Kaur v. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 179
Date Issued: August 7, 2026
File(s): CS-007642
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Sandeep Kaur
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and Sharyn Pountney
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO ADJOURN A HEARING
Rule 30
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
Counsel for the Complainant: Menachem Freedman
Counsel for the Respondent: Derek Frenette
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Sandeep Kaur alleges that Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and Sharyn Pountney discriminated against her in employment based on race, colour, place of origin, physical disability, and mental disability. Her complaint is scheduled for a five-day hearing beginning on August 24, 2026.
[2] On July 22, 2026, Ms. Kaur applied to adjourn the hearing under Rule 30 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules]. By letter on August 6, 2026, I granted the adjournment application with written reasons to follow. Those reasons are set out below. To make my decision, I considered all the arguments and evidence filed. In my reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact related to the merits of the complaint.
[3] I note that Ms. Kaur also applied to fast-track the Tribunal’s consideration of her request to adjourn. Given the timing of the adjournment request, the Tribunal necessarily dealt with it on an expedited basis, and so I find it unnecessary to decide the fast-track application.
II Procedural history
[4] The complaint was filed on November 12, 2021. Ms. Kaur alleges that various acts and omissions of the Respondents between February and November 2020 contravened s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. In May 2025, the parties agreed to schedule the hearing for August 24 to 28, 2026.
[5] On March 24, 2026, Ms. Kaur emailed the Respondents to seek their consent to adjourn the hearing so she could attend her cousin’s wedding. The Respondents did not consent, but were open to discussing settlement. The parties agreed not to rely on the settlement discussion period for any arguments regarding delay or adjournment. Settlement discussions came to an end in mid-June.
[6] On June 24, Ms. Kaur applied to adjourn the hearing “to the next mutually available date” [First Application]. She said her cousin’s wedding was a culturally important occasion, and failure to attend would cause great offense. Further, she said the wedding would be a critical opportunity to spend time with close family members, many of whom would be attending from India, and one of whom was very ill. The Respondents opposed the adjournment request.
[7] I denied the First Application in a letter decision on July 14, 2026 [First Decision]. Considering the reason for the request, the timing of the request, and the indeterminate length of the adjournment requested, I was not satisfied that the request was reasonable. Given this conclusion, I did not find it necessary to consider the question of whether granting the adjournment would unduly prejudice the Respondents. I noted, however, that “the length of time between the alleged contravention and the hearing in this case would have factored strongly in favour of a finding of undue prejudice.”
[8] The Tribunal held a hearing readiness case conference with the parties on July 16. On July 22, Ms. Kaur filed the present adjournment application. The next day, the Tribunal set an expedited submissions schedule, which completed on August 4. I made my decision to grant the application on August 6.
III DECISION
[9] A party applying to adjourn a hearing must state why the request is reasonable and why granting it will not unduly prejudice the other participants: Rule 30(1). The Tribunal must interpret and apply these requirements in a manner that facilitates the just and timely resolution of complaints: Rule 1(1); Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld (No. 4), 2024 BCHRT 284 at para. 6, cited in Britten v. School District No. 37 (Delta) and others (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 127 at para. 13. I will address the requirements in turn.
A. Reasonableness
[10] The reasonableness of an adjournment request depends on the circumstances. To determine whether the request is reasonable, the Tribunal considers relevant factors, which may include the reason for the request (e.g., health issues, availability of counsel), the length of the adjournment requested, and the timing of the application to adjourn: Chato v. Teck Metals Ltd. (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 311 at para. 27; see Britten at para. 14; Dhillon v. London Drugs and Kuttnick, 2005 BCHRT 423 at para. 5.
[11] Broader public policy issues – such as the administration of the human rights system under the Code, including the Tribunal’s ability to efficiently manage its operation and provide its services – may also factor into the assessment of whether an adjournment request is reasonable: Chato at para. 27. In addition, depending on the circumstances, there may be other relevant factors, such as the likelihood of completing the hearing within the time currently scheduled, the complexity and anticipated length of the hearing, the potential prejudice to the applicant if their request to adjourn is not granted, the clarity and specificity of what is being requested, and the quality of the evidence supporting the request: see Rostas v. Llanes and others (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 169 at paras. 27-39; Chilliwack Teachers’ Association at para. 23; Doratty v. Fording Coal Ltd., 2004 BCHRT 82; Chato at para. 27; Glumac v. Fusco and others (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 487 at paras. 38-41.
[12] In the circumstances of the First Application, I was not satisfied that the adjournment request was reasonable. For the following reasons, I have reached the opposite conclusion regarding the present application.
1. Reasons for the request
[13] Ms. Kaur asks for a roughly two-month adjournment of the hearing “due to unforeseen family care issues that have arisen and which will coincide with the hearing dates, and due to [her] own health issues which will affect [her] ability to participate in the hearing” if it goes ahead as scheduled. In support of her request, she provides two statutory declarations and supporting medical documents.
[14] Ms. Kaur says the ill family member referenced in the First Application is her father, who lives in India. Her evidence is that he has a number of serious health issues, which have continued to worsen since the First Application was filed, such that he is no longer able to travel to North America for her cousin’s wedding. Ms. Kaur says her father’s doctor recently advised “that his condition is expected to deteriorate and that [Ms. Kaur] will need to be in India to provide care” to him until the end of August or September 2026.
[15] In a July 18, 2026 medical note (revised for clarity on July 20, 2026), the doctor confirms that Ms. Kaur’s father has been diagnosed with a particular chronic health condition, and that his overall medical situation “has continued to deteriorate from June 2026.” According to the doctor, “the latest clinical reports in July 2026” indicate that Ms. Kaur’s father is in the “advance chronic stage of this disease.” The doctor states that, given this “ongoing disease progression,” Ms. Kaur’s father “requires closer monitoring and support as part of [his] treatment plan in August.” The doctor states that it is “medically necessary” for Ms. Kaur to stay with her father during this time “to provide essential caregiving, assist with personal care, medical appointments and treatment.” Ms. Kaur adds that she will also be working to organize various social services, housing supports, and private care providers for her father, which she expects will be in place by November 2026.
[16] Regarding her own health, Ms. Kaur states that the “pressure and responsibility of being one of my father’s primary caregivers has taken a toll on my physical and mental well-being,” which has gotten worse since the First Decision was issued. In a July 18, 2026 medical note, Ms. Kaur’s doctor confirms that she “is currently experiencing significant psychological stress related to her father’s serious medical illness and deterioration,” and as a result “has developed symptoms of anxiety and insomnia.” The doctor opines that, given her current condition, Ms. Kaur “is not fit to attend meetings or legal/administrative proceedings scheduled during the month of August 2026.” The doctor says allowing “this period of leave from such commitments is expected to support [Ms. Kaur’s] recovery and help stabilize her mental health.”
[17] Ms. Kaur argues that the health and caregiving-related reasons for the present adjournment request support its reasonableness. She says proceeding with the hearing as scheduled will compromise her family responsibilities, and those responsibilities will interfere with her ability to fully participate in the hearing. She says her current health issues will also negatively impact her participation in the hearing, and proceeding as scheduled would be contrary to her doctor’s medical advice.
[18] The Respondents sympathize with Ms. Kaur’s situation, but “submit that the factors considered at the reasonableness stage of the test for an adjournment weigh in favour of declining the adjournment request.” Regarding the reasons for the request, they argue that “the evidence respecting [Ms. Kaur’s] caregiving responsibilities is limited,” and suggest that she should have disclosed her own health-related barriers to participating in the hearing earlier.
[19] In the circumstances of this application, I agree with Ms. Kaur that the reasons for her adjournment request support a finding that the request is reasonable. Her father is very ill, and she seeks to care for him in India during the week of the hearing. This situation has taken a toll on her, such that her doctor has recently deemed her temporarily unfit to attend a legal proceeding. These are fair and sensible reasons to request an adjournment of the scheduled hearing dates.
2. Timing of the request
[20] Ms. Kaur’s evidence is that the reasons for the present application arose after the First Application was made. She says the severity of her father’s condition and the extent of his care needs were not clear to her when she instructed her counsel to file the First Application. Further, she says her health worsened in July, at which time her doctor advised that she was unfit to attend the hearing in August.
[21] For their part, the Respondents assert that Ms. Kaur knew her father was very ill before filing the First Application. They therefore argue that “the timing of the [present] adjournment request is unreasonable.” I disagree with this argument. While Ms. Kaur knew her father was very ill when she made the First Application, the evidence supports that his health circumstances – and Ms. Kaur’s understanding of those circumstances – subsequently changed for the worse. At the time of the First Application, Ms. Kaur expected her father to be well enough to travel to North America for her cousin’s wedding. She hoped to attend the wedding in August with him. The evidence shows that these plans changed substantially after the First Application, due to the further decline of her father’s health and his doctor’s advice regarding the necessity of Ms. Kaur’s attendance in India to care for him.
[22] Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the timing of the present adjournment request is reasonable.
3. Length of the adjournment requested
[23] In the First Application, Ms. Kaur asked for an indeterminate adjournment “to the next mutually available date,” without providing any indication of when that might be. In the present application, she seeks a relatively short, two-month adjournment. In my view, this is a reasonable length of time, given her current circumstances. That said, the Respondents are correct in noting that the actual delay caused by adjourning could be significantly longer, primarily due to the Tribunal’s busy hearing schedule.
[24] In my view, both considerations – the length of the adjournment requested, and the actual length of the delay that may result – are relevant to determining if the request is reasonable. Whether one is given more weight than the other will depend on the circumstances: see generally Chato at paras. 37-40. In the present case, I find that these factors offset. The reasonableness of the relatively short length of the request is rendered neutral by the practical realities of the Tribunal’s busy schedule, which will probably give rise to a longer actual delay if the request is granted.
4. Other factors
[25] If a hearing is unlikely to complete within the existing, scheduled dates, this will often factor in favour of granting a request to adjourn the allotted dates: Chato at para. 29. Such is not the case here. Nor, in my view, does Ms. Kaur’s present adjournment request raise broader public policy issues related to the Tribunal’s ability to efficiently manage its business, sufficient to justify a finding that her request is unreasonable. An adjournment close to a hearing date will almost always come at the cost of the efficient use of the Tribunal’s hearing time and staff and member resources. In my view, however, in the present case, this factor is outweighed by the countervailing circumstances discussed above.
[26] The fact that there have been no previous adjournments in this case also supports Ms. Kaur’s request, which was filed within the time limit set out in Rule 30(2).
[27] I agree with the Respondents’ submission that “the chronology of the evidence and the procedural history” are relevant considerations in this application, as is the fact that this is Ms. Kaur’s “second application to adjourn the same hearing within a relatively short period of time.” However, on the information filed, I do not see how these considerations weigh against a finding that the present request is reasonable.
[28] Finally, Ms. Kaur has provided substantial and compelling evidence in support of what she is specifically seeking and why she is seeking it. In my view, it is not unreasonable for Ms. Kaur to request an adjournment for health and family caregiving-related reasons based on the information presented: compare Glumac at paras. 33-41.
[29] In sum, in all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that Ms. Kaur’s adjournment request is reasonable.
B. Undue prejudice
[30] Whether a requested adjournment will unduly prejudice other participants will depend on the circumstances. Relevant factors may include the timing of the adjournment application and the length of time between the alleged contravention and the hearing: see Schmidt v. G & R Contracting Ltd. and others, 2005 BCHRT 362 at paras. 14-16; Dhillon at para. 11. In addition, the Tribunal will consider other specific allegations of prejudice put forward by the respondent to the adjournment application: Dhillon at para. 11.
[31] In the present case, the Respondents argue that significant prejudice would result from granting Ms. Kaur’s request to adjourn. They cite the age of the complaint (over 4.5 years), the length of time between Ms. Kaur’s earliest allegations of discrimination and the hearing (roughly 6.5 years), and the several-month delay that will likely result if the request is granted.
[32] The Respondents also assert that the complaint process has taken an “emotional, financial, and professional” toll on them. In addition, they submit that they have already “arranged witness availability and incurred the time and expense associated with preparing to proceed on the scheduled hearing dates.”
[33] Ms. Kaur argues that granting her application will not unduly prejudice the Respondents. She says her request for a two-month reprieve is minimal compared to the length of time it has otherwise taken for this matter to reach a hearing, and she should not be held responsible for any prejudice that may have been caused by the pre-existing delay. She adds that the Respondents have made legal submissions regarding the toll taken by the complaint process and the costs incurred preparing for the upcoming dates, but they have provided no evidence to support these claims.
[34] In the First Decision, I noted that the several-year period that had already passed since the alleged contravention would be a strong factor in support of a finding that granting the First Application – which was a request for an open-ended adjournment so Ms. Kaur could attend a wedding – would result in undue prejudice. However, I did not actually consider this issue in the First Application, and I made no prejudice determinations one way or the other.
[35] I have now fully considered this issue in the context of the present application, and I agree with Ms. Kaur that granting her adjournment request will not unduly prejudice the Respondents.
[36] I accept that all parties have been prejudiced, to some extent, by the considerable length of time that has passed since the alleged contravention. The existing delay in this case factors against Ms. Kaur’s request to adjourn the hearing. However, just as delay, on its own, is not an abuse of process, in my view, neither does delay, in itself, equate to “undue” prejudice: see generally Allan v. Columbus Charities Association and others, 2025 BCHRT 38 at para. 10, citing Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44. Denying an adjournment application because of the mere passage of time would effectively impose a limitation period for such applications, separate and apart from the time limit set out in the Rules. Instead, the focus must be on the effect of the delay on the other participants, and whether that effect amounts to undue prejudice.
[37] Prejudice is a question of fact: Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29 [Abrametz] at para. 69. Delay may cause prejudice where it “impairs a party’s ability to answer the complaint against them” or is otherwise a detriment to the affected party: see generally Abrametz at paras. 41 and 67-69. Prejudice can include “significant psychological harm, stigma attached to the individual’s reputation, disruption to family life, loss of work or business opportunities, as well as extended and intrusive media attention”: Abrametz at para. 69.
[38] In the absence of any evidence from the Respondents regarding how the Tribunal’s process has affected them to date or how they may be impacted by further delay, I cannot find that granting Ms. Kaur’s adjournment request will be so detrimental as to amount to undue prejudice. Nor are the Respondents’ vague assertions about their hearing preparations persuasive in this regard. In addition, while I accept that memories have likely faded over the past several years, possibly creating prejudice for all parties, there is no indication that evidence will be lost if the hearing is adjourned or essential witnesses will be unavailable for a rescheduled hearing.
[39] In sum, on the information before me, while I accept that the requested adjournment could result in some prejudice to everyone involved in this proceeding, I am satisfied that it will not “unduly” prejudice the Respondents.
IV CONCLUSION
[40] The application to adjourn the hearing is granted.
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member