[1] Ms. T uses a collapsible wheelchair.[1] On August 20, 2021, she booked a taxi through Victoria Taxi (1987) Ltd., to attend a medical appointment, with her wheelchair. Based on her experience with Victoria Taxi and its driver Ehsan Khan, she filed a complaint alleging they discriminated against her, in their provision of services, contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code. This is a decision on the merits of Ms. T’s complaint after a hearing.

[2] Ms. T alleges that Victoria Taxi and Mr. Khan discriminated against her, based on disability, because: (1) Mr. Khan denied her a taxi ride, in a regular taxi, due to her collapsible wheelchair; (2) he refused to wear a mask in the taxi during Covid-19; (3) he was rude; and (4) in her follow-up call to Victoria Taxi, the dispatcher told her drivers don’t want to deal with wheelchairs. With respect to Mr. Khan’s alleged rudeness, Ms. T says it was discriminatory based on both disability and sex.

[3] In their response to the complaint, Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi said that: Ms. T’s wheelchair was too big to fit in a regular taxi; Mr. Khan wore a mask; and it was Ms. T who was rude. Victoria Taxi also said that its dispatcher no longer works for the company, and it has no record of Ms. T’s call.

[4] Aside from their response to the complaint, Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi did not otherwise participate in the complaint process. Critically, neither participated in the hearing nor put forward any evidence. However, I am satisfied that they each had notice and the opportunity to participate at each step of the process, including the hearing.

II ISSUES AND DECISION

[5] In this decision, I answer four questions posed by Ms. T’s complaint, as follows:

Did Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi discriminate against Ms. T, based on disability, when Mr. Khan did not give her a ride due to her collapsible wheelchair? Yes.
Did Mr. Khan refuse to wear a mask during the Covid-19 pandemic? No.
Was Mr. Khan rude? Yes. Was it discriminatory based on sex and disability? Yes.
Did the dispatcher tell Ms. T. that drivers don’t want to deal with wheelchairs? Yes. Did this discriminate against Ms. T based on disability? Yes.

[6] My answers mean that Ms. T has proven most of her complaint, and I find she is entitled to some of the remedies she seeks. I explain my decision next.

[7] Despite not having legal training, and coping with a migraine at the hearing, Ms. T effectively presented her case. I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision, but I thank Ms. T for her efforts.

III EVIDENCE

[8] Ms. T’s evidence consisted of her own testimony, and the testimony of her witness Ning Li. Ning Li is a healthcare worker who assisted Ms. T on August 20, 2021. Ms. T also provided documentary evidence, which I admitted based on witness evidence about those documents.

[9] Because Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi did not participate in the hearing, Ms. T’s and Ms. Li’s evidence is undisputed. Where necessary, I have made findings of facts, based on the factors I summarized in Van Vugt v. Donnelly Landscapes Ltd. and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 229, para. 51.

1. Ms. T’s health condition, mobility needs, and wheelchair

[10] Ms. T has a chronic, neurological condition stemming from Lyme disease. Due to her symptoms, she uses a cane and wheelchair, as needed. She relies on health care support services to assist her with daily living tasks such as attending appointments.

[11] On August 20, 2021, Ms. Li was at Ms. T’s home. At the time, Ms. Li worked for a company that helps clients with health care needs. That help may involve support with daily tasks like personal care, meal prep, cleaning, or accompaniments to appointments. Ms. Li was assisting Ms. T with daily living tasks, including helping her prepare for a medical appointment, and accompanying her to that appointment.

[12] Ms. T. had arranged for a taxi to pick her and Ms. Li up at a certain time to go to Ms. T’s medical appointment. Ms. Li’s evidence was that it took “a lot of time” for Ms. T to prepare, with her help, for the taxi ride and appointment. Ms. T further described their preparations:

I have to sort of pack myself up, get help to pack myself up. With the myasthenia … I can sort of guesstimate how much energy I have and … I knew that I could get myself down the stairs with my cane. I have … a flight of stairs that’s … maybe like 12 to 15 steps from my front door down to my walkway. And then there’s an additional 5 steps down to the sidewalk.

And I was able to get myself down all the stairs with my cane and to sort of park myself on this … retaining wall by the sidewalk to wait for the taxi. So I was down there waiting and [Ms. Li] was able to get the wheelchair and its components down the stairs and to be disassembling it, waiting for the ride to come.

[13] Ms. Li’s and Ms. T’s evidence illustrates that, for Ms. T, preparing to take a taxi may take many more steps, more time, and more support, than for a person without her health and mobility issues.

2. August 20, 2021 events

[14] Mr. Khan arrived at Ms. T’s house, in a four-door sedan, approximately five minutes late. Ms. T described him as a “pretty big guy,” and physically strong and fit. They had an exchange along the following lines:

Mr. Khan: “oh, you have a wheelchair? You didn’t tell me.”

Ms. T: “its not heavy and easy to fold. It can fit in a small car.”

Mr. Khan: “No it won’t fit.”

Ms. T: “I always call for taxis and my wheelchair is not a big deal, it can fit.”

[15] As part of her healthcare worker role, Ms. Li had experience putting similar wheelchairs in car trunks. She folded Ms. T’s wheelchair and tried to demonstrate to Mr. Khan that it would fit in his trunk. Her evidence was that the wheelchair would have fit but that Mr. Khan pulled the wheelchair away, closed the trunk, and told Ms. T and Ms. Li they needed to call a “disability van.” Then he left.

[16] Both Ms. Li and Ms. T described Mr. Khan as unfriendly, unhelpful, rude, and unwilling to listen to either of them [the rudeness allegation]. Ms. T also characterized the interaction as a power imbalance based on her description of Mr. Khan as a large, able bodied man, and herself as a woman, who is not able bodied, and was dependent on his transport services, to access health care.

[17] Ms. T called Victoria Taxi and told the dispatcher that Mr. Khan was rude to her and refused her service because she had a wheelchair. She explained that her wheelchair folds up, as light, and small as a suitcase. The dispatcher told her that it didn’t matter, and she still needed to tell them that she needed an accessible taxi because “drivers don’t want to deal with wheelchairs.”

[18] Given the response of the Victoria Taxi dispatcher, Ms. T concluded that Victoria Taxi was not going to help her and she did not want to deal with them. She called Bluebird Cabs instead. Erring on the side of caution she told Bluebird Cabs that she needed a wheelchair taxi to get to a medical appointment. A taxi driver in a Bluebird minivan arrived without incident. Although Ms. T was late for her appointment, she was able to proceed with it.

[19] The next day, Ms. T filed the human rights complaint before me and a complaint to Consumer Protection BC: Exhibit 1, p. 6.

[20] I thank both witnesses for taking the time to give their evidence. They both brought forward important information to assist me in deciding this case.

IV ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[21] Ms. T has the burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s conduct discriminated against her: Gichuru v. Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78, para. 50. To prove discrimination, Ms. T has the burden to prove that: (1) she has a characteristic protected by the Code, in this case physical disability and sex; (2) she was adversely impacted by Mr. Khan and/or Victoria Taxi, in the areas of services; and (3) her disability and/or sex was a factor in the adverse impact(s): Code, s. 8; Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, para. 33.

[22] If Ms. T proves discrimination, the burden shifts to Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi to justify the adverse impacts on her. If Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi cannot justify the adverse impacts, the Tribunal will find that they breached the Code: Moore, para. 33.

[23] As discussed next, I find that Ms. T has proven all of her allegations of discrimination except one. My analysis ends there because Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi did not participate in the hearing to argue that the impacts on Ms. T were justified.

1. Did Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi discriminate against Ms. T, based on disability, when Mr. Khan denied her a taxi ride?

[24] The answer to this question is yes. To answer this question, I first considered whether Ms. T has proven that she had disability protected under the Code.

(1) Did Ms. T have a disability?

[25] Disability is not defined in the Code. Rather, the Tribunal and Courts have developed criteria to determine what is and is not a disability, taking into account the purposes of the Code: Stevenson v. Marcon Construction, 2020 BCHRT 80, para. 7. One purpose of the Code is to remove barriers that people face in certain areas of their life because of a disability: Code, s. 3; Stevenson, para. 7. Those barriers may arise from actual functional limitations associated with a disability, or society’s response to the disability: Stevenson, para. 7. To decide whether a specific medical condition is a disability within the meaning of the Code, the Tribunal generally considers three factors:

the degree of impairment and functional limitations associated with the condition; and/or
the degree of severity, permanence, and persistence of the condition; and/or
the social perception and response to that condition, such as stigma, taking into account human rights principles.

Stevenson, paras. 7-8; Morris v. BC Rail, 2003 BCHRT 14, paras. 211 and 214; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City); Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City), 2000 SCC 27, paras. 39 and 76-77; Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 SCR 703, paras. 28-29 and 36-40.

[26] I apply these principles to the evidence before me about Ms. T’s stated disability. Ms. T’s undisputed evidence was that:

Since 2018, she was diagnosed with a chronic, neurological condition stemming from Lyme disease.
The symptoms she experiences because of the condition include: muscle fatigue and weakness; frequent and chronic vertigo; and migraines.
Due to her symptoms, she uses a cane and wheelchair, as needed.
She accesses health care services, including Ms. Li’s services to assist her with daily living activities such as attending appointments.

[27] Ms. T provided corroborating medical documentation about her medical condition and symptoms: Exhibit 2, p. 11-12; Exhibit 3, p. 3-14. Based on the evidence I find Ms. T. had a disability under the Code for two reasons.

[28] Degree of impairment and functional limitations – First I find that Ms. T’s symptoms, associated with her neurological condition, impair and limit her daily functions to a degree that falls under the Code’s protection. There is no question that on August 20, 2021, she needed to use a wheelchair and was dependent on Ms. Li’s health care support to get to an appointment. In my view, this evidence is enough to show a serious impairment to and limit on Ms. T’s daily function on the date in question.

[29] Degree of severity – Second, I find that Ms. T’s neurological condition is severe, permanent, and persistent enough to fall under the Code’s protection. I accept Ms. T’s evidence that her symptoms, due to the condition, include muscle fatigue and weakness; frequent and chronic vertigo; and migraines. Because of these symptoms she needs to use of a cane, a wheelchair, and health care services, regularly, to address her daily living activities. In my view, those aspects of her condition make it severe.

[30] Degree of persistence or permanence – I also find that Ms. T’s neurological condition has a degree of persistence or permanence. I accept her evidence that she was diagnosed with the condition in 2018. I also accept her evidence that the condition is chronic, and her symptoms have persisted since at least 2018 until the date of the hearing. In support of her oral testimony, she provided a letter from her physiotherapist, indicating that Ms. T.’s systems were “significantly exacerbated” in early 2026, which substantially compromised her ability to engage in basic daily living activities: Exhibit 3, p. 9. This evidence is undisputed and in harmony with Ms. T’s evidence. I accept it. I also accept Ms. T’s evidence that at the hearing she was struggling with a migraine – one of the symptoms of her condition.

[31] Ms. T’s evidence about her medical condition, its nature, and its impacts, is enough to show a disability under the Code. As a result, I did not need to consider societal responses to and perceptions of Ms. T’s medical condition. However, I acknowledge that the concept of disability, in a human rights framework, goes beyond medical conditions. A disability under the Code includes barriers that people with disabilities face because of social norms, designs and perceptions that exclude them: Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., [2007] 1 SCR 650 [Via Rail], para. 181; Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 SCR 241 [Eaton], para. 67.

[32] In summary, I accept that Ms. T’s neurological condition, its symptoms, and impacts, qualify as a disability under the Code. I turn next to whether Ms. T was adversely impacted when Mr. Khan did not give her a taxi ride on August 21, 2021.

(2) Was Ms. T adversely impacted when Mr. Khan denied her a taxi ride?

[33] There is no dispute that Mr. Khan refused to give Ms. T a taxi ride on August 21, 2021. I have no difficulty finding that the denial of service adversely impacted Ms. T.

[34] I accept Ms. T’s evidence that it was “extremely stressful” when she was left without a ride to get to her medical appointment. She was left stranded and scrambling to get to her medical appointment after making special arrangements and efforts to get to it by taxi, and with Ms. Li’s support. In her words, she already faced barriers to get to her appointment that day and did not need another one. She had to call another taxi company, Bluebird Cabs, to pick her up. She was late for her medical appointment through no fault of her own. Because she was late, she did not know whether her appointment could proceed. It did proceed, but instead of helping her get to it, Mr. Khan’s denial of service was another barrier she had to overcome.

(3) Was Ms. T’s disability a factor in Mr. Khan denying her taxi ride?

[35] There is no dispute that the only reason Mr. Khan denied Ms. T a taxi ride is because she had her wheelchair with her. Her wheelchair use is inseparable from her neurological condition, which I have found is a disability. I have no difficulty finding that Ms. T’s disability was a factor in Mr. Khan denying her taxi ride.

[36] In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered whether the size of Ms. T’s wheelchair was too big to fit in a regular taxi. In this regard, I accept Ms. Li’s and Ms. T’s evidence that the wheelchair is foldable, lightweight and about the size of a suitcase, when collapsed. Their testimony, and Ms. T’s documentary evidence, showed that the wheelchair, when folded for transport, weighs about 9.5 pounds. When folded, it measures approximately 28 inches in width, 30 inches in height (with rear wheels removed), and 11 inches in depth.

[37] Ms. T’s and Ms. Li’s evidence about the wheelchair’s folded size, is consistent with the dimensions of a suitcase widely accepted by most airline requirements – 62 total linear inches (weight + height + depth combined): See, for example, Air Canada, “checked baggage”, https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/plan/baggage/checked.html#/. The linear dimensions of Ms. T’s folded wheelchair is (28 + 30 + 11) is 69 inches. However, Ms. T’s folded wheelchair, at 9.5 pounds is much lighter than a large suitcase, which is usually up to 50 pounds.

[38] I also find that Ms. T’s wheelchair is a portable mobility aid, as defined by the BC Government, which means it is designed to fit in a regular taxi. As part of her evidence for this hearing, Ms. T included two documents from the BC Government, dated December 17, 2025, with respect to taxi services in BC. The first document, entitled “Information for Drivers,” states:

Passengers may need assistance entering or exiting the taxi and storing items. Taxi drivers may not add charges to the fare for handling luggage. WorkSafe BC provides useful information on preventing injuries caused by heavy luggage.
Portable mobility aids are designed to collapse for easy transport and can be accommodated in a regular taxi, without the need for an accessible taxi.

Exhibit 1, p. 14.

[39] The second document, entitled “Taxi Bill of Rights” states that taxi passengers have the right to:

Be picked up and transported to your stated destination by any available on duty taxi driver.
A courteous driver who provides assistance, if requested.
Travel with an assistance dog or portable mobility aid.

Exhibit 2, p. 1.

[40] On the undisputed evidence before me, I find that Ms. T’s wheelchair is a portable mobility aid, because it is designed to collapse for easy transport. Further, the BC Government expects that taxi drivers will handle and store portable mobility aids, in their regular taxis, much like luggage. I find that Ms. T did not require an accessible taxi, and she was not obliged to ask for one when she booked a taxi through Victoria Taxi.

[41] Ms. T has proven that Mr. Khan’s refusal to provide her a taxi ride was discriminatory, based on her disability.

2. Did Mr. Khan refuse to wear a mask during the pandemic?

[42] The answer to this question is no, based on the evidence before me.

[43] Ms. T alleged that: when Mr. Khan arrived to pick her up on August 21, 2021 he was not wearing a mask; she asked him to wear one because it was during the Covid-19 pandemic and she is immunocompromised; and Mr. Khan ignored her request and refused to wear a mask [mask allegation].

[44] Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi refuted this allegation in their response to the complaint. On their account, Mr. Khan was wearing a mask for his own safety, and safety of his family, including a baby at the time. He was wearing a mask regularly at that time because it was the Covid-19 pandemic.

[45] Ms. T testified that when Mr. Khan pulled up he was not wearing a mask. Her evidence was that she “politely” asked him to put one on. This aspect of her evidence is consistent with what she set out in her complaint, as well as the complaint she made to Consumer Protection BC. She made both complaints the day after the incident with Mr. Khan. She put the Consumer Protection BC complaint before me as part of her evidence: Exhibit 1, p. 6-7.

[46] Ms. T also testified that when she asked Mr. Khan to wear a mask he did not respond. In her testimony she could not recall whether Mr. Khan did put on a mask. Her evidence was: “I don’t think he put on a mask, but … it was a long time ago.” She relied on her earlier statements in her complaint and a Consumer Protection BC complaint about what occurred on August 20, 2021. She testified that her memory was fresher in her earlier statements, and more accurate on this point.

[47] While the evidence supports Ms. T asking Mr. Khan to wear a mask, I do not find that Mr. Khan then refused to wear a mask for four reasons. First, in her testimony, Ms. T could not recall whether Mr. Khan put a mask on or not. Second, Ms. Li, who was present during the incident, did not have any evidence about the mask allegation. Third, Ms. T’s complaint is silent about what happened after she asked she Mr. Khan to wear a mask. Fourth, in her Consumer Protection BC complaint, Ms. T states that when she asked Mr. Khan to wear a mask “he did so reluctantly”: Exhibit 3, p. 7.

[48] While it is understandable that Ms. T’s memory has faded with time, I do not have enough reliable evidence before to find that Mr. Khan refused to wear a mask. Accordingly, I dismiss the mask allegation.

3. Was Mr. Khan rude? If so, was it discrimination based on sex and disability?

[49] Ms. T alleged that Mr. Khan was rude to her and Ms. Li, who are both women, and that Mr. Khan’s rudeness was discrimination based on both sex and disability [rudeness allegation].

[50] Both Ms. T and Ms. Li described Mr. Khan as unfriendly, unhelpful, rude, and unwilling to listen to them, in their interactions with him on August 20, 2021. I accept all of their undisputed evidence about the rudeness allegation as credible and reliable for five reasons.

[51] First, their evidence relates to their first-hand interactions with Mr. Khan. Second, they were able to recall and describe their interaction and acknowledged the limits of their memories. Both described Mr. Khan as muttering something as he left, and both candidly acknowledged that they could not recall his exact words. Third, both did not attempt to give evidence about events not in their direct knowledge, such as the other witness’s interaction with Mr. Khan. Fourth, their accounts were consistent throughout their testimony. Fifth their evidence was in harmony with each other and the documentary evidence. To the extent that there any differences in the evidence, they are minor details and do not affect my assessment of their credibility and reliability.

[52] I have no difficulty finding that Mr. Khan was unfriendly, unhelpful, rude, and unwilling to listen to Ms. T or Ms. Li in his interactions with them. Next I consider whether his rudeness amounts to discrimination based on disability and sex.

(1) Protected characteristics

[53] There is no question that Ms. T is a woman, and her gender is protected under the Code based on sex. I also found earlier that Ms. T’s neurological condition, its symptoms, and impacts qualify as a disability under the Code.

(2) Was Ms. T adversely impacted by Mr. Khan’s rudeness?

[54] I have no difficulty finding that Ms. T was adversely impacted by Mr. Khan’s rudeness. Given my findings, I accept her evidence that she was confused, stressed, upset, and incredulous that a service provider treated her in this manner. She felt disliked and disrespected by Mr. Khan’s rudeness.

(3) Was Ms. T’s disability and / or sex a factor in Mr. Khan’s rudeness?

[55] I have no difficulty finding that Ms. T’s disability was a factor in Mr. Khan’s rudeness. It is obvious to me that Mr. Khan was rude to Ms. T primarily because she had a wheelchair with her, and her wheelchair use is inseparable from her disability.

[56] While the primary focus of Ms. T’s complaint is her disability, she is not only a person with a disability. She is a woman with a disability. The Tribunal takes an intersectional approach [2] to assess discrimination, in recognition that people do not exist as the sum of disconnected identities: Hale v. University of British Columbia Okanagan (No. 5), 2023 BCHRT 121, para. 216; Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) and Securiguard Services (No. 3), 2005 BCHRT 302, para. 463.

[57] People in the same protected group may have different and distinct experiences: Miller v. Union of BC Performers, 2020 BCHRT 133 [Miller BCHRT] (upheld in Miller v. The Union of British Columbia Performers, 2022 BCCA 358 [Miller BCCA]), para. 21. Focusing on only one of a person’s protected characteristics risks minimizing or even erasing the effects of the discrimination: Michel v. Graydon, [2020] 2 SCR 763, para. 101; Radek, paras. 464-465; Baylis-Flannery v. DeWilde (Tri Community Physiotherapy), 2003 HRTO 28, paras. 144-145. Further, intersectional group membership tends to amplify discriminatory effects and may give rise to discriminatory effects not visited upon a group viewed in isolation: Ontario (Attorney General) v. G., 2020 SCC 38 [Ontario v. G], para. 47.

[58] People with disabilities and women have long fought to have their voices heard, and lived expertise accounted for, in areas of daily life. There is no question that both groups experience persistent patterns of inequality: Ontario v. G, para. 61; Miller, para. 20. These are structural disadvantages which gave rise to the protection of disability and sex, under human rights law, in the first place: Stewart v. Theatre Passe Muraille, 2024 HRTO 1836, para. 25.

[59] Neither of Ms. T’s identities can be parsed from her experience: Hale, para. 16; Radek, para. 463. She experienced Mr. Khan’s rudeness – as an aspect of denying her access to appropriate and respectful transportation services – as both a person with a disability and a woman. In her evidence, and closing submissions, she described a power imbalance between her and Mr. Khan and attributed that imbalance to both their differences in ability and gender. She described Mr. Khan as a large, strong, able-bodied man and herself as a female passenger who was not able-bodied.

[60] Mr. Khan did not participate in the hearing to provide an explanation for his rudeness. Whatever his intention, his conduct harmed Ms. T. I accept her evidence that she felt particularly vulnerable, disempowered, and disrespected as a woman with disability, dependent on taxi services to attend a medical appointment. The Code is concerned with impact not intention: Code, s. 2; R.R. v. Vancouver Aboriginal Child and Family Services Society, 2025 BCCA 151, para. 34.

[61] I conclude that Ms. T’s sex was also a factor in the adverse impacts she experienced because of Mr. Khan’s rudeness.

4. Did a Victoria Taxi dispatcher tell Ms. T. that drivers don’t want to deal with wheelchairs? If so was it discriminatory based on disability?

[62] Ms. T’s undisputed evidence is that a Victoria Taxi dispatcher told her that its drivers don’t want to deal with wheelchairs. I accept her evidence as credible and reliable for three reasons. First, her account is consistent with the accounts she gave of this interaction in her human rights complaint and Consumer Protection Branch complaint. Second, Ms. T gave those earlier accounts on August 21, 2021, when her memory was fresher. Third, there were no inconsistencies between Ms. T’s testimony and the documentary evidence.

[63] Ms. T argues that the dispatcher’s comment discriminated against her based on disability. I agree. In terms of the adverse impact on her, I unequivocally accept Ms. T’s evidence that the comment reinforced to her that she did not deserve the same access to services as other passengers. The comment was also an aspect of continuing to deny her appropriate taxi services. Again, I have no difficulty finding that Ms. T’s disability was a factor in the dispatcher’s comment because her wheelchair use is inseparable from her disability.

5. Conclusion

[64] Ms. T has proven that Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s conduct, in connection with denying her a taxi ride, discriminated against her in the area of services: Code, s. 8. Because Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi did not participate in the hearing, neither of them presented any evidence to justify the discrimination. Accordingly, I find that Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi discriminated against Ms. T in violation of s. 8 of the Code. Because Mr. Khan was employed by Victoria Taxi at the time, both Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi are liable for that discrimination: Code, s. 44(2).

V REMEDIES

[65] I have found that Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi discriminated against Ms. T contrary to s. 8 of the Code. I declare that Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s lack of appropriate services for Ms. T was discrimination contrary to the Code. I order Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi to cease this contravention and refrain from committing the same or similar contravention: Code, s. 37(2)(a) and (b).

[66] Ms. T also seeks further orders that Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi:

take steps to ameliorate the effects of their discriminatory practices: Code, s. 37(2)(c)(i);
adopt and implement an employment equity program or other special program to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups: Code, s. 37(2)(c)(ii);
make available to her the services they denied her: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(i);
compensate her for the expenses she incurred because of the discrimination: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(ii); and
compensate her for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect [injury to dignity], in the amount of $35,000: Code, s. 37(d)(iii).

[67] I will address these requests in turn.

1. Section 37(2)(c)(i) – training

[68] Under s. 37(2)(c)(i) of the Code, the Tribunal may order a respondent take specific steps to ameliorate the effects of their discriminatory practices. In this regard, Ms. T. requests that Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi take training in providing “respectful, competent service to people with disabilities and other protected classes, ensure that they are aware that foldable mobility devices such as wheelchairs ARE accepted cargo, and adopt a ‘3 strikes, you’re out’ policy” for drivers or employees who discriminate: Form 9.4 – Remedy Sought, p. 2; closing submissions, p. 5.

[69] In some cases, the Tribunal has ordered respondents to undergo or provide mandatory training on their human rights obligations: Beckett and Kuan v. The Owners, Strata Plan NW 2603, 2016 BCHRT 27, para. 190; Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd. dba Buono Osteria and others, 2021 BCHRT 137, para. 144e.

[70] I find that an order for training, with respect to Victoria Taxi, is appropriate here for two reasons. First, Victoria Taxi did not participate in the hearing to justify its training. Second, Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s conduct towards Ms. T indicate that Victoria Taxi lacks awareness of its obligations under the Code to provide appropriate and equitable services to people who use wheelchairs. Without such awareness, Victoria Taxi, and its drivers, risk committing the same or similar type of discrimination. While I have already ordered Victoria Tax to cease and refrain from doing so, training is a concrete tool to help it comply with that order.

[71] Within six months of this decision, I order Victoria Taxi to implement mandatory training, of no less than two hours, for all staff and managers, about its human rights obligations to provide services to people who use wheelchairs – including wheelchairs designated as portable mobility aids.

[72] I am not making any training order with respect to Mr. Khan because such an order is best fulfilled by Victoria Taxi, as the company and the employer with the responsibility to train its staff.

2. Section 37(c)(ii) – employment equity or special program

[73] Under s. 37(2)(c)(ii) of the Code, the Tribunal may order a respondent to adopt and implement an employment equity program or other special program to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups if the evidence at the hearing indicates the respondent has engaged in a discriminatory pattern or practice.

[74] In this regard, Ms. T asks for an order requiring Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi to adopt an employment equity program, ethics and sensitivity training, or other special program to learn about and address the conditions of disadvantaged people and improve service delivery to them: closing submissions, p. 5.

[75] I decline to make an order under s. 37(2)(c)(ii) for two reasons.

[76] First, based on the plain wording of s. 37(2)(c)(ii), I require evidence of a discriminatory pattern or practice. I am not persuaded that is the case here. Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s conduct occurred over one day, on August 20, 2021. That conduct, and their lack of participation in the Tribunal process is troubling. But there was no evidence before me that either had a pattern or practice before or after August 20, 2021, of discriminatory conduct.

[77] Second, I have already ordered Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi to cease and desist their discriminatory conduct and ordered Victoria Taxi to implement relevant training. These orders will require Mr. Khan and Victoria to take a different approach in providing taxi services to people using wheelchairs.

3. Section 37(1)(d)(i) – reinstating services denied

[78] Under s. 37(1)(d)(i) of the Code, the Tribunal may order a respondent to make available to the complainant the right, opportunity, or privilege that the complainant was denied contrary to the Code. The goal is to restore the “the right, opportunity or privilege” that was denied because of the discrimination: Thandi v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Corrections Branch, North Fraser Pretrial Centre, 2025 BCHRT 294, para. 133. In this regard, Ms. T seeks an order that Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi: confirm that she can travel in one its regular taxis, as a passenger with a foldable wheelchair; and, in providing those services, the drivers will assist her and her wheelchair to get in and out of the taxi: closing submissions, p. 5.

[79] Mr. Khan refused to assist Ms. T with her wheelchair or transport it in his taxi on the basis that it would not fit, and Ms. T should have booked a “disability van.” Victoria Taxi’s dispatcher echoed Mr. Khan’s comment by also telling Ms. T that she should have booked an accessible taxi. I have found otherwise. I take notice that the number of taxi companies in Victoria is finite. Ms. T should not be left with any uncertainty about her ability to access Victoria Taxi, with her foldable wheelchair, in the future.

[80] In these circumstances, I find it is appropriate to order Victoria Taxi to confirm to Ms. T in writing, within two months of this decision, that she has the option to travel in its regular taxis with her foldable wheelchair, and, in providing those services will assist her and her wheelchair to get in and out of the taxi.

[81] I am not making any order with respect to Mr. Khan in this regard, because such an order is best fulfilled by Victoria Taxi, as the company providing the service.

4. Section 37(2)(d)(ii) – expenses

[82] Under s. 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code, the Tribunal may make an award for “any wages or salary lost, or expenses incurred” because of the discrimination. Ms. T seeks an order that Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi compensate her for the time she spent to bring her complaint forward. Before the hearing, she filed a remedy form (Form 9.4) estimating that she had spent about 50 hours working on her complaint by that point and valued her time at “a reasonable wage for that labour” in the amount of $25 per hour: Form 9.4, p. 3. Accordingly, she requests [50 hours x $25 per hour] $1250 for her time.

[83] I have no doubt that Ms. T has spent many hours to bring her complaint forward. But, for two reasons I have decided that her time is not compensable. First, I did not have evidence before me that Ms. T lost any wages or salary as a result of the time she spent on her complaint. Second, her time is not an “expense.” The plain meaning of the word means a financial expense, and the Tribunal has interpreted expense under s. 37(2)(d)(ii) to mean an out-of-pocket, financial expense incurred by the complainant: Cameron v. Burrardview Housing Co-Operative (No. 3), 2022 BCHRT 74, para. 152; Jickling v. Sweet Meadows Market (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 325, paras. 68-73.

5. Section 37(2)(d)(iii) – Injury to dignity, feelings, and self respect

[84] Finally, Ms. T seeks $35,000 to compensate her for the injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect [injury to dignity] as a result of the discrimination.

[85] In making an injury to dignity award the Tribunal generally considers: the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s social context or vulnerability; and the specific effect the discrimination had on the complainant: Sarba v. Ruskin Construction Ltd. and others (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 74, para. 124.

[86] Determining the amount of an injury to dignity award depends on the specific facts and circumstances in any given case: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185, para. 256. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is also helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases: Sarba, para. 123. I begin with the nature of the discrimination in this case.

[87] The nature of the discrimination is a taxi driver treating a female passenger and wheelchair user in a rude, unfriendly, and unhelpful manner. Mr. Khan refused to consider any information from Ms. T and Ms. Li about the wheelchair and ultimately denied them taxi services. Victoria Taxi made the situation worse by not addressing Mr. Khan’s conduct or Ms. T’s immediate need for a taxi. Instead, its dispatcher reinforced Mr. Khan’s conduct by telling Ms. T that drivers don’t want to deal with wheelchairs. The discrimination occurred during two brief encounters on the same day.

[88] While the duration was short, two aspects heighten the seriousness of the discrimination. First, Ms. T was denied a service that was critical to her ability to participate in life outside of her home, including access to health care. Second, Victoria Taxi, essentially, doubled down on Mr. Khan’s conduct.

[89] With respect to social context, there is no question that people with disabilities and women face persistent patterns of inequality associated with discrimination under the Code. As I said earlier, it is these patterns which gave rise to the protection of disability and sex, under human rights law, in the first place: Stewart, para. 55. Within this context, Ms. T was uniquely vulnerable as a woman with a disability dependent on taxi services to participate in daily life outside her home, including access to health care. As a passenger, she was vulnerable as a “captive audience” to Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s conduct and decisions, in their provision of taxi services: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, [2017] 2 SCR 795, para. 44.

[90] With respect to the effect the discrimination had on Ms. T, I have already accepted her evidence about the immediate impacts she experienced because of Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s conduct. I also accept further information she provided in her closing submission about the effects of the discrimination. In her words:

Being treated in such a way felt, and still feels, awful, like being invisible, or seen as less than human, inferior, without dignity, and undeserving of safety, and even the most basic respect as a person. This incident not only caused me considerable physiological and emotional stress on top of an already stressful and difficult time, it affected my confidence, and my sense of trust that my needs for safety and support will be met in this life, even with regard to paid safety, or paid support in the form of a simple hired transportation service: closing submission, p. 4

[91] Ms. T also described feeling “more wary and apprehensive around men” and “less safe in the world as a woman and person with disabilities, anxious about being dependent on service providers”: p. 4. I accept that she has an ongoing apprehension about calling taxis and other similar service out of a worry that she could have a similar experience.

[92] Finally, I have considered the injury to dignity awards in recent cases involving a denial of service, to a complainant with a disability, on a single day. The awards range from $7500 to $15,000.

[93] In Belusic v. Yellow Cab of Victoria, 2018 BCHRT 81, Mr. Belusic was denied taxi service because he had a guide dog in connection with disability. The Tribunal awarded Mr. Belusic $7,500. In Pike v. Ooh La La Café and others (No. 2), 2023 BCHRT 99, a café denied services to Ms. Pike because she had a guide dog in connection with her disability. The Tribunal awarded Ms. Pike $12,000. In Client v. Spruce Hill Resort & Spa, 2021 BCHRT 104, the client was denied massage services because of her disability. Like in this complaint, the respondent in that case, Spruce Hill Resort & Spa, did not participate in the hearing. The Tribunal awarded the Client $15,000.

[94] Ms. T cites cases like Testar v. The Owners, Strata Plan VR 1097, 2022 BCHRT 70, Bauer v. Uber Canada Inc. and others, 2024 BCHRT 62 and Kovacs v. City of Maple Ridge (No. 2), 2023 BCHRT 158 as a basis for an injury to dignity award of $35,000. In my view, those cases are less similar to this one because the denial of service did not occur over a single day but was ongoing.

[95] Ms. T’s case is most similar to Pike. While both cases involved a discrete occurrence, the impacts on each complainant were immediate and long term. Considering the specific circumstances of this case, I exercise my discretion to award Ms. T $12,000 as compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

VI ORDER

[96] Ms. T has proven most of her complaint of discrimination against Ehsan Khan and Victoria Taxi, and I order as follows:

I order Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi to cease the contravention and refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention of the Code: s. 37(2)(a).
I declare that Mr. Khan’s and Victoria Taxi’s conduct, or similar conduct, was discrimination contrary to s. 8 of the Code: s. 37(2)(b).
Within six months of this decision, I order Victoria Taxi to implement mandatory training, of no less than two hours, for all staff and managers, about its human rights obligations to provide services to people who use wheelchairs – including wheelchairs designated as portable mobility aids: Code, s. 37(2)(c)(i).
Within two months of this decision, I order Victoria Taxi to confirm to Ms. T in writing, that she has the option to travel in its regular taxis with her collapsible wheelchair, and, in providing those services, will assist her and her wheelchair to get in and out of the taxi: Code, s. 37(1)(d)(i).
I order Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi to pay Ms. T $12,000 as compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii).
I order Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi to pay Ms. T post-judgment interest on the injury to dignity award until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
Mr. Khan and Victoria Taxi are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the injury to dignity award and any interest to Ms. T. This means that they are both responsible for making this payment to Ms. T up to the entire amount of $12,000 and interest.

Amber Prince
Tribunal Member

[1] In a letter decision on April 20, 2026, I granted Ms. T’s application to limit publication of information which could identify her.

[2] Law Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw is credited with introducing the term and concept of “intersectionality” more than 35 years ago: Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1989: Iss. 1, Article 8.