Hakin v. City of Vancouver, 2026 BCHRT 16
Date Issued: January 14, 2026
File: CS-010460
Indexed as: Hakin v. City of Vancouver, 2026 BCHRT 16
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Kevin Hakin
COMPLAINANT
AND:
City of Vancouver
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On his own behalf: Kevin Hakin
Counsel for the City of Vancouver: Valerie Dixon
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On September 19, 2023, Kevin Hakin filed a complaint of discrimination in employment based on physical disability, religion and political belief contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against the City of Vancouver [the City].
[2] The issue before me is whether to accept the late filed Complaint against the City. I make no findings of fact regarding the merits of this complaint.
[3] This application was decided based Mr. Hakin’s complaint form information and the City’s time limit response form only. To date, Mr. Hakin has not provided any time limit reply form, despite being provided the opportunity to do so.
[4] For the reasons that follow it is not in the public interest to allow the Complaint to proceed late filed: s. 22(3).
II. BACKGROUND
[5] Mr. Hakin has an asthma condition. He worked in operations for the City from 2016 until 2024.
[6] On August 26, 2021, Mr. Hakin alleges involvement in a mask wearing dispute with the City related to traveling in a vehicle with coworkers. At the relevant time mask wearing was mandated to prevent the spread of COVID-19 during the recent pandemic. Mr. Hakin alleges losing two weeks of wages until the City agreed to uphold the provincial mask mandate in its vehicles [the August 2021 Allegations].
[7] Mr. Hakin alleges a grievance was filed on his behalf against the City for the lost wages in mid 2021. At the time his complaint was filed, Mr. Hakin alleges the City stalled the process by refusing to schedule the matter for a hearing before an arbitrator.
[8] On May 3, 2023, Mr. Hakin alleges that he experienced a “separate medical matter” that prevented him from working in his full capacity. He says that after “providing the employer with a reasonable return to work they [were] again preventing my ability to work and earn wages” [the May 2023 Allegations]. Mr. Hakin did not provide any further details about the May 2023 Allegations.
III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[9] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit and Arguable Contraventions
[10] The Complaint was filed on September 19, 2023. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after September 19, 2022.
[11] In deciding if a complaint is late filed it necessary to consider the timing of any allegations that are arguable contraventions of the Code. For an allegation to arguably be discrimination under the Code, Mr. Hakin must show, if proven, that he has a personal characteristics (in this case physical disability), experienced an adverse impact with respect to his employment with the City, and that his physical disability was a factor in the alleged adverse impact for the allegation: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) [Moore], 2012 SCC 61 at para 33.
[12] Mr. Hakin’s complaint contains two separate allegations, the August 2021 Allegations and the May 2023 Allegations. I have first considered whether the August 2021 Allegations contain the necessary elements found in Moore to be arguable contraventions of the Code. In deciding these allegations are arguable contraventions, I note Mr. Hakin has provided details of his disability, asthma, and provided details about not being accommodated for his disability in ride sharing situations at work such that he went off without pay for two weeks in mid 2021. With these details in mind, I have concluded that Mr. Hakin has provided details about the nature of his disability, the adverse impact suffered at work and made the necessary connection between going off work without pay and his asthma condition. Taken together, Mr. Hakin has set out an arguable contravention of the Code with respect to the August 2021 Allegations.
[13] I have next considered whether the May 2023 Allegations are arguable contraventions of the Code. I agree with the City that Mr. Hakin has not provided sufficient information to set out any arguable contraventions concerning these allegations. First, Mr. Hakin refers to his personal characteristic with respect to this allegation as being a “separate medical matter” without providing any details about the nature of the medical issue. While appreciating Mr. Hakin provided some details about him not being able to return to work because the City would not accommodate him as being a harm experienced with respect to this medical matter, in my view he has not provided any information linking this harm to a specific physical or mental disability necessary to conclude a protected personal characteristic was a factor in the harm alleged. Without more information provided by Mr. Hakin I am unable find any arguable link between the “separate medical matter” and the City’s acts or omissions in May 2023.
[14] Given my conclusion that Mr. Hakin has only set out arguable allegations of discrimination with respect to the August 2021 Allegations, I find his complaint was late filed and proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[15] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[16] I have first considered the length of the delay in filing. As noted above, the arguable contraventions in this case occurred in August 2021. As such, the delay in this case is approximately one year in length, which is which is considered by the Tribunal to be excessive and militates strongly against the public interest: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another 2014 BCHRT 170 at para. 13.
[17] Mr. Hakin’s brief reasons for delay focused on waiting for the matter to be heard by an arbitrator and the stress related to the accumulation of lost earnings.
[18] I have first considered whether Mr. Hakin’s awaiting redress through the union grievance process attracts the public interest in allowing his late filed complaint to proceed. While acknowledging that Mr. Hakin waited to file the complaint until he realized that the union grievance process was taking a long time to be heard, this is not a compelling reason to allow her complaint to proceed late filed. The Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BCHRT 99 at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218 at paras. 20-21.
[19] Mr. Hakin also states that he delayed in filing because he was under extreme financial stress. Without doubting this was the case for him, it is unclear to me why the pressures of not getting wages delayed him from filing a complaint. Here, Mr. Hakin’s evidence indicates he was able to work with his union to file and pursue a grievance and there is nothing to indicate the stress of not having an income prevented him from also filing with the Tribunal.
[20] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[21] Mr. Hakin argues the public interest is engaged in this case because it will set a standard for employers to ensure medical issues are not a barrier to workers’ ability to earn a living. I appreciate Mr. Hakin’s wish to send a message to employers that they must accommodate workers’ disabilities, however, I am not satisfied that his complaint raises a novel issue that should be heard by the Tribunal to advance the purposes of the Code. Complaints involving employment and disability are commonly heard by the Tribunal and the law in this area is settled.
[22] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV. CONCLUSION
[23] For these reasons, the complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member