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Singh v. IATSE Local 891, 2026 BCHRT 191

Date Issued: September 9, 2026
File: CS-007012

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Priya Singh
COMPLAINANT

AND:

IATSE Local 891
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

APPLICATION TO Dismiss a complaint

Section 27(1)(c)

Tribunal Member: Andrew Robb
On her own behalf: Priya Singh
Counsel for the Respondent: Allison N. Tremblay

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Ms. Singh filed a human rights complaint against IATSE Local 891 [the Union]. She is a makeup artist in the film industry. She says the Union discriminated against her, based on her race and colour.

[2]             Ms. Singh alleges that in multiple incidents, over the course of about seven months, members of the Union who worked with her on film productions treated her negatively and excluded her from the workplace, in favour of non-racialised employees who were less qualified than her. She also says the Union discriminated against her during the election process for a Union working group that she wanted to be involved in. Based on these incidents, she says the Union is responsible for discrimination in her employment, under s. 13 of the Human Rights Code, and in her membership in the Union, under s. 14.

[3]             The Union denies discriminating and applies to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. The Union says Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving that some of the incidents where she says she was treated negatively in the workplace had an adverse impact on her employment, and no reasonable prospect of proving her race or colour were a factor in any of the incidents described in her complaint. Additionally, the Union says she has no reasonable prospect of proving the Union was responsible for any of the incidents where other members of the Union treated her negatively, as those Union members were acting on behalf of their employers, not the Union.

[4]             For the following reasons, I dismiss the Union’s application. I am not satisfied that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving she was excluded from the workplace, on multiple occasions, and this had an adverse impact on her employment, even when she was not financially disadvantaged by the exclusions. I am not satisfied she has no reasonable prospect of proving her race and colour were a factor in the exclusions, considering her evidence that she was excluded in favour of non-racialised employees who were less qualified than her. I am not satisfied that she has no reasonable prospect of showing the Union was responsible for these incidents, considering the evidence that the Union did not take any action related to her allegation of racial discrimination, when she reported it promptly on one occasion, and the evidence that the Union would not have taken any action in relation to her other allegations, even if she had reported them more promptly.

[5]             Regarding the working group election, I am not satisfied that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving she experienced an adverse impact in the election process, in which her race and colour were a factor.

[6]             To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

II      BACKGROUND

[7]             Ms. Singh says she experienced negative treatment by heads of department [HOD’s], who were also members of the Union, in different film productions where she was employed, in 2022. She says HOD’s are responsible for assigning work opportunities, during the course of a production, and for making decisions about when other workers’ shifts would end each day.

[8]             In the productions where Ms. Singh worked, Union members worked alongside non-Union members, or permittees. There is no dispute between the parties that, under the collective agreement that governed employment on these productions, Union members were supposed to be prioritised for work, and HOD’s were supposed to end permittees’ shifts first, before ending Union members’ shifts. Despite this, Ms. Singh says HOD’s ended her shifts prematurely while allowing non-racialised permittees to stay on shift. In particular she says:

  1. On May 5, 2022, an HOD asked Ms. Singh and another racialised woman to sign out, while a non-racialised permittee was able to stay.
  2. On May 27, 2022, an HOD asked Ms. Singh and another racialised woman to sign out, while non-racialised permittees were able to stay.
  3. On June 28, 2022, an HOD told Ms. Singh she could go, while a non-racialised permittee was still on shift. However, it turned out the permittee was unable to do the required job. When the HOD was informed of this, they asked Ms. Singh to stay after all. The permittee also remained on shift, along with Ms. Singh.
  4. On July 25, 2022, after Ms. Singh had a negative interaction with another make-up artist, the other artist complained to an HOD, and the HOD then told Ms. Singh she did not have to come in the next day, but she would still be paid for the day. I understand Ms. Singh to say the other make-up artist and the HOD were non-racialised people.
  5. On November 2, 2022, an HOD ended Ms. Singh’s shift while two non-racialised permittees were able to stay. Ms. Singh complained to the Union about this and later received the same pay, for November 2, as the non-racialised permittees who stayed on shift.

[9]             In response to the incidents listed above, the Union says its records show:

  1. Ms. Singh worked 3.7 fewer hours than a permittee on May 5 and 4.3 fewer hours than two permittees on May 27. The Union says these incidents appear to be violations of the collective agreement, but the Union did not learn about them until after the time frame for filing a grievance had expired. The Union says that if Ms. Singh had reported her concern sooner, the Union would have investigated.
  2. On June 28, Ms. Singh and a permittee both worked less than eight hours but were paid for eight hours, which was the minimum shift duration under the collective agreement. The Union says Ms. Singh did not complain to the Union about being asked to leave work early, and it was not a violation of the collective agreement, since she was paid for more hours than she worked, and no permittee was paid for more hours than her.
  3. On July 25, Ms. Singh was paid for 14 hours that she did not work. The Union says it does not know why. On the same day, a permittee worked for 14.2 hours, so she received more pay than Ms. Singh. This was technically a violation of the collective agreement, but the Union did not learn about it until after the time frame for filing a grievance had expired.
  4. Regarding the November 2 incident, the Union considered the matter resolved because Ms. Singh was made whole.

[10]         The Union says it did not learn about any of these incidents, other than the November 2 incident, until it received Ms. Singh’s human rights complaint. Ms. Singh does not deny this, in the materials before me.

[11]         In addition to her allegations about being treated differently than non-racialised workers by HOD’s, Ms. Singh alleges discrimination in the election process for a Union working group. The working group was created to address the issue of using make-up to make some performers appear to be from a different ethnic background.

[12]         Ms. Singh says the Union asked candidates for the working group to provide written statements, which voting members of the Union could consider when casting their ballots. Ms. Singh wanted to run in the election, and she provided a candidate statement, but the Union later decided not to publish any candidate statements. Ms. Singh says the Union’s Business Representative told her the statements were not published because they were not “sufficient”, and anyway the voting Union members knew the candidates well enough already. This was frustrating for Ms. Singh, and she withdrew from the election. She says the Business Representative punished her for this by leaving her name on the ballot, but including the word “WITHDRAWN” on the ballot next to her name. The Union says this happened because it hired a contractor to administer the election, and the contractor was unable to remove Ms. Singh’s name from the ballot entirely, in time for the election.

[13]         Ms. Singh says the Business Representative’s decision not to publish the candidate statements was a form of speaking on behalf of racialised persons, even though she did not have lived experience as a racialised person. I understand her to argue that the decision not to publish candidate statements undermined her ability to tell the voters about her lived experience as a racialised person, which was relevant to the subject matter of the working group. The candidate statement submitted by Ms. Singh is not before me, nor is any other candidate statement that the Union received from candidates in the election.

[14]         The Union’s application to dismiss included a statement from the Business Representative. She says she asked candidates to provide statements for the election, but some did not, and upon reflection she found it most fair to not publish the statements that were provided. The Business Representative says the candidates who were ultimately elected to the working group came from various racial and ethnic backgrounds.

III    DECISION

A.    Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success

[15]         The Union applies to dismiss Ms. Singh’s complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Human Rights Code, on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to dismiss complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. The onus is on the Union to establish the basis for dismissal.

[16]         The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.

[17]         The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint beyond conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.

[18]         To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Singh would have to prove she has a characteristic protected by the Human Rights Code, she was adversely impacted in her employment and her membership in the Union, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she did that, the burden would shift to the Union to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification.

[19]         Depending on the circumstances, a union respondent may be liable for discrimination under s. 13 of the Code, which applies to employment, or s. 14, which applies to membership in a union, or both: Ferris v. Office and Technical Employees Union, Local 15, 1999 BCHRT 55 at paras. 79-80; Basi v. District of Saanich and another, 2018 BCHRT 7 at paras. 124-125. Section 13 is generally engaged where a union’s discrimination against its member “touches on the employment relationship” or otherwise “has a sufficient nexus to the employment context”: Ferris at para. 79; British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2007 SCC 62 atpara. 38. For example, where a union participates with an employer in the formulation or application of a discriminatory rule or practice, it becomes a party to workplace discrimination: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 [Renaud]. Where a union acts as an employer, it can also be liable under s. 13 like any other employer, if a complainant experiences discrimination in their employment by the union.

[20]          Section 14 of the Code is generally engaged where a union “discriminates against a member as a member rather than as an employee”: Ferris at para. 80. For example, s. 14 may be breached where a union provides inadequate or inappropriate representation to its member, and the member’s protected characteristic is a factor in the poor representation: see Graham v. School District No. 38 (Richmond) and CUPE Local 716, 2005 BCHRT 520 at para. 59; Waters v. Coca-Cola and Teamsters Local 213, 2005 BCHRT 557 at para. 18; Basi at para. 125.

[21]         The Union does not deny Ms. Singh is entitled to the protection of the Code based on her race and colour. The Union acknowledges she experienced an adverse impact in her employment on May 5 and 27 and November 2, 2022, based on receiving less pay than permittees who should have had their shifts ended before her. But the Union says she has no reasonable prospect of proving any adverse impact based on the incidents on June 28 and July 25, 2022, since she received more pay than she worked for on those dates. Further, the Union she has no reasonable prospect of proving her race or colour were factors in any of these incidents, from May to November 2022. In any event, the Union says Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving the Union was responsible for these incidents, as the HOD’s responsible for the alleged discrimination were acting on behalf of the productions that employed them, not on behalf of the Union. Additionally, the Union says Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving her race or colour were factors in her allegations about the working group election process.

[22]         For the following reasons, I am not satisfied that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving her complaint under ss. 13 and 14 of the Code, based on the incidents where she says HOD’s treated her negatively, compared to non-racialised coworkers, and based on her allegations about the working group election.

[23]         First, I will address Ms. Singh’s allegations about negative treatment by HOD’s. I will start with her complaint on this basis under s. 13 of the Code and then turn to the complaint under s. 14. I will then address her allegations about the working group election.

B.    Negative treatment by HOD’s

[24]         Ms. Singh says the Union is responsible for the incidents where HOD’s gave non-racialised employees preferential treatment compared to her, between May and November 2022. She says the Union does not proactively promote employment equity principles among its members, and it should create protocols or programs to promote equity and prevent discrimination. I understand her to say the Union overlooks—and thereby condones—systemic discrimination against her in her employment.

[25]         The Union provided detailed records identifying who worked with Ms. Singh on the productions in question, whether they were Union members or permittees, and how many hours they worked on the days when Ms. Singh says she experienced discrimination. The records are generally consistent with Ms. Singh’s allegations about when she worked, and when permittees were allowed to work longer shifts than her. But the Union’s evidence does not address Ms. Singh’s claim about differential treatment based on her race or colour. The Union says her allegation that her race or colour was a factor in these incidents is speculative.

[26]         Regarding the incident on November 2, 2022, the Union says it took steps to ensure Ms. Singh was paid as much as any permittee who worked with her, and it considered the matter closed when she was made whole, i.e. when the employer agreed to pay her as much as the permittees who stayed on shift after her shift ended. The Union does not say whether it contacted the HOD’s involved in the incident, or the relevant employer or employers’ association, or whether it took any other steps to investigate the aspect of Ms. Singh’s complaint about differential treatment based on her race and colour.

[27]         I begin by addressing the Union’s argument that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving an adverse impact on her employment based on the incidents on June 28 and July 5, 2022, since she was paid more than she should have been on those dates. I do not accept this argument. I understand Ms. Singh’s complaint to allege an adverse impact based on not just the financial effects of the alleged discrimination, but also based on being excluded from the workplace in favour of non-racialised colleagues who were less qualified than she was, in the sense that the collective agreement required Union members to be prioritised over permittees for work assignments.

[28]         Based on Ms. Singh’s evidence about differential treatment compared to non-racialised permittees, it appears she was excluded from the workplace, or considered for exclusion, in all five incidents she refers to, between May and November 2022. I am not satisfied that she has no reasonable prospect of proving these incidents had an adverse impact on her employment, even when she did not lose any income. The Tribunal could find, after a hearing, that her exclusion from the workplace—or the initial plan to exclude her, in the June 28 incident—was an adverse impact on her employment, even if it was not accompanied by a financial loss in in each case.

[29]         For similar reasons, I am not satisfied that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving the alleged adverse impact was connected to her race and colour. The Union did not provide any evidence that could contradict Ms. Singh’s allegation that the permittees who were allowed to stay longer than her, on May 2 and 27 and November 2, 2022 and the permittee who was initially asked to stay longer than her on June 28, 2022 and the permittee who worked while Ms. Singh did not, on July 25, 2022, were non-racialised people. As permittees, these employees were objectively less qualified than Ms. Singh, under the terms of the collective agreement. Based on the evidence that Ms. Singh, as a racialised employee, was repeatedly excluded from the workplace in favour of less qualified, non-racialised employees, I find she has brought the connection between these incidents and her race and colour beyond conjecture.

[30]         The Union points out that by Ms. Singh’s own account of some of these incidents suggests, she did not assert her right, as a Union member, to be prioritised over permittees. I am not persuaded that this assists the Union’s position in this application. Even if Ms. Singh could have been more vocal in asserting her rights as a Union member, this does not mean she has no reasonable prospect of proving the HOD’s who made the decisions to exclude her from the workplace treated her adversely, in a way that was connected to her race or colour.

[31]         In my view, the more difficult question is whether Ms. Singh has brought the Union’s liability for the alleged discrimination in her employment beyond conjecture. At the time they allegedly discriminated against Ms. Singh, the HOD’s were employees of the productions that Ms. Singh was working on; they were not acting on behalf of the Union. In her response to the application to dismiss Ms. Singh suggests the Union acts as a temporary employment agency, in the context of assigning work under the collective agreement, and so it was, in a sense, her employer. But the Union cites authorities suggesting it does not act as the employer or employment agency, under the terms of the collective agreement, and I have not relied on this part of Ms. Singh’s argument in making my decision.

[32]         I also note there is no evidence that Ms. Singh notified the Union about the alleged discrimination, before she filed the complaint, with the exception of the November 2 incident.

[33]         Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving her complaint under s. 13 of the Code, based on the principles set out in Renaud. On the evidence before me, the Tribunal could find, after a hearing, that 1) it was a normal practice, in Ms. Singh’s industry, to exclude her from the workplace in favour of non-racialised permittees, and 2) the Union was aware of this practice, and did not object to it, as long as Ms. Singh received the same pay as permittees who were allowed to remain in the workplace after Ms. Singh’s shifts were ended.

[34]         Regarding the November 2 incident, the Union says it took no action except to ensure the employer made Ms. Singh whole by paying her for the same number of hours worked by permittees who stayed longer than her on that day. Regarding the June 28 incident, the Union’s evidence is that even if Ms. Singh had reported the incident to the Union promptly, the Union would not have taken any action because Ms. Singh was paid for the same number of hours as the permittee, so there was no violation of the collective agreement. Regarding the July 25 incident, the Union says this appears to have been a “technical, although extremely minor” violation of the collective agreement, since Ms. Singh was paid for 14 hours although she did not work at all that day, while a permittee was paid $7.25 more than her, for working 14.2 hours. The Union does not suggest that it would have taken any action, even if Ms. Singh had reported this incident.

[35]         Regarding each of these incidents, it appears the Union’s focus was—or would have been, if Ms. Singh had reported the incidents sooner—solely on whether Ms. Singh received as much pay as permittees who worked on the same productions as her. It does not appear that the Union considered Ms. Singh’s allegation that the November 2 incident was discrimination based on her race. Based on the Union’s evidence that it would not have taken any action regarding the June 28 incident, and that the July 25 incident was an “extremely minor” violation of the collective agreement, it does not appear the Union would have taken any action regarding Ms. Singh’s allegations of differential treatment based on her race, regardless of when she reported them.

[36]         The Union did not provide any evidence that could contradict Ms. Singh’s allegation that in all these incidents, she was excluded from the workplace in favour of non-racialised permittees. The Union does not say why it did not respond to this element of Ms. Singh’s allegation about the November 2 incident, or why it would not have responded to similar elements of her allegations about June 28 and July 25. I also note that the Union does not suggest, in the materials before me, that it has internal protocols or policies in place to promote employment equity or prevent discrimination by Union members against other members.

[37]         In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving the Union participated with the productions that employed her in the application of a discriminatory practice. The Union’s focus on whether Ms. Singh was financially disadvantaged could be seen to reflect an indifference about whether she was excluded from the workplace for reasons related to her race, as long as the employer paid her as much as permittees were paid. This part of the complaint appears to raise the issue of whether a union’s tacit acceptance of discrimination by an employer may amount to participation in that discrimination. In my view this issue is best addressed based on a full evidentiary record, at a hearing.

[38]         I now turn to Ms. Singh’s complaint under s. 14 of the Code. On the evidence before me, the Tribunal could find, after a hearing, that in relation to the November 2 incident, Ms. Singh gave the Union evidence of workplace discrimination against her, by members of the Union, and the Union ignored it. The Union does not deny that the HOD treated her worse than less qualified, non-racialised employees. The Union does not suggest that it contacted the HOD about this, or that it notified the employer about the alleged racial discrimination. The Union’s evidence suggests its concern about the incident was limited to the fact that Ms. Singh was paid less than a permittee.

[39]         Based on the Union’s evidence about how it would have responded to her allegations about the June 28 and July 25 incidents, if she had reported them sooner, the Tribunal could find that the Union would have ignored the evidence of racial discrimination in those allegations too.

[40]         Considering the Union’s response to these allegations, the Tribunal could infer that the Union preferred to protect its non-racialised members who allegedly discriminated against Ms. Singh, rather than taking any steps to address the discrimination, or prevent it from happening again. On this basis, the Tribunal could find her race and colour were factors in the Union’s decisions about how to represent her. Even if Ms. Singh did not notify the Union about all the incidents in which she allegedly faced discrimination before she filed the complaint, on the evidence before me it appears the Union would not have taken any steps to address her allegations of discrimination in any event.

[41]         For these reasons, I am not satisfied Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving the Union discriminated against her in her membership in the Union.

C.    Working group election

[42]         I understand Ms. Singh to argue that she was disadvantaged in the working group election process, as a result of the decision not to publish candidate statements, as this removed an opportunity for her to tell the voters about her lived experience as a racialised person, which was relevant to the reason the working group was created.

[43]         Regarding Ms. Singh’s complaint under s. 13 of the Code, the Union says that for the purposes of the application to dismiss, it assumes, without admitting, that participation in the working group is a form of employment by the Union. But the Union says Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving the decision not to publish Ms. Singh’s candidate statement was discriminatory, since the Union treated all candidates equally, and the decision did not prejudice or prefer any candidates based on their personal characteristics.

[44]         For the following reasons, I am not satisfied that Ms. Singh has no reasonable prospect of proving her race and colour were a factor in the adverse impact alleged in this part of her complaint.

[45]         Considering the purpose of the working group, Ms. Singh could establish that the decision not to publish candidate statements had an adverse impact on her that was connected to her race or colour. If the Union did not give candidates with lived experience as racialised persons the opportunity to explain that experience, that could potentially have disadvantaged them, considering the purpose of the working group. The Union says the Business Representative decided not to publish the candidate statements in order to ensure fairness to all the candidates, since not all candidates provided statements, but it does not explain how this decision promoted fairness. The Union does not say, for example, why publishing the statements of candidates who chose to provide them could have been unfair.

[46]         The Business Representative’s evidence is that she offered Ms. Singh alternatives to the candidate statement, and Ms. Singh was not interested, but there is no evidence about what the alternatives were, or how they would have allowed Ms. Singh to convey the relevance of her lived experience as a racialised person to the Union members who were voting in the election. Ms. Singh says the Business Representative told her that candidate statements were unnecessary because the voters knew the candidates well enough already, and the Union does not deny this, in the materials before me. But there is no evidence about how the voters knew Ms. Singh, or the other candidates, or whether the voters knew of any of the candidates’ lived experience as racialised persons.

[47]         If the Tribunal finds, after a hearing, that the Union’s actions denied Ms. Singh an opportunity to tell the voters about her lived experience as a racialised person, and this affected her ability to be elected to a Union working group, the Tribunal could find that she experienced an adverse impact in her membership in the Union, in which her race and colour were factors. On this basis, I find she has brought her complaint under s. 14 beyond conjecture.

[48]         If the Tribunal accepts that membership in the working group was a form of employment by the Union, the Tribunal could find a contravention of s. 13 on the basis that Ms. Singh’s ability to obtain a leadership position in the group was compromised, for reasons related to her race and colour. Since the Union does not deny, in this application, that membership in the working group could be seen as a form of employment by the Union, I decline to dismiss the complaint under s. 13. But I note that at a hearing, the onus will be on Ms. Singh to prove that membership in the working group was a form of employment, or that it had a sufficient nexus to the employment context, to establish discrimination under s. 13.

IV    Conclusion

[49]         The Union’s application is dismissed. The complaint will proceed to a hearing.

Andrew Robb
Tribunal Member