Millman v. BC Ministry of Finance (BC Public Service Agency) and another (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 185
Date Issued: August 20, 2026
File(s): CS-008130
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Patricia Millman
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as Represented by the Ministry of Finance (BC Public Service Agency) and Ministry of Attorney General (Civil Resolution Tribunal)
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION FOR RECUSAL AND TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On her own behalf: Patricia Millman
Counsel for the Respondents: Graeme Norton
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Patricia Millman has filed a human rights complaint against her former employer, the Civil Resolution Tribunal, and BC’s Public Service Agency [together, Respondents]. In an earlier decision, I denied her application to limit publication of her name and granted two of her disclosure applications in part: Millman v. BC Ministry of Finance (BC Public Service Agency) and another, 2026 BCHRT 145 [Decision]. After the Decision was published, Ms. Millman wrote to the Tribunal, asking the Tribunal to make a number of corrections to the Decision, and two earlier letter decisions. I denied that request in a letter dated August 11, 2026 [Corrections Letter].
[2] Ms. Millman applies for:
a. reconsideration of the Decision,
b. reconsideration of the Corrections Letter, and
c. an order that the reconsiderations be decided by a different Tribunal Member.
[3] For the reasons set out below, the applications are denied.
II APPLICATION FOR RECUSAL
[4] The practice of the Human Rights Tribunal is that reconsideration applications are decided by the member who made the original decision. That member is most familiar with the evidence and issues in the complaint and best placed to efficiently determine whether there is a basis to reconsider the original decision: Karbalaeilali v. BC (Human Rights Tribunal), 2010 BCSC 1130 at para. 65; see also University of British Columbia v. University of British Columbia Faculty Assn., 2007 BCCA 210 at para. 84.
[5] There is an exception to this principle where the member who decided the original decision recuses themselves because of a reasonable apprehension of bias. Ms. Millman argues that, through my decisions in relation to her complaint, I have demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias. She asks that her reconsideration applications be assigned to a different Tribunal Member. I have not found it necessary to seek submissions from the Respondents about this request.
[6] The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is:
… what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision maker], whether consciously or unconsciously would not decide fairly.
Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC) at 394
[7] All Tribunal members are presumed to be impartial in the exercise of their duties, and that presumption is not easily displaced: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2 5 at para. 20; C.S. v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2017 BCSC 1268 at para. 155, upheld in 2018 BCCA 264. This high threshold also guards against the “undesirable prospect of complicated and time-consuming recusal motions that introduce delay and uncertainty into the process and distorts judicial workloads”: Bizon v. Bizon, 2014 ABCA 174 at para. 61.
[8] Adjudicators must not be too eager to recuse themselves. Doing so may delay proceedings and damages respect for the administration of justice. As Justice Marzari has pointed out, “acceding too quickly to suggestions of bias encourages parties, and the public, to believe that a different judge would be more likely to decide in their favour”: AB v. CD and EF, 2019 BCSC 1057 at para. 11. This undermines the integrity of the justice system: R v. S(RD), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC) at para. 113.
[9] The party alleging bias – here, Ms. Millman – bears a heavy burden, and the evidence of bias “must be substantial”: CS at para. 155; Yukon Francophone School at para. 26. The fact that an adjudicator has made rulings “against” a party is not evidence of bias. As Justice Watchuk explained in CS:
The fact that the Tribunal made rulings ‘against’ Ms. S. and ultimately dismissed her human rights claim is not evidence of bias. Adjudicators must reach decisions. Where one party’s case is stronger than the other’s, the first party may enjoy a greater ‘pattern of success’ throughout a proceeding. In an adversarial dispute, one or more of the parties may be dissatisfied with the result. None of this, on its own, suggests bias. As Madam Justice Gray put it in Millar, “the fact that Mr. Millar’s arguments failed does not establish bias. To use a baseball analogy, an umpire is not biased because the umpire called a strike. The judge, like the umpire, must make a call”. [para. 164]
[10] Ms. Millman argues that, throughout my decision making on her complaint, I have demonstrated a pattern of conduct that gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. She argues that this pattern is apparent from the cumulative effects of my decisions. She points specifically to:
a. An alleged pattern of mischaracterizing her allegations and material positions, and relying on those mischaracterizations to define her complaint and the parties’ obligations in this process,
b. My decision to deny her application to limit publication, and allow the Decision to be published while her application for reconsideration was outstanding, in circumstances where she had requested that it not be published,
c. My refusal to examine the accuracy of her requests for corrections to the Decision, and
d. My determination that her complaint about my conduct did not identify a basis to conclude that I had violated the Tribunal’s Code of Conduct for Tribunal Members, including the requirements that I act independently, objectively, and impartially.
Ms. Millman argues that “a reasonable and well-informed person considering the entire sequence would reasonably apprehend that the two outstanding reconsideration applications may not receive the independent, impartial and open-minded determination required”.
[11] I am not satisfied that Ms. Millman has presented the requisite substantial evidence to support a reasonable apprehension of bias. Her concerns arise from the decision making I have made in her complaint. I have explained those decisions, to the extent required by principles of procedural fairness in the context of an administrative tribunal operating with scarce resources and a mandate for the expeditious resolution of human rights complaints. Though Ms. Millman may perceive a pattern whereby my “calls” have gone against her, that is not necessarily the case and – more importantly – not enough to support a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[12] In my view, it would not be appropriate to recuse myself. I am the Member who is most familiar with this complaint and the underlying decisions. I can most efficiently address Ms. Millman’s applications.
III APPLICATIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
[13] Finality is a fundamental principle underlying the legal system generally and administrative tribunals specifically. As the Supreme Court of Canada has explained:
Litigants hope to have their legal issues resolved as equitably and expeditiously as possible by an authoritative adjudicator. Subject only to rights of review or appeal, they expect, in the interests of fairness, to be able to rely on the outcome as final and binding …
British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52 [Figliola] at para. 1
Finality is a particularly important value in administrative proceedings like this one because administrative bodies are designed “to facilitate the expeditious resolution of disputes”: Figliola at para. 27. It ensures that the resources of the Tribunal and the parties are not endlessly taken up in re-arguing the same issues, which would be neither efficient nor fair.
[14] Consistent with this principle, the Tribunal generally only decides an issue once. Once it does so, its jurisdiction to consider that issue is “spent”: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at para 160, upheld on this point in 2016 SCC 25 [Fraser Health]. The decision “cannot be revisited because the tribunal has changed its mind, made an error within jurisdiction or because there has been a change of circumstances”: Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, 1989 CanLII 41 (SCC). Subject to judicial review, parties should be able to rely on a Tribunal decision as final.
[15] There is a narrow exception to the general rule, which allows for reconsideration where it is in the interests of fairness and justice: Zutter v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1995 CanLII 1234 (BCCA); Fraser Health Authority at para. 160; Chandler. This may occur where the Tribunal makes a non-substantive “slip” or mistake, or where the Tribunal fails to exercise the jurisdiction given to it: Fraser Health at para. 141. This includes reconsideration where there has not been procedural fairness: Fraser Health at para. 161.
[16] The Tribunal exercises its reconsideration power sparingly, giving due consideration to the principle of finality: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 at para. 10. It does not have authority to reconsider a decision based on an argument that the decision was wrong or unreasonable or because there has been a change of circumstances: Fraser Health at paras. 135 and 160. Reconsideration is not an opportunity for parties to “enter new facts that with reasonable diligence were available in the first instance, to make arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to reargue matters that were argued in the first instance in an attempt to achieve a different result”: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2),2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13.
[17] In these applications, the burden is on Ms. Millman to show that reconsideration is in the interests of fairness and justice: Grant at para. 10; Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 36(1). I only sought submissions from the Respondents about Ms. Millman’s application to reconsider the Decision. I did not find it necessary to seek their submissions about Ms. Millman’s application to reconsider the Corrections Letter.
A. Application to reconsider the Decision
[18] As a preliminary matter, I note that Ms. Millman’s arguments in support of this application exceeded the Tribunal’s page limits.
[19] The Tribunal has a ten-page limit for written arguments in support of an application: Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 28(7). The purpose of this limit is to support the fair and efficient resolution of interim issues.
[20] Ms. Millman sought, and was granted, an extension of that limit to 15 pages. She then filed a written argument of 13 pages, in compliance with the limit. However, Ms. Millman also filed a 39-page “appendix”, which contains examples of problems within the Decision which she says support reconsideration. The appendix identifies numerous paragraphs in the Decision. For each one, Ms. Millman sets out her dispute with the paragraph, a cross-reference to the underlying record, “why it matters”, and how she says the Tribunal’s error supports reconsideration. Ms. Millman explains that the examples are “intended to illustrate how the concerns identified in the Application arise from specific portions of the Decision and record.” This appendix is effectively an extension of Ms. Millman’s argument. It does not comply with the page limit and should not have been accepted for filing.
[21] Unfortunately, this issue was only identified after the parties completed their submissions on the application. In this circumstance, and on a one-time basis, I exercise my discretion to waive the page limit and accept the appendix. However, I put Ms. Millman on notice that future materials will not be accepted unless they comply with the Tribunal’s Rules and directions.
[22] Though I have considered them all, I do not intend to comprehensively set out or address all of Ms. Millman’s arguments. Doing so would undermine one of the primary purposes of finality and the Tribunal’s narrow reconsideration power: the preservation of scarce resources. I have already carefully considered Ms. Millman’s arguments, and addressed the most important ones, when I made the Decision. Absent a proper basis, an application for reconsideration does not impose on the Tribunal an obligation to supplement its reasons, address requests for clarification, or re-articulate its decision on issues it has already addressed. In this case, I have found there is no basis for reconsideration, and so I summarize Ms. Millman’s arguments and address them at a high level.
[23] Ms. Millman argues that reconsideration is warranted because:
a. The Decision does not address questions that were material to the applications before the Tribunal; and
b. The manner in which the Complaint, amendments, and issues were characterized resulted in procedural unfairness because those characterizations were subsequently used to determine disclosure relevance and the scope of the proceeding.
[24] Ms. Millman points to many instances within the Decision where she argues that “the wording of the Decision differs from, omits qualifications contained in, or appears inconsistent with the underlying record”. She argues these discrepancies “raise concerns that material aspects of the record may have been overlooked, misunderstood, or inaccurately summarized”. She takes specific issue with:
a. The Decision’s description of the scope of her retaliation allegations;
b. The Decision’s characterization of the scope of the complaint and definition of the issues in the complaint;
c. The determination of relevance in relation to disclosure; and
d. The “failure to address the privacy interest advanced in the publication application”.
[25] As a remedy, Ms. Millman asks the Tribunal to reconsider:
a. its interpretation of the January 12 and January 14 amendments;
b. its characterization of the Complaint and issues in dispute;
c. those portions of disclosure rulings that depend on those characterizations and the resulting relevance analysis;
d. the publication ruling, including the Tribunal’s analysis of the privacy interests advanced in support of that application and whether publication of the Complainant’s identity was necessary to serve the public interest in open proceedings where the application sought anonymization only;
e. any related findings affected by reconsideration of the foregoing issues;
f. clarification of the scope of the accepted retaliation amendment and the issues intended to proceed to adjudication; and
g. such further relief as the Tribunal considers just. [as written]
[26] Respectfully, I agree with the Respondents that Ms. Millman has not identified grounds for reconsideration.
[27] Ms. Millman has not identified any procedural unfairness. The parties had a full opportunity to make submissions on the five applications underlying the Decision and did so. All those submissions were before me when I made the Decision, and I considered them. In my reasons, I did not address every argument or piece of evidence submitted by the parties. I was not required to: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65at para. 91; School H v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2016 BCSC 672,at paras. 47-48 and 79-80. Rather, I addressed those arguments and issues which were necessary to reach my decision. I necessarily summarized and paraphrased the parties’ materials. I do not agree with Ms. Millman that, in doing so, I rendered the process unfair.
[28] I agree with the Respondents that most of Ms. Millman’s arguments are in substance an attempt to re-argue the same issues I addressed in the Decision, in hopes of a different result. This is most apparent in her submissions about my interpretation of her retaliation allegations, and my decision to deny her application to limit publication. In the Decision, I gave reasons for interpreting her retaliation allegations to include only allegations that could contravene the Code (paras. 47-54). I also considered Ms. Millman’s asserted privacy interests and determined they did not outweigh the public interest in full access to the proceeding (paras. 8-21). Aside from her disagreement with my description of the issues and the outcome of the applications, Ms. Millman has not identified any unfairness in the process or other basis to reopen the Decision.
[29] I accept that I described some of Ms. Millman’ arguments in terms that she does not agree with. Ms. Millman is especially concerned with my statement at para. 56, where I said “Ms. Millman disputes this narrow characterisation of the complaint. So do I.” In fact, Ms. Millman does not dispute the Respondents’ narrow characterisation of the complaint. She takes issue with my description of her discrimination allegations at para. 57, where I wrote:
Ms. Millman’s complaint concerns the CRT’s requests for medical information following her disclosure of a previous mental health condition to her supervisor in February 2020. The events that unfolded over the next 22 months, including the removal of Ms. Millman from the workplace, the workplace investigation, and the termination, all form part of the complaint and the Respondents’ response.
Ms. Millman argues that, in fact, her allegations of discrimination are narrower. She says that my broad description will require her to “prove adverse impacts arising from requests for medical information dating back to February 2020”.
[30] For clarity, nothing in my Decision requires Ms. Millman to advance allegations of discrimination that she does not want to advance. As the complainant, she defines her own complaint, subject to the Tribunal’s authority to screen out complaints or amendments that are untimely, outside its jurisdiction, or could not contravene the Code.
[31] Ms. Millman has since filed an amendment which clarifies that:
a. her discrimination allegations are limited to events between August 25, 2021, and December 7, 2021,
b. events before August 25, 2021, are “relied upon solely as factual background” and “are not pleaded as independent discriminatory contraventions for which relief is sought”, and
c. she does not allege that the workplace investigation “constituted an independent discriminatory contravention”.
I have accepted this amendment for filing. I confirm that it defines the temporal scope of the discrimination allegations that Ms. Millman is pursuing. The amendment appears to address the substance of Ms. Millman’s concern that I have wrongly expanded the scope of her complaint against her wishes.
[32] There are many other examples in the Decision where Ms. Millman says that I mischaracterized her position. Another example is at para. 31, where I said, “From August to December 2020, Ms. Millman took the position that there was no basis to require her to provide medical information”. In fact, Ms. Millman says she was objecting to “repeated demand for more medical, above and beyond what has already been provided and/or previously offered”.
[33] I do not agree with Ms. Millman that these types of issues warrant reopening and reconsidering the Decision. They do not reflect any unfairness in the underlying process and they did not affect the outcome of the Decision. I premised the Decision with the following:
I stress that the information in the following sections is a summary of highly disputed facts and allegations as presented by the parties. I make no findings of fact. [para. 25]
Ms. Millman has not persuaded me that it is in the interests of justice and fairness to reconsider the Decision to evaluate her claims that I have not accurately characterized her complaint, or the events giving rise to the complaint.
[34] Having denied the reconsideration application, I also deny Ms. Millman’s alternative request for “clarification” about:
the scope of the accepted amendments, the distinction between contextual background and allegations requiring determination, whether the requests for medical information identified in paragraph 56 of the Decision are intended to constitute independent adverse impacts requiring proof, the extent to which the issues identified in paragraphs 55-60 are intended to reflect the Complaint as pleaded, and the basis upon which publication of the Complainant’s identity was found necessary where the application sought anonymization only and would not have restricted public access to the proceeding, evidence, submissions, or reasons.
[35] All these issues were addressed in the Decision. It is not efficient or fair to supplement reasons in response to follow up questions from a party who does not understand or does not accept the Tribunal’s reasons at first instance. Once the Tribunal makes its decision, the decision must speak for itself.
[36] The application for reconsideration of the Decision is denied.
B. Application to reconsider Corrections Letter
[37] In my letter dated August 11, I addressed several communications and two amendments filed by Ms. Millman. This included Ms. Millman’s requests that the Tribunal make “technical corrections” to three decisions:
a. The Decision: Ms. Millman’s requested corrections were set out in a 16-page chart filed July 17 and supplemented in a two-page document filed on July 20
b. Tribunal’s letter decision dated July 30, 2025: Ms. Millman’s requested corrections were set out in an eight-page document filed on July 20
c. Tribunal’s letter decision dated November 3, 2025: Ms. Millman’s requested corrections were set out in a four-page document filed on July 20
[38] In denying the requests, I explained:
It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that, once a decision is issued, it is final. Corrections to a decision are only made for minor slips or mistakes, like typos. This supports the fair and efficient resolution of issues for the many people that this Tribunal serves.
Ms. Millman’s proposed corrections go far beyond minor slips or mistakes. They request numerous changes to the decisions, including re-writing parts of the decisions. They do not fall within the proper scope of the Tribunal’s authority to correct a decision and would not be an appropriate use of the Tribunal’s limited resources. I will not consider them further.
[39] Ms. Millman now acknowledges that some of her requests “went beyond what the Tribunal considers to be a minor technical correction”. However, she applies for reconsideration of my refusal to address her requests for “corrections” to “a published statement expressly attributing a material allegation, argument or position to me where an identified contemporaneous pleading or submission in the Tribunal record demonstrates that I advanced a materially different position”. She argues that it is unfair to publish statements which are attributed to her, “without determining whether [they] accurately [reflect] the record”.
[40] I am not persuaded that these are grounds for reconsideration. As I have said, Ms. Millman’s requests fall outside the scope of the Tribunal’s discretion to correct minor slips or mistakes. It undermines the finality and efficiency of Tribunal decision making to permit a process where parties can request significant changes to a decision, absent proper grounds for reconsideration.
IV CONCLUSION
[41] My decision to deny the applications for reconsideration is grounded in the paramount principle of finality in Tribunal decision making. This principle is foundational to the Tribunal’s ability to adjudicate human rights complaints fairly and efficiently. It allows for very few exceptions, which are not present here.
[42] The application for reconsideration is denied. Further to the Tribunal’s earlier case management direction, Ms. Millman now has two weeks to challenge any of the Respondents’ claims of privilege.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair