Bucci v. The University of British Columbia and others, 2026 BCHRT 19
Date Issued: January 15, 2026
File: CS-004262
Indexed as: Bucci v. The University of British Columbia and others, 2026 BCHRT 19
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Paul Bucci
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The University of British Columbia and Karon MacLean and Christina Conati and Me Ling Chu
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On his own behalf: Paul Bucci
Counsel for the Respondents: Kacey Krenn and Madeline Lusk
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mr. Bucci alleges the University of British Columbia, Karon MacLean, Cristina Conati, and Me Ling Chu [together the “Respondents] discriminated against him in employment and in the provision of a service based on mental disability when Dr. MacLean ended her supervisory relationship with him and he needed to find a new supervisor to continue in his PhD program.
[2] The Respondents made a settlement offer to resolve Mr. Bucci’s complaint. Mr. Bucci rejected the offer and the Respondents now apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Human Rights Code. They say it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with a hearing because they made a reasonable settlement offer.
[3] Mr. Bucci opposes the dismissal application and disputes the offer presented by the Respondents is reasonable.
[4] In this decision I consider whether the Respondents’ offer is reasonable and if so, whether it would further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed where Mr. Bucci has rejected the offer. For the reasons that follow, I grant the Respondents’ application and dismiss the complaint. I find the offer was reasonable and it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint in light of the offer.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] Mr. Bucci was a PhD student at the University in the Department of Computer Science under the supervision of Dr. MacLean.
[7] Between December 2019 and June 2020, interpersonal issues began to develop between Dr. MacLean and Mr. Bucci. On June 22, 2020, after Mr. Bucci sent Dr. MacLean an email stating he believed she was a “bad person” and felt “a lot of resentment” towards her, Dr. MacLean decided that the supervisory relationship was no longer viable and informed the University that she wanted to terminate her supervisory relationship with Mr. Bucci.
[8] On July 16, 2020, the University convened a meeting with Mr. Bucci, Dr. MacLean, Ms. Chu, the director of student academic support, and Dr. Conati, the associate head of graduate affairs. At the meeting Dr. MacLean ended her supervisory relationship with Mr. Bucci. Mr. Bucci was given the option of pausing his PhD and taking a leave of absence to find a new supervisor. He was also offered a role as a graduate teaching assistant to mitigate any lost income while searching for a new supervisor. Mr. Bucci declined these offers.
[9] Mr. Bucci found a new supervisor within the department by September 2020 and did not pause his PhD or lose income.
[10] Mr. Bucci filed his complaint with the Tribunal on June 11, 2021. In his complaint form he indicated he was seeking the following remedies:
a. A declaration that the conduct complained of is discrimination.
b. Steps or programs to address the discrimination.
c. An order to stop the discrimination.
d. Compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
e. Compensation for lost wages or other expenses.
f. An official extension to his graduation timeline.
g. A review of the University’s systems and HR processes
[11] On July 6, 2023, the Respondents made a with prejudice offer to settle the complaint. The terms of the offer are:
a. The University will extend the time for Mr. Bucci to complete his PhD to December 31, 2024, with additional extensions of time as needed.
b. The University will guarantee that Mr. Bucci will continue to receive funding during his PhD program. If Mr. Bucci accepts employment or an internship outside of the University during his PhD program the amount of his funding may be reduced.
c. The University will waive Mr. Bucci’s tuition requirements until December 31, 2024.
d. The University will pay to Mr. Bucci the sum of $20,000.
e. The University will remind members of the Department of Computer Science that complaints of bullying and harassment must be addressed through the University’s statement on respectful environment for students, faculty, and staff.
f. Mr. Bucci will withdraw his human rights complaint. Mr. Bucci will agree not to make any offensive or defamatory statements about the Respondents.
[12] The offer remains open for acceptance until two weeks following the Tribunal’s decision in this application to dismiss.
[13] Mr. Bucci rejected the offer.
III DECISION
[14] The Respondents argue that it would not further the Code’s purpose to allow the complaint to proceed because it made a reasonable settlement offer: Carter v. Travelex Canada UK (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 275 at para. 23-25, upheld in 2009 BCCA 180. Mr. Bucci says the offer is not reasonable for two reasons. First, he says $20,000 is not within the range of what the Tribunal would likely award if his complaint succeeds. Second, he says the settlement offer does not contain an admission of fault or steps to address the discrimination by the University. I first turn to the principles that guide my analysis.
[15] There are two prerequisites for the Tribunal to consider dismissing a complaint based on a reasonable settlement offer. First, the settlement offer must be made “with prejudice” because the Tribunal cannot rely on information about settlement discussions that is inadmissible based on privilege: at Dar Santos v. University of British Columbia, 2003 BCHRT 73 para. 64; Carter at para. 25. Second, the offer must remain open for the complainant’s acceptance regardless of the outcome of the application to dismiss: Issa v. Loblaw, 2009 BCHRT 264at para. 35. There is no dispute that both prerequisites are met in this case.
[16] Where the prerequisites are met, the Tribunal engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether it furthers the purposes of the Code to proceed. The first step is to determine if the offer is reasonable: Dar Santos at para. 59. If it is, the next step is to address whether there are considerations that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint, considering the purposes of the Code.
A. Is the settlement offer reasonable?
[17] In assessing whether the offer is reasonable, the Tribunal assumes that the complainant will prove their allegations and considers what the Tribunal would likely order. The offer does not need to mirror exactly what the Tribunal would order: Carter at para. 30. It is not always necessary for a respondent to admit liability: Frick v. University of British Columbia, 2009 BCHRT 85 at para. 54. However, the offer must fully address the allegations and available remedies, both monetary and non-monetary.
1. Monetary Remedies
[18] In my view the settlement offer of $20,000 is within the reasonable range that the Tribunal might award if the complaint was found to be justified.
[19] The Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii). The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. The amount of compensation depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case and relevant factors: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 2), 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396 at para. 260. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases. In making an injury to dignity award the Tribunal often considers several factors including the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s vulnerability; and the effect on the complainant: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58at para. 225.
[20] Any discrimination is serious; however, the egregiousness of the discriminatory conduct varies depending on the specific facts of the case: Cyncora v. Axton Inc., 2022 BCHRT 36 at para. 114. Here, the nature of the discrimination is discrete. Mr. Bucci alleges Dr. MacLean ended her supervisory relationship with him because of his mental disability. I appreciate that Mr. Bucci says it was disruptive to find a new supervisor. However, I agree with the Respondents that the evidence before me supports a lower award because the evidence does not establish a pattern of discrimination and Mr. Bucci was not removed from his PhD program.
[21] Next, I consider Mr. Bucci’s vulnerability or the social context of the discrimination. The Tribunal has recognized that a student is in a vulnerable position as they rely upon the academic institution to provide education and training: Kelly v. University of British Columbia (No. 4), 2013 BCHRT 302 at para. 101.
[22] Finally, I consider the impact of the discrimination. Mr. Bucci says the discrimination caused him pain and suffering, damage to his career and loss of opportunity and wages. He says he suffered fear, anxiety, and loss of sleep because of the discrimination and concerns about his academic status.
[23] The Respondents say $20,000 is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might award. They refer me to the following cases they say support their position: Cyncora ($20,000), Mackenzie v. Jace Holdings and another (No. 4), 2012 BCHRT 376 ($5,000); Bertrend v. Golder and Associates, 2009 BCHRT 274 ($12,500). They acknowledge that none of the cases they cite mirror the exact circumstances of this case. They say that the present case is distinguishable from these cases because Mr. Bucci was not terminated or removed from his PhD program and the settlement offer surpasses the cases they rely upon.
[24] Much of Mr. Bucci’s submissions are about allegations beyond the scope of his human rights complaint. In his response to the dismissal application Mr. Bucci alleges that in 2019 he and other graduate students raised issues about Dr. MacLean’s conduct with the University which was not appropriately investigated. He further argues that the settlement offer of $20,000 is insufficient to “buy a lifelong silence” preventing him from speaking out against the Respondents. These submissions are beyond the scope of the human rights complaint and are not relevant to assessing the reasonableness of the Respondents’ offer regarding injury to dignity damages.
[25] In the circumstances of this case, I find that $20,000 is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might award if the complaint succeeded at a hearing.
[26] In his complaint form Mr. Bucci seeks an award for lost wages or other expenses. Mr. Bucci says he has suffered a loss of job opportunities and wages because of the discrimination. However, the evidence before me is that there was no delay in Mr. Bucci finding a new supervisor after Dr. MacKay ended the supervisory relationship. Mr. Bucci says that within the academic context, reputation and perception can impact hiring decisions and he lost the opportunity to apply for academic positions as a result of the discrimination. This assertion is speculative and not supported in the evidence before me.
[27] Further, Mr. Bucci says he incurred therapy and legal expenses as a result of the discrimination but provides no details of these costs. In this respect, while the settlement offer does not explicitly compensate him for lost wages or out of pocket expenses, I find the global sum of $20,000 reasonable.
2. Non-monetary Remedies
[28] Mr. Bucci seeks a declaratory order and an order that the Respondents cease the discrimination. He also seeks a review of the University’s processes and steps to prevent further discrimination. While the settlement offer does not incorporate the orders sought, the absence of such an order does not in itself provide a basis for denying the dismissal application: McQueen v. Three Point Motors, 2017 BCHRT 120 at para. 33.
[29] In conclusion, looking at the entirety of the offer, I am satisfied that it fully addresses the allegations and available remedies and offers monetary compensation that is within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order. I find the offer reasonable.
[30] I next consider whether there are factors that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint, based on the purposes set out in the Code.
B. Will it serve the purposes of the Code to proceed despite the reasonable settlement offer?
[31] The assessment of whether proceeding with a complaint will further the purposes of the Code, involves more than an assessment of an individual complaint. It encompasses broader public policy issues including the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in processing a complaint to a hearing: Dar Santos at para. 59. In general, it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing where the respondent has made a reasonable settlement offer: Salanguit v. Parq Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 119at para. 47.
[32] Here, I find there are no factors that favour proceeding with the complaint in light of the reasonable settlement offer. The Tribunal routinely hears and decides cases that concern allegations of discrimination on the basis of mental disability in post-secondary institutions: Student D v. Selkirk College, 2025 BCHRT 178; Pattinson v. University of Northern British Columbia (No. 4), 2025 BCHRT 57; Fernandes v. City University of Seattle in Canada and another (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 116. I am not persuaded that the present complaint engages broader public policy issues that warrants the complaint proceeding in the face of a reasonable settlement offer.
[33] Mr. Bucci argues that his complaint should proceed because it is not solely about the discrimination he experienced but represents other students who faced systemic issues within the University which the settlement offer does not address. I am not persuaded by this argument. The complaint accepted by the Tribunal is about Mr. Bucci’s allegations of discrimination when Dr. MacLean ended her supervisory relationship with him. It is not a complaint filed on behalf of a group or class of persons under s. 21 (4) of the Code. Therefore, Mr. Bucci’s assertion that other students experienced similar issues to his is not a basis for this complaint to proceed.
[34] Under the circumstances, I find that allowing this complaint to proceed would not further the purposes of the Code.
IV CONCLUSION
[35] I grant the application and dismiss the complaint under s.27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[36] As set out in the Respondents’ settlement offer, the settlement offer will expire in two weeks following the date of this decision.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member