According to Ms. Mudaliar’s complaint amendment, incidents that form part of the impugned conduct occurred after filing the Original Complaint. Although she does not provide dates for most of the incidents, she says that the incident involving her mother delivering groceries occurred in September 2025. For the purposes of this application, I accept, and Fort Park does not dispute, that all of the impugned conduct occurred after 2021.
[66] For the purpose of this application, I also accept that conduct of the kind Ms. Mudaliar describes, that is the imposition of a levy, the denial of access to records, exclusion from participation, and threats of financial consequences, could fall within s. 43 of the Code. In its dismissal application, Fort Park does not make specific submissions regarding the impugned conduct. I turn to the third element which requires a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the original complaint.
[67] The Court of Appeal in Pallai explained that there are two ways to establish a sufficient connection between the conduct and the complaint:
a. By proving the respondent intended to retaliate for the complaint; or
b. By inference, where the respondent can reasonably have been perceived to have engaged in the conduct as retaliation for the complaint: Pallai at para. 58.
[68] The test is not whether the earlier complaint was a factor in the conduct, but whether there is a “sufficient connection” to prove or infer retaliation: Brooks v. Skyacres Turkey Ranch Ltd. and others (No. 2), 2022 BCHRT 73 at para. 234. Because retaliation will rarely be acknowledged as such by a respondent, it often must be inferred from a review of all the evidence: C.S.W.U. Local 1611 v. SELI Canada (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 423 at para. 17.
[69] The inquiry is objective. A reasonable perception of retaliation is assessed from the point of view of “a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, at the time of the impugned conduct,” and not from the point of view of the complainant alleging retaliation: Pallai at paras. 58 and 66.
[70] The circumstances a reasonable complainant would be apprised of here include the following: (1) Fort Park is the Strata’s property manager and not its Strata Council; (2) the Strata makes decisions about levies and about the Strata’s finances, acting through the Strata Council; (3) a registered bylaw of the Strata provides that only the owner of a strata lot may make a complaint to the Strata, and Ms. Mudaliar was told in April 2022 that, because she is not the registered owner, complaints would need to come from her parents; (4) Fort Park has no physical presence in the building. I consider each allegation against that background to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect that Ms. Mudaliar could prove a sufficient connection between any of the impugned conduct and the Original Complaint.
[71] First, Ms. Mudaliar alleges that a Stata Council member told her that pursuing the Original Complaint could result in increased levies and financial harm to her family. Ms. Mudaliar identifies as a member of the Strata Council as making this statement. Section 44(2) deems an act done by an agent or official within the scope of their authority to be an act of the person for whom they act. I relied on that provision above in concluding that Fort Park is properly named for functions it performs on the Strata’s behalf. It does not assist Ms. Mudaliar here. The Stata Council member’s conduct is deemed to be conduct of the Strata, not of Fort Park; both are answerable to the Strata. Fort Park, not being the principal of the Strata Council, is not deemed responsible for what Strata Council members say. A reasonable complainant apprised of the relationship between a strata, its council, and its property manager would not perceive a statement by a council member as conduct of Fort Park.
[72] Second, Ms. Mudaliar alleges she was assessed a $900 “City Hall cleanup” levy which was not applied to other owners. Beyond the bare assertion that she was singled out for a levy, Ms. Mudaliar does not provide any particulars regarding this allegation. She does not say who imposed the levy or when it was imposed. Without more, I am not satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of establishing a sufficient connection between the Original Complaint and the purported levy.
[73] Third, regarding the allegation that Ms. Mudaliar and her parents were excluded from Strata activities and governance, this allegation is also unparticularized. Ms. Mudaliar does not set out the dates of the alleged exclusions or identify any occasion when she or her parents were denied something they were entitled to receive or prevented from attending something they were entitled to attend. Further, Ms. Mudaliar is not a registered owner of the Strata lot. Fort Park’s position, communicated to her in April 2022, was that no assignment of her parents’ powers and duties as the lot owners under s. 147 of the Strata Property Act had been made effective by written notice to the Strata. It also relies on the Strata’s Bylaw 24.1, under which only the owner of a strata lot may make a complaint to the Strata. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect that Ms. Mudaliar would establish a sufficient connection between any limitations she encountered in engaging in Strata activities and governance, and the Original Complaint.
[74] Fourth, regarding as to access to financial records, as stated above, Ms. Mudaliar is not the registered owner of the strata lot which was communicated to her in April 2022. Beyond her bare assertion that she is a proxy for her parents, Ms. Mudaliar provides no particulars regarding the financial records she requested and was denied. I am not satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of proving a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct at (d) and her complaint against Fort Park.
[75] Finally, I turn to the impugned conduct at (e) and (f) concerning the vandalism of Ms. Mudaliar’s mother’s vehicle on September 5, 2025, and ongoing harassment including ridicule of her religious observance. These allegations do not describe conduct by Fort Park, or its representatives, and Fort Park’s undisputed evidence is that it has no physical presence at the building. Ms. Mudaliar attributes them to Strata Council members, to unnamed individuals she describes as local building associates, and, in the case of the vandalism, to individuals associated with a business unconnected to Fort Park. Viewed objectively, the circumstances do not reasonably support an inference that this conduct was retaliation by Fort Park. On this basis, I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of establishing a sufficient connection between this conduct and her complaint against Fort Park.
[76] The retaliation complaint is dismissed.
V CONCLUSION
[77] I dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Based on the materials before me, I am not satisfied that Ms. Mudaliar has a reasonable prospect of proving discrimination by Fort Park based on a protected characteristic or retaliation connected to the Original Complaint.
Ijeamaka Anika
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal