Dayries v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Corrections Branch, North Fraser Pretrial Centre, 2026 BCHRT 188

Date Issued: September 1, 2026
File: CS-004498

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Ashton Dayries
COMPLAINANT

AND:

His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Corrections Branch, North Fraser Pretrial Centre
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
On their own behalf: Ashton Dayries
Counsel for the Respondent: Rochelle Pauls

Date of Hearing: May 11, 2026
Location of Hearing: Videoconference

I        INTRODUCTION

[1]             Ashton Dayries was incarcerated at the North Fraser Pretrial Centre [NFPC] for 21 days between February 18, 2021 and March 11, 2021. NFPC is a correctional centre operated by BC Corrections’ Adult Custody Division. In this decision, I refer to the Respondent as Corrections.

[2]             The issues I must decide are whether Corrections discriminated against Mr. Dayries based on Indigenous identity, race, ancestry, mental disability, and/or religion when it (1) failed to give him access to requested Indigenous and Buddhist spiritual support, including an Elder, (2) placed him alone in a filthy cell and mocked him while on suicide watch for the first 24 hours of his confinement, which triggered his Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD] and anxiety, and/or (3) kept him in what was essentially solitary confinement during the remainder of his incarceration. If I find that Mr. Dayries has proved any of these actions were discriminatory, then I must consider whether Corrections has proved a justification defence.

[3]             For the following reasons, I find:

1. Mr. Dayries’s complaint about the lack of spiritual support is unjustified based on the evidence before me. This allegation is dismissed.
2. Mr. Dayries has proved his complaint about the first 24 hours of his incarceration. As Corrections has not proved a defence, I order it to pay Mr. Dayries $15,000 in injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect. I also order Corrections to pay Mr. Dayries $328 in expenses based on the wages lost to attend the hearing.
3. Mr. Dayries has not proved his case about his time in solitary confinement during the remainder of his incarceration. This allegation is unjustified and dismissed.

[4]             I note that Mr. Dayries also brought his complaint on the ground of physical disability. This was not pursued either at the hearing or in closing submissions. I therefore consider this ground abandoned. If I am wrong about Mr. Dayries abandoning this ground, then I would have found that the evidence led did not support a finding of discrimination on this basis.

II      FACTS

[5]             In this section I set out my findings of fact. These facts are derived from the evidence submitted by the parties, through their witnesses, as well as the documents that were admitted into evidence during the hearing.

[6]             I note that there is some conflicting evidence about the issues that are relevant to my decision. Where I make findings of fact about these issues, I will explain what evidence I have preferred, and why. In making these findings of fact, I must determine which evidence is more plausible based on a balance of probabilities: Mr. S v. Cannae Holdings, 2018 BCHRT 47 at para. 12. In assessing which evidence is more plausible, the Tribunal considers the credibility and reliability of that evidence. In assessing credibility and reliability, I am guided by the principles set out in R. v. S.A.S., 2021 BCPC 69 at paras. 21-27; Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398 at para. 186, affirmed in 2012 BCCA 296; and Hardychuk v. Johnstone, 2012 BCSC 1359 at para. 10.

A.    Evidence and Witnesses

[7]             In addition to himself, one witness testified on Mr. Dayries’ behalf: his spouse. Mr. Dayries’s spouse testified about her communications with Mr. Dayries during his incarceration, as well as the effect that the discrimination had on Mr. Dayries.

[8]             I found Mr. Dayries’s witnesses to be credible and reliable.

[9]             Michael Fernquist testified for Corrections. He is the Assistant Deputy Warden of Standards at NFPC, a role that requires him to be familiar with NFPC policies and procedures, which he spoke about during his testimony. Mr. Fernquist also spoke to the institutional documentation kept by NFPC during Mr. Dayries’s incarceration. He had no direct knowledge of the events at issue. For that reason, and as explained further below, I generally prefer Mr. Dayries’s evidence where there are conflicts between the dictates of NFPC policy versus what Mr. Dayries says actually occurred.

B.    Background

[10]         Mr. Dayries identifies as Salish Métis and the grandson of a language keeper. In addition to being Buddhist, he has what he calls traditional Indigenous spiritual practices.

[11]         Mr. Dayries, a veteran who served in Afghanistan, has PTSD and what he describes as moderate levels of anxiety. He has been prescribed a variety of psychiatric medications for these medical conditions.

[12]         NFPC houses those who are (1) on remand awaiting trial, (2) serving a sentence of two years less a day, or (3) waiting for a transfer to federal custody in the case of longer sentences. NFPC currently houses around 300 individuals.

[13]         There are 10 living units at NFPC as well as segregation and healthcare units, where individuals at NFPC may be housed, depending on the circumstances. Supervision on these units is provided by Correctional Officers [COs]. During COVID-19, some of the living units were converted into “induction units”, which were a kind of 14-day quarantine for those entering NFPC at around the same time. For the majority of his time at NFPC, Mr. Dayries was placed on an induction unit [Induction Unit]. Induction units are discussed further below.

[14]         Health services at NFPC are provided by staff of the Provincial Health Services Authority [PHSA].

[15]         Corrections maintains that its “records show that Mr. Dayries’ time at NFPC was brief, and that in general, there were no notable concerns that arose.” For the purposes of this section, I divide Mr. Dayries’s time at NFPC into three periods, Intake, Suicide Watch, and Induction Unit, and I describe Mr. Dayries’s concerns during each period.

1.     Intake

[16]         The intake process for individuals entering NFPC includes a health screening to assess the physical and mental wellbeing of the individual. If, as a result of this screening, PHSA staff say that an individual should be placed on suicide watch, Corrections staff does not question that decision.

[17]         On suicide watch, the individual is placed in a cell with a higher level of supervision, generally in the segregation unit. Mr. Fernquist testified that the individual will be given a gown and a blanket that are not easily torn. He also testified that COs do visual checks every 15 minutes for individuals on suicide watch. There is an emergency call button in the segregation cell that links to the CO on duty.

[18]         Upon intake, Mr. Dayries was medically assessed by PHSA staff, who recommended that Corrections place Mr. Dayries on suicide watch in a segregated cell. Mr. Dayries says, and I accept, that he told someone at intake that his mental disabilities would be triggered if he were placed in solitary conditions.

[19]         Also upon intake, Mr. Dayries was asked whether he wanted to see an Elder, and he said that he did. Despite this and further oral requests, Mr. Dayries was not provided with access to an Elder for the 21 days he was at NFPC. Nor was he provided with requested Buddhist and Indigenous spiritual materials.

[20]         Mr. Fernquist testified that oral requests for spiritual support will not be fulfilled because they must be made in writing as per institutional policy. Mr. Fernquist explained that this is so that requests can be tracked. Those who make oral requests at intake are generally advised to fill out a written form once assigned to a living unit.

[21]         While Mr. Dayries acknowledges Corrections’ policy regarding written requests, he says that for the limited time he had outside his cell, the forms were often not available to fill out.

2.     Suicide Watch

[22]         After intake, Mr. Dayries was stripped of his clothing, given a smock, and placed in segregation on suicide watch. Mr. Dayries explained this was because of a suicide attempt in 2018; but he says he was not suicidal at intake.

[23]         Mr. Dayries’ time on suicide watch was brief but impactful. Mr. Dayries testified, and I accept, that his cell was in a deplorable condition. The cell was “covered in bodily fluids”. There were blood, urine, and vomit stains as well as rodents and their droppings. The light in his cell never turned off, and he was not given a pillow, which he needed for a back injury. Mr. Dayries did not receive food, water, or his psychiatric medications during this period.

[24]         The condition of the cell made Mr. Dayries feel unsafe and triggered his PTSD and anxiety. He began having an anxiety attack and pressed the emergency call button. The CO who answered told Mr. Dayries to “fuck off” and “tell somebody who cares”. Mr. Dayries ended up pressing the button two more times; however, he never received help. Rather the CO on the other end mocked him, saying at another point “I don’t know what you want me to do about it, I’m just a voice in the wall.”

[25]         Corrections disputes that Mr. Dayries’s cell was filthy. Mr. Fernquist testified that especially during the pandemic, extra precautions were taken to keep things clean at NFPC. He relied on Corrections’ records, which indicate that the segregation cell had been cleaned.

[26]         While I do not doubt that Corrections had extra protocol in place at the time, I am not persuaded that Mr. Dayries is being untruthful or exaggerating for his own benefit. Not only did I find Mr. Dayries to be a credible witness, but his testimony was also corroborated by his spouse, with whom he was in contact during the incarceration. Further, Mr. Dayries has been consistent throughout the years of this process about the condition of the segregation cell. A letter written while he was at NFPC chronicles his time in suicide watch and it mirrors what he told me during the hearing:

I was stripped completely naked and forced into a freezing cold medical isolation cell that was filthy with human bodily fluids, vomit, blood, mice droppings, and urine. I had to spend the night on a filthy wet mattress with no bedding. To make things worse, I was denied the medications I’ve been prescribed for years to treat my anxiety, depression, and PTSD. There was no water access in my cell either. To make things worse, the CO on duty did not offer to help when I asked and begged for it – instead choosing to mock me instead.

[27]         Mr. Dayries was transferred to the Induction unit about 20 hours later once he was seen by a PHSA psychologist, who confirmed that he was not at risk of self harm.

3.     Induction Unit

[28]         Mr. Dayries was incarcerated at NFPC in February and March 2021, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. As it did in all areas of life in the province, COVID-19 had a significant impact on operations at NFPC.

[29]         As discussed above, certain protocols were put into place at NFPC during the pandemic in order to avoid a COVID-19 outbreak. Part of this effort was to create “induction units”, which were authorized by Ministerial order. During the time that Mr. Dayries was at NFPC, incarcerated individuals would spend at least 14 days after intake on an induction unit in quarantine from the general population. Those living on an induction unit received less time outside of their cells than those who were housed on a general living unit.

[30]         As I understand it, Mr. Dayries spent extra time in the Induction Unit because he became ill with food poisoning and had to be placed in medical segregation. Mr. Fernquist testified that during the pandemic, if someone showed signs of illness, this would restart the 14-day quarantine period on an induction unit.

[31]         Mr. Dayries was kept alone in a cell on the Induction Unit. He remained in the cell most of the day everyday. Some days, he was not let out at all.

[32]         Mr. Dayries wanted to see an Elder, but he struggled at this time to get written request forms. When he was let out of his cell, the written request forms were often all gone and had not yet been replenished. In evidence are three written request forms filled out by Mr. Dayries. However, none of them requests Elder access. Mr. Dayries’s made verbal requests for an Elder while on the Induction Unit, but these requests were not met.

[33]         Mr. Dayries testified that other individuals on the Induction Unit had their spiritual needs met. In particular, he said that the Imam was often present, visiting those who were incarcerated.

[34]         Mr. Dayries testified that he struggled mentally during this time due to the segregation and lack of spiritual support. He said the lack of spiritual guidance from an Elder was particularly difficult when there was a death on the Induction Unit.

III    ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[35]         Section 8 of the Code applies to accommodations, services, and facilities customarily available to the public. Section 8(1) says:

A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification,

(a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or

(b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public

because of the Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or age of that person or class of persons.

[36]         To prove his complaint under s. 8 of the Code, Mr. Dayries must show (1) he has one or more of the protected characteristics listed in his complaint, namely Indigenous identity, race, ancestry, mental disability, and religion; (2) he suffered one or more adverse impacts regarding a service, facility or accommodation provided by Corrections; and (3) his protected characteristic(s) was a factor in the service-related adverse impacts: Moore v. British Columbia (Education),  2012 SCC 61 at para 33.

[37]            To justify any adverse impacts on Mr. Dayries, Corrections will have to establish three criteria on a balance of probabilities:

1. They adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed;
2. They adopted the standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary for fulfillment of the purpose; and
3. The standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, Corrections must demonstrate that it would be impossible to accommodate individuals sharing the claimant’s characteristics without incurring undue hardship.

British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer], at para. 20.

[38]         Corrections accepts, and I am satisfied on the evidence, that Mr. Dayries has the protected characteristics he alleges. However, Corrections says Mr. Dayries has failed to establish adverse impact(s) or the required connection to his protected characteristics on a balance of probabilities with respect to any of the alleged grounds.

[39]         In the alternative, should I be satisfied that Mr. Dayries has proved his case of discrimination, Corrections argues that there was a bona fide and reasonable justification for the adverse impacts he experienced.

A.    Has Mr. Dayries proved he experienced adverse impacts connected to his protected characteristics?

[40]         I first turn to whether Mr. Dayries experienced adverse impacts connected to his protected characteristics while housed at NFPC. I find that he has regarding the suicide watch. As Mr. Dayries has not proved his case about his time on the Induction Unit or the lack of spiritual support during his incarceration, I dismiss those aspects of the complaint.

[41]         First, in terms of the suicide watch and the worsening of Mr. Dayries’s PTSD and anxiety, Corrections says that causing or contributing to a mental disability cannot be discrimination. It relies on para. 43 of Vandale v. Town of Golden and others, 2009 BCHRT 219, at para. 43, where the Tribunal said:

[T]he fact that particular conduct results in an individual experiencing stress and anxiety, or even a mental disability, does not mean that that conduct constitutes discrimination on the grounds of mental disability. Ms. Vandale’s allegation is that the respondents caused her to suffer stress and anxiety, not that they discriminated against her because of or in relation to the stress and anxiety she alleges she experienced. 

[42]         However, in more recent cases, the Tribunal has distinguished between causing or contributing to a new disability as in Vandale and exacerbating an already-existing disability. It has found that exacerbation of a disability due to a respondent’s conduct can be a disability-related adverse impact for the purposes of the Code: Tyler v. City of Powell River, 2025 BCHRT 316 at para. 58, Student (by Parent) v. School District, 2023 BCHRT 237 at para 84; Brezinski v. City of Vancouver, 2020 BCHRT 148 at para 65. I agree with the analysis in these cases. In particular, I am guided by paras. 63 and 64 of Tyler, where the Tribunal distinguished cases like Vandale and McMillan v. Coast Mountain Bus Company, 2018 BCHRT 20, from the facts in that case:

In cases where a disability arises from adverse treatment by a respondent, and the fact that the disability has come into existence as a result of that treatment is the only connection between the disability and the adverse treatment, the purposes of the Code are not necessarily engaged. The Code is not meant to protect against all bad treatment, only bad treatment that is connected to a protected characteristic. If a person did not have (or was not perceived to have) a Code protected characteristic at the time they experienced the adverse treatment, then there was no protected characteristic that was acting as a barrier to their ability to fully and with dignity access an area of life protected by the Code.

Contrast the above situation with the present case, where Mx. Tyler’s pre-existing Code protected disability has clearly operated as a barrier to their ability to participate fully in their employment due, at least in part, to conduct attributable to the City which exacerbated their disability.

[43]         Here, Mr. Dayries came into Corrections’ custody with preexisting anxiety and PTSD, which Corrections concedes were mental disabilities. Mr. Dayries alleges, and I accept, that Corrections’ conduct failing to give him his medication, placing him alone in filthy cell leading to a panic attack, and then mocking him while he was in crisis caused a worsening of these disabilities. In my view, based on the case law cited above, this is sufficient to prove a disability-related adverse impact. Incarcerated individuals must be able to access Corrections’ services in a discrimination-free way that maintains their dignity and humanity. In this case, Corrections did not treat Mr. Dayries with dignity and created barriers to his safe incarceration based on the disabilities that he entered with. I am satisfied that Mr. Dayries’s experience on suicide watch caused a disability-related adverse impact on him. He has proved discrimination for this allegation.

[44]         Next, I turn to the remainder of Mr. Dayries’s incarceration, which he says “affected [his] mental health”.

[45]         After the suicide watch, Corrections put Mr. Dayries on the Induction Unit, where he had very limited time outside his one-person cell. Mr. Dayries says, and I accept, that this was essentially solitary confinement, which could trigger an anxiety attack. However, I am not prepared to accept that Mr. Dayries has proved his case with regards to this allegation. There simply is not enough evidence before me to ground a finding of adverse impact. Without further explanation, Mr. Dayries says that this time “took a toll on [his] mental health”. Mr. Dayries’s spouse said that Mr. Dayries’s “mental health was affected”.

[46]         While it is no doubt very difficult to experience solitary confinement, and while I accept that Mr. Dayries’s mental health was challenged during this time, the particular impact on Mr. Dayries’s mental disabilities is not self-evident. In my view, Mr. Dayries was required to lead more evidence about how the solitary confinement affected him. In particular, what is missing is if and how the conditions of confinement exacerbated his mental disabilities (PTSD and anxiety), as opposed to being a challenge to his mental health generally. In contrast to the first 24 hours of the confinement, which did cause a panic attack, here there is no such evidence. I cannot find discrimination under these circumstances. 

[47]         Finally, I turn to the spiritual support Mr. Dayries orally requested from Corrections. As found above, I accept that Mr. Dayries was not provided with the spiritual support he sought during intake and then periodically throughout his incarceration. There is no dispute that Mr. Dayries has proved he is Indigenous with Buddhist and Indigenous spiritual practices and therefore protected from discrimination based on his religion, Indigenous identity, race, and ancestry. The question is whether the lack of spiritual support was an adverse impact in which Mr. Dayries’ protected characteristics were a factor. Based on the evidence before me, I find that it was not.  

[48]         Corrections’ denial of spiritual materials and an Elder is the denial of a service customarily available to the public, and I find it constituted an adverse impact on Mr. Dayries: see Kelly v. B.C. (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) (No. 3), 2011 BCHRT 183 at para. 387.  However, I am not satisfied that Mr. Dayries’s protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impacts he experienced as a result of the denial of these services. Corrections argues, and I accept, that there was a wholly non-discriminatory reason that Mr. Dayries was not provided with the spiritual support that he requested—i.e. the failure to fill out a request form. Mr. Fernquist testified that all requests for spiritual support must be made in writing so that they can be tracked and fulfilled. I cannot say under these circumstances that Mr. Dayries’s Indigenous identity or religion were a factor in the denial of services to him. Rather, it was the fact that Corrections did not have a written request from Mr. Dayries.

[49]         While Mr. Dayries maintains that there were no forms available, and I accept that at times the forms might have needed to be replenished, Mr. Dayries was able to fill out three forms during his 21-day incarceration, none of which mentioned an Elder or spiritual support.

[50]         I do not find that Mr. Dayries has proved discrimination for this allegation.

[51]         Having found that Mr. Dayries has proved the elements of his case with regards to the suicide watch, I now decide whether the adverse impact was justified—i.e. whether Corrections has established a defence.

B.    Has Corrections established a defence?

[52]         The final question before me in the discrimination analysis is whether Corrections has justified the adverse impacts experienced by Mr. Dayries on the suicide watch. While I accept that the preventative measures to address those at risk of self-harm at NFPC were reasonably adopted and made in good faith, I find that Corrections has not proved Mr. Dayries was accommodated up to the point of undue hardship. 

[53]         “‘Accommodation’ refers to what is required in the circumstances to avoid discrimination”: Grismer at para. 22. The “standard for accommodation is reasonableness, not perfection”: McCulloch v. Nociar and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 111, citing Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at para. 425; see Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 [Renaud]. It is about doing what is reasonable and practical to avoid the negative impact related to the affected person’s protected characteristics: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 38.

[54]         Determining what constitutes reasonable accommodation, or accommodation to the point of undue hardship, is “a question of fact,” in the sense that the answer depends on the context and circumstances of the case: Renaud at p. 984. The point of undue hardship is reached and the duty to accommodate ends “when reasonable means of accommodation are exhausted and only unreasonable or impracticable options for accommodation remain”: Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15 at para. 130.

[55]         Here, I accept that PHSA staff may not have advised Corrections that Mr. Dayries had medical concerns about being placed in solitary confinement. However, Mr. Dayries pushed the emergency call button three times while on suicide watch, linking him directly to Corrections staff. When he talked to Corrections staff, the CO, he told them that he was in crisis. This was a trigger point, which should have prompted Corrections to act. However, instead of providing assistance or assessing the situation to see if anything could be done to accommodate Mr. Dayries, the CO mocked and cursed at him. I cannot under these circumstances find that all reasonable and practical steps were taken to avoid the adverse impact on Mr. Dayries. Indeed, no steps were taken at all. 

[56]         Corrections argues that Mr. Dayries was on suicide watch only for a brief period. It says Mr. Dayries was transferred out as soon as it was determined that he was not at risk of self harm. I am not persuaded that this absolves Corrections of the duty to provide a carceral environment free of discrimination, no matter the duration at issue. Discrimination is discrimination, even if the encounter is brief: see Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4), 2019 BCHRT 275. While brevity may be considered in determining remedies, it is not, in my view, relevant to the current exercise—determining whether Corrections has proved a justification defence.

[57]         Corrections also argues that Mr. Dayries was monitored frequently over the 24-hour period he was on suicide watch. It denies that Mr. Dayries told Corrections staff that he was having a medical emergency, relying on the fact that there is no log documenting any concerns during this period. Again, I am not persuaded by this argument. First, Mr. Fernquist testified that not every interaction is recorded in the client logs kept at NFPC. For example, Mr. Dayries’s repeated requests for an Elder were not recorded. Second, I am not surprised that the CO did not take steps to chronicle Mr. Dayries’s concerns under the circumstances. It is undisputed that Mr. Dayries pressed the emergency call button three times. And while it is true that there is no log about why he had pressed the button, in my view, this is consistent with Mr. Dayries’s evidence that he was mocked and cursed when he explained to the CO that he was in crisis. It is not hard to believe that the CO would not have recorded these interactions given their treatment of Mr. Dayries.

[58]         In sum, Corrections has not proved a defence. Having found discrimination with regards to the suicide watch, I must now determine what remedies to order as a result.

IV    Remedy

A.    Section 37(2)(a): Order to Cease the Contravention

[59]         Having found the complaint is justified in part, I order Corrections to cease and refrain from committing the same or similar discrimination, pursuant to s. 37(2)(a) of the Code.

B.    Section 37(2)(b): Declaratory Order

[60]           Under s. 37(2)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is contrary to the Code. In the circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to make such an order. I declare that Corrections’ conduct during the suicide watch was discrimination contrary to s. 8 of the Code.

C.    Section 37(2)(d)(ii): Compensation – Expenses

[61]         Mr. Dayries asks for $1,000 in expenses incurred because of the discrimination. He says he lost wages at a rate of $328 a day in order to attend the hearing.  

[62]         Wages lost to attend a hearing are compensable: Cassidy v. Emergency and Health Services Commission and Another (No. 3), 2009 BCHRT 110, at para. 100. This request for remedial relief clearly falls under s. 37(2), and I consider it appropriate. The quantum is at issue.

[63]         Initially this hearing was set for three days; however, it ended up being a one-day hearing. Given this, it is reasonable in my view to award Mr. Dayries $328 for one day’s wages lost to attend the hearing [Expenses Award].

[64]         I order Corrections to pay $328.00 to Mr. Dayries under s. 37(2)(d)(ii).

D.   Section 37(2)(d)(iii): Injury to Dignity, Feelings and Self-Respect

[65]         Mr. Dayries seeks an award of $15,000 for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect. For the following reasons, I award him the entire amount sought [Injury to Dignity Award].

[66]         Under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code, the Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity. The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. The amount of compensation depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No.9), 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396, at para. 260. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases.

[67]          The Tribunal usually considers several factors in determining quantum, including the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s social context or vulnerability; and the specific effect the discrimination had on the complainant: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 225. I consider each of these factors in turn.

[68]         First, the nature of the discrimination was short but severe. Corrections placed Mr. Dayries in solitary confinement while on suicide watch, exacerbating his mental disabilities, leading to a panic attack. His pleas for assistance were mocked and ultimately ignored, worsening his distress, without a bona fide and reasonable justification.  While the discrimination was brief, the effects of the discrimination have been long-lasting.

[69]         In terms of social context and vulnerability, situating the discrimination in this way allows the Tribunal “to consider whether any social forces heightened power imbalances between the parties or worsened the specific effect that the discrimination had on a complainant”: Bayongan v. Shimmura and another, 2023 BCHRT 27 at para. 74.

[70]         There can be little doubt that those incarcerated are amongst the most vulnerable individuals in our society: Ali v. BC Ministry of Justice, 2017 BCHRT 262 at para. 19. This is particularly so for mentally disabled individuals placed in solitary confinement: Kelly at para. 441; Fetterly v. B.C. (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General), 2012 BCHRT 111 at para. 92. As the Tribunal has said, the issues engaged by solitary confinement within the prison system are among the most serious in society: Bjorklund v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2018 BCHRT 204 at para. 39. As such, prolonged solitary confinement of those with mental disabilities has been ruled unconstitutional in the context of federal penitentiaries: British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 BCSC 62.

[71]         Here, the power imbalance between Mr. Dayries and Corrections was extreme. Mr. Dayries was stripped of his clothing, deprived of his medications, and placed alone in deplorable conditions. Mr. Dayries could not leave or otherwise change his situation without Corrections’ assistance. In other words, he was disempowered and entirely dependent on Corrections to keep him safe. The only mechanism that he had to communicate his needs was an emergency call button. When he pressed the button during the anxiety attack, he did not receive help or accommodation. Rather, he was told, amongst other things, to “fuck off” and “tell someone who cares”.

[72]         The effect of the discrimination has been serious and lasting. In his testimony, Mr. Dayries struck me as a very stoic and succinct person. Nevertheless, he provided powerful details about how the discrimination has impacted him. Mr. Dayries was incarcerated over five years ago; yet, he says it “feels like yesterday”. Mr. Dayries testified that he frequently closes his eyes and sees the inside of the cell, covered in blood and other bodily fluids. His experience on suicide watch at NFPC, while brief, is “etched into his memory.”

[73]         In short, the discrimination was severe and has followed Mr. Dayries. Corrections failed to keep Mr. Dayries safe and in a discrimination-free environment at a time when he was extraordinarily vulnerable during a mental health crisis. This failure not only impacted him in the moment, exacerbating his mental disabilities, but it has also carried over to his life outside of Corrections’ custody.

[74]         In his filed remedy materials, Mr. Dayries relies on three of the Tribunal’s prior decisions: Dawson v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 2), 2015 BCHRT 54 [$15,000], Client v. Spruce Hill Resort & Spa, 2021 BCHRT 104 [$15,000], and Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4), 2019 BCHRT 275 [$20,000]. In making this determination, I am also guided by the Tribunal’s recent decision in Mr. M v. The Governing Council of The Salvation Army in Canada, obo Belkin House, 2026 BCHRT 141 [$30,000], and the case relied upon by Corrections: Kelly [$5,000]. 

[75]         In Dawson, the Tribunal awarded $15,000 to a transgender woman whose requests to have post-operative gender affirming care while in police custody were ignored on three occasions. Further, the respondent had a practice of misgendering and deadnaming the complainant.

[76]         In Client, the Tribunal awarded the complainant $15,000 for a discrete incident of discrimination in services. The discrimination occurred when the complainant was refused massage services on a single occasion because the service-provider had misconceptions about the client’s cancer diagnosis and surgery. 

[77]         In Campbell, the Tribunal awarded $20,000 to the complainant, an Indigenous mother, who witnessed police officers stop and arrest her 19-year-old son. The arrest took around 20 minutes, during which the complainant was roughly and physically separated from her son and blocked from witnessing what was happening. Her questions to the officers went largely unanswered, and she was warned that her own behaviour could justify a charge for obstruction of justice. The events were traumatic for the complainant. The Tribunal acknowledged the seriousness of the discrimination and its significant impact on the complainant, taking into account that “the discrimination happened in a single brief encounter but struck at the core of what is already a very troubled relationship between Indigenous people and the police.” The Tribunal found that the complainant was deprived of a feeling that she was safe with, and protected by police, and was entitled to an award commensurate with that loss of security and dignity.

[78]         In Mr. M, the Tribunal awarded the complainant $30,000 when the respondent withdrew its services as a halfway house after Mr. M was conditionally released from incarceration. As a result, Mr. M’s conditional release was suspended, and he was arrested by police and reincarcerated for almost two weeks. The Tribunal was guided by Mr. M’s extreme vulnerability—he was serving a sentence and was under the control of the respondent, “which exercised power in relation to every accommodation, service, and facility made available to him at the time”: at para. 157. The discrimination he experienced also had long-lasting effects on his health, well-being, and livelihood. Given Mr. M’s vulnerability when the discrimination occurred, and the severity of the effects of the discrimination, the Tribunal found appropriate an award at the higher end of the range of recent decisions under s. 8 of the Code.

[79]         Finally, in Kelly, the Tribunal awarded $5,000 for injury to dignity to an incarcerated Indigenous person after the respondent denied access to Indigenous religious counselling and spiritual literature while in segregation in prison. As Corrections points out, Kelly involved repeated instances of discrimination against a complainant who was young and vulnerable.

[80]         Given that the Tribunal has been increasing injury to dignity awards over the years since Kelly was decided, $5,000 is too little to compensate Mr. Dayries for the discrimination he experienced. Considering (1) the nature of the discrimination, which, as in Campbell and Mr. M, was brief but amounted to a profound loss of security and dignity, (2) the social context of Mr. Dayries’s extreme vulnerability as an incarcerated person, (3) the lasting effects of the discrimination on him, and (4) the range of awards in similar, more recent cases, I find it appropriate to award Mr. Dayries the full amount sought.

[81]         I order Corrections to pay Mr. Dayries $15,000 for the injury to his dignity.

E.    Interest on Monetary Awards

[82]           The Tribunal has the discretion to order interest on its monetary awards and regularly does so. An award of interest is part of the compensatory nature of the Tribunal’s awards, recognizing that but for the discrimination a complainant would have had the use of the money now awarded. The interest places the complainant in the economic position they would have been in but for the discrimination: Vasil v. Mongovius and another (No. 3), 2009 BCHRT 117.

[83]         I order Corrections to pay Mr. Dayries pre- and post-judgement interest on the Expenses Award, and post-judgement interest on the Injury to Dignity Award in accordance with the provisions of the Court Order Interest Act.

V      CONCLUSION

[84]         Corrections created barriers to Mr. Dayries’s safe and dignified incarceration during the first 24 hours he was housed at NFPC, which had a disability-related adverse impact on him—i.e. an exacerbation of his mental disabilities. As Corrections has not proved a defence, the complaint is justified in part.

[85]         Because the complaint is justified in part, I declare that Corrections violated s. 8 of the Code, and I order it to:

1. cease the contravention and refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention: s. 37(2)(a);
2. pay Mr. Dayries $328 for expenses incurred because of the discrimination: s. 37(2)(d)(ii);
3. pay Mr. Dayries $15,000 as compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect: s. 37(2)(d)(iii);
4. pay Mr. Dayries pre-judgment interest on the Expenses Award until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act; and
5. pay Mr. Dayries post-judgment interest on the Expenses Award and the Injury to Dignity Award until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.

Robin Dean
Tribunal Member