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Widdifield v. North Cedar Improvement District 2026 BCHRT 192

Date Issued: September 9, 2026
File: CS-007336

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Joseph Widdifield
COMPLAINANT

AND:

North Cedar Improvement District
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
On his own behalf: Joseph Widdifield
Counsel for the Respondent: Zachary White and Matt Landry (articled student)

Date of Hearing: May 4-7, 2026

Location of Hearing: Nanaimo

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             For eight years, Joseph Widdifield was a volunteer firefighter with the North Cedar Fire Department [Fire Department] within the North Cedar Improvement District [NCID].[1] On July 2, 2021, NCID terminated Mr. Widdifield’s employment while he was on a three-month leave. Mr. Widdifield alleges that his mental disability, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD], was a factor in his termination, and he makes this complaint of discrimination under s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.

[2]             NCID denies that Mr. Widdifield’s PTSD was a factor in the termination. It says that it terminated Mr. Widdifield’s employment after a series of heated incidents between Mr. Widdifield and members of the public, which made his supervisors question whether he could effectively perform his firefighting duties.

[3]             Mr. Widdifield argues that the incidents leading to his termination must be assessed in the context of his PTSD, which contributed to his behaviour during the incidents. Mr. Widdifield contends that once NCID became aware of his PTSD, NCID was required to investigate whether his mental disability could be accommodated. Instead of doing so, he says, the employer treated the incidents as misconduct alone and terminated his employment.

[4]               I agree with Mr. Widdifield and find that his PTSD caused or contributed to the incidents that gave rise to his termination. As a result, Mr. Widdifield has established that his disability was a factor in his termination. Because I am not persuaded that NCID fulfilled its duty to accommodate, Mr. Widdifield’s complaint is justified, and I order remedies as a result.

II      FACTS

[5]             In this section I set out my findings of fact. These facts are derived from the evidence submitted by the parties, through their witnesses, as well as the documents that were admitted into evidence during the hearing.

[6]             There were some conflicts in the evidence, which I discuss below. Given the nature of the evidence, which involved testimony about heated interactions, and the time that has elapsed, about five years, I am not surprised that there were some discrepancies. In my view, all the witnesses testified as truthfully as possible. And in any event, I did not find it necessary to resolve these conflicts in order to come to my decision.

A.    Evidence and Witnesses

[7]             Mr. Widdifield called three witnesses and testified on his own behalf. Testifying was obviously a difficult and emotional process for Mr. Widdifield. He spoke about his mental disability and how his PTSD plays out in his life, his version of the incidents that led to his termination, and how the termination has had a durable impact on him.

[8]             Mr. Widdifield’s mother and son testified, and they also gave me insight into the effects of the termination on Mr. Widdifield. The final witness for Mr. Widdifield was his close friend, who was present for one of the incidents. His testimony was also helpful in determining the impact of the discrimination on Mr. Widdifield.

[9]             Six witnesses testified for NCID:

  1. Percy Tipping was Fire Chief at the relevant time, and he testified about the complaints received from the public, the expectations placed on NCID firefighters, and the reasons why NCID terminated Mr. Widdifield’s employment.
  2. Joel Collins is a member of the Fire Department, and he held various roles during Mr. Widdifield’s tenure. He testified about his interactions with Mr. Widdifield, including an investigation, discussed below, where Mr. Widdifield caused damage to a fire truck.
  3. Louise and Gordon Judson were Mr. Widdifield’s neighbours who testified about the complaints they made to the Fire Department about Mr. Widdifield. They said that Mr. Widdifield would sometimes set off fireworks on his property with the debris occasionally falling on their buildings. They testified that when they confronted Mr. Widdifield about the fireworks, he would laugh at them.
  4. Jennifer Bradley is the District Administrator for NCID. The appeal of Mr. Widdifield’s termination was escalated to her, and she testified about the reasons why she upheld the termination.
  5. Justin Gueulette is the current Fire Chief at NCID, and he was Deputy Fire Chief at the relevant time. Like Mr. Tipping, he testified about the complaints he received from the public, the expectations placed on NCID firefighters, and the reasons why NCID terminated Mr. Widdifield’s employment.

B.    Background

[10]         During the relevant time, Mr. Widdifield lived in the town of Cedar. He began his employment with the Fire Department in February 2013. By all accounts, he was a valued firefighter during the eight years he was employed by NCID. Except for one incident, which involved Mr. Widdifield accidentally damaging a fire truck as he was pulling into the station, his record with the Fire Department was unblemished.

[11]         The Fire Department operates under a Code of Conduct, which applies to both on- and off-duty behaviour. Under the heading, “Ethical Standards for Employees and Volunteers”, the Code of Conduct reads:

Employees and volunteers shall endeavor to adhere to the following ethical standards:

  • Carrying out their duties with professionalism and integrity and in a fair, impartial, honest and open manner;
  • avoiding any situation which could impair judgement in the performance of duties or give the impression to others;
  • Not knowingly engaging in any unlawful activity;
  • Demonstrating the highest standards of integrity in all public activities to inspire public confidence and trust;
  • Serving the public with respect, concern, courtesy and equality;
  • Approaching organizational and operational duties with a positive attitude and constructively supporting open communications, creativity and dedication to high standards of service; and
  • Accepting the responsibility to keep up to date on emerging issues and administering the public’s business with professional competence, fairness, efficiency, impartiality and effectiveness.

[12]         In 2021, Mr. Widdifield’s superiors began to have concerns about Mr. Widdifield’s off-duty conduct based on some reports from members of the public. The reports alleged that Mr. Widdifield had engaged in heated behaviour involving the public, including:

  1. laughing and cursing at his neighbours when they approached Mr. Widdifield about setting off fireworks in his yard late at night;
  2. engaging in a verbal altercation with a member of the public who had approached his house about the fireworks;
  3. sending a threatening text message to a friend of his ex-wife; and
  4. engaging in an “aggressive” exchange with staff at his children’s school resulting in a shelter in place at the school.

[13]         Mr. Widdifield explained during the hearing that the incidents occurred because he was in a stress response related to what he felt were threats against the safety of his children and himself. Mr. Widdifield told me that because of his PTSD, he struggles with emotional control when he is hyper-aroused, as he was during the incidents. At that time, Mr. Widdifield’s PTSD was aggravated in part due to stressors arising from his divorce.

[14]         NCID took the reports against Mr. Widdifield at face value and did not investigate them to determine their veracity. During the hearing, I heard a lot about the specifics of the incidents, and there were differing accounts of exactly what had happened. I do not find it necessary to resolve these discrepancies in order to make my decision. NCID believed the incidents occurred as they were reported and made its decision to terminate Mr. Widdifield based on what it believed.

[15]         On May 11, 2021, Mr. Tipping and Mr. Gueulette called Mr. Widdifield into a meeting where they confronted him about the reported incidents [Meeting]. During the Meeting Mr. Widdifield explained that he has PTSD and told them about how his PTSD affected him during the incidents.

[16]         As a result of the meeting, Mr. Widdifield was placed on leave, essentially a suspension, for three months. Mr. Tipping and Mr. Gueulette also imposed mandatory counselling sessions to be completed during the leave.

[17]         While Mr. Widdifield was on leave, and before he could begin counselling, another report came in from a teacher at the Widdifield children’s school that Mr. Widdifield had threatened, harassed, and intimidated her.

[18]         As a result of this report, which Mr. Widdifield’s superiors viewed as a breach of the Code of Conduct, Mr. Widdifield’s employment was terminated without further discussion or investigation. Mr. Widdifield appealed the decision within the NCID but was unsuccessful.

III    ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[19]         Mr. Widdifield alleges discrimination in employment contrary to s. 13 of the Code. For his complaint to succeed, he must first prove that he (1) had a mental disability; (2) experienced an adverse impact in employment; and (3) his disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If Mr. Widdifield proves the elements of his case, the burden shifts to NCID to establish a justification defence, including that it took all reasonable and practical steps to accommodate Mr. Widdifield up to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 60. If NCID proves a justification defence, there is no discrimination.

[20]         The parties do not dispute that Mr. Widdifield has PTSD, a mental disability, and that he experienced an employment-related adverse impact, the termination of his employment. As stated above, the issue at the heart of this complaint is whether Mr. Widdifield can establish a nexus between his mental disability and the termination. NCID argues that Mr. Widdifield has not established this element of his case. It says that it decided to terminate his employment based on the public complaints, not his PTSD.

[21]         I must disagree that Mr. Widdifield’s PTSD was not a factor in the termination of his employment. I easily find that it was. The complaints were based on Mr. Widdifield’s conduct, conduct which arose, whether in part or in whole, because Mr. Widdifield’s PTSD was triggered. In other words, Mr. Widdifield’s mental disability caused or contributed to the complaints, which directly led to the termination of his employment with NCID. As a result, Mr. Widdifield has established that his disability was a factor in the termination: see Shaikh v. Colliers Project Leaders Inc. (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 93.

[22]         Because Mr. Widdifield has established his case, the burden shifts to NCID to prove a bona fide occupational requirement [BFOR] for the adverse impact experienced by Mr. Widdifield.

[23]         Under the BFOR test, I must consider whether the standards adopted by NCID: (1) had a purpose rationally connected to the performance of Mr. Widdifield’s job, (2) were adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to fulfill a legitimate work-related purpose, and (3) were reasonably necessary to fulfill that purpose, including that NCID could not accommodate Mr. Widdifield without experiencing undue hardship: Meiorin at para. 54. NCID must establish all three to succeed.

[24]            The parties do not dispute the first two factors of the BFOR test. Accommodation is at issue.

[25]         Mr. Widdifield maintains that NCID did not fulfill its duty to accommodate; it simply fired him.

[26]         NCID argues that it had to terminate Mr. Widdifield’s employment given the dictates of the Code of Conduct. It says that the public must be able to maintain its trust in Cedar’s firefighters. I understand the public-facing role that NCID’s firefighters hold as well as the difficult position that NCID found itself in given that the complaints it received were from the public. It may have been that Mr. Widdifield could not have been accommodated without undue hardship. However, as discussed below, Mr. Widdifield was entitled to more from his employer to determine whether that was the case.

[27]            In the accommodation process, both Mr. Widdifield and NCID had obligations. Generally speaking, if a person requires accommodation, it is their responsibility to bring forward the relevant facts: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 at p. 994. However, if and when an employer knows or ought to have known an employee is experiencing disability-related barriers, the employer has the obligation to take all reasonable and practicable steps to address those barriers, including initiating the accommodation process, and finding and proposing solutions before taking steps that will negatively impact the employee: Renaud at pp. 992 and 994-995. 

[28]         There is both a procedural component and a substantive component within the duty to accommodate. The procedural component requires the employer to undertake an individualized investigation of accommodation measures and an assessment of an employee’s needs. The substantive component requires the employer to make modifications or provide the accommodation necessary in order to allow an employee to participate fully in the workplace: Meiorin at para. 66.

[29]         The Tribunal has found that the procedural component imposes a duty on an employer to obtain all relevant information about the employee’s disability that is required to accommodate them. Depending on the circumstances of the case, that may include “information about the employee’s medical condition, prognosis for recovery, ability to perform job duties, and capabilities for alternate work”: Gordy v. Painter’s Lodge (No. 2), 2004 BCHRT 225 at para. 84. Given the privacy issues at play, employers are not entitled to all medical information about the employee, just the information that is required to formulate a reasonable accommodation: Flynn v. v. DF Architecture Inc. (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 81 at para. 44.

[30]         Here, when Mr. Widdifield’s supervisors confronted him about the complaints during the Meeting, Mr. Widdifield explained that he has PTSD. He told his supervisors about the stressors aggravating his PTSD and explained to them that he was seeking therapy. His supervisors’ response was to put him on a three-month leave and to impose mandatory counselling through Mr. Widdifield’s extended medical benefits provider. Before the leave was over and before Mr. Widdifield was able to complete the mandatory counselling, NCID terminated his employment because it was made aware of another public complaint.  

[31]         I am satisfied that Mr. Widdifield brought forward his PTSD, including telling his supervisors about the role that his PTSD had played in the complaints from the public. In my view, this was information sufficient to alert his employers that he was experiencing disability-related barriers in meeting the standards of conduct required by his employment. It triggered the accommodation process. NCID was required to take all reasonable and practical steps to address those barriers before firing Mr. Widdifield.

[32]         NCID failed to meet this requirement. NCID did not assess Mr. Widdifield’s needs. It did not undertake an investigation. It did not propose potential solutions which might have allowed Mr. Widdifield to continue working for NCID. There was no dialogue between Mr. Widdifield and his employer about how he might be accommodated under the circumstances. As Mr. Widdifield said during the hearing, NCID was required to pause, assess, and accommodate if it could do so without incurring undue hardship. This it did not do.

[33]         Mr. Gueulette suggested during the hearing that imposing the leave and the counselling were steps in the accommodation process. Even if I were to accept that argument, I would find that NCID did not allow the accommodation process to play out. It should have. Rather, it fired Mr. Widdifield before Mr. Widdifield had gone to his first counselling session and before NCID could assess whether these steps had made a meaningful impact in addressing the barriers Mr. Widdifield faced.

[34]         Having found that NCID has not established a defence, the complaint is justified. Next, I determine what remedies will flow from NCID’s breach of the Code. 

IV    Remedy

A.    Section 37(2)(a): Order to Cease the Contravention

[35]         Having found the complaint is justified in part, I order NCID to cease and refrain from committing the same or similar discrimination, pursuant to s. 37(2)(a) of the Code.

B.    Section 37(2)(b): Declaratory Order

[36]         Under s. 37(2)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is contrary to the Code. I consider it appropriate to make such an order. I declare that NCID’s termination of Mr. Widdifield’s employment was discrimination contrary to s. 13 of the Code.

C.    Section 37(2)(d)(ii): Compensation – Lost Wages and Expenses

1.     Lost Wages

[37]         Mr. Widdifield testified that the effects of the termination have extended into every part of his life, including his ability to work in related fields and his ability to work on his own business, which provides first aid training. This situation, according to Mr. Widdifield, has had a financial impact in terms of past and future wage loss. He and his mother testified that Mr. Widdifield’s company has done fewer trainings because of the discrimination, and this has financially impacted his business. He seeks $15,000 in compensation. 

[38]           Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to compensate a person for all, or a part, of any wages or salary lost, or expenses incurred because of discrimination. The purpose of wage loss compensation is to restore a complainant, to the extent possible, to the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred.

[39]         When assessing a complainant’s wage loss, the first question is whether a causal connection has been established between the discrimination and the losses claimed: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 298-303, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396; Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82 at para. 88. This is a question of fact: Mema v. City of Nanaimo (No. 2), 2023 BCHRT 91 at para. 378. The onus is on the complainant to show a causal connection between the discriminatory act and the loss claimed:  Gichuru at para. 302.

[40]         Once the Complainant establishes the requisite causal connection, the amount of compensation is a matter of discretion, which is exercised on a principled basis considering the purposes of the Code and the purposes of the award: Gichuru at para. 303.

[41]         The Tribunal also considers whether a complainant has taken reasonable steps to mitigate their losses. The Tribunal may reduce a wage loss award if a complainant did not reasonably mitigate their wage loss or if other wage loss uncertainties need to be accounted for, such as the complainant leaving the employment: LaFleche v. NLFD Auto dba Prince George Ford (No. 2), 2022 BCHRT 88 at para. 87. The burden of proving a complainant has failed to mitigate their loss rests on the respondent: Gichuru at para. 370.

[42]         Here, there is not enough evidence to support a claim of past or future wage loss. This does not mean that the discrimination has not had an impact on Mr. Widdifield’s wages or his business, just that I do not have evidence to support the number that Mr. Widdifield has asked for. Without that evidence, the exercise of my discretion to award lost wages would be arbitrary and unprincipled. Mr. Widdifield was required to introduce evidence to satisfy me that $15,000 would place him in the position he would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. Without some evidence of the amount necessary to do that, I cannot award the $15,000 that Mr. Widdifield seeks.

2.     Legal Expenses

[43]           Mr. Widdifield seeks compensation for legal expenses in the amount of $11,153.04. 

[44]         Under s. 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code, the Tribunal has authority to award compensation to a successful complainant for all or part of the expenses incurred by the contravention. The Tribunal has held that “legal fees that flow from the discrimination, but are unrelated to prosecuting that claim, are compensable”: Kerr v. Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) (No. 5), 2010 BCHRT 62 at para. 93; see also Fraser v. BC Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations (No. 6), 2019 BCHRT 195 at para. 16-21.

[45]         There is no documentation of Mr. Widdifield’s legal expenses in the evidence before me. Without a detailed bill, or an explanation from Mr. Widdifield of how he incurred these expenses, I cannot determine Mr. Widdifield’s entitlement to this amount. I do not know whether the expenses were incurred because of the discrimination, but not in prosecuting the complaint before me. I must therefore decline to award compensation for Mr. Widdifield’s legal expenses.

D.   Section 37(2)(d)(iii): Injury to Dignity, Feelings and Self-Respect

[46]         Mr. Widdifield seeks an award of $35,000 for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect. For the following reasons, I award him the entire amount sought.

[47]         Under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code, the Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity. The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. The amount of compensation depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No.9), 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396, at para. 260. At thesame time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases.

[48]         The Tribunal usually considers several factors in determining quantum, including the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s social context or vulnerability; and the specific effect the discrimination had on the complainant: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 225. I consider each of these factors in turn.

[49]         First, the nature of the discrimination was brief, in the sense that it was not ongoing, but the consequences were serious. The loss of a job is the “ultimate employment-related consequence”, which is severe in any circumstance: Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd. dba Buono Osteria and others, 2021 BCHRT 137 at para. 129. As succinctly put in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1987 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at p. 368 (per Dickson CJ):

Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life, providing the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A person’s employment is an essential component of [their] sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being.

Cases involving the loss of employment often attract the top end of this Tribunal’s awards given the central significance of a person’s employment to their financial and emotional wellbeing: Nelson at para. 129.

[50]         Next, I consider the social context of the complaint, and Mr. Widdifield’s vulnerability.  Here, Mr. Widdifield was particularly vulnerable given the employer-employee relationship between him and NCID, which has a built-in power imbalance: Gibbons v. CML Contracting and another, 2024 BCHRT 220 at para. 123. This vulnerability was further compounded by Mr. Widdifield’s honesty with his employer about the struggles he was having with PTSD, a mental disability that is stigmatized and not well-understood: Hayes v. DW Johnson Holdings Ltd. and others, 2023 BCHRT 143 at para. 93.  As the Tribunal put it in Hayes:

People with mental disabilities are often met with dubious perceptions that their condition is easily feigned, exaggerated, trivial, or a matter of growing a tougher hide: Saadati at para. 21. People with PTSD in particular, may face incorrect and stereotypical perceptions associated with their condition: Davis v. Sandringham Care Centre and another, 2015 BCHRT 14[8] at para. 375. Stereotypes and stigma can have the effect of marginalizing and excluding people with disabilities within their own communities and society at large: Stevenson at para. 7.

Here, the evidence before me is clear that NCID’s perception or misunderstanding of Mr. Widdifield’s PTSD operated to exclude him from an area of life essential to his well-being. As such, he was extraordinarily vulnerable under the circumstances.

[51]         Finally, the loss of his job has had a profound and lasting impact on Mr. Widdifield, and in that sense, was serious. As a result of the discrimination, Mr. Widdifield lost not only his employment and identity as a firefighter, but also his home and sense of community. He testified that after the discrimination, he associated Cedar with trauma. As he put it, the home and community that he had spent his life building became a source of ongoing psychological distress. As a result, he moved and therefore has been displaced. This displacement has resulted in a profound loss of stability and community. Mr. Widdifield testified that even now, returning to Cedar triggers a response. Nevertheless, he must return as his parents and child still live there. The discrimination he experienced affects his daily life up into the present.

[52]         The profound and lasting impact on Mr. Widdifield was evident during the hearing. Throughout the hearing process, Mr. Widdifield was very emotional as were his friends and family members, who testified that Mr. Widdifield has undergone significant changes since the discrimination. I understand that Mr. Widdifield previously was a joyful and happy presence in the lives of his community members. He was the “life of the party”. They now describe Mr. Widdifield as quiet and someone who keeps to himself. I have also considered these impacts in making my decision.

[53]         Given the nature of the discrimination which occurred within a context of vulnerability and has had an extreme impact, I award Mr. Widdifield $35,000 for the injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

[54]         NCID argues that this award is above the high end of s. 13 cases. I disagree. While higher than some awards, it is still within the range of recent Tribunal decisions where the complainant has lost their employment due to discrimination: see Shaikh at para. 120 [$30,000]; Jickling v. Sweet Meadows Market (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 325at para. 97 [$40,000]. I find the impact of the discrimination to be similar to Jickling, where the termination profoundly impacted the complainant in that case. It had devastating effect on the complainant’s mental health and self-worth, disrupting her life and negatively impacting her relationships with others.

[55]         NCID argues that $14,000 is more appropriate, citing Bowden v Yellow Cab and Others (No. 2), 2011 BCHRT 14, where a taxi driver’s mental disabilities, including PTSD, were a factor in his termination. There, the Tribunal awarded $10,000 ($14,000 in today’s money). I disagree. Since Bowden was decided, the Tribunal has been increasing its injury to dignity awards: Flynn at para. 73. Further, the impact on the complainant in Bowden, while described as a negative impact on his family life, was not described by the Tribunal to be as pervasive or devastating as it was to Mr. Widdifield.

V      CONCLUSION

[56]         Mr. Widdifield told his supervisors that the complaints NCID had received from the public were connected to his PTSD. Instead of assessing how it could help its longstanding employee navigate the disability-related barriers he was newly experiencing, NCID simply put him on leave and then fired him before he could finish the requirements of the leave. The complaint is justified. NCID discriminated against Mr. Widdifield based on his mental disability, in contravention of s. 13 of the Code.

[57]         As a result, I order NCID to:

a.   cease the contravention of the Code and refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention: Code,s. 37(2)(a);

b.   pay Mr. Widdifield $35,000 as compensation for the injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii);

c.   pay Mr. Widdifield post-judgment interest on the injury to dignity award until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.

Robin Dean
Tribunal Member

[1] NCID uses a “paid on call” model to compensate volunteer firefighters, who do not work on a full-time basis but respond to calls when alerted.