Rozendaal v. Fraser Health Authority, 2026 BCHRT 17
Date Issued: January 14, 2026
File: CS-004247
Indexed as: Rozendaal v. Fraser Health Authority, 2026 BCHRT 17
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Rhodora Rozendaal
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Fraser Health Authority
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
Complainant: Rhodora Rozendaal
Counsel the Respondent: Aleksandar Petrovic
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In this decision I explain why I dismiss Rhodora Rozendaal’s retaliation complaint.
[2] On June 10, 2021, Ms. Rozendaal filed a complaint alleging her former employer, Fraser Health Authority, retaliated against her contrary to s. 43 of the Human Rights Code because she filed a complaint alleging she was discriminated against by Fraser Health and its employees on the basis of her disabilities [the Original Complaint]. She says that after she filed her complaint, Fraser Health demoted her by offering her a lower position at a different hospital, then subsequently terminated her employment.
[3] Fraser Health denies retaliating and applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code because the complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding at a hearing, and under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code because some of the allegations in the complaint are about events that occurred more than one year before the complaint was filed and are untimely.
[4] Ms. Rozendaal did not file a response to the dismissal application. On May 7, 2025, the Tribunal set a deadline of July 16, 2025 for Ms. Rozendaal to respond to the dismissal application. The Tribunal reminded Ms. Rozendaal of the deadline in an email on June 11, 2025. Ms. Rozendaal did not file a response to the application by the deadline of July 16, 2025 or subsequently. On November 21, 2025, the Tribunal informed Ms. Rozendaal that submissions for the dismissal application had closed and if she wanted to late file a response, she must make a request to the Tribunal. In these circumstances, I am satisfied Ms. Rozendaal had notice of the dismissal application and an opportunity to respond. I find no unfairness in making this decision on the materials before me.
[5] For the following reasons, I allow the application under s. 27(1)(c). I am persuaded that the retaliation complaint has no reasonable prospect of succeeding because Fraser Health is likely to prove a non-retaliatory reason for their conduct and Ms. Rozendaal has no reasonable prospect of proving a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and her Original Complaint.
[6] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[7] Ms. Rozendaal was employed by Fraser Health as a registered nurse. She went on a leave of absence on July 17, 2017, citing ongoing stress in the workplace.
[8] In December 2017, the College of Registered Nurses of BC investigated Ms. Rozendaal’s nursing practice and suspended her nursing license.
[9] On December 22, 2017, Ms. Rozendaal filed her Original Complaint alleging she was discriminated in employment based on physical disability by Fraser Health. The Tribunal’s records show it served the notice of complaint on Fraser Health in May 2018.
[10] Between 2017 and 2020, Fraser Health requested updates from Ms. Rozendaal on the status of her health and license, and whether she was seeking to return to work. Ms. Rozendaal indicated she wanted to return but provided no medical information to support her ongoing leave, and no information about any restrictions or accommodations required if she returned to work. She informed Fraser Health that her nursing license had been suspended.
[11] On September 30, 2019, Fraser Health sent Ms. Rozendaal a letter advising her that because she did not hold a nursing license, she was precluded from working as a registered nurse. Fraser Health told Ms. Rozendaal her leave of absence would be extended to November 29, 2019, but that she needed to find a position within Fraser Health that she was capable of performing to maintain her employment.
[12] On April 27, 2020, Fraser Health sent a letter to Ms. Rozendaal offering her a position as a care aide at a different hospital than the one she had worked at as a registered nurse. This role did not require a nursing license. Fraser Health said if Ms. Rozendaal did not secure a position within Fraser Health by May 11, 2020, or provide information to support her leave, she would be deemed to have resigned.
[13] Ms. Rozendaal emailed Fraser Health on May 11, 2020 accepting the care aide position. Fraser Health subsequently emailed Ms. Rozendaal to process her return to work. Ms. Rozendaal did not respond to Fraser Health. Fraser Health wrote to Ms. Rozendaal on July 23, 2020, stating she must contact it to process her hiring process to the care aide position by August 6, 2020 or she will be deemed to have resigned her employment.
[14] Ms. Rozendaal did not respond to Fraser Health by August 6, 2020 or subsequently. On August 11, 2020, Fraser Health deemed Ms. Rozendaal to have resigned.
III DECISION
[15] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[16] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[17] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[18] Section 43 of the Code protects people from retaliatory conduct for participating in the human rights complaint process:
43 A person must not evict, discharge, suspend, expel, intimidate, coerce, impose any pecuniary or other penalty on, deny a right or benefit to or otherwise discriminate against a person because that person complains or is named in a complaint, might complain or be named in a complaint, gives evidence, might give evidence or otherwise assists or might assist in a complaint or other proceeding under this Code.
[19] To succeed on her retaliation complaint, Ms. Rozendaal would have to show at a hearing that: (1) Fraser Health was aware of the Original Complaint; (2) Fraser Health engaged in or threatened to engage in conduct described in s. 43; and (3) there is sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the Original Complaint: Gichuru v. Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78 [Pallai], at para. 58.
[20] In the present case, the first two elements are not in dispute. Fraser Health acknowledges it was aware of the Original Complaint and concedes that a demotion, transfer, and termination could engage the protections of s. 43 of the Code. Therefore, my analysis turns on whether, on all the evidence, there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Rozendaal establishing the third element. For the reasons that follow, I find there is not.
[21] In Pallai, the Court of Appeal confirmed that to establish a retaliation complaint under s. 43, a complainant must establish a sufficient connection between the alleged conduct – which must be of the type described in s. 43 – and the previous complaint (at para. 58).
[22] The Court in Pallai explained that there are two ways that a “sufficient connection” between the conduct and the complaint can be established:
a. By proving the respondent intended to retaliate for the complaint; or
b. By inference, where the respondent can reasonably have been perceived to have engaged in the conduct as retaliation for the complaint (at para. 58).
[23] Because retaliation will rarely be acknowledged as such by a respondent, it often must be inferred from a review of all the evidence: C.S.W.U. Local 1611 v. SELI Canada (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 423 at para. 17.
[24] A “reasonable perception” which can arise by inference, is assessed from the point of view of “a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, at the time of the impugned conduct”, and not from the point of view of the complainant who alleges retaliation: Pallai at paras. 58 and 66.
[25] While s. 43 does not contain a justification clause, meaning that the Code does not set out a statutory defense for retaliation, a respondent’s evidence is important for assessing the context of the alleged retaliation. In particular, the respondent’s explanation for their conduct must be considered with all of the evidence to determine if the requisite connection has been established: Pallai at para 59.
[26] The test is not whether the previous complaint was a factor in the conduct, but whether there is a “sufficient connection” to prove or infer retaliation: Brooks v. Skyacres Turkey Ranch Ltd. and others (No. 2), 2022 BCHRT 73, at para. 234.
[27] From her complaint, I understand Ms. Rozendaal to be arguing that because the offer of a care aide job at a different hospital, and the termination of her employment occurred after she had filed the Original Complaint, this supports a reasonable inference that the impugned conduct is sufficiently connected to the Original Complaint.
[28] I have considered all the evidence and materials, including the submissions on this dismissal application and Ms. Rozendaal’s complaint. Based on the totality of the materials, I am persuaded that Ms. Rozendaal has no reasonable prospect of proving a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and her Original Complaint.
[29] I begin with the timing of the impugned conduct. Ms. Rozendaal says that Fraser Health offering her a care aide position at a different hospital in April 2020, was retaliation. The original complaint was filed in 2017 and served on Fraser Health in May 2018. A gap of nearly two years between Fraser Health becoming aware of the Original Complaint and the impugned conduct does not suggest a reasonable inference that retaliation was intended or could be inferred. The large gap in time is a factor that weighs against a reasonable inference of retaliation.
[30] To the extent that the sequence of events may support a possible inference of retaliation, I am persuaded that Fraser Health is reasonably certain to rebut any inference that there is a connection. It is undisputed that a valid license to practice nursing is required to work as a registered nurse and that Ms. Rozendaal has not been licensed since 2017. Fraser Health says, and I am persuaded that they are reasonably certain to prove that, it could not offer Ms. Rozendaal a job as a registered nurse because she did not have the required qualifications. Based on the evidence before me I am satisfied that Fraser Health is reasonably certain to prove it offered Ms. Rozendaal a job as a care aide at a different hospital because it was an available position for which Ms. Rozendaal was qualified.
[31] Moreover, I am persuaded that Fraser Health is reasonably certain to prove that the reason it deemed Ms. Rozendaal to have resigned her employment was because she had provided no information to support her leave and did not communicate to start her role as a care aide. Fraser Health has put before me evidence of its attempts to communicate with Ms. Rozendaal; seeking information about her leave; confirming she did not have a valid nursing license; and informing her of the consequences if she did not contact them to start her care aide role. The materials before me support Fraser Health’s assertion that the sole reason for deeming Ms. Rozendaal to have resigned her employment was her lack of meaningful communication.
[32] Each of these factors weighs against an inference of retaliation, and taken together, these factors lead me to the conclusion that if his matter were to go to a hearing, Ms. Rozendaal would have no reasonable prospect of proving that a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, would reasonable perceive the conduct of Fraser Health was retaliatory.
[33] I dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
IV CONCLUSION
[34] I allow the application under s. 27(1)(c). The complaint is dismissed.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member